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My dissertation is an intellectual and cultural history of a distinct movement in 
modern Europe that I call “scientific spiritualism.” I argue that the philosopher Henri 
Bergson emerged from this movement as its most celebrated spokesman.  
From the 1874 publication of Émile Boutroux’s The Contingency of the Laws of 
Nature to Bergson’s 1907 Creative Evolution, a wave of heterodox thinkers, including 
Maurice Blondel, Alfred Fouillée, Jean-Marie Guyau, Pierre Janet, and Édouard Le Roy, 
gave shape to scientific spiritualism. These thinkers staged a rapprochement between two 
disparate formations: on the one hand, the rich heritage of French spiritualism, extending 
from the sixteenth- and seventeeth-century polymaths Michel de Montaigne and René 
Descartes to the nineteenth-century philosophes Maine de Biran and Victor Cousin; and 
on the other hand, transnational developments in the emergent natural and human 
sciences, especially in the nascent experimental psychology and evolutionary biology. I 
trace the influx of these developments into Paris, where scientific spiritualists 
collaboratively rejuvenated the philosophical and religious study of consciousness on the 
basis of the very sciences that threatened the authority of philosophy and religion. Using 
original materials gathered in French and Belgian archives, I argue that new reading 
communities formed around scientific journals, the explosion of research institutes, and 
the secularization of the French education system, brought about this significant, though 
heretofore neglected wave of thought.  
The Bergsonian Moment reframes the formative role of science in the fin de 
siècle. Following France’s defeat to Germany in The War of 1870, French Republicans 
iv 
invoked science as a wellspring of national regeneration, precipitating a crisis that 
historians have framed as society’s moral anxiety in the face of materialism and as 
intellectuals’ disillusionment in the promise of reason. I interpret the period, to the 
contrary, as a historical opening seized to transform the meaning and scope of science. 
Far from having led a revolt against positivism, as a long-standing historiographical 
narrative holds, Bergson drew on the natural and human sciences to expand the bounds of 
reason, and led to an enduring reconsideration of the place and value of memory, time, 
and experience in modern Europe. 
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Philosopher, statesman, mathematician, celebrity, Henri Bergson was a towering 
figure of the fin de siècle. He achieved world-historical fame for having inventively 
articulated the dynamic contours of consciousness – or spirit, from the French l’esprit. 
Bergson’s thought, and the late nineteenth-century period it defined, remain two of the 
most celebrated yet misunderstood moments in the intellectual and cultural history of 
modern Europe.  Unlike many philosophers who safeguarded their trade from scientific 
intrusion, for fear that the ascendant demands of experimentation and quantification 
would threaten philosophy’s metaphysical territory, Bergson meticulously studied 
burgeoning research in the natural and human sciences to show that, instead of 
squelching metaphysics, scientific developments inspired new metaphysical problems. It 
was from within advancements in experimental psychology and evolutionary biology in 
particular, I argue, that the cherished compendium of Bergsonion concepts emerged: the 
durée of lived experience; philosophical intuition; the planes of consciousness; and the 
élan vital [vital impulse]. The global circulation of these concepts defined the Bergsonian 
moment. It was a moment that touched both sides of the Atlantic.1 And recently, scholars 
have traced its resonance beyond Europe and America.2 The fame that Bergson achieved, 
however, did not depend on the singularity of his corpus, but on his contributions to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paul Douglass, Bergson, Eliot, and American Literature (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 
1986); Tom Quirk, Bergson and American Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); 
Larry McGrath, “Bergson Comes to America,” Journal of the History of Ideas 74, no. 4 (2013): 599-620. 
2 Alain Guy, “Le bergsonisme et Amérique latine,” Caravelle 1, no. 1 (1963): 121-139; Souleymane Bachir 
Diagne, Bergson postcolonial: L’élan vital dans la pensée de Léopold Sédar Senghor et de Mohamed Iqbal 
(Paris: CNRS Editions, 2011); African Art as Philosophy: Senghor, Bergson and the Idea of Negritude, 
trans. Chike Jeffers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Arnaud François and Camille Riquier, 
eds., Annales bergsoniennes, VI: Bergson, le Japon, la catastrophe (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
2013). 
2 
wide movement in French thought that innovatively appropriated the sciences as a 
springboard to revolutionize the modern understanding of consciousness.  
Since descending from his prestigious chair at the Collège de France, a position 
he held from 1900 to 1920, Bergson has been firmly installed in the canon of Western 
thought, cemented by his 1927 Nobel Prize in literature. Yet, Bergson became significant 
because his work steered a cultural and intellectual movement that swept over France in 
the late nineteenth century – a movement eclipsed by the prestige of Bergsonisme. These 
scientific spiritualists, as I am calling them, collaboratively staged a rapprochement 
between two disparate formations: on the one hand, the rich heritage of French 
spiritualism, perhaps “the most French of all philosophical orientations,”3 extending from 
the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century polymaths Michel de Montaigne and René 
Descartes to the nineteenth-century philosophes Maine de Biran and Victor Cousin; and 
on the other hand, transnational developments in the nascent natural and human sciences 
– especially in evolutionary theory, the physiology of the nervous system, brain 
localization, psychophysics, and psychopathology – which exploded men’s and women’s 
understanding of their relations to each other and the world. As these developments 
rapidly inundated Paris, provoking the Third Republic to reshape French society in the 
image of science, scientific spiritualists sought to rejuvenate the nation’s spiritualist 
heritage from within the emergent sciences. From 1874, when the Ministry of Public 
Instruction overhauled the official education curriculum to promulgate scientific research 
and cultivate rational Republican citizens, to the appearance of Bergson’s L’Évolution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Jean Louis Fabiani, Qu’est-ce qu’un philosophe français?: La vie sociale des concepts (1880-1980) 
(Paris: Éditions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2010), 153.  
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créatrice in 1907, scientific spiritualists gave shape to a distinct period in the history of 
European thought, defined by the problem around which they converged: to revolutionize 
the philosophical and religious study of consciousness on the basis of the very sciences 
that threatened the authority of philosophy and religion. 
This was the problem that Bergson tackled in his early books. Essai sur les 
données immédiates de la conscience (1889) critiqued psychophysics’ claim to quantify 
sensory perceptions; Matière et mémoire (1896) took aim at psychopathology’s 
contribution to brain localization; and L’Évolution créatrice (1907) confronted the 
theoretical underpinnings of evolutionary biology. In each book, Bergson pressed recent 
research in the incipient sciences beyond their methodological limits. “On this new 
ground philosophy ought to follow science,” Bergson wrote in L’Évolution créatrice, “in 
order to superpose on scientific truth a knowledge of another kind, which may be called 
metaphysical. Thus combined, all our knowledge, both scientific and metaphysical, is 
heightened.”4 Bergson’s dialogue with the natural and human sciences was part of a 
wider conversation, I aim to show, within a movement already underway under the Third 
Republic. “The new spiritualism,” as one critic wrote in 1884, “is not a new doctrine: it is 
spiritualism renewed by science.”5 These scientific spiritualists’ endeavor to surpass the 
limits of scientific explanation, and thereby justify philosophy and religion anew, 
determined the stakes of the philosophical itinerary that Bergson pursued.  
It is by no means innocent to claim that Bergson was a scientific thinker, let alone 
a thinker who belonged to a scientific movement. Bergson has been canonized as the 
transitional figure straddling the threshold between the nineteenth and twentieth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), 199, originally 
published as L’Évolution créatrice (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907). 
5 Étienne Vacherot, Le nouveau spiritualisme (Paris: Hachette, 1884), i.  
4 
centuries. Reflecting on the past two centuries of French thought, Michel Foucault noted 
a fissure dividing its lineages:  
It is the one that separates a philosophy of experience, of meaning, of the 
subject, and a philosophy of knowledge, or rationality, and of the concept. 
On one side, a filiation which is that of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty; and the other, which is that of Jean Cavaillès, Gaston 
Bachelard, Alexandre Koyré, and Canguilhem. Doubtless this cleavage 
comes from afar, and one could trace it back through the nineteenth 
century: Henri Bergson and Henri Poincaré, Jules Lachelier and Louis 
Couturat, Pierre Maine de Biran and Auguste Comte. And, in any case, it 
was so well established in the twentieth century that, through it, 
phenomenology was admitted into France.6 
 
Foucault’s division between a philosophy of experience and a philosophy of the concept 
predictably situates Bergson in opposition to those thinkers, the mathematician Poincaré 
above all, who were allied to the hard sciences. It is debatable whether Foucault’s 
division adequately captures the defining contours of French thought.7 And it is even 
more problematic, as contemporary scientists’ interest in his work attests, to frame 
Bergson within an intellectual lineage apart from the sciences.8 Two things, however, are 
clear: the first is that it has become commonplace to historicize Bergson as skeptical of, if 
not resistant to, the scientific advancements of his era; second, Bergson has become 
singularly representative of the passage from nineteenth- to twentieth-century philosophy. 
Histories of twentieth-century French philosophy begin with Bergson.9 Those of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Michel Foucault, “Life: Experience and Science” in Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 2, 
Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion, tr. Robert Hurley and Paul Rabinow (New 
York: New Press, 1998), 466, originally published as “La vie: l’expérience et la science,” Revue de 
métaphysique et de morale 70 (1985): 4. 
7 Elie During contests the lineage, preferring to place Bergson at the intersection of the two traditions in 
“‘A history of Problems’: Bergson and the French Epistemological Tradition,” Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology 35, no. 1 (2004): 4-23. 
8 The chemists Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers are arguably the most famous scientists to promote 
Bergson’s work in the service of what they see as the deep interaction, rather than rupture, between nature 
and culture. See La nouvelle alliance (Paris: Gallimard, 1978).  
9 Joseph Chiari isolates Bergson at the debut of twentieth century in Twentieth-Century French Thought. 
From Bergson to Lévi-Strauss (London: Paul Elek, 1975), 21-59; Eric Matthews submits Bergson to a 
similar treatment in Twentieth Century French Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 14-
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nineteenth century conclude with him.10 Although a consensus confirms Bergson’s 
transitional situation, philosophers and historians alike have yet to define the movement 
from which the Bergsonian moment emerged.  
The goal of my dissertation is to document the formation and explain the 
coherence of scientific spiritualism. This movement was a collaborative philosophical 
project as much as a distinct moment in modern European history. That is, scientific 
spiritualism had a set of theoretical commitments and a conceptual integrity as coherent 
as other movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, such as neo-
Kantianism and American pragmatism.11  
But more important, scientific spiritualism opens a heretofore-neglected window 
onto the social resonance of science in the fin de siècle that challenges accepted 
understandings of the period. The transformations that experimental psychology and 
evolutionary biology brought about in Europe were nothing short of seismic. These 
developments steered the emergence of modernism,12 and stoked the ideological battles 
between socialism and fascism that preoccupied early twentieth-century politics.13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39; Gary Gutting places Bergson alone alongside the adjacent currents of positivism, idealism, and 
spiritualism in French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (London: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
9-25; so does Alan Schrift in Twentieth-Century French Philosophy: Key Themes and Figures (New York: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 5-16. 
10 See Dominique Parodi, La Philosophie contemporaine de la France: essai de classification des doctrines 
(Paris: Félix Alcan, 1919); George Herbert Mead, “French Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century” in 
Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Merritt H. Moore (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1936), 418-510; F.C.T. Moore, “French Spiritualist Philosophy,” in Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, 
Vol. 2, Revolutionary Responses to the Existing Order, ed. Alan D. Schrift and Daniel Conway (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), ch. 8. 
11 Deiter Henrich’s concept of a “historical constellation” captures what my dissertation aims to constitute: 
that is, a tightly knit creative group of people who contact each other either face-to-face or through letters. 
See Deiter Henrich, Konstellationen. Probleme und Debatten am Ursprung der idealistischen Philosophie 
(1789-1795) (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991).  
12 John Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory. (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966); Michael Ruse, The Darwinian Revolution: Science Red in Tooth and Claw. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), ch. 9; Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-
1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
13 Gertrude Himmelfarb, Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959), books 4-
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Despite historians’ rich and diverse explorations of science’s contributions to modern 
Europe, many lean on a simplistic historiographical narrative that presents social 
reactions to science within the narrow and oppositional trope of crisis.  
The crisis narrative has achieved especial historiographical salience in the case of 
France, where Republicans invoked science as the source of national regeneration 
following their humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, which many 
politicians and social reformers attributed to Germany’s scientific and technological 
prowess. The ascendant role of science in French society provoked a crisis marked by 
moral anxiety and intellectual disillusionment, so the narrative goes, as men and women 
grappled with a disenchanted world mastered by iron-clad and universal laws. “The 
advocates of reason and science thought it possible to explain and rule the world,” Eugen 
Weber characteristically writes in France, Fin de Siècle, “But a reaction soon developed, 
one that stressed irrational factors such as the unknown, the mysterious, and the 
wonderful.”14 The logic of the crisis narrative hinges on its dyadic structure, which H. 
Stuart Hughes inaugurated by positioning Bergson at the forefront of a “revolt against 
positivism” and a retreat into the irrational.15 Now half a century old, vestiges of Hughes 
narrative still inform accounts of the fin de siècle as a “revolt against mechanism,”16 a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6; William Logue, From Philosophy to Sociology: The Evolution of French Liberalism, 1870-1914 
(Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1983); Linda L Clark, Social Darwinism in France 
(Birmingham, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984).    
14 Eugen Weber, France, Fin de Siècle (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1986), 142.  
15 H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-
1930 (New York: Vintage, 1958), 33-66.  
16 R.C. Gronin depicts the spiritualist period as a religious revival in The Bergsonian Controversy in 
France, 1900-1914 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1988), 1-20. 
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“reaction against materialism,”17 a “rejection of positivism,”18 or a “revolt against 
rationality.”19 
The central methodological argument of my dissertation is that, far from having 
led a revolt against positivism, scientific spiritualists sought to radically reconceive what 
counts as a positive fact. According to my reading, the incipient sciences of the late 
nineteenth century did not engender a crisis marked by anxiety and disillusionment, but a 
new epistemological possibility creatively seized on by scientific spiritualists, Bergson 
foremost among them, in order to expand the bounds of reason. In the name of a higher 
positivism, Bergson’s generation stirred Europeans to reconsider the place and value of 
memory, time, and experience in modernity.  
Revisiting the social resonance of science in Bergson’s France is especially 
pertinent today in light of the ascendant prestige that the neurosciences and sociobiology 
garner beyond laboratory walls. These sciences inform incipient fields such as neuro-
legal studies, neuroethics, neurophilosophy, and even neurohistory.20 Brain imaging 
revealing the neural correlates of conscious experience, as well as evolutionary models 
demonstrating the adaptive function of cultural practices, have provided many scholars in 
the humanities and social sciences with the conceptual tools to rethink their disciplines’ 
epistemological relationship to the sciences in the wake of the perceived exhaustion of 
the constructivist and semiotic methods so predominant since the 1960’s. Whether we are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 J.W. Burrow, The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000), 56-67. 
18 James A Winders, European Culture Since 1848, From Modern to Postmodern and Beyond (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), 94.  
19 Thomas Laqueur, “Why the Margins Matter: Occultism and the Making of Modernity,” Modern 
Intellectual History 3, no. 1 (2006): 112. 
20 See Francisco Ortega and Fernando Vidal, eds., Neurocultures. Glimpses into an Expanding Universe 
(Frankfurt: Peter Lang GmbH, 2011); Melissa M. Littlefield and Jenell M. Johnson, eds., The 
Neuroscientific Turn: Transdisciplinarity in the Age of the Brain (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press, 2012). 
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in the midst of a post-linguistic turn spurred by the sciences is a point of heated 
contention.21 While some humanities and social science scholars embrace the newfound 
dialogue beyond The Two Cultures that C.P. Snow lamented in 1959, others defend their 
disciplines against the incursion of reductive causal analyses. A history of scientific 
spiritualism promises to enrich these debates by offering a timely model to take stock of 
the rapid dissemination of the neurosciences and sociobiology today.  
Not only did scientific spiritualists advance a vision of interdisciplinarity built out 
of a sustained dialogue with the embryonic beginnings of these sciences, but scientific 
spiritualists also experienced momentous institutional transformations marked by the 
professionalization of philosophy and a heightened proximity to scientific research. 
Indeed, Bergson so swiftly climbed the academic hierarchy in France, from a provincial 
instructor in a lycée (the French equivalent of high school) to the prestigious Collège de 
France, in large part, I argue, because he mastered the social function that the Third 
Republic charged philosophy instructors with carrying out: disseminating scientific 
knowledge and inculcating secular values. This institutional context shines a light on 
scientific spiritualists’ success in renewing spiritualism on the basis of science without 
letting their distinct disciplinary methods become subservient to science.  
By returning to the lessons of scientific spiritualism, I do not mean to suggest that 
the movement can be seamlessly transported into the present. Rather, I have chosen to 
document the development of Bergson’s thought because it has enjoyed a resurgence, 
particularly within recent scientific inquiry. As the French neuroscientist Jean-Pierre 
Change
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See “AHR forum: Historiographic “Turns” in Critical Perspective,” American Historical Review 117, no. 
3 (2012): 698-813. 
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the brain might be expected to have positive consequences for philosophy.”22 For 
Changeux, Bergson’s thought offers more than a critique of biological reductionism, but 
a timely reminder for humanists and scientists alike that “The brain needs to be seen as an 
open, motivated, and self-organizing system continually engaged in the exploration of its 
environment.”23 To be sure, efforts have been made to synthesize the sciences humaines 
with the sciences durs since the domains’ bifurcation in the seventeenth century. 
Scientific spiritualists, however, were unique in demonstrating that the monumental 
advancements in physiological psychology and evolutionary theory engendered a new 
understanding of consciousness that necessitated distinctly metaphysical concepts. 
The Bergsonian oeuvre lies at the crossroads of several philosophical trends 
extending from early nineteenth-century spiritualism to the present. Bergson was a 
guiding interlocutor within the pragmatist movement on both sides of the Atlantic;24 he 
was an originating figure in French phenomenology;25 his thought proved influential for 
French post-structuralism, especially following Gilles Deleuze’s celebrated monograph;26 
and most recently Bergson’s thought has taken center stage among “new materialisms.”27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Jean-Pierre Changeux, The Physiology of Truth: Neuroscience and Human Knowledge, trans. M.B. 
DeBevoise (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2002), 2; originally published as L’Homme de vérité (Paris: 
Odile Jacob, 2002). 
23 Ibid., 32. Also see Sergiu C. Blumen and Nava Blumen, “From the Philosophy Auditorium to the 
Neurophysiology Laboratory and Back: From Bergson to Damasio,” Israeli Medical Association Journal 4, 
no. 2 (2002): 163-165; Alain Panero, Corps, cerveau et esprit chez Bergson. Le spiritualisme minimaliste 
de Matière et mémoire (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006). 
24 See A.O. Lovejoy’s famous account of Bergson’s influence on pragmatism, “The Thirteen Pragmatisms. 
I,” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods 5, no. 1 (1908): 5-12; Part II 5, no. 2 
(1908): 29-39; more recently see Stéphane Madelrieux, ed., France Bergson et James, cents ans après, ed. 
(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2011), especially Paola Marrati, “James, Bergson et un univers en 
devenir,” 123-140. 
25 Herbert Spiegelberg claims that Bergson’s thought made France receptive to phenomenology in the 
twentieth century, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, Vol. 2 (The Hague, NL: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 398-399.  
26 Gilles Deleuze, Le Bergsonisme (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1966); also Différence et 
répétition (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1968), chs. 2, 4.  
27 Elizabeth Grosz, The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 155-214; Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke 
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My aim, however, is to reveal that the conceptual purchase of Bergson’s philosophy was 
not exclusively philosophical, and further, that Bergson emerged as the most articulate 
advocate within an intellectual and cultural milieu that sought to revolutionize the 
methods of philosophy in response to scientific and social transformations in late 
nineteenth-century France.  
So, the argument of my dissertation is threefold:  
 
1. Scientific spiritualism constituted a distinct moment in the history of European 
thought generally and of French spiritualism particularly. Whereas historians and 
philosophers have presented French spiritualism as a linear progression beginning 
with Maine de Biran, passing through Victor Cousin, and culminating in Bergson, 
I contend that scientific spiritualists introduced a significant rupture in their 
spiritualist legacy during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
 
2. The history of scientific spiritualism casts into stark relief the limitations of the 
long-held historiographical narrative that Bergson’s generation led a “revolt 
against positivism.” To the contrary, I argue that scientific spiritualists sought to 
widen the scope of positivism to include conscious experience, and furthermore, 
that the fin de siècle should be re-conceptualized, not as a crisis of science, but as 
a contestation over the meaning of science.  
 
3. Today as humanities and social science scholars appropriate research from 
neuroscience and sociobiology, scientific spiritualism offers a critical moment 
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from which to trace a history of the present. By reorienting humanistic and social 
inquiry around empirical data while simultaneously challenging biological 
reductionism, scientific spiritualists, Bergson chief among them, furnish 
conceptual resources to critique the merit and limits of interdisciplinary links 
forged with science in the present. 
 
Spiritualism in France  
 
The term “spiritualism” poses difficulties. Those difficulties begin with the 
French word, l’esprit, signifying the realm of the intellectual faculties (apparent as well 
in the German, Geist), and extend back to the Latin, spiritus, meaning “breath.” The 
difficulties are compounded by the hostility the word connotes towards the hard sciences. 
Both “spirit,” as well as “esprit,” elicit a religious and mystical, if not cultish, 
otherworldly sense.28 I will explore the religious ramifications of spiritualist thought. But 
“spirit” is not exclusively religious. The historically textured meaning of the term 
signifies the dimension of reality revealed through inner experience. “Spirit,” in this 
sense, comes close to “consciousness,” what philosophers today call “mind,” and what 
brain researchers call “cognition.”  
The spiritualist tradition has deep roots in French intellectual history, beginning 
with Michel de Montaigne. His sixteenth-century essays argued that all human 
knowledge ultimately has its source in the knowledge of one’s self. Since humans’ inner 
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self is in constant flux, it is imperative, Montaigne held, to control one’s passions, seek 
happiness, and be content that absolute certainty is unattainable. Montaigne’s idea that 
introspection confers a privileged kind of knowledge found its most systematic account in 
Descartes’ cogito.  Humans’ clear and distinct perception of their thought reveals, 
according to Descartes, a kind of introspective knowledge distinct from observation of 
the external world. Descartes’ division between res cogitas and res extensia served to 
enforce this separation. His spiritualism consisted of safeguarding the realm of inner 
knowledge from any attempt to trace its origins to external knowledge, whether of 
sensations, corpuscles, or vibrations. Pascal’s Pensées, emblematized by the famous 
dictum, “We know the truth not only by reason, but also by the heart,” fits in line with the 
spiritualist tradition.29 Finally, Rousseau dedicated his eighteenth-century writings to 
understanding himself by means of the lumière intérieure. For Rousseau, humans’ own 
reflective power, and not their senses, reveals their true nature. These méditatifs 
intérieurs stood at odds with French materialist thinkers who denied the dualism between 
spirit and matter, such as Diderot, who famously described living spirit in Le Rêve de 
d’Alembert (1769) as an assemblage of matter en masse. The clearest system of 
materialist thought came in what Condillac called sensationalism, his elaboration of John 
Locke’s empiricism. Condillac’s figure of the insentient statue, which acquired its 
individual senses and ideas through repeated sensations, represented the zenith of anti-
spiritualist thought in France.   
 The consolidation of French spiritualism as a distinct lineage took place in the 
nineteenth century. Marie-François-Pierre Gonthier de Biran, called Maine de Biran, 
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inaugurated the movement. What made Biran’s philosophy spiritualist was his 
conception of psychology as the window onto the absolute. The activity of consciousness, 
illuminated by psychological introspection, is part of the very fabric of reality; according 
to Biran, it is the world viewed, as it were, from the inside. The specific activity that 
Biran made the object of his spiritualism was the experience of motor effort. Biran 
dedicated his L’Influence de l'habitude sur la faculté de penser (1802), one of only two 
books he managed to publish during his lifetime, to the problem of how humans develop 
an immediate sense of self from repeated corporeal exertion. In line with the empiricist 
tradition, Biran affirmed sensations as the source of consciousness. Yet, he departed from 
that tradition by identifying the active sensation of muscular effort, and not passive 
sensations received from the external world, as the unique source of immediate self-
knowledge. Biran’s treatise on habit originated a positivist trend within spiritualism, 
which, according to Jerrold Seigel, “took the evidence of mental activity itself as a basic 
fact of psychology, thus challenging the materialist assumption that the primary 
phenomena of mental experience were sense-impressions, whose causes lay outside the 
subject.”30 Biran established the metaphysical prerogative, adopted most forcefully by 
Victor Cousin, to pierce through the internal activity of immaterial reality, in opposition 
to the physical sciences, which analyze the external activity of material reality. But Biran 
and Cousin diverged in their respective accounts of the relation between science and 
consciousness.  
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 Whereas Biran posited the will as the centerpiece of his spiritualist positivism,31 
Victor Cousin established the intellect as the pillar of his eclectic spiritualism. In fact, 
Cousin monopolized spiritualism for much of the nineteenth century. He oversaw the 
official philosophy curriculum in France from 1830 to 1851, and his influence persisted 
well beyond his death in 1867. Cousin conceived psychology as an introspective study 
that paved the high road to ontology by examining the faculties of consciousness – 
sensation, reason, and the will – using metaphysical methods culled from the history of 
Western philosophy. These methods were eclectic, as Donald Kelley highlights, because 
“history in effect took precedence over unassisted and unencumbered reason and became 
‘first philosophy’.” 32 As Jan Goldstein documents, Cousin’s disciples “constructed their 
psychology around an immaterial self, or moi, that (they insisted) was given to its 
possessor whole and a priori,” 33 a notion, which, she argues, underwrote the bourgeois 
masculine ideology of post-Revolutionary France. Eclectic spiritualism was an anti-
scientific approach to the study of consciousness inculcated by educators. “Such a 
construction,” Goldstein continues, “avoided the insidious undermining of the self that, in 
their opinion, resulted from hitching psychology to biology.”34 Although Goldstein aptly 
documents the wide reach of Cousin’s pedagogical-political power, exercised from his 
influential position atop the Université de Paris, she fails to appreciate the spiritualist 
reaction to his reign. My dissertation resuscitates these post-Cousinian thinkers, Bergson 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Biran’s priority of the will over the intellect is at the center of Susan Stebbins’ claim that French 
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the notion of truth in the development of French philosophy from Maine de Biran to Bergson (London: 
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chief among them, who sought to reanimate their spiritualist commitments by 
overthrowing Cousin’s antipathy toward the sciences.  
 It has become a conventional narrative for historians and philosophers to frame 
French spiritualism as a linear filiation from Biran to Bergson by way of Cousin. 
Dominique Janicaud’s Une généalogie du spiritualisme français, despite being the most 
penetrating study of the lineage, erroneously arranges Biran and Bergson as its 
bookends.35 Janicaud and many apt scholars have ascertained the family resemblances 
shared between these thinkers,36 correcting historical surveys, most notably François 
Châtelet’s magisterial eight-volume Histoire de la Philosophie, which present Bergson as 
a singular figure.37 But the linear historiographical framework of these studies 
nonetheless neglects the discontinuous receptions that steered the development of French 
spiritualism. The nineteenth century, I want to suggest, did not witness one current of 
French spiritualism, but two. The first was the eclectic spiritualism of Cousin; the second 
was the scientifically revivified spiritualism led by Bergson.  
New periods claim new origins. My argument is that Biran became a post 
factum point of departure for French spiritualism in large part thanks to his revival in 
the hands of scientific spiritualists in the late nineteenth century. These thinkers found 
in the posthumous publication of Biran’s writings, especially his medical essays, an 
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alternative spiritualist archive amenable to a rapprochement with advances in 
experimental psychology. This is not to say that the publication of Biran’s posthumous 
work caused the scientific turn in French spiritualism. Rather, my claim is that 
scientific spiritualism formed in large part as a readership around Maine de Biran’s 
fragmentary corpus, which, as one commentator aptly describes, “is more to be 
compared to a Chinese painted scroll whose significance emerges as it is unwound, 
than to a simple wall picture of the West.”38 Although Maine de Biran’s writings 
predated Cousin’s from the beginning of the century, his significance as an origin for 
the new spiritualism would be retroactively installed toward the end. In this light, 
Maine de Biran’s belated reception from beneath Cousin’s legacy testifies to John 
Pocock’s characterization of intellectual history: “Appropriation and expropriation are 
important aspects of what we have to study.”39  
The term “scientific spiritualism” is my own. It consolidates the various titles 
attributed to those thinkers who self-consciously rejuvenated the spiritualist tradition with 
methods drawn from the sciences. The philosopher Gustave Belot heralded the movement 
as a “new spiritualism.”40 One critic dubbed the period “neo-materialism,” suggesting 
that among its proponents “these three notions are combined and gathered: fundamental 
contingency, unlimited becoming, internal life anterior to intelligence and intelligibility - 
creator of one and the other; with them we end up with the product – the new philosophy 
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– which represents the exact antipode of rationalism.”41 Bergson best described the 
impulse he shared with other thinkers to leap beyond the sciences and advance what he 
called a “positive metaphysics”:  
Let us work to grasp experience from as close as we can. Let us accept 
science with its current complexity, and let us recommence, with this new 
science as our raw material, an analogous effort to that which the old 
metaphysicians carried out on a much simpler science. We need to break 
out of mathematical frameworks, to take account of the biological, 
psychological, and sociological sciences, and on this broader base 
construct a metaphysics that can go higher and higher through the 
continual, progressive, and organized effort of all philosophers, in the 
same respect for experience. 42 
 
Scientific spiritualists shared Bergson’s project of culling insights from the 
sciences in order to describe the dynamic activity of consciousness. In 1874, Émile 
Boutroux set the movement in motion with De la contingence des lois de la nature, 
which argued that freedom is not an exception to the mechanistic worldview, but 
immanent to the causal order of nature. Subsequent thinkers reconciled scientific 
developments with the autonomy of consciousness, including Alfred Fouillée, the 
philosopher of idées-forces, who composed a magisterial corpus excavating the 
spiritualist dimensions of evolution, psychology, and sociology; Jean-Marie Guyau, 
France’s literary Nietzsche and critic of positivist currents in sociology and psychology in 
La Morale anglaise contemporaine (1879) and La genèse de l'idée de temps (1890); 
Maurice Blondel, the Catholic spiritualist who rejuvenated faith using developments in 
experimental pychology in L’Action (1893) and precipitated the surge of early twentieth 
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century Catholic Modernism; and Édouard Le Roy, whose popular series of articles, “La 
science et la philosophie” (1899-1900), solidified Bergsonisme as a scientifically credible 
position. These seminal works defined the scientific spiritualist movement that rallied 
further contributions of a host of other minor thinkers.  
My goal is to give shape, at once personal and conceptual, institutional and 
intellectual, to scientific spiritualism. I do so by presenting the ideas contained in the 
books and articles of these more or less forgotten thinkers and by reconstructing their 
relationships around manuscripts, letters, marginalia, library records, diaries, and course 
notes. My dissertation thus stages what Quentin Skinner calls a “dialogue between 
philosophical discussion and historical evidence.”43 Within this tightly woven fabric of 
relationships, scientific spiritualists constituted a moment defined not by its definitive 
position, nor by its members’ individual genius. Rather, my claim is that a shared 
problem held scientific spiritualism together as a distinct movement. These thinkers 
sought to revitalize the philosophical and religious study of consciousness on the basis of 
the sciences that jeopardized the authority of philosophy and religion. 
In his recent La philosophie en France au XXe siècle, Frédéric Worms elevates 
Bergson’s understanding of the problems that give philosophy meaning to a 
historiographical method. Worms does not organize the history of French philosophy 
around a series of positions, but a series of problems that lent purchase to divergent 
historical moments. He identifies the “problem of spirit” as the grounding moment of the 
twentieth century.44 Bergson’s conception of the problem, according to Worms, was not 
to have presented consciousness as a dimension of reality opposed to another physical, 
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material, or natural dimension; Bergson identified the problem of spirit within the 
sciences of his time. My dissertation follows both Worms’ organization of the period and 
his description of the problem that gave it shape. But I aim to go beyond his study by 
expanding the problem of spirit to include thinkers preceding and following Bergson who 
sought to articulate anew the nature of conscious activity.  
 
A Counter Narrative for the Fin de Siècle 
 
Scientific spiritualists’ engagements with natural and human sciences expose the 
cracks in the historiographical narrative that the fin de siècle emerged out of a crisis in 
Western thought animated, above all, by a “revolt against positivism.” When H. Stuart 
Hughes originally crafted the narrative in 1958, he employed “positivism” to designate 
the culture of scientism,45 characterized by the belief, ascendant following the revolutions 
of 1848, that the mechanistic principles of matter and motion originally developed in the 
physics of René Descartes and Isaac Newton, and subsequently perfected by naturalists 
such as Antoine Lavoisier and Ludwig Büchner, could exhaustively explain the laws of 
nature and humans’ place within them. Against this intellectual backdrop, Bergson 
instigated a “radical opposition” to science, “his main intellectual stock-in-trade, and 
there would have been no point in his allowing it to be whittled away by a more 
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conciliatory attitude.”46 Bergson’s exploration of the so-called “irrational” dimension of 
reality, which for Hughes constituted the subjective or “emotional” aspect of experience 
occluded by the positivist worldview, rallied modernist figures in the decade of the 1890s 
such as Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Georges Sorel. Their revolt 
installed consciousness as the centerpiece of the human sciences, what Hughes described 
as “the subjective attitude of the observer of society,”47 and laid the conceptual 
groundwork for figures such as Émile Durkhiem and Max Weber to found the modern 
social sciences. The merit of Consciousness and Society was its demonstration that the 
chief thinkers of the fin de siècle did not rebel against the values of the Enlightenment, 
but against its distortion in the form of positivism. Yet, Hughes bestowed historians with 
an enduring narrative that specifically fails to account for Bergson’s profound debt to the 
sciences and generally neglects the transformative dialogue that modernist thinkers 
forged with the sciences.  
Hughes was not the first to oppose Bergson to the sciences. John Herman Randall 
Jr. had already situated Bergson in reaction against the “growing world of mechanism 
and naturalism” in The Making of the Modern Mind.48 In early twentieth-century Europe, 
Bergson came to be seen as a mystical thinker, an accusation propagated on both sides of 
the political spectrum by the polemicists Julian Benda and Paul Nizan. Benda published 
three books between 1912 and 1914 skewering the explanatory power of Bergson’s 
philosophy. With more trenchant derision, Nizan identified Bergson as one of guard dogs 
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of French idealism against “realist” political involvement.49 In a more charitable fashion, 
René Barthelot was the first to systematically identify Bergson’s thought as 
representative of the turn to the twentieth century. Alongside Nietzsche, Henri Poincaré, 
and William James, Barthelot situated Bergson as one of the “Romantic utilitarians” in 
his three-volume history of the pragmatist movement. All four thinkers, according to 
Barthelot, demonstrated an “anti-intellectualism” that did not outright oppose the natural 
sciences so much as re-conceptualize the notion of truth on which their laws are 
constructed. But Barthelot’s study firmly installed Bergson within a complementary 
narrative of aesthetic modernism:  
Bergsonisme, when considered both in the thought of it master and its 
disciples, is a close relative to the impressionist symbolism that seduced 
an entire generation of French poets and musicians for the last twenty 
years. Bergsonisme is a philosophical “Debussyism.”50 
 
Berthelot set in motion the modernist narrative within which art historians have situated 
Bergson. Mark Antliff, for example, examines the Cubist, Rhythmist, and Futurist 
interest in Bergson, all of which found in his thought a critique of the quantitative 
constraints of Albertian perspective and of the analytic style of impressionism.51 
Bergson’s place in aesthetic modernism continues to inform historiographies on this side 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Paul Nizan, Les Chiens de garde (Paris: Rieder, 1932).  
50 René Berthelot, Un Romanisme utilitaire, étude sur le mouvement pragmatiste, Vol. 1 (Paris: Félix 
Alcan, 1911), 22.  
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of the Atlantic.52 But this art historical narrative has served to buttress the obverse 
intellectual historical narrative, which treats Bergsonian irrationalism as a reaction 
against science.  
Hughes lent historiographical traction to his narrative by framing the fin de siècle 
within the dyadic structure of positivism versus irrationalism. Hughes was correct, to be 
sure, in so far as Bergson did not champion unapologetic materialists, such as Herbert 
Spencer or Ernst Haeckel, who folded consciousness into an all-embracing physical 
monism. Yet the narrative misrepresents the stakes on which Bergson’s critique of 
positivism hinged. Far from opposing positivism, understood, following Hughes, as a 
widespread scientistic movement in European thought, Bergson sought to radically 
enlarge what counts as a positive fact. Bergson’s generation, I am suggesting, intervened 
in the sciences by challenging their narrow methodologies, and more importantly, by 
contributing a multi-dimensional and practice-oriented conception of scientific 
knowledge.  
My argument builds on historians’ critiques of Hughes’ method. David 
Lindenfeld contends that the “revolt against positivism” is a “misleading” label, given 
that many thinkers of the fin de siècle sought to revise the meaning of positive 
knowledge: the phenomenology of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl, for example, 
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incorporated extra-rational aspects of consciousness in the name of scientific 
philosophy.53 Dorothy Ross advances the more challenging objection that “Hughes 
himself could not escape positivism’s identification of rationality with objectivity, 
understood as access to a reality independent of any particular human view of it.”54 
Writing in the aftermath of early twentieth-century logical positivism, and its summary 
dismissal of questions of value, Hughes too hastily “understood the subjectivity of the 
generation of the 1890s as emotion, irrationality, and “supra- or infra-rational values”.”55 
Jan Goldstein, moreover, has committed her oeuvre over the past two decades to 
inverting Hughes’ narrative by investigating “psychological modernism” in France, a 
term she initially employed to designate French psychiatric figures, Pierre Janet foremost 
among them, whose medical models of the psyche retained the residue of nineteenth-
century spiritualism.56 In place of a revolt against positivism, Goldstein frames the fin de 
siècle around the intractability of metaphysics, especially in the emergent human 
sciences.57  
Taken together, these challenges to Hughes’ historiographical narrative indicate 
that positivism ought to be understood not as a monolithic object of resistance, but 
instead, I want to suggest, as a site of conceptual contestation. By that I mean that 
positivism oriented the stakes of intellectual and cultural debates: late nineteenth-century 
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thinkers, especially scientific spiritualists, vied over competing conceptions of the content 
and scope of positive facts, which, in their eyes, conferred scientific rigor on the study of 
consciousness.  
Nowhere was this more evident than in Bergson’s first book, fittingly titled, Essai 
sur les données immédiates [translated in English as the “immediate data”] de la 
conscience, which sought to grant first-person qualitative experiences the scientific 
legitimacy that experimental psychologists otherwise reserved for sensations measured 
by third-person observers. It was no stretch for Édouard Le Roy, Bergson’s student, to 
dub Bergson’s thought, “spiritualist positivism.” This movement, “far from having been 
called from outside, as it were, by metaphysical and moral preoccupations,” Le Roy 
wrote, “has appeared from the inside of science, under the pressure of its internal needs, 
and in contact with its very facts and theories.”58 In this light, scientific spiritualism can 
enrich historians’ understanding of the fin de siècle, first, because of the movement’s 
formidable challenge to Hughes’ dyadic opposition between positivism and irrationalism; 
and second, because these thinkers’ endeavor to dilate scientific methodologies they 
viewed as malleable unsettles the historiographical logic of crisis and its treatment of 
science as a static category. 
Motivated by neither intellectual disillusionment nor moral anxiety, pace 
historiographies of the “crisis of reason,”59 scientific spiritualists sought to mobilize 
research in experimental psychology and evolutionary biology, not in opposition to a 
monolithic domain of science, but rather, in opposition to competing conceptions of 
science, specifically the intellectualist conception advanced by neo-Kantians. 
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Intellectualism holds that consciousness represents the world in conceptual form, and 
judges the validity of its representations. Against neo-Kantians’ claim that consciousness 
amounts to an intellectual act of judgment, scientific spiritualists argued that 
consciousness amounts to a practical activity engaged in a shared natural and social 
world. Neo-Kantians espoused intellectualism in order to safeguard the sciences from 
impinging on the realm of freedom, whereas scientific spiritualists set freedom in 
continuity with nature. As a result, Neo-Kantianism treated the study of consciousness as 
a handmaiden to the sciences, pursued to elucidate scientific concepts’ epistemological 
foundations, while scientific spiritualists, on the other hand, saw the study of 
consciousness as a frontier beyond the limits of science. If scientific spiritualists can be 
said to have staged a revolt, I am suggesting, it was a revolt against intellectualism, not 
against positivism.  
The stakes of my argument, to be clear, do not only turn on the veracity of the 
crisis narrative, but also, and more importantly, on the function of the crisis narrative. 
Whereas the crisis narrative takes “science” for granted as a stable domain thrown into 
disrepute, over and against which fin de siècle thought emerged, I am suggesting that 
contestation functions to better explain the fluid debates over the meaning and scope of 
science that fueled scientific spiritualism.   
 
Scientific Spiritualism Contra Intellectualism 
 
My account of the dispute between scientific spiritualism and intellectualism 
borrows from James Kloppenberg, who has brought attention to the significant support 
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that neo-Kantianism gained in the late nineteenth century in opposition to what he calls 
the “radical theory of knowledge.”60 The latter treated consciousness as a pragmatic and 
plastic activity, and advocated a via media between metaphysics and science. Certain 
radical theorists that Kloppenberg highlights, such as Alfred Fouillée, overlap with the 
configuration at the center of my dissertation. I see my dissertation as building on 
Kloppenberg’s insight that nineteenth-century attempts to unite scientific and 
metaphysical methods found opposition in the intellectualist current of thought. By 
focusing on local problems in France, intellectualism can best be understood as a 
tendency of thought at times even present in the work of scientific spiritualism. Scientific 
spiritualism and neo-Kantianism, that is to say, often manifested, not only as two 
philosophical movements, but also as divergent tendencies in French engagements with 
the natural and human sciences, even surfacing in tension with each other in works by the 
same author.  
 Scientific spiritualists’ critique of intellectualism aimed at overthrowing three 
interlocking dualities at the heart of Kant’s critical philosophy: the duality between nature 
and freedom; the duality between theoretical and practical reason; and the duality 
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1) Nature and Freedom 
 
The architectonic division that Kant drew between the domains of nature and 
freedom separated the laws determining human representations of the world from the 
laws regulating human conduct. The chasm between the two served to safeguard 
autonomy. If human autonomy cannot be represented in the natural world, then it cannot 
constitute an object of scientific inquiry uncovered by means of observation and 
experimentation. Humans exercise their freedom, Kant argued, by transcending the realm 
of nature and employing a priori concepts of the understanding to make judgments about 
nature. But freedom from nature comes at the expense of an absolute knowledge of 
nature. Kant presented this distinction in the epistemological terms of phenomena and 
noumena. On the one hand, the concepts of the understanding only apply to nature as it 
appears to consciousness, that is, as phenomena obeying causal laws. On the other hand, 
the concepts of the understanding foreclose any knowledge of an unconditioned, that is, 
noumenal nature existing apart from the form it assumes in consciousness. Kant 
employed the distinction to diagnose and dispel the illusions that ensue when humans 
seek to know unconditioned entities – such as the soul or God – existing beyond the laws 
of representation.  
 
2) Theoretical and Practical Reason 
 
The metaphysical division between the realms of nature and freedom entailed an 
epistemological division between theoretical and practical reason, manifest in Kant’s 
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separation between his First and Second Critiques.61 Both theoretical and practical 
reasoning share the same capacity to systematize our knowledge, that is, to impart 
universality and necessity to representations. But they diverge in respect to the kind of 
knowledge each attains. Whereas theoretical reasoning facilitates judgments about the 
causal relationships in nature, typified in physics and geometry, practical reasoning 
constructs the moral relationships between humans. The division further served to 
safeguard human autonomy, since the normative principles determining morals cannot be 
derived from the causal principles determining natural processes. As Kant framed the 
distinction, the concepts of science determine the appearance of nature, whereas the 
concepts of morality determine the ends of human freedom. The highest principle of 
theoretical reason is self-consciousness, or what Kant called the unity of apperception, 
which endows experience with a necessary and universal form. The highest principle of 
practical reason is the moral law, or what Kant called the categorical imperative, which 
grounds the particular duties we owe to each other.  
 
3) Receptivity and Spontaneity 
 
According to Kant, knowledge consists of determining the relation of a concept to 
an object. Consciousness receives an object by means of intuition, and spontaneously 
unifies the object by means of concepts. These dual operations ensure that our 
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representations of nature are self-conscious, dependent not only on the capacity of 
consciousness to sense objects, but also on its capacity to issue judgments about objects. 
Receptivity and spontaneity therefore constitute the composite nature of our 
representations, the building blocks of knowledge.  
 Receptivity and spontaneity, as Kant made clear, are limited capacities peculiar to 
human consciousness. In order for an object to appear before us, we must be affected by 
the object. But if we were not finite creatures, and instead possessed what Kant called an 
“intellectual intuition,” then consciousness could furnish its own objects. The receptive 
capacity of our sensibility, however, is “derivative (intuitus derivativus) rather than 
original (intuitus originarius), and hence is not intellectual intuition.”62 Analogously, if 
the spontaneous power of the understanding were not limited to applying concepts, then it 
would be possible for the understanding to generate its own objects. But the concepts or 
our finite understanding only pertain to possible objects, meaning that the understanding 
can only work upon the objects presented in intuition. The spontaneous power of the 
understanding, Kant held, is discursive; it is confined to making judgments about objects.  
 
Scientific spiritualists critiqued Kant’s interlocking divisions on epistemological 
and metaphysical grounds. On epistemological grounds, scientific spiritualists argued that 
the divisions between nature and freedom, and between theoretical and practical reason, 
unduly segregated metaphysical and scientific inquiry. “I know it has become fashionable 
among some thinkers, thanks to the excessive propaganda of Kantianism and especially 
French neo-Kantianism,” Alfred Fouillée wrote, “to transpose philosophy outside of 
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science, under the pretext of placing it higher and making a place for belief.” 63 Since 
Kant held that freedom is peculiar to the normative realm, impervious to causal analysis, 
his critical philosophy foreclosed the possibility of investigating the natural bases of 
consciousness (in so far as thinking, neo-Kantians and spiritualist concurred, is a free 
activity). Philosophy’s proper relation to the natural sciences, as Kant conceived it, was 
to establish the foundations of scientific knowledge. Scientific spiritualists, however, 
envisioned an inverted relation between philosophy and the natural sciences: the sciences 
establish the foundation of philosophy, albeit a negative foundation, which philosophy 
aims to surpass by means of a speculative leap.  
On metaphysical grounds, scientific spiritualists argued that the divisions between 
nature and freedom as well as between theoretical and practical reason followed from the 
false picture of consciousness that Kant enshrined in his division between receptivity and 
spontaneity. Kant unduly shackled the active powers of consciousness to applying 
concepts: “To know a reality in the ordinary meaning of the word “to know,”” Bergson 
wrote, “is to take ready-made concepts, apportion them, and combine them until one 
obtains a practical equivalent of the real.”64 It followed, according to Bergson, that the 
Kantian account foreclosed consciousness’ creative power of inventing concepts:  
[T]he whole of the Critique of Pure Reason leads to establishing the fact 
that Platonism, illegitimate if Ideas are things, becomes legitimate if ideas 
are relations, and that the ready-made idea, once thus brought down from 
heaven to earth, is indeed as Plato wished, the common basis of thought 
and nature. But the whole Critique of Pure Reason rests also upon the 
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postulate that our thought is incapable of anything but Platonizing, that is, 
of pouring the whole of possible experience into pre-existing molds.65 
 
Bergson and scientific spiritualists argued that by overthrowing neo-Kantian 
intellectualism, they could mend the division between science and metaphysics, all the 
while preserving human autonomy. Scientific spiritualists did so by advancing a rival 
account of consciousness as an experimental and practical activity. But neo-Kantians 
such as Léon Brunschvicg were resistant: “properly psychological action is not 
movement, it is judgment.” 66 Such were the stakes motivating scientific spiritualists’ 
dispute with intellectualism, which cast into stark relief an alternative historiographical 
narrative for the fin de siècle, structured around neither a revolt against positivism nor a 
crisis of science, but instead around contestations over the meaning and scope of the 
sciences. 
 
Bergson and the Contemporary Brain Sciences 
  
 It may seem odd to historicize Bergson as a scientific thinker, given that he is 
widely remembered for having been amiss about physics in his infamous public debate 
with Albert Einstein in 1922.67 Therein Bergson set the durée of conscious experience, 
the notion of time he developed in the Essai and Matière et mémoire, in confrontation 
with the theory of special relativity.68 "It is regrettable that Bergson should be so 
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thoroughly mistaken,” Einstein wrote following their encounter, “and his error is really of 
a purely physical nature, apart from any disagreement between philosophical schools."69 
Perhaps Bergson’s error even lay at the origin of the contemporary “science wars,” a 
suggestion made by Alan Sokal, 70 the physicist who notoriously cast aspersion over the 
humanities’ lack of scientific rigor.71 Nonetheless, a growing body of recent scholarship 
has excavated Bergson’s engagements with the sciences during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century.72 I see my dissertation as building on this exciting trend by 
situating Bergson within the wider formation of scientific spiritualism.  
My argument that Bergson wrote in response to the incipient natural and human 
sciences may lead some readers to suspect that I have at best vitiated the metaphysical 
splendor from the challenging concepts he forged, and at worst sullied the vivid and even 
literary style of philosophizing that he perfected. It is worth clarifying: I am not arguing 
that Bergson’s thought can be reduced to a reaction to the sciences. Rather, I see my 
dissertation as a sustained reading of the chapters of Bergson’s early books penned in 
scrupulous dialogue with scientific research, chapters that have largely gone neglected by 
a century of Bergson scholarship focused on the exclusively philosophical dimension of 
his thought. Bergson did rise above his philosophical milieu; and he managed to do so, I 
am suggesting, because of the care he took to so extensively cite scientific research and, 
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more importantly, because he so radically jettisoned the vestiges of intellectualism from 
the project of scientific spiritualism. 
By historicizing Bergson’s engagements with the sciences, I also hope that his 
thought might claim critical leverage on the writing of history today. A growing number 
of historians have recently turned to the neurosciences in order to rethink their 
discipline’s epistemological foundations. Lynn Hunt and Daniel Lord Smail call for a 
new “neurohistory,” while William Reddy and Barbara Rosenwein cite neuroscientific 
research in support of their investigation of the history of the emotions.73 No longer 
restricted to the history of science and technology, interest in the neurosciences now 
animates bold claims in contemporary historiography. Smail, for example, advances a 
counter-history of the Enlightenment drawn from neuroscientific research on the cerebral 
effects of psychotropic mechanisms. He claims, “the progress of European civilization 
from the Middle Ages to modernity consists of a significant expansion or autotropic 
mechanisms available on the market.”74 Coffee, sugar, tobacco, alcohol, and chocolate 
are thus used as neuro-psychological causes to explain the explosion of intellectual 
debate that defined the era. These developments are both exciting and problematic.  
The history of scientific spiritualists’ engagements with the emergent sciences of 
the late nineteenth century might help to guide contemporary historians’ engagements 
with the mature sciences of the twenty-first century. My dissertation thus stages a 
“history of the present.” Although I am aware of the dangers of distorted readings that 
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this kind of anachronism might produce, the chapter takes guidance from the insight of 
Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner: “If to be anachronistic is to link a 
past X to a present Y rather than studying it in isolation, then every historian is always 
anachronistic.”75 Indeed, I see the conceptual stakes undergirding my history of scientific 
spiritualism as motivating an intervention in the present. That is, the history of scientific 
spiritualism serves to illuminate the salvageable core and pare the mistaken approaches in 
recent historiographies drawing from the contemporary brain sciences.  
 
Organization of Chapters 
 
 Scientific spiritualism was neither a monolithic enterprise nor a disaggregated 
collection of thinkers, but a dynamic and transforming movement. I have organized my 
dissertation around the intellectual and cultural contexts that explain the formation, 
development, and significance of this movement. At an intellectual level, the six chapters 
follow the conceptual arc, divided into three moments, along which scientific spiritualists 
posited and debated the guiding problem of articulating the nature of conscious activity: 
motility, contingency, and pragmatism.76 Early spiritualist thinkers, from Maine de Biran 
to Ravaisson, conceived conscious activity as a form of motor activity; subsequent 
thinkers, Émile Boutroux most notably, advanced contingency as the basis of conscious 
activity; and those writing on the eve of the twentieth century, such as Bergson, Fouillée, 
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and Le Roy, conceptualized conscious activity as an experiential and action-oriented 
endeavor. At a cultural level, I have organized the chapters around five contexts: 
philosophical, scientific, institutional, religious, and finally, the present. These contexts 
reveal the pivotal transformation in the late nineteenth-century understanding of 
conscious activity, from an intimate relationship with one’s self, to a public interaction 
with a shared social and biological world.  
Chapters 1 and 2 present a pre-history of early nineteenth-century French 
spiritualism, taking as a point of departure the legacies of Biran and Cousin. I argue that 
scientific spiritualism in the late nineteenth century rejuvenated the Biranian 
philosophical archive against the Cousinian heritage. Chapter 1 contends that Biran 
advanced a conception of conscious activity as motility, or motor activity, which later 
thinkers radicalized in opposition to Cousin’s conception of conscious activity as 
intellection. Chapter 2 analyzes the thought of Félix Ravaisson, Jules Lachelier, and 
Émile Boutroux who set the stage for scientific spiritualism in formulating what they 
called “spiritualist positivism,” consisting of an expanded account of consciousness set 
within nature. They argued that contingency mediates both the structure of consciousness 
and its emergence from natural processes. These two concepts, motility and contingency, 
set the terms of scientific spiritualists’ engagements with the sciences in the late 
nineteenth century.   
Chapters 3 and 4 document the impact of experimental psychology. I examine 
how the emerging discipline, and the work of Thédole Ribot in particular, fueled 
scientific spiritualism. Ribot’s La Revue philosophique was France’s chief organ of 
experimental psychology as well as the premier outlet for academic philosophy. The 
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journal, I argue, constituted a reading community in which scientific spiritualism took 
form around two specific developments: psychophysics and psychopathology. Chapter 3 
focuses on psychophysics, the science of measuring sensations founded by the German 
psychologist Theodor Fechner, which spurred a rich debate in France around the extent to 
which conscious states could be measured in quantitative terms. Chapter 4 addresses 
psychopathology, which aimed at discerning the laws of the healthy mind through the 
examination of abnormality. The field especially piqued the interest of French men and 
women following Ribot’s series of articles in the La Revue philosophique claiming that 
memories could be localized in the brain.  
Chapter 5 explores scientific spiritualism in the context of educational 
institutions. I focus on philosophy textbooks and course notes written by Bergson’s 
students in order to trace the scientific turn in the official philosophy curriculum under 
the Third Republic and to demonstrate how scientific spiritualism was both brought about 
by and actively oriented French academe. From 1874 to 1902, the French Ministry of 
Public Instruction introduced scientific psychology in secondary education by inculcating 
neurophysiology and disseminating research in psychopathology. These reforms, I argue, 
mobilized the philosophy course as a vehicle to promulgate scientific instruction and 
promote technological progress in order to compete with Germany and simultaneously to 
steer the cultural resonance of the emergent brain sciences. The reforms also cast light on 
Bergson’s success at integrating spiritualist philosophy and psychological research in the 
classroom, which accounts in large part for the fame he achieved. 
Chapter 6 argues that the pragmatist moment in scientific spiritualism reached its 
zenith in the context of religious debates surrounding Catholic Modernism. The crisis in 
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the Church exploded as progressive theologians advocated historicist and pragmatist 
methods for interpreting Catholic doctrine. I devote the bulk of the chapter to Le Roy’s 
debate with Blondel around these issues in published articles as well as in personal 
correspondences. Both took aim at the same problem, which was how to give meaning to 
religious dogma on the basis scientific spiritualists’ conception of consciousness. Both, 
that is, drew from advancements in the sciences as well as their respective critiques the 
intellectualism. Blondel and Le Roy thus extended scientific spiritualism into the realm 
of religion by simultaneously advancing a fully social account of conscious activity.  
 The Epilogue brings the history of scientific spiritualism to bear on contemporary 
efforts in the humanities and social sciences to stage a new rapprochement with the 
neurosciences and sociobiology. I contend that the dialogue scientific spiritualists forged 
with the nascent scientific psychology and evolutionary theory offers an illuminating 
position from which to critique contemporary efforts to broach a similar dialogue today. 
For humanists who came of age in the midst of social and linguistic constructivism, new 
“neurocultures” offer novel and exciting accounts of human and non-human creativity 
and historicity that overthrow what many had felt as a post-structuralist injunction to 
limit their theoretical horizons to the textual frames imported from literary studies. The 
discipline of history now experiences, according to Gabrielle Spiegel, “a form of 
backlash against postmodernist/poststructuralist thought, with its insistence on the 
mediated, indeed constructed, nature of all knowledge, and most especially knowledge of 
the past.”77 The neurosciences offer one, though not the only, means to move beyond the 
perceived exhaustion of the linguistic turn.  
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Yet, historians remain undecided and at times conflicted about what division of 
labor they hope to achieve between historical criticism and scientific experimentation. 
Left unresolved, the problem of biological reductionism resurges anew. Forceful critiques 
of this reductionism have emerged among historians. For example, Fernando Vidal 
succinctly identifies the reductionist presupposition of neurocultures as, “the mind is 
what the brain does.”78 Ruth Leys has also subjected this presupposition to a nuanced 
critique in what she sees as “recent attempts to naturalize contemporary politics and 
culture by linking them to the brain sciences.”79 My aim is to contribute to these debates 
by suggesting that scientific spiritualists’ project, which engaged the sciences to yield 
new problems surpassing the reach of the sciences, can help clarify what is still a hazy 
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The history of French spiritualism has been largely written as a linear march 
across the nineteenth century from Maine de Biran to Henri Bergson. Bergson 
acknowledged his affinity with “the master idea of Maine de Biran that had accompanied 
the nineteenth century, the idea of concentrating philosophy’s attention on the interior life 
of the soul, of situating human personality, as it appears to consciousness, half way 
between the relative and the absolute of ancient metaphysics, higher than the 
phenomenon of Kantians, but lower than their thing in itself.” For Bergson, Biran held 
the key to “experimentally penetrating the beyond, our at least approaching its threshold, 
by taking interior observation as a guide.”1 Biran oriented French spiritualism around the 
project of articulating the inner activity of reality as it is experienced by consciousness. 
Although the conceptual problem around which both Biran and Bergson converged 
turned on what this activity amounts to, Biran only became a historically influential 
figure in the late nineteenth century.   
It has become a standard narrative to situate Biran and Bergson as bookends of 
the nineteenth-century spiritualist itinerary.2 This straight and narrow path informs the 
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most probing study, Dominique Janicaud’s genealogy of French spiritualism.3 But this 
narrative neglects the discontinuous receptions that steered the development of French 
spiritualism. The central historical claim of this section is that the nineteenth century did 
not witness one current of French spiritualism, but two. The first was the old spiritualism 
of Maine de Biran and Victor Cousin, and the second was the new, scientifically 
revivified spiritualism that Bergson popularized by the turn to the twentieth century. But 
it was only in reaction against Cousin’s official spiritualism that Biran’s subterranean 
spiritualism would receive due attention, unearthed as it was from beneath the Cousinian 
legacy. The old spiritualism, in this light, appears less as a monolithic point of resistance 
against which scientific spiritualism emerged, and more as a fluid archive that disobeyed 
a straightforward chronological progression.  
New movements claim new origins. Although Biran has been historicized as the 
inaugural figure in French spiritualism, I am suggesting that his thought functioned as a 
post factum point of departure. Biran’s writings remained occluded by Cousin’s official 
state philosophy for much of the nineteenth century, posthumously trickling from diverse 
publishing houses. Formulated in the post-Revolutionary era, Biran’s thought had to wait 
until the post-Cousinian era before it blossomed, offering scientific spiritualists a 
conceptual toolkit sturdy enough to defend the autonomy of consciousness while 
sufficiently adaptable to experimental research on areas such as the nervous system, 
visual perception, and brain anatomy. Scientific spiritualism emerged during the late 
nineteenth century in large part as a reading community around Biran’s work. The 
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emergence of scientific spiritualism, and its divergence from Cousin’s eclectic 
spiritualism, is therefore, as I will trace, a reception history of Biran’s work.  
The following two chapters examine the formation of French spiritualism in two 
distinct moments. The first analyzes Biran and Cousin, and the rift they imparted to the 
old spiritualism between two respective conceptions of consciousness: motility and 
intellectualism. The second chapter traces the revival of Biran’s concept of motor activity 
following the demise of Cousin’s monopoly over academic philosophy. These post-
Cousinian thinkers, namely, Félix Ravaisson, Jules Lachelier, and Émile Boutroux, 
















Chapter 1: Maine de Biran, Victor Cousin, 
and the Contest Over the Meaning of French Spiritualism 
 
In advancing a new spiritualist movement, thinkers in the final quarter of the 
nineteenth century self-consciously strove to overcome the old spiritualism monopolized 
by Victor Cousin. Cousin’s brand of eclectic spiritualism dominated French academic life 
for the greater part of the century. Still after his death in 1867, influential disciples of 
Cousin such as Elme Caro, Paul Janet, and Léon Ollé-Laprune continued to occupy the 
philosophy chairs of the Université de Paris. Although a budding generation of scientific 
spiritualists were frustrated by what they saw as Cousin’s tyranny over academic 
philosophy as well as his hostility to commingling philosophy and the sciences, they 
nonetheless strove to preserve the animating tenets of the French spiritualist tradition. In 
their effort to stage a rapprochement between an updated spiritualism and developments 
in the natural and human sciences, these thinkers turned to the posthumous writings of 
Maine de Biran. This independent philosopher of post-Revolutionary France never held 
an academic post and published little in his lifetime. But the gradual appearance of his 
works flowed like an alternative spiritualist current to Cousin’s legacy. In parting ways 
with Cousin, their spiritualist father, scientific spiritualists reunited with Biran, an 
estranged grandfather.   
 What defined Cousin’s and Biran’s thought as spiritualist was their conception of 
psychology as the window onto the absolute. The activity of consciousness illuminated 
by psychological introspection is part of the very fabric of reality; it is the world viewed, 
as it were, from the inside, and not a view set over and against the world, as subjectivism 
or phenomenalism would hold. Spiritualists aspired to pierce through the internal activity 
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of immaterial reality, in opposition to the physical sciences, which analyze the external 
activity of immaterial reality. But Biran and Cousin diverged over their distinct accounts 
of what conscious activity amounts to.  
 Cousin believed that conscious activity opens onto the realm of reason. He 
promoted psychology as a science humaine that revealed the organizing principles of 
thought by introspection – that is, by directing philosophical analysis away from the 
objects of the external world and inward toward the objects of consciousness. For Cousin, 
consciousness constituted a substance, no less real than the entities inhabiting the 
physical world. Cousin adopted this approach from Descartes, who conceived res 
cogitans as an ensemble of mental objects marked by their features of clarity and 
distinctness. Psychology, according to Cousin, “is the thought folding back upon itself, 
and contemplating the spectacle presented by itself.”1 When exercised properly, 
introspection would reveal the universal principles of reason enabling particular acts of 
thought. Cousin was a thoroughgoing idealist. Reason, he argued, is not merely a 
subjective feature of consciousness; reason is the objective structure by which the world 
presents itself to thought. Cousinian spiritualism thus pursued psychology as the surest 
route to ontology.  
 What made Cousin’s approach eclectic was his reliance on the history of 
philosophy. Cousin claimed to derive his brand of eclectic spiritualism from the superior 
elements of the Western canon. In practice, this amounted to synthesizing the systems of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – namely those of John Locke’s empiricism, 
Thomas Reid’s common sense philosophy, and Kant’s transcendental idealism – in order 
to arrive at a rational science of psychology. By studying the greatest minds of the past, 
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the student of eclectic spiritualism was meant to secure the foundations of reason for the 
nineteenth century.  
 Biran’s account of conscious activity was markedly different. At the heart of 
Biran’s oeuvre is the guiding principle that consciousness is an energetic, rather than 
intellectual, kind of activity. Whereas psychology, for Cousin, analyzed mental acts that 
invoke principles of reason, Biran employed psychology to analyze mental activity as an 
exercise of the will. Thinking, according to Biran, is an activity that summons the body’s 
energy and manifests in the feeling of effort. At bottom, this line of thought belonged to 
the empiricist tradition, which affirmed sensations as the source of ideas. Biran, however, 
argued that effort is a unique kind of sensation. In exerting muscular effort, one actively 
invokes the body’s energy, which is a form of sensation distinct from the sensations 
received from objects in the material world. Biran’s spiritualism construed the exercise of 
effort as a window onto the absolute: in consciously directing my body’s energy, I open 
myself onto the internal and energetic activity of reality itself.   
The master-concept that Biran employed to designate the activity of 
consciousness was le sentiment de l’effort musculaire, the sensation of muscular effort. 
For Cousin, it was le sens intime du moi, the immediate sense of self. These approaches, 
the former corporeal, the latter intellectual, animated the rift separating Biran’s empiricist 
spiritualism and Cousin’s eclectic spiritualism. This rift turned on competing conceptions 
of psychology and spirit: 
1) Psychology as an act of intellection vs. psychology as a motor activity of 
willing. 
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2) Spirit as the rational being of reality vs. spirit as the energetic becoming of 
reality. 
In what follows, I will first present the historical genesis of this rift, and then 




The historical rift between two spiritualisms extends back to the first meeting 
between Cousin and Biran at the metaphysical society that Biran organized in his Paris 
home in 1814. It was there where Biran found sanctuary amidst the tumult of the 
Bourbon reclamation of the throne. Biran had spent his life in politics. Wounded in the 
battle of Versailles in 1789, Biran served a formidable career in various state roles under 
Napoleon: administrator of Dordogne, deputy in the Council of Five Hundred under the 
Directory, legislator under the Empire, and member in the Chamber of Deputies during 
the Restoration. From 1813, Biran served on the Commission of Five, charged with 
studying the documents justifying the Emperor’s power. No sooner had Biran submitted 
his report to the Legislative Corps than Napoleon dissolved its powers in anticipation of 
the military siege that would ensue. In the wake of the Treaty of Paris, Biran convened in 
his home some of the greatest philosophical minds of Paris: the naturalists Georges and 
Frédéric Cuvier, the philosophers Joseph-Marie Degérando and Pierre-Paul Royer-
Collard, the physicist André-Marie Ampère, and the future Prime Minister, François 
Guizot.2 Each fortnightly séance featured the presentation of a paper followed by 
discussion. And by 1816 the metaphysical society included among the attendees the 
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young Cousin, whose “passionate mind,” as Biran later recounted, fueled “nothing less 
than the hope for a true philosophy among us.”3  
Biran’s metaphysical society was one of many intimate settings where early 
nineteenth-century French spiritualism thrived in the form of conversation. Biran hopped 
between philosophical milieus depending on his political positions. Under the Directory, 
he frequented the salon of Madame Helvétius before serving as an appointed deputy of 
the Southwestern town of Bergerac, where, outside his administrative duties, he 
organized a medical society that gathered physiologists and physicians as well as 
philosophers and geographers. It was in these exclusive cultural enclaves that Biran 
shared his writings, with little ambition that they circulate among a mass readership. 
Cousin, for his part, regularly attended the salon of Madame de Staël, well known 
for gathering literary figures alongside aristocrats who came to learn the names Kant, 
Jacobi, Herder and Fichte. De Staël travelled to Germany in 1803 and 1807 and compiled 
her reflections on the nation’s transcendental philosophy in De l’Allemagne (1810), a 
book quickly censored for allegedly adding fuel to the fire of France’s perpetual conflicts 
beyond the Rhine. Cousin was indebted to de Staël for having illuminated a philosophical 
path beyond the eighteenth-century sensationalism of Condillac that dominated French 
philosophical circles at the time. “She opened up the doctrine so dear to Cousin,” one 
critic reflected, “by treating nearly all philosophers preceding [Kant] as materialists, 
some for having frankly espoused it, and others for having been committed to it without 
knowing.”4 Kant had previously found a foothold in France as early as 1797 thanks to the 
affable Wilhelm von Humboldt, who made his way into the philosophical circle at the 
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recently created Institut de France.5 But it was Cousin who, following his voyage to 
Leipzig in 1817, was the first Frenchman to champion Kant’s thought when he lectured 
on transcendental philosophy in the 1820s at the Sorbonne.6  
These informal societies and salons, starkly different from the academic 
institutions philosophers occupied in the late nineteenth century, incubated the divergent 
paths of French spiritualism. Whereas Biran imbibed philosophy alongside the scientists 
of French nobility, Cousin assimilated writings from beyond l’hexagone. The genetic 
divergence between Biran’s and Cousin’s brands of spiritualism turned on their 
respective development out French medical thought, on the one hand, and German 
transcendental philosophy, on the other. But the social contexts of these spiritualisms 
were equally important for the ends they served. If spiritualist philosophy, for Biran, was 
a refuge from the politics of his day, it was thanks to Cousin that spiritualism became a 
form of politics.  
Jan Goldstein has brought renewed attention to “[t]he hegemony of Cousinianism 
in France, its ability to beat out its competitors and impose its concept of the self on a 
significant segment of the population,” which, she suggests, “rested first and foremost on 
Cousin’s capture of the lycée curriculum.”7 Cousin introduced his eclectic spiritualism in 
the first courses he taught at the École normale supérieure in 1815. But it was on the 
heels of the 1830 Revolution that Cousin cemented his pedagogical-political power by 
installing eclectic spiritualism as the nation’s official philosophy. Cousin claimed a post 
in the five-member Royal Council of Public Instruction, which set the parameters of a 
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new examination that all students took in order to receive the baccalaureate upon lycée 
graduation. Ever since 1809, when philosophy instruction was formalized under 
Napoléon, all public school students studied philosophy in the third and final year of 
lycée. It was a feature of French education that philosophy marked the coronation of a 
student’s primary school career. With the 1832 mandate, Cousin introduced psychology 
into the curriculum. It was positioned as the first subject of the philosophy course, 
followed by logic, morals, and theodicy. The mandate overthrew the prior organization of 
the curriculum, which followed the medieval division of logic, metaphysics, and morals. 
The next year, the loi Guizot reorganized primary school instruction. The law facilitated 
the training of more professors in order to expand the educational system. It did so by 
creating two separate tracks in primary instruction: an elementary track that taught 
reading, writing, and arithmetic, as well as courses in morality; and a superior track that 
offered courses in geometry, physics, natural and human history, and geography. These 
reforms put the innovations in place that Cousin promoted following his study of German 
education. Their effect was to secure a rigid structure of social organization. The two 
tracks served to regulate mobility between the classes, and the superior one in particular 
filtered out those students deemed unfit to climb the ranks of the bourgeoisie.8 The same 
year, 1833, Cousin served as general supervisor of the École normale supérieure. Perched 
at the top of the educational hierarchy, the École normale supérieure advanced more 
students through the agrégation than any other university. From 1833 on, Cousin 
surveyed the matriculation of the students who would carry forth his eclectic legacy. As 
Jean-Louis Fabiani documents, the vast majority of subjects covered by the agrégation as 
well as thesis topics chosen by doctoral students were dedicated to the progression of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Douglas Johnson, Guizot: Aspects of French History, 1787-1874 (New York: Routledge, 1963), 127-129.  
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philosophers, from Plato to Leibniz, that Cousin imposed as the antecedents of eclectic 
spiritualism.9  Although Cousin would exercise most of his influence from within the 
Royal Council, he ascended to the position of Minister of Public Instruction for eight 
months in 1840. Until Bonapartism returned in 1853, Cousin mobilized his bureaucratic 
control over the educational system to enforce eclecticism as the official philosophy. 
Cousin was not without help in securing his power. The politician François 
Guizot and philosopher Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard were respected figures in the 
movement known as the Doctrinaires. Cousin followed the tutelage of Guizot, the 
eponymous architect of the 1833 law, who was the Minister of Public Instruction from 
1832 to 1836 before serving as Prime Minister in 1840. Alongside Guizot, Royer-Collard 
proved to be a model for the young Cousin. Royer-Collard left his professorship at the 
Sorbonne in 1815 to serve on the Council of Public Instruction. Guizot and Royer-
Collard endorsed the Doctrinaire ideology of constitutional monarchism, which they 
promoted in their respective transitions between the worlds of education and politics. 
State authority, in their eyes, functioned best when disseminated via social institutions. 
“Chief among those institutions,” Goldstein writes, “were the public schools, that, placed 
under the supervision of the Université, already had one foot in the state. To produce new 
forms of knowledge and then disseminate them by means of the school system was thus a 
characteristically Doctrinaire procedure for the modernization of state power.”10 The 
method rubbed off on Cousin. Thanks to Guizot’s guidance, the already precocious 
Cousin swiftly climbed the institutional ranks. He consolidated his authority by 
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occupying numerous posts under the July Monarchy in the Chamber of Peers, the Institut 
de France, the Académie française, and Académie des science morales et politiques. 
The official spiritualism came to symbolize a conservative force dictated over 
philosophy professors from on high. As the dissident professor Joseph Ferrari lambasted 
it in Les philosophes salariés, “Mr. Cousin was born in the university; we don’t know 
him to be a part of any other family, and he carries his condition like a monk.”11 Ferrari 
was a socialist philosophy professor at the Université de Strasbourg, when he was ejected 
from his post for having taught a controversial course on Renaissance thought. Soon 
after, with the formation of the Second Empire, the imperial government suspended 
Cousin’s control over the organs of his pedagogical-political authority. His position atop 
the Royal Council of Public Instruction, surveillance of the philosophy program at École 
normale, and control over the agrégation in philosophy were all eliminated. Following 
Louis-Napoléon’s coup, suspicion was cast over what many state authorities thought to 
be the anti-Clerical bent of Cousinian psychology. As a result, the philosophy class was 
abolished in the lycées and replaced with a class in logic. Cousin’s political hiatus would 
endure until 1863 when Victor Duruy was appointed Minister of Public Education. One 
of his first decrees was to restore the Cousinian philosophy curriculum and re-open the 
agrégation in philosophy.  
Although the specter of Cousin continued to weigh on French academia after his 
death in 1867, eclectic spiritualism did fall from its status as the official philosophy. The 
rise of the Third Republic set the stage for an alternative spiritualist current, untethered to 
the historical march of ideas culminating in Cousin. Freed from the edicts of eclectic 
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spiritualism, French philosophers still committed to their nation’s philosophical heritage 
turned to the recently published works of Biran to uncover what remained, for the better 
part of Cousin’s tenure, an occluded philosophical sub-current. Biran would offer a 
pliable version of spiritualism firmly grounded in the empiricism of the sciences yet 
critical of reductive scientism.   
 
Spiritualism Against Sensationalism 
  
The conceptual rift between Biran’s and Cousin’s spiritualisms took its point of 
departure from each thinker’s critique of the sensationalist doctrine of from the 
eighteenth century. It was in response to the psychologies of John Locke and especially 
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac that Biran and subsequently Cousin advanced rival 
spiritualist psychologies.  
 In the second book of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke 
posited the basic empiricist commitment that ideas originate in experience. According to 
Locke, experience is of two kinds, sensation and reflection. Sensation tells us about 
things and processes in the external world. Reflection tells us about the operations of our 
consciousness. Reflection is an internal sense that makes us conscious of our mental 
processes. Some ideas we get only from sensation (such as extension, shape, and motion), 
some we get only from reflection (such as memory, judgment, knowledge, faith), and 
some come from both (such as pleasure, pain, being, power, unity and succession). The 
Essay was monumental for predicating these ideas of a single consciousness. In fact, the 
English word “consciousness” entered the French vocabulary as “con-science” with 
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Pierre Coste’s 1714 translation of the Essay. As Étienne Balibar affirms, “in making 
consciousness the criterion of the identity of the person, Locke revolutionized the very 
conception of subjectivity.”12 For Locke, consciousness gives shape to the structure of 
thought, which he understood to be more than the diverse contents of individual ideas. 
Consciousness imparts identity to thought, or as Coste transcribed, “con-science makes 
the same person.” 13  
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac provided France with its own brand of empiricism. 
Condillac advanced a more radical empiricism, positing sensation alone as the source of 
ideas in his Traité des sensations (1754). This was the doctrine of sensationalism. 
Whereas Locke posited reflection as a basic faculty of consciousness, Condillac instead 
presented attention as its basic faculty. The crucial difference was that reflection 
composes and decomposes what is perceived in sensation. Attention, however, must be 
built out of the progressive accumulation of sensations. Condillac argued that the entirety 
of our mental world could be progressively constructed out of sensations drawn from the 
external world. As a thought experiment, Condillac considered a statue void of any 
knowledge (a radicalization of Locke’s tabula rasa) in order to demonstrate that the 
progressive accumulation of basic sensations could build up higher faculties. The statue’s 
most basic sensation was smell. Olfactory stimuli would furnish a primitive sense of 
pleasure and pain, but not an idea of an external object to which the smell belongs. 
Condillac then considered sight, which would provide the statue with a sense of colors. 
Finally, the sense of touch would furnish the statue with knowledge of distinct objects 
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existing in space. Touch would contribute the sensation of solidity, the source of the idea 
that extended objects exist. The statue would finally use its spatial awareness to attribute 
scents and colors to external objects existing outside oneself. According to Condillac, 
consciousness admits degrees: the statue gains a greater consciousness as it accumulates 
sensations and heightens its power of attention.  
 Biran and Cousin argued that neither Locke’s empiricism nor especially 
Condillac’s sensationalism justified a sufficient concept of the self. Although Locke and 
Condillac provided an account of ideas’ origin, they neglected to explain ideas’ 
coherence in a unified consciousness. Insofar as all sensations as well as ideas are 
experienced as part of my consciousness, then experience must exhibit unity. Otherwise, 
experiences would float through time without any meaningful connections; and without 
meaningful connections, there would be no ground to ascertain causal relations between 
experiences. Biran and Cousin argued that there must be a basis on which to ground the 
necessarily unified character of consciousness; and moreover, that such a basis cannot be 
derived from sensations received from the external world, since unity is already a 
presupposition of all experience. The self, or moi, served to impart unity to 
consciousness. Jan Goldstein identifies this point as Biran’s guiding influence on Cousin:  
Its main features were the postulation of a self, or moi, existing before 
sensory experience and as the precondition for it; a phenomenological 
elaboration of the nature of experience and the radical separation of the 
domain of external or sensory experience, labeled “objective,” from a 
privileged domain of internal experience, or consciousness, labeled 
“subjective”; and the postulation of consciousness of the moi as a so-
called fait primitive, or originary fact, that grounded the theory at a fixed 
and stable point.14 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Jan Goldstein, The Post-Revolutionary Self, 129-130. 
54 
 Goldstein, however, neglects the profound difference between Biran and Cousin. 
Whereas Cousin leaned on a transcendental concept of the self borrowed from his 
readings of Kant, Biran advanced a corporeal concept of the self drawn from his readings 
of physiology. Whereas Cousin believed that the self is given, following Goldstein, 
“before sensory experience and as the precondition for it,” Biran, to the contrary, 
affirmed that the self does derive from sensory experience, albeit from the distinct 
sensory experience of motility. 
 The divergences between Biran’s and Cousin’s respective accounts of the unity of 
the self further hinged on their readings of Leibniz, Kant’s German predecessor. Biran 
saw himself as bringing Leibniz’s La Monadologie (1714) to bear on psychology by 
conceiving the self as a force rather than as a substance. According to Leibniz, 
consciousness entails an act of apperception, meaning that consciousness is always 
consciousness of an object. Consciousness is not itself an object. Biran argued that the 
self is a principle of motor activity exercised upon an object; but motor activity is not 
itself a substance. Cousin, however, treated the self as a substance, the lone ground he 
deemed sturdy enough to secure the identity of personhood. The difficulty with Cousin’s 
account, as Pierre Leroux charged in his polemic against eclecticism, is that it reified 
consciousness as an object before knowledge: “only such a hardly solid thinker 
could…take consciousness or apperception for something isolable from the 
phenomenon.”15 Indeed, Cousin’s writings displayed his unflagging penchant for 
invoking the moi as the master concept neglected by his philosophical opponents.  
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Biran formulated his account of the unity of the self on the basis of the medical 
writings of Pierre Jean-George Cabanis and Marie François Xavier Bichat. Both thinkers 
pioneered an experimental turn in the natural sciences of the early nineteenth century by 
replacing the anatomical paradigm of describing organs’ structures with the physiological 
paradigm of explaining the function of organs. Their medical revolution followed the 
political revolution in Paris. Cabanis and Bichat saw their work in physiology as part of a 
larger project that they called anthropology, or “the science of man,” which sought to 
connect ideology and physiology by adopting Condillac’s method of analysis.16 
“Medicine could thus lay claim to the whole of human experience,” Elizabeth Williams 
writes, “and was rendered fundamentally anthropological in nature.”17 Cabanis was 
especially emphatic. Anthropology would synthesize“the systematic development of 
[man’s] organs with the analogous development of his sentiments and his passions, 
relations from which it clearly results that physiology, analysis of ideas, and ethics are 
but the three branches of a single science, which may be justly called the science of 
man.”18 Other prominent physiologists such as Phillipe Pinel and Charles-Louis Dumas 
contributed to the project. But what singled out Bichat and Cabanis was their adherence 
to advancing the empiricist tradition. Both accepted the empiricist account of the 
generation of ideas out of sensations. Yet they believe that this generative process 
remained obscure so long as it was confined to philosophical reflection. While reading 
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the lectures of Cabanis and Bichat between 1799 and 1802, Biran inventively 
appropriated physiology as the key to securing the unity of the self without recourse to 
transcendental principles.  
 It was on the basis of their respective critiques of sensationalism, I want to 
suggest, that later readers understood Biran’s thought to be better serviceable than 
Cousin’s to engage developments in the natural and human sciences. If the self was not 
anterior to, but instead immanent to sensory experiences, as Biran’s psychology held, 
then the autonomy of consciousness could be articulated in dialogue, rather than in 
confrontation with, those very sciences. In order to appreciate these divergent paths, a 
closer examination of Biran’s and Cousin’s respective psychologies is in order.  
 
Biran’s Treatise on Habit 
 
The lone significant work that Biran published during his lifetime was Influence 
de l’habitude sur la faculté de penser (1802). It was a treatise that won Biran an essay 
competition organized by the Institut de France,19 but its historical significance was far 
greater: the treaty bridged the philosophical epochs of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 20 Biran employed then-contemporary physiological concepts in order to 
explain the nature of force, causality, and substance, all of which were concepts central to 
philosophers of the eighteenth century. Influence de l’habitude was published 
anonymously, and Biran’s only other works to reach the press were a minor essay on the 
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philosophy of Pierre Laromiguière and another on Leibniz.21 “He had the taste for writing 
and the rather strange habit of beginning over again the same work without end,” Paul 
Janet surmised, “but he never had the taste for publishing, he feared it.”22 
Biran construed habit as an ontological principle, a foundation of being as much 
as a condition of freedom. Habit endows humans with the tendencies that impart direction 
to their lives and a backdrop to their self-modification. Biran’s view contrasted with the 
negative appraisal of habit, inaugurated by Descartes and extending through Kant, which 
construed habit as a blind repetition corroding the rational coordination of the will. These 
thinkers condemned habit as mechanized routine, whereas Biran conceived automaticity 
as a constitutive and even virtuous disposition of the will. This positive conception of 
habit was part and parcel of Biran’s picture of consciousness. Thinking, Biran held, is an 
enduring, and even taxing activity, rather than a punctuated act of the understanding.  
Thought, on this picture, is both affective and perceptual, which Biran presented 
as respectively instinctive and intellectual; and habit effectuates the passage of thought 
between these dual dimensions: “Among the repeated impressions which gradually 
weaken, some continue to fade away and even completely vanish, whilst others, in 
becoming more indifferent, not only conserve all their clarity, but often acquire even 
more distinction.”23 Biran posited habit as the force that degrades feeling and perfects 
perception, what he called the double law of habit: “the less we feel, the more we 
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perceive.”24 On the one hand, the double law generates passive habits. The resistance that 
my body meets in its effort to carry out a task, with repetition, engenders a habit 
facilitating my body’s smooth execution of the task. The resistance I initially felt has now 
diminished, and the effort initially demanded subsides. What at first required intellectual 
coordination now flows instinctively. My newfound habit is passive, as I automatically 
carry it out. On the other hand, the double law generates active habits. I hear a new 
language, for example, as a confused mass of sound, unable to understand the meaning of 
discrete words. I commit myself, straining and struggling, to learn the vocabulary. Habit 
facilitates the ease with which I not only come to speak the language, but also to 
understand its meaning. What I at first felt as a cacophony, I now perceive as a system of 
signs with conceptual content. According to Biran, the ensemble of signs that constitute 
ideas are all active habits.  
In the treatise on habit, Biran intervened in the empiricist tradition by 
distinguishing two kinds of sensation where Condillac as well as Locke had only 
conceived of one. Active sensations that the body voluntarily wills, Biran affirmed, are 
different in kind than the passive sensations that the body receives as impressions from 
the external world. For Biran, the active sensation of effort corresponds to a motor force 
that opens an immediate window onto the self. Sensations received passively, no matter 
how intensely impressed or how frequently repeated, are not sufficient to generate an idea 
of selfhood. Biran’s analysis of consciousness as a motor activity dependent on the 
sensation of effort would cleave a newfound basis for spiritualism from the empiricist 
tradition. 
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Effort, Biran argued, generates an idea of the self. But effort depends on the 
distinct sense of motor activity entailed in the feeling of resistance: “Effort necessarily 
carries with it the perception of a relation between the being who moves or who wants to 
move, and an obstacle opposed to its movement. Without a subject or a will that 
determines the movement, without a term that resists, there is no effort, and without 
effort, no consciousness, no perception of any kind.”25 The reason why resistance is so 
essential to selfhood is because it involves a reflexive awareness of one’s effort. I am 
aware of applying my effort as much as my own resistance. “The basic example is not at 
all the effort exerted in order to raise a weight or to break a stick, that is to say the 
experience of a conflict between two forces, one internal and the other external,” Henri 
Gouhier clarifies, “muscular effort gives me the feeling of a force deployed against an 
organic resistance, without any reference to an external object; their opposition is no way 
that between subject and object, but between the active and the inert, the one and the 
multiple.”26 Hence, habit plays a crucial role in generating an idea of the self because 
habit modulates the resistance that my own body confronts in itself. For Biran, the idea of 
the self entails two selves: the self that acts and the non-self that resists.  
Biran set this dialectic of effort and resistance in opposition to Condillac, who 
argued that the sense of touch generates the idea of the self by way of contrast to external 
objects distinct from myself. Not only did Condillac’s argument fail to explain the unity 
of the self, Biran claimed, but it also neglected the reflexive experience that the active 
experience of touching entails. Sensations merely washed over Condillac’s statue since it 
only passively received tactile impressions. As Biran affirmed, “In supposing each 
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interior organic apparatus that is necessary to constitute a being such as a physical man, 
one could examine what he would be with one sense or another, reducing him to odor or 
taste for example, or even to sound or sight; one would see his reflective perceptibility 
narrow or widen before even acquiring any idea of a relation to the exterior world.”27 The 
most that passive sensations can generate, according Biran, is knowledge of the 
individual sense organs, but not knowledge of a unified self, which requires self-
consciousness, that is, an awareness of myself feeling myself. By contrast, the sensation 
of resistance felt in the voluntary exercise of effort generates awareness of an "I who 
moves, or who wants to move." Effort and resistance are for Biran, "two terms of the 
relation necessary to ground the first simple judgment of personality: I am."28 
Biran’s metaphysical distinction between active and passive sensations built upon 
and surpassed the physiological distinction that Cabanis and Bichat drew between the 
body’s inner and outer organs. The inner organs include the liver, stomach, lungs, colon, 
heart, and kidneys, which, by means of their sympathetic coordination, maintain the 
organism through circulation and digestion. The external organs include the senses, 
nerves, larynx, and what these thinkers called “voluntary muscles,” all of which furnish 
the sensory material for perceiving the world. For Cabanis, the division between inner 
and outer organs corresponds to the organism’s sensory and motor functions. The internal 
organs belong to instinct and the external organs coordinate intelligence and reasoning. 
For Bichat, the functions of the two sets of organs correspond to what he respectively 
called organic life and animal life. By building on the physiological distinction between 
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internal and external organs, Biran identified the metaphysical source of the unity of 
consciousness in distinctly internal sensations.   
Cabanis placed particular emphasis on the role that the internal organs play in 
affecting consciousness. He examined the constitution of these organs under various 
conditions such as age, sex, temperament, illness, diet, and climate. Cabanis took note, 
for example, that “in the bad quarters of cities, puberty is not given enough time to 
appear. It is hurried, and its effects are usually confused with the early habit of 
licentiousness.”29 Cabanis made his preference clear for the leisurely life of the province. 
Yet, the contrast was even more marked in the home: “Within pious and strict families, 
where children’s imaginations are directed toward religious ideas, the amorous 
melancholy of their puberty often appears to become mingled with ascetic melancholy.”30 
Despite his bucolic sentimentality, Cabanis’ observations highlighted the crucial role 
played by the internal organs as they transform during puberty and develop an 
adolescent’s consciousness. The consequence Cabanis drew, against Condillac, was that 
“the moral ideas and determinations do not depend solely on what are called the 
sensations, that is the distinct impressions received by the sense organs, but that the 
impressions resulting from the functions of many internal organs contribute to them in a 
greater or lesser degree, and in certain cases appear to produce them alone.”31 Cabanis 
thus opposed the discrete sensations received from the external world to the holistic 
sensations involved in the body’s internal development. It is the latter, Cabanis argued, 
which explain the generation of consciousness.  
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Bichat put physiology in service of histology, the science he founded to study the 
tissues of organs. Bichat contended that the tissues of the heart, lungs, and brain in 
particular express variable vital functions. These are twofold. On the one hand, the 
internal organs express the functions of organic life, which, as Bichat wrote, “is 
composed of a continual succession of assimilation and excretion.”32 Evident in 
vegetables and animals alike, the organic life permits the organism to “live within itself 
only.”33 By contrast, the animal life is peculiar to external organs. The animal life 
regulates the functions of external organs, by which the animal “exists, as it were, out of 
itself: it is the inhabitant of the world, and not, like a vegetable, of the spot which gave it 
birth.”34 According to this schema, animals lead a double life, with their internal and 
external organs respectively expressing organic and animal functions. Bichat presented 
the two lives in inverse ratio. On one side, the external organs such as the eyes, nose, 
ears, and hands, are all symmetrical, composed of a right and a left half; they successfully 
transmit sensations to the brain only when they function harmoniously. A lesion to one 
eye, or a single blocked nostril, for example, affects the totality of the visual or olfactory 
field. On the other side, the internal organs such as the stomach and liver do not function 
as pairs, and where they do, such as the kidneys and lungs, they do not depend on each 
other to produce a unified sensation. Bichat’s schema was parsimonious. It assigned each 
organ a function in proportion to its role in the totality of the body. The punctual and 
voluntary use of the external organs generates clear and discrete ideas of the external 
world. The uninterrupted and involuntary use of the internal organs generates continuous 
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and confused ideas of the self. Biran redistributed Bichat’s schema by arguing that the 
voluntary use of the internal organs engenders an immediate and distinct sense of the self.  
Both Bichat and Cabanis advanced groundbreaking accounts of the distinctly 
internal dimension of sensation that anchored Biran’s treatise on habit. Biran claim that 
he arrived at the same insight independent of his readings of both authors.35 Yet, it is 
clear that Biran’s intellectual debt to Bichat and Cabanis runs deeper than the division 
both drew between the internal and external organs. Each physiologist offered Biran 
further material that he molded into his conceptual edifice. First, Biran amalgamated their 
thought to support the claim that effort generates a unified experience of consciousness. 
Both Bichat and Cabanis posited internal sensations as scantly conscious. The circulatory 
workings of the internal organs that sustain the organism are, in normal conditions, not 
stimulating enough to cross the plane of awareness. The reason was that neither Bichat 
nor Cabanis treated internal sensations as distinctly perceived. In contrast to the distinct 
sensations that the external organs transmit to the brain as perceptions of discrete objects, 
the internal organs produce obscure sensations. Yet, both authors believed that these 
obscure sensations were the most significant category of sensations. According to Bichat, 
the internal organs are the seat of the passions. Anger, sadness, and joy all affect 
consciousness; they affect the voluntary muscles, stimulating or sedating their activity, in 
order to “snatch from the empire of the will, motions which are naturally voluntary.”36 
Cabanis’ views were of a piece. Internal sensations, he claimed, affect the entirety of the 
organism. These thinkers’ physiological research on the internal source of sensations 
staged a profound revolution in empiricist thought by distinguishing two qualitatively 
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different kinds of sensations: holistic sensations affecting the totality of the organism and 
discrete sensations perceived by the external organs. Biran, I am suggesting, mobilized 
this distinction to advance a revolutionary account of habit. His treatise showed that the 
activity of motor effort generates a holistic sensation affecting the totality of the 
organism, and in turn, that this internal sensation imparts unity to consciousness.  
Second, Biran borrowed the conceptual crux of habit – its double law – from 
Bichat in particular, who formulated the double law of habit thus: “The feeling is 
constantly blunted by it, whereas the judgment on the contrary owes to it its perfection.”37 
Habit, Bichat held, regulates the entirety of animal life. He recounted several scenes in 
which habit works on new experiences, such as going to the opera for the first time. What 
is at first felt as a “delightful chaos” gives way, with habituation, to the capacity to 
discern the elements of dance, music, decoration, and narrative.38 Bichat made clear that 
“the center of those revolutions of pleasure, of pain, and of indifference is not in the 
organs which receive or transmit the sensation, but in the mind which perceive it.”39 
Biran would take the philosophical mantle from Bichat and explain those operations of 
the mind. Critical to his explanation was a monistic understanding of habit. Habit, Biran 
argued, does not contribute new content to sensations, but instead discerns the nuances 
already inhering in sensations. That is to say that consciousness does not act on 
sensations from without; rather, consciousness is immanent to the body’s capacity for 
sensation.  
Biran’s treatise ultimately set consciousness in relation to the body anew, in 
opposition to both Cartesian dualism and biological reductionism. Biran reframed the 
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dualism that Descartes inaugurated between a thinking substance and a material 
substance by presenting mind and body as divergent tendencies. The double law of habit 
effectuates the passage from the mental to the bodily, or as Biran presented it, from the 
intellectual to the instinctive: whereas the novice strains her mental powers to co-ordinate 
her resistant limbs, the veteran is unaware of her body’s automaticity. Biran’s treatise 
also critiqued the reductionism of Cabanis. It has been noted that Biran’s first draft 
reflected Cabanis’ view that consciousness is a series of movements.40 Cabanis defended 
a crudely materialist psychology and famously conceived of the brain “as a peculiar 
organ, specially designed for the production [of ideas], just as the stomach is designed to 
effect digestion, the liver to filter bile, the parotids and the maxillary and sublingual 
glands to prepare the salivary juices.”41 The second draft of the treatise, however, 
presented consciousness as what Biran called a “hyper-organic cause”. The resistance 
that effort confronts, Biran believed, exceeds the muscles’ reaction to external-world 
objects. For the duality between resistance and effort, between the non-self and the self, 
is a duality internal to motility.    
The dualism between effort and resistance anchored Biran’s ethics.  Habit erodes 
the resistance that my effort initially meets in order to erect a secondary resistance. It lulls 
the body into mechanistic activity as much as it eases consciousness into rote thinking. In 
both cases, mental activity wanes as corporeal habit waxes, replacing the active exertion 
of effort with passivity: “Its obstinacy is proportional to its blindness.”42 Mental error has 
it source, for Biran, in the passive use of the imagination in place of the active use of 
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recollection. Rules that at first take much effort to memorize become formulae, which, 
once thoroughly habituated, lead us to overlook new evidence. All this serves to support 
Biran’s understanding of freedom: freedom consists of the renewed effort to resist old 
habits. Where judgment becomes mechanical, and automatic memories obscure the 
subtleties before us, we must undergo a newfound effort to overcome the obstacles that 
our habits have erected. Biran’s ethics set freedom against itself, since habit, the very 
condition of our freedom, is also its foremost enemy.  
The novelty of Biran’s foundational principle, that motor activity generates 
consciousness, should not be underestimated, although it did bear resemblance to other 
philosophies of the era. The primacy of effort in Biran’s thought was certainly of a piece 
with Johann Fichte’s account of consciousness as a form of striving (Streben). Fichte 
published his System der Sittenlehre (1798) just four years prior to the appearance of 
Biran’s treatise. Fichte explained the transcendence of freedom from nature, whereby 
consciousness organizes organic causes around a principle of unity, rendering them 
higher, intentional causes.  
More pertinently, Biran kept in close contact with the philosophical school known 
as idéologie, which advanced French empiricism following Condillac. The ideologues 
aimed to build a science of consciousness out of the study of linguistic signs. Chief 
among them was Destutt de Tracy, who coined the term idéologie to signify the study of 
ideas, their origins, and their laws, in his Mémoire sur la faculté de penser (1876). 
Following Condillac, Tracy analyzed ideas by decomposing them into their constituent 
parts, breaking complex ideas into simple ideas. Along with other idéologues such as 
Pierre-George Cabanis, Comte Volney, Dominique Garat, and Pierre Danou, Tracy traced 
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simple ideas to their source in sensation. His Éléments d’idéologie (1801) categorized 
ideas into four faculties – sensation, memory, judgment, and will. He presented each as a 
kind of sensation, effectively prioritizing the first faculty over the other three. The 
priority that Biran placed on motor activity stood in marked contrast to the ideological 
explanation of consciousness as the manipulation of signs. Nonetheless, they shared 
strong ties. Tracy dedicated the twelfth chapter of Éléments to the “faculty we have of 
moving ourselves,” an investigation that flirted with Biran’s account of motility. But it 
was only later in Traité de la volonté et de ses effets (1815) that Tracy acknowledged the 
distinct power of the will. Tracy’s sustained correspondence with Biran on the subject, 
beginning in 1804, would prove influential to Biran’s work following his treatise on 
habit.43 From that point onward, Biran claimed his independence from the ideologues by 




 Cousin self-consciously formulated his account of the unity of the self against 
Biran. “That admirable observer taught me to tease out in all our knowledge, and even in 
the simple events of consciousness, the role of voluntary activity, of that activity in which 
our personality bursts forth.”44 But Cousin conceived the will as one aspect of the self, 
and not as its originating principle. Cousin’s vision of selfhood functioned to hold 
together what he called “triplicity” of consciousness: sensation, will, and, above all, 
reason. Together, these component parts paved the high road from psychology to 
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ontology, as Cousin wrote, “voluntary activity leading to mankind, sensibility to nature, 
and reason to God.”45 On occasion Cousin often appeared Biranian when asserting, “The 
will alone is the person or the moi.”46 But against Biran, Cousin claimed that the will is 
merely a personal capacity, since the feeling of effort involves one’s own volition, 
whereas reason is universal and thus impersonal. Reason, Cousin held, is a faculty all 
thought makes use of, but which no one claims as his own. Biran’s ultimate shortcoming, 
Cousin argued, was that his notion of effort failed to ground an idea of the self sufficient 
to unite the personal will and universal reason.  
 Despite the authority that he wielded, Cousin wrote little of his own. The first and 
most well known publication was his Fragments philosophiques (1826). His others were 
compilations of heavily edited notes of his lecture courses from the École normale 
featuring programmatic statements, or faute de mieux, outlining the contours of eclectic 
spiritualism. The lectures that inaugurated his career at the École normale, however, 
would not undergo publication until 1853 when, following his ouster under the Second 
Empire, Cousin retreated from his position atop the Université de Paris in order to 
systematize his thought in solitude. It took the form of the ambitiously titled, Du vrai, du 
beau, du bien (1854), in which Cousin positioned psychology as the gateway to 
aesthetics, morals, natural and public law, and finally theodicy.47 Although different in 
their content, each domain partakes in the same overarching reality. Cousin’s conviction 
that psychology is the privileged means of making contact with the absolute hinged on 
his unabashed spiritualism, “whose character is to subordinate feeling to the spirit 
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[esprit], and to aim at raising up and enlarging man by all the means that reason 
admits.”48 Psychology’s aim, Cousin held, is to peer into the depths of consciousness and, 
aided by the immediate feeling of spirit, or sens intime, unveil the absolute principles 
embracing all of reality.  
 The clearest window onto Cousin’s system can be found in the curriculum that he 
designed for the lycées as part of the loi-Guizot of 1833. Lycée philosophy professors 
were expected to open class with a brief introduction to the objective of philosophy and 
its distinction from other sciences. The first section was psychology, which was designed 
to teach students the proper method by which to achieve certainty in reasoning. Over the 
course of the section, the professor would explain in each lesson the different faculties of 
consciousness, the very faculties that the introspective method was meant to reveal: 
attention, external perception, judgment, reason, memory, abstraction, generalization, and 
the association of ideas. Cousin deemed each to be a power that consciousness exercises. 
What holds them together is the moi, the principle of unity serving as the foundation of 
psychology. “The self, its identity and its unity” was the final lesson that synthesized the 
psychology section.  
 Psychology concluded with a lesson on the self because Cousin believed that the 
march of Western philosophy culminated in Kant’s transcendental idealism. Specifically, 
Cousin traced his eclectic history spanning the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
which progressed along a providential lineage from empiricism, through common sense 
philosophy, and ultimately to transcendental idealism. Locke, as I have already discussed, 
set the point of departure. Cousin borrowed a significant part of his criticism of Locke 
from the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. Originally propounded in his Inquiry into 
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the Human Mind and the Principles of Common Sense (1764), Reid’s common sense 
philosophy, a term borrowed from Cicero’s sensus communis, analyzed the truths that 
must be presupposed in order to enter into rational discussion. They are truths immune 
from skepticism, including the principle that consciousness experiences direct contact 
with objects in the external world. Against Locke, Cousin took the principle to mean that 
the ideas and sensations that we are directly aware of do not constitute the limit of human 
experience. To that end, sensation is not a privileged mode of experience that mediates 
the external world; but rather, as Cousin interpreted Reid, sensation is simply one mode 
of conscious experience.49   
 Beyond empiricism and common sense philosophy, it was Kant who Cousin 
believed “would introduce us into the depths of a problem which has escaped the other 
schools.”50 Although Kant marked the culmination of philosophy’s historical march, 
Cousin pressed his ideas in service of a higher spiritualism. Its aim was “to seize the 
torch bequeathed to us by the eighteenth century, but to carry it into all the parts of the 
edifice we set about studying.”51 Cousin meant that spiritualism should mend the 
antinomies that Kant had erected. The interstice between the Critiques of theoretical and 
practical reason, which mapped onto the worlds of science and morals, left open the 
possibility of faith. Cousin believed that philosophy did not need to take the divisions of 
Kant’s critical system for granted. It was possible to comprehend the rational kernel 
uniting Christianity. Herein lay the difference as much as the continuity between Kantian 
idealism and its appropriation in Cousinian spiritualism. As Paul Janet remarked, 
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“Metaphysics, for Cousin, could not continue for long as an abstract and logical science. 
Its eminently enthusiastic spirit would come to life and ignite itself in the face of the 
absolute.”52 Cousin’s ambition was to work with Kantian categories while curtailing their 
limitations. In practice, this meant seizing hold of psychology as the surest route to 
ontology, and thereby deriving knowledge of the absolute from the introspection into 
consciousness. 
Kant’s philosophy afforded Cousin not only a philosophical tool, but also, as 
critics noted, a political weapon. Cousin packaged the publication of Biran’s work in a 
thinly veiled critique. In the introduction to Biran’s four volumes of Biran’s 
posthumously published writings, Cousin argued that the sensation of effort fails to 
furnish the metaphysical basis of reason. “Now, in order to succeed in pulling together all 
the philosophy of [Biran’s] psychology,” Cousin wrote, “the first condition is for 
psychology itself to be completed, that it reproduce all the facts of consciousness.”53 For 
Cousin, the “facts of consciousness” are the pure categories of the understanding 
(quantity, quality, relation, modality) that, according to Kant, are presupposed by any 
object in general prior to being experienced. They are pure because the categories cannot 
be derived from any experience. In opposition to Biran’s motor psychology, Cousin 
advanced a faculty psychology. By packaging the posthumous publication of Biran’s 
writings in eclectic wrapping, Cousin managed to blunt the novel import of Biran’s 
psychology, which broke with the outmoded view of consciousness as an ensemble of 
distinct faculties.  
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 The full contours of Biran’s motor psychology, in which he developed a more 
rigorous account of consciousness untethered to the faculty-psychology of the eighteenth 
century, only became known with the publication of his posthumous volumes. The 
dissemination of his work was the subject of intense controversy. Omissions were 
abounding, as Cousin, charged with editing Biran’s late writings, guardedly regulated 
their appearance. Many in fact believed that Cousin intentionally distorted Biran’s legacy 
to safeguard his own eclectic spiritualism. Biran initially designated Joseph Laîné, 
president of the Chamber of Deputies under Louis XVIII, as the executor of his estate. 
Laîné solicited Cousin to inventory four cartons worth of manuscripts in 1825. Yet it was 
only in 1834 that the first of Biran’s manuscripts was released, Nouvelles considérations 
sur les rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, followed by Nouvelles 
considérations sur le sommeil et les songes (1837),54 and finally a more complete four-
volume set, Œuvres philosophique de Maine de Biran, would wait until 1841.   
Readers hastened to criticize Cousin’s summary of Biran’s thought as one-sided. 
Indeed, Cousin, who controlled the release of Biran’s writings, ensured that French 
audiences came to know the thinker within the terms of his own eclecticist interpretation. 
The three axes of Biranisme, according to Cousin, were, first, that the true activity of 
consciousness belongs to the will; second, that the will is the moi, “the personality and all 
the personality;” and third, the moi is the first cause of all conscious activity: “The 
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person, the will, and causality are therefore identical.”55 Cousin faithfully distilled the 
ideas contained in Biran’s early work; but Cousin neglected to mention their debt to 
medical science. Cousin lumped the early Biran together with empiricist thinkers, 
ignoring his inventive appropriation of physiological ideas. 
More importantly, critics alleged that Cousin’s selection of materials was 
woefully incomplete. Pierre Leroux wrote in his journal, Le Globe, urging Cousin to 
publish Biran’s work in its entirety. Following the release of the four volumes in 1841, 
Leroux decried Cousin for having “held for twelve years the case of manuscripts that had 
been entrusted to him, without making them known to the public; for only after two 
lustrums did he publish some of them, a publication which further paid a great honor to 
Biran. But isn’t twelve lost years, when the discoveries of a man like Maine de Biran are 
at stake, just baffling?”56 Leroux’s accusation was legible: Cousin deliberately withheld 
the publication of Biran’s work for fear that it would compromise the edifice of eclectic 
spiritualism. Suspicion was in the air. As Patrice Vermeren suggests, “Was it not because 
its publication would have overshadowed [Cousin], reducing his own glory to have 
shattered the eighteenth century while in addition posing the danger that one could have 
found in Maine de Biran the germ of another spiritualism, more rigorous and coherent 
than eclecticism?”57 Cousin’s authority made him a visible target for his philosophical 
opponents. But the idea that Cousin had intentionally distorted Biran’s thought in order to 
secure his personal prestige stirred a notably incendiary controversy in the otherwise 
aseptic world of philosophical affairs. 
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It was perhaps not beyond Cousin’s political guile to purposefully withhold 
Biran’s manuscripts from publication. But Biran’s heritage also testifies to practical 
reasons for their belated release. Cousin took over an incomplete set of manuscripts that 
Biran had left in Paris. Many others remained in Grateloup-Saint-Grayard, as Biran’s 
subsequent editor, Ernest Naville noted, “having been thrown away indiscriminately as 
paperwork in a waste bin, they were carried back to a grocer’s home by one of his 
servants.”58 Cousin spent time raising funds for the cartons’ publication, a task more 
difficult than he initially thought, since the publisher feared that the little-known 
philosopher’s work would not sell.  
“The works that Victor Cousin edited,” according to one of Biran’s late editors, 
“gave rise to few admirers.”59 Paul Janet reflected that by their publication in 1841, when 
Cousin’s monopoly over French philosophy was already firmly installed, “it seems that 
the moment had already passed for the philosophical germ contained in these writings to 
be able to bear fruit.”60 Biran’s manuscripts underwent publication at a glacial pace for 
most of the nineteenth century. It was the same work, as Henri Gouhier suggests, that 
unfurled from Biran’s disjointed opus: first penned as Mémoire sur la décomposition de 
la pensée, then reworked as Essai sur les fondements de la psychologie, and finally edited 
as Nouveaux essais d'anthropologie.61 This period of production began immediately 
following his treatise on habit in 1802 and extended through 1822, when Biran was 
finally satisfied enough with his work. It marks what scholars categorize as the second 
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period of Biran’s oeuvre, which he dedicated to physiological psychology.62 Between 
Biran’s two major works, the published treatise on habit and the posthumously published 
memoirs on psychology, lies the difference, I want to suggest, between a spiritualism 
preoccupied by an eighteenth-century conception of the will, and a corporeal spiritualism 
of motility that would become indispensable for late nineteenth century readers.   
It was the Swiss François Naville and his son Ernest Naville who took on the task 
of filling the lacunae of Cousin’s editions by publishing Biran’s memoirs on psychology. 
In 1843, when writing his study La Génie de Maine de Biran, François Naville received a 
hefty 35 pounds of manuscripts from Biran’s son, Félix de Biran. He had recovered the 
majority from a waste bin. François Naville gave up his work and dedicated his efforts to 
publishing the carton. He at last made Biran’s writings on psychology available in their 
near entirety in 1845.63 But the majority of the work was done by Ernest Naville 
following his father’s death in 1846. Saddled with piles of unorganized papers, Naville 
remarked, “What a task it is to carry a light into such chaos!”64 Ernest went on to publish 
Biran’s Journal intime in 1857, a collection of memoirs that finally allowed readers to 
synthesize the stages of Biran’s thought. The Naville family’s editions were what one 
editor characterized as a “revelation,” correcting what had until then been an obscure 
rendering of Biran’s thought under Cousin’s editorial authority.65  
Scientific spiritualists of the latter nineteenth century were some of the first 
readers privy to Biran’s scientific writings genrally, and his forceful critique of faculty 
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psychology in particular. It was Alexis Bertrand, a friend of the late Maine de Biran, who 
would make his work especially relevant to scientific spiritualists. Bertrand published 
Biran’s diverse presentations at his Medical Society of Bergerac in Science et 
psychologie. Nouvelle œuvres inédites de Maine de Biran (1887). Indeed, it was only in 
the 1880’s that Biran’s thought became available in its entirety. The circuitous route that 
Biran’s manuscripts followed left his corporeal spiritualism, grounded in a sustained 
dialogue with physiology and psychology, to blossom ever so slowly, waiting some sixty 
years after he originally put pen to paper for later generations to see the scientific import 
of his thought.  
 
 




French readers learned about the scientific import of Biran’s account of motor 
activity with the late publication of the writings he wrote as an organizer of the Medical 
Society of Bergerac. Biran founded the society in 1806. That year, the Empire appointed 
Biran as a regional deputy of the southwestern French town, a position he held until his 
death in 1824. The society gathered forty members in total, including doctors, surgeons, 
pharmacists, and public health officials, who discussed the natural sciences as well as 
issues of public policy.66 Their first goal was to produce a medical topography of the 
region. The society surveyed not only the health of citizens, but also the diseases 
afflicting agriculture, potable water sources, and veterinary health – both domesticated 
animals in homes and farms, in addition to those living in mountain forests. Following 
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their survey, the society regularly informed the mayors and pastors of the predominantly 
Protestant region about the benefits of vaccination – a notable announcement in an age 
before the discovery of bacteria. Diseases were still believed to result from atmospheric 
causes. Yet, vaccinations against smallpox had been recently discovered just ten years 
prior, and Biran insisted on their distribution, especially to children and the elderly. 
Biran’s public health campaign was admirable, yet he failed to muster enough support for 
the society’s continuation. After four years and a total of ten meetings, the society closed 
its doors in 1810.   
 At the Medical Society, one of the most noteworthy subjects debated was the 
work of Franz Joseph Gall, the eccentric Viennese physiologist best known as the creator 
of cranioscopy – what came to be known as phrenology. Cranioscopy claimed to localize 
the mental faculties in their respective areas of the brain. These areas could be discerned 
along the crevices and bumps of the skull; and Gall developed a method to palpate and 
measure the skull in accord with a classification of its different shapes. Each mental 
faculty had its proper place, so injuring brain tissue near the back of the head, for 
example, would disable a person’s "philoprogenitiveness" (from the Greek for "love of 
offspring”), the seat of amorous feelings. Biran was keenly interested yet skeptical of 
Gall’s ambition to break consciousness into distinct faculties. In France, his work was 
first made available thanks to the reports of his disciple, Johann Casper Spurzheim, who 
later vulgarized the doctrine into the racial science that he called “phrenology.” Before 
the Institut de France on March 14, 1808, Spurzheim and Gall presented a paper titled 
“Recherches sur le système nerveux en général, et sur celui du cerveau en particulier.” 
Biran, however, would relay Gall’s findings to the Medical Society by way of the 
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anatomist George Cuvier’s review of cranioscopy published later that year.67 Indeed, 
Bergerac was a hotbed for discussions of the burgeoning science of brain localization 
well before cranioscopy burst into the popular imagination with a biting satire of the 
method in the Edinburgh Review in 1815.68  
Before the Medical Society of Bergerac on November 13, 1808, Biran presented a 
critique of Gall’s work.69  Biran was not interested in the practice of skull palpation that 
had captivated popular audiences. He instead directed his critique at what he took to be 
the more neglected, yet metaphysically intriguing, aspect of Gall’s work: his anatomy, 
and most importantly, the understanding of consciousness that it presupposed. Gall 
proposed an anatomy of the nervous system that identified the brain stem as the hub of 
nervous activity, running down through the spinal cord and up through the brain cortices. 
This account upended the widely held view that the brain is the center of the nervous 
system. Gall instead saw it as an appendix to the nervous system. Biran argued that the 
brain is one of many sites where pairs of nerves formed bulges, indicating prolonged 
nervous activity. Since these bulges protrude the most on the brain, it is easiest to analyze 
them through the curvature of the skull. Although the brain played a derivative role in 
Gall’s nervous anatomy, the brain was the region that most clearly exposed the hidden 
neural bulbs. Gall’s complete classification of the different kinds of bulbs claimed to 
reveal the pathways of nervous activity, indicating the locale of a person’s sensations and 
ideas, but more importantly, his or her temperament and character.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See George Cuvier, Rapport sur un mémoire de MM. Gall et Spurzheim, relatif à l'anatomie du cerveau 
(Paris: Baudouin, 1808).   
68 John Gordon, “The Doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim,” Edinburgh Review 25 (1815): 227-268. 
69 Maine de Biran, “Observations sur les divisions organiques du cerveau considérées comme sièges des 
différentes facultés intellectuelles et morales,” in Tome V des œuvres de Maine de Biran: Discours à la 
société médicale de Bergerac, ed. François Azouvi (Paris: J. Vrin, 1984), 47-81.  
79 
 Biran seized on what he took to be a contradiction between Gall’s nervous 
anatomy and his cranioscopic method. If the nervous system were in fact decentralized, 
as Gall’s anatomy held, then the brain would only manifest a portion of the neural bulbs, 
meaning that the skull would not be the privileged point of access onto the mind’s 
faculties. Biran argued that Gall wound himself into a contradiction after overthrowing 
the accepted anatomy of the nervous system initially presented by Bichat, and his 
division of humans’ organic and animal lives. Only those nerves transmitting animal 
functions, Bichat held, extend immediately to the brain, whereas the nerves transmitting 
organic functions only reach the brain after traversing the spinal cord. Where Bichat 
admitted two kinds of nerves, cerebral and spinal, Gall only admitted one kind. Biran 
argued that Gall had no reason to believe that the brain could house the mind’s faculties if 
the brain did not lay claim to special nerves destined to reach it. Nervous pathways could 
just as easily disperse to other regions of the body. The merit of Bichat’s anatomy, by 
contrast, was that it offered a coherent reason why the brain laid claim to the nervous 
system, specifically those nerves corresponding to animal functions.  
 Biran drew from Bichat’s physiology to critique the faculty psychology that Gall 
endorsed. Bichat’s division between animal and organic life, to recall, explained the 
distinction between two kinds of perceptions: distinct perceptions received from the 
external sense organs, and obscure perceptions received from the internal sense organs; 
the former pertain to intellectual ideas of objects in the external world, whereas the latter 
pertain to what Bichat called the passions affecting the total disposition of the organism. 
Biran argued that by treating the brain as the privileged domain of the mind’s faculties, 
Gall had neglected the obscure internal perceptions that Bichat had shown to be 
80 
transmitted through nerves not immediately destined for the brain. As a result, Gall fell 
captive to a picture of consciousness that conflated what Biran called the “affective 
faculties” and the “intellectual faculties.”70 Gall construed the functions of consciousness 
as discrete and separable, as if they were designed to represent distinct perceptions of the 
world. It naturally followed, Biran affirmed, that cranioscopy aimed to localize mental 
faculties along the skull’s fixed bumps, since Gall already endorsed a picture of 
consciousness amenable to localization. Gall neglected the affective ideas flowing before 
consciousness continuously and incessantly, which express a class of sensations affecting 
the entirety of the organism, and specifically its character and temperament. Bichat’s 
division between organic and animal life ultimately served, for Biran’s purposes, to 
elucidate a more fundamental distinction between two kinds of ideas: “those which arise 
exclusively from the internal sense [sens intime], and which apprehend nothing of the 
outside, and those which, on the contrary, have their reason in exterior observation.”71 
Biran’s critique of craniology provided him with an opportunity to clarify the 
relation between physiology and consciousness’ multiple dimensions – affective and 
intellectual. At stake was the problem of translating the dual nervous systems into the 
duality of consciousness, what Biran called homo duplex. “If the affective faculties, like 
the intellectual faculties, have their seat in the brain,” Biran rhetorically asked of Gall, 
“then where does this opposition and struggle come from, which we feel in ourselves 
between two principles of movements and determinations, that power of desire, the true 
motor force, at times dominant over that of passions, instincts, and appetites that pull in 
the opposite direction as in the stoic sage, and at other times subjugated by those truly 
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unhappy passions that seem to drag us away by a kind of fatum?”72 In other words, what 
was most damning about Gall’s cranioscopy was not the nervous anatomy on which it 
was grounded, nor even the well-known method of skull palpation, but its failure to offer 
a complete account of consciousness in its dual dimensions. 
The work of mid-nineteenth century French alienists confirmed the medical value 
of Biran’s division between the intellectual and affective dimensions of consciousness.73 
“Alienism” was employed to designate the psychology of mental maladies. The alienists 
Jules Baillarger and Jacques-Joseph Moreau de Tours co-founded the Annales médico-
psychologique in 1843. In the journal, they reported on cases of mental regression, which 
they believed to reveal the affective and automatic dimension of consciousness otherwise 
occluded beneath the voluntary and attentive dimension. Baillarger was known for his 
studies of mental automatism evident in hallucinations, depression, and especially in 
what is now called manic-depressive disorder. These delirious states evince what he took 
to be a psychological automatism, whereby consciousness regresses to an animal state. 
Similarly, Moreau de Tours dedicated his Du Hachisch et de l’aliénation mentale (1845) 
to his experimentation with the drug, which he believed offered a glimpse into the 
affective dimension by dampening the motor activity of attentive consciousness. Mid-
nineteenth century alienists thought dreams, above all, present the clearest window into 
this kind of non-attentive, yet nonetheless conscious activity.74  These thinkers drew from 
the Biranian insight that mental abnormalities manifest the resurgence of a 
complimentary dimension of consciousness marked, above all, by the cessation of 
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voluntary activity. This distinction reflected the Biranian division between the active and 
passive dimensions of consciousness, what he later re-formulated as the intellectual and 
affective dimensions. The thesis overhauled the thought of the early nineteenth-century 
alienist Jean-Étienne Dominique Esquirol, who believed that mental abnormalities 
manifest a failure of the mind’s mechanism of attention, and not the positive expression 
of a complimentary activity.75  
 The division that Biran drew between the intellectual and affective dimensions of 
consciousness in his medical writings refined and updated his account of motility from 
the treatise on habit in light of physiological research. In the treatise, Biran had posited a 
stark opposition between passive and active sensations, privileging the latter as the 
unique source of consciousness. In clarifying the organic and animal duality in the human 
nervous system, Biran elucidated the heightened duality internal to conscious activity. He 
thereby resolved the problem left lingering in his treatise on habit: how to explain the 
connection between passivity and activity. But the dialogue that Biran staged between 
Bichat’s and Gall’s anatomies at Bergerac ultimately could not have the last say, since 
medical analysis could offer insights into the causes of conscious activity, but it could not 
explain the meaning that consciousness confers on its activity. “Between the science of 
organic functions, and that of sensations and ideas, I would first observe that the 
physiological analysis of vital functions has nothing and can have nothing in common, in 
its object or in its aim, in its technical practice, and in the results that it proposes, with the 
psychological analysis of ideas and human understanding.”76 Biran defended a 
straightforward anti-reductionism; but he did so, it is worth highlighting, by deriving the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See Esquirol’s three-volume Des maladies mentales considérées sous le rapport médical, hygiénique, et 
médico-légal (Paris: Baillière, 1838).  
76 Maine de Biran, “Observations,” 49.  
83 
very possibility of reductionism from the dual dimensions of consciousness grounded in 
intellection and affection, or what he alternatively referred to as imagination and 
reflection:  
This line of demarcation, I say, which separates the two kinds of analyses 
at stake, is founded on the difference and very opposition between the two 
faculties that direct them respectively, namely: the imagination, which, 
representing what is outside of us, follows exclusively in the formation of 
its pictures from what can be seen, touched, and described as such; and 
reflection, which, concentrating on what is inside us, completely follows 
the most intimate modes, and does not at all have, outside of 
consciousness, signs of manifestation, objects or images, which would 
exist physically. Therefore, there are two analyses or two methods of 
essentially distinct divisions: the first is representative and descriptive; it 
is that which is appropriate to the anatomical and physiological sciences; 
the second is purely reflexive, which must be employed exclusively in the 
science appropriate to ideas and faculties of a thinking subject.77  
 
Biran presented the imagination and reflection as two complementary yet opposed 
dimensions internal to consciousness. The imagination, because it is tailored to the 
external world, engenders illusions when employed to represent the internal world of 
consciousness. One of these illusions belongs to faculty psychology, which divides 
consciousness into an ensemble of discrete faculties as if they were objects occupying 
space in the external world. Cranioscopy thus depended, Biran argued, on a one-sided 
misrepresentation abstracted from the reflective dimension of consciousness. What Biran 
called “reflection” is a dimension that presents ideas as they are experienced reflexively, 
and not as they are observed in the external world. With this newfound division between 
imagination and reflection, Biran forged an internal bond between the atomistic and 
holistic dimensions of experience that he had previously presented as respectively passive 
and active sensations. 
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Nineteenth-century French spiritualism thus emerged out of the rift between a 
spiritualism of the body and a spiritualism of reason. These divergent spiritualisms were 
allied to distinct metaphysical methods, grounded in physiology and history respectively. 
Herein lied the difference, I hope to have shown, between, on the one hand, Biran’s 
corporeal spiritualism, which posited motility as the key to analyzing consciousness’ 
multiple dimensions; and on the other hand, Cousin’s eclectic spiritualism, which posited 
the intellect as the sine qua non of consciousness. These divergent paths, as I have 
argued, followed a history of discontinuous receptions after Biran’s thought had remained 
buried for much of the early nineteenth century. Indeed, the reception of Biran’s 
posthumous work, unearthed as it was from beneath the official philosophy of 
eclecticism, only came about thanks to the efforts of those whose challenge to Cousin’s 
authority was as strident as their commitment to restoring the roots of the spiritualist 
legacy. In their revolt against Cousin’s segregation of philosophical reflection from 
scientific inquiry, and what they saw as his narrow intellectualism, a cadre of thinkers 
who I will examine in the next chapter, Félix Ravaisson, Jules Lachelier, and Émile 














Chapter 2: Nature, Contingency,  




The divergent paths of French spiritualism came to the fore in 1867, when the 
little-known but immensely influential philosopher Félix Ravaisson published his 
Rapport sur la philosophie en France au XIXe siècle. Victor Duruy, the Ministry of 
Public instruction, commissioned Ravaisson to document the state of philosophy of 
France in anticipation of the 1869 Universal Exhibition in Paris. Record keeping was in 
order. Philosophy instruction remained an experimental project in secondary education 
after having re-opened under the Second Empire. Most importantly, Ravaisson released 
his report immediately following the death of Cousin. His death came as the eclectic 
regime’s authority over national pedagogy began to dissolve, a fate Ravaisson welcomed: 
“In these last years, eclecticism, although still in possession of nearly all public 
education, has lost its credit and influence.” 1 The report scanned the past, tracing the 
march of Western philosophy bequeathed to France, from Plato and Aristotle, through the 
scholastics of the Middle Ages, the Kantian revolution, Condillac, Ampère, Royer-
Collard, and up to the physiology of Claude Bernard. But the roots of French 
spiritualism, as Ravaisson presented their lineage, split in two directions: the official 
spiritualism of Cousin, and the subterranean spiritualism of Biran. 
Ravaisson delineated this bifurcation within French spiritualism in opposition to 
the tradition’s critics, most notably the positivist Hippolyte Taine, who republished his 
own report the same year. His Les Philosophes classiques du XIXe siècle en France 
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identified the central fissure in French philosophy to be between positivism and 
spiritualism.2 For Ravaisson, to the contrary, there was a three-fold fissure between 
positivism and two currents of spiritualism. It was a point on which Ravaisson’s student, 
Jules Lachelier, insisted after reading the report: 
Aren’t there in reality, since 1815, two philosophies: on the one hand, that 
of Mr. Cousin and his school, on the other, that of Maine de Biran…Isn’t 
it the silent struggle between these two philosophies, and the gradual 
triumph of the latter over the former, which you did not sufficiently 
indicate in your report?3 
 
Ravaisson’s report served as a bellwether in France for its prognostication of the shape 
that philosophy would take in the post-Cousinian era. The future of philosophy, 
Ravaisson foretold, would bring about what he called a “spiritualist realism or 
positivism”:  
The signs are in place; we can foresee a philosophical epoch soon to come 
whose general character will be the predominance of what might be called 
a spiritualist realism or positivism, having for its motivating principle the 
awareness that consciousness has of itself, a self understood to be an 
existence from which all other forms of existence derive and depend, and 
which is nothing other than its own activity. 4 
 
Ravaisson’s objective was to enhance Biran’s spiritualism on a positive and 
naturalist basis. The contents of conscious experience, Ravaisson believed, ought to be 
studied as facts no less real than the facts of material reality. Studying the immediate (one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Hippolyte Taine, Les Philosophes classiques du XIXe siècle, 3rd. ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1868), vii.  
3 Jules Lachelier, letter to Félix Ravaisson, 15 Aug. 1868, MS 4119, Papiers divers d’Émile Boutroux, 
Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque de l’Institut de France, Paris. 
4 Félix Ravaisson, Rapport, 258, my emphasis. The significance of Ravaisson’s Rapport, and these lines in 
particular, have been documented among French philosophers. Henri Gouhier acknowledges “the most 
apparent manifestation of this new state of spiritualism was the work of Ravaisson himself; but the theses 
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would go on to show how accurately and far off Ravaissons saw,” Œuvres choisies de Maine de Biran 
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“spiritualist positivism” in La gloire de Bergson. Essai sur le magistère philosophique (Paris: Gallimard, 
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might anachronistically say “phenomenological”) data of experience would overcome the 
persistent metaphysical dualisms that haunted the history of philosophy: “In the infinite, 
fact and cause, essence and existence, are one, containing each other as equivalent yet 
abstract expressions of a single positive idea in which reason and experience merge.”5 
And this positive idea, Ravaisson clarified, “is that of a fully active, and thus fully 
spiritual nature, its existence complete and absolute; a nature from which it follows that 
thought, will, and love are one and the same thing, a flame, as it were, without material 
support, and thriving on itself.”6 Spiritualist positivism would, in opposition to Cousinian 
spiritualism, trace the activity of consciousness from the activity of nature, and in so 
doing elevate a new science of consciousness complementing the science of nature.  
Ravaisson’s Rapport resonated throughout France well after its publication. 
“Generations of students,” Bergson reflected, “have learned [these pages] by heart.”7 
Bergson himself was one of those students who adopted spiritualist positivism when he 
began to write his Essai in 1882. 8 But the true value of Ravaisson’s prognostication, 
Bergson believed, lay in the trajectory it lent to philosophers’ engagements with science: 
“That the serious study of the phenomena of life must lead positive science to widen its 
framework, and go beyond the pure mechanism in which it has been enclosed for the last 
three centuries.”9  
Spiritualist positivism, Ravaisson believed, would renew the French spiritualist 
heritage. Despite Cousin’s close regulation of Biran’s reception throughout the first half 
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(Mineola, NY: Dover, 2007), 204, originally published as “La vie et les œuvres de M. Félix Ravaisson-
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of the nineteenth century, Ravaisson sought to restore Biran’s thought as the wellspring 
of a subterranean spiritualist current. In 1840, Ravaisson published a forceful blow to the 
Cousinian regime, arguing that the eclectic philosopher had sullied Biran’s legacy. “Mr. 
Cousin declares that he adopts Maine de Biran’s doctrine of the identity of the moi, or of 
the identity of the personality and the will,” Ravaisson argued, “But at the same time, it 
seems to us that he has denatured and annulled it on account of the restrictions that he 
imposes.”10 It was up to a new generation of spiritualist thinkers to rejuvenate Biran’s 
thought. “It was Ravaisson who taught us,” Jules Lachelier wrote to his colleague, Paul 
Janet, “to conceive being, not by the objective forms of substances or of phenomena, but 
by the subjective form of spiritual action; and furthermore, this action ultimately lies in 
thought or will [volonté].” Although the problem of “spiritual action” was 
straightforward, “perhaps even the only one which…lends unity to our philosophical 
movement,” the path by which the problem traversed the nineteenth century was not. “I 
don’t need to remind you of the article in the Revue des deux mondes [1840] in which 
Ravaisson connected his writing to the philosophy of Maine de Biran. There you have,” 
Lachelier concluded, “our point of departure.”11  
According to Ravaisson, Cousin failed to appreciate that Biran’s concept of effort 
was not simply a personal feeling constitutive of consciousness, but also an impersonal 
force inhering in nature. “Effort supposes… an anterior tendency which, by its auto-
development, provokes resistance; it is the original activity, prior to effort, which, 
reflected by resistance, comes to possess itself by itself in a voluntary action.” 12 
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Lachelier, Institut de France.  
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Ravaisson read Biran through a vitalist lens, arguing that habit marks the threshold 
between consciousness and nature. The double law of habit, according to Biran, emerges 
from a single vital force. As Mark Sinclair remarks, “Instead of Biran's distinction of 
passive and active impressions… Ravaisson apprehends… a graduated continuum from 
the lowest levels of activity in more passive, sensory experiences to its highest levels in 
the clearest consciousness and voluntary apperception.”13 Ravaisson advanced his 
reading of Biran’s treatise on habit in De l’habitude (1838), a guiding book in the 
development of French spiritualism that illuminated Biran’s account of motility as a 
naturalist alternative to eclectic spiritualism.  
 This chapter traces Ravaisson’s formative role in nineteenth-century French 
spiritualism, joining the Biranian past to the post-Cousinian future. In the wake of his 
Rapport, a wave of thinkers advanced spiritualist positivism in order to expand the scope 
of science and conceptualize the meaning of positive facts anew. Their work, I am 
arguing, set the stage for the ascent of scientific spiritualism. In particular, Jules Lachelier 
and Émile Boutroux, two students of Ravaisson, enlarged Biran’s psychology by setting 
it in an energetic and creative nature. Specifically, Lachelier and Boutroux posited 
contingency as the mediating principle connecting consciousness and nature. The 
contingency inherent in nature, these thinkers argued, explains the possibility of novelty 
and ultimately the genesis of human freedom. Their elaboration of the indeterminate 
creativity inhering in the determinate laws of nature constituted a formidable challenge to 
Cousin’s eclectic regime and a novel rapprochement between metaphysics and science.  
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Félix Ravaisson’s De l’habitude 
 
Jean Gaspard Félix Ravaisson-Mollien was born in 1813 in Namur, a small town 
in modern-day Belgium. As a young student, Ravaisson received the sponsorship of 
Cousin after having written a winning essay on Aristotle’s Metaphysics in a competition 
hosted by the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in 1834. Following Cousin’s 
recommendation, Ravaisson spent time in Munich attending Friedrich Shelling’s 
philosophy lectures. Upon returning to Paris in 1837, Ravaisson submitted his thesis, De 
l’habitude, to the Sorbonne, and pursued a career outside of academia. Although he was 
never a professor, Ravaisson nonetheless exercised a commanding influence over the 
matriculation of French philosophy students, first as an Inspector of Libraries, then as an 
Inspector General of Higher Education. Moreover, he retained a steady position on the 
jury of the agrégation in philosophy, which meant that he oversaw the advancement of 
philosophy students to the rank of professor. From 1870, he was even a curator of 
classical antiques at the Louvre. The fact that a philosopher as brilliant as Ravaisson 
spent his career on the sideline of the universities has led some to speculate that Cousin 
barred him from becoming a professor.14 In fact, Ravaisson became the secretary of the 
Ministry of Public Instruction under Achille de Salvandy, an outspoken opponent of 
Cousin.  
Ravaisson argued in De l’habitude that habit forges a bond between the will and 
nature. Habit is what Ravaisson called “a natured nature, the product and successive 
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revelation of naturing nature.”15 Ravaisson remained committed to the Biranian principle 
that consciousness is, at bottom, dependent on the will. But whereas Biran’s treatise on 
habit was concerned with the effects of habit on consciousness, Ravaisson probed the 
metaphysical impulse that animates habit, not only in humans, but in the entire organic 
realm. As Bergson summarized Ravaisson’s sweeping thesis, “The visible universe is 
presented to us as the external aspect of a reality which, seen from within and grasped in 
itself, would appear to us as a gratuitous gift, as a great act of liberality and love.”16 
Ravaisson propelled his thesis by pursuing the theological and aesthetic implications of 
habit on the one hand, and the French medical tradition of vitalism on the other.    
Ravaisson organized De l’habitude into two halves: the first traced the ascent of 
habit’s animating power from brute matter through vegetable, animal, and ultimately 
human life; the second half descended, as he described, “from the clearest of regions of 
consciousness [as] habit carries with it light from those regions into the depths and dark 
night of nature.”17 The ascent follows the progressive degrees of habitual activity found 
in nature. The freer the organism, the greater the force by which habit imparts its 
tendencies toward action. Vegetables develop habits more freely than brute matter, and 
animals more freely than vegetables. Even bamboo shoots, Ravaisson noted, habitually 
mold to the pole around which they grow; but in animals, and especially in humans, the 
power of spontaneity reaches its apex. “Spontaneity,” for Ravaisson, signified the interval 
between the actions an organism carries out by its own effort and that organism’s passive 
reactions to the environment. In brute matter, where action and reaction are equivalent, 
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17 Félix Ravaisson, Of Habit, 59.  
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this interval is inexistent; but in human consciousness, this interval is pushed to its limit, 
since humans’ free exercise of their will surpasses the energy imbibed via nutrition. It is 
an interval constituting what Ravaisson called a being’s “internal potentiality,” which he 
construed as the condition of possibility, following Biran, for the double law of habit: 
“The change that has come to [an organism] from the outside becomes more and more 
foreign to it; the change that it has brought upon itself becomes more and more proper to 
it. Receptivity diminishes and spontaneity increases.”18 As a being acquires habits, nature 
penetrates its tendencies and guides its spontaneous activity. Habit, as it were, sutures the 
interval between activity and passivity.  
 The second half of De l’habitude traced the descent from habit to nature. 
Ravaisson’s aim was to reframe the distinction between the body and consciousness, or 
better, between nature and the will, not as a static division, but instead as “a dividing line 
that is always moving, and which advances by an imperceptible progress from one 
extremity to the other.”19 Drawing on Biran, Ravaisson argued that consciousness 
emerges from the immediate feeling of effort. And where habit diminishes the effort 
required to execute actions, consciousness recedes into mechanistic regularity. As one 
commentator writes, “ideas are no longer representative, it is the idea in action, the 
actualization of the ideal in this confusion of the end and of movement that is its 
tendency.”20 Habit, in other words, does not simply bridge the division between intention 
and action, but generates the intentional horizon along which consciousness and nature 
put the body into action. “Habit is thus, so to speak, the infinitesimal differential, or, the 
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dynamic flexion from Will to nature.”21 Ravaisson’s decent from the heights of 
consciousness to the depths of nature served to show that habit traverses an imperceptible 
continuity between the two poles.  
 The poles of consciousness and nature equally circumscribed the domain of 
freedom, which Ravaisson conceived as the transition between activity and passivity, or 
what he called “action” and “passion” (or passivity). For Ravaisson, these are the twin 
dimensions of habit, and it was his goal to present habit as imparting both a metaphysical 
and aesthetic dimension to freedom. He argued that true freedom depends on the proper 
cultivation of habit such that one exerts just enough effort (conscious coordination) so as 
not to overwhelm the resistance encountered in mechanical repetition (force of nature). In 
perhaps one of the most eloquent passages of his book, Ravaisson characterized this 
delicate balance action and passion:  
[A]s resistance fades, there is no longer anything to reflect the principle of 
action back onto itself; nothing calls it back to itself. Its will is lost in the 
excess of its freedom. The subject experiencing pure passion is completely 
within himself, and by this very fact cannot yet distinguish and know himself. 
In pure action, he is completely outside of himself, and no longer knows 
himself. Personality perishes to the same degree in extreme subjectivity and 
in extreme objectivity, by passion in the one case and by action in the other. It 
is in the intermediate region of touch, within this mysterious middle ground 
of effort, that there is to be found, with reflection, the clearest and most 
assured consciousness of personality.22 
 
Freedom, balanced between what Ravaisson called “mechanical fatality” and “reflective 
freedom,”23 amounts to “the law of grace.”24 The aesthetic meaning of the concept is 
evinced, for example, by a ballet dancer, whose gestures express her seemingly effortless 
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levitation.25 Hence, grace manifests as “the law of limbs.”26 But Ravaisson equally 
conceived grace in theological terms: “Nature is prevenient [divine] grace. It is God 
within us, God hidden solely by being so far within as in this intimate source of 
ourselves, to whose depths we do not descend.”27 Paradoxically, it is on the visible body, 
and not in the depths of the soul, where grace manifests its theological splendor. Habit, 
according to Ravaisson, inscribes freedom on the flesh.  
 In radicalizing Biran’s treatise, Ravaisson drew on a number of sources from the 
French vitalist tradition, Xavier Bichat chief among them. Vitalism explains the 
distinction between life and matter on account of a vital force animating organisms. 
Against biological mechanism, which explains vital functions such as respiration and 
digestion on account of the machine-like relations between an organism’s organs, 
vitalism affirms the existence of an immaterial principle that coordinates the inner 
harmony of the organism.28 Bichat, to recall, identified this principle in organic tissues, 
which actively resist the decaying influence of matter. Ravaisson’s references were 
extensive, ranging from the seventeenth-century animist Jan Baptist von Helmont to the 
eighteenth-century physiologist Paul Joseph Barthez. What they shared was a 
commitment to the naturalist distinction between the variability of living organisms and 
the mechanical fatalism of inorganic matter.  
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 Habit functions as a “hyper-organic cause,” Ravaisson argued, thanks to the vital 
principle inhering in nature.29 Ravaisson saw himself as filling in the lacuna of Biran’s 
treatise, which remained silent about the cause of habit. Habit effectuates motor 
dispositions in organisms that exceed not only the mechanistic laws of physics and 
chemistry, but also the organic laws of biology. The causal laws peculiar to these 
sciences, as Ravaisson understood them, determine the relations between natural 
phenomena that are external to each other. Habit, however, guides the desires and needs 
internal to the organism. These internal activities, or inclinations of the will, depend on 
the indetermination inhering in the vital principle interpenetrating the otherwise 
determinate laws of nature. Nature thus contributes a distinct force to habit, which is 
irreducible to natural causes. Yet, as Jean Cazeneuve suggests, De l’habitude went 
beyond classical vitalism, in that Ravaisson did not situate vital forces against other 
domains of nature.30 Ravaisson thus overcame the modesty of the vitalists he cited, who 
posited the vital force as one element within nature, as if life occupied islands amidst a 
sea of physical matter. Rather, Ravaisson treated the totality of nature as the 
manifestation of a single vital principle that progressively enlarges its scope across the 
hierarchy of vegetal, animal, and human life.  
 De l’habitude stood out as singular among the theses written under Cousin’s 
watch.31 Ravaisson did not trace a hagiography of the great thinkers leading to Cousin’s 
eclectic spiritualism, as was the case for most doctoral students of the period. Ravaisson 
instead radicalized Biran’s account of conscious activity by illuminating its dynamic 
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31 See “Chronique littéraire de Charles Labitte,” Revue des Deux Mondes T. 20 (1839): 523-529. 
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naturalist foundation. In Ravaisson’s hands, Biran’s thought offered a philosophical 
resource for spiritualist thinkers committed to the autonomy of consciousness, yet 
captivated by its continuity with nature.  
 
 




Jules Lachelier was born in 1832 in Fontainbleau near the forest where he would 
later retreat from the Parisian academic scene to hike with Ravaisson. Lachelier entered 
the École normale supérieure as a student in 1861, and although Ravaisson was not a 
professor there, his influence loomed over the institution. Ravaisson’s position as regular 
member of the jury for the agrégation in philosophy afforded him the power to steer the 
examination’s content, and thus mold the philosophical itinerary students followed in 
preparation. But following the suppression of philosophy instruction under the Second 
Empire – the field was transformed into rhetoric with the education reforms of 1853 – 
Lachelier had to wait a decade before he could sit the agrégation. In 1863, he finished 
first in the newly opened class of philosophy agrégés, a diverse group ranging from 
recent university graduates to elder autodidacts anticipating the opportunity to launch 
their deferred philosophical careers.32 Lachelier’s success granted him an immediate 
teaching post at the École normale, where he shaped a generation of students who came 
of age in the post-Cousinian philosophical climate.    
As a doctoral student, Lachelier began by writing a thesis on Maine de Biran. “I 
think I agree with everyone in considering him as one of the strongest supports of 
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spiritualism,” Lachelier wrote to Ravaisson.33 The problem that Lachelier tackled turned 
on the principle of causality in Biran’s thought, the key, he believed, to justifying the 
explanatory principles of the natural sciences. If motor effort generated an immediate 
apprehension of causation, as Biran stipulated, then on what basis could the personal 
nature of the will ground the universal nature of force? “From there, it is difficult to 
abstract the absolute and necessary notion of substance from a relative and contingent 
fact of individual existence. There you have the vague character of a notion meant to suit 
both consciousness and exterior bodies.”34 Lachelier completed twenty-nine pages of his 
thesis before abandoning the project. He instead studied Kant to uncover the bases of 
scientific causality. In fact, Lachelier gained a reputation as a vanguard of Kantianism at 
the École normale, where he self-consciously “Kanticized all year long.” 35 He was 
known for meeting students in his office, where a copy of Kant’s First Critique rested on 
his desk, always open to the page stating that the “I think” accompanies all our 
perceptions.36  
Lachelier’s commitment to Kant was thoroughly idiosyncratic. Lachelier argued 
in his magnum opus, Du fondement de l’induction (1871), that the laws of mechanism are 
not sufficient to exhaustively explain the natural world. Our concept of nature also 
presupposes the unifying activity of consciousness, specifically the Kantian 
understanding of consciousness as apperception But Lachelier also went well beyond 
Kant. True to Ravaisson’s understanding of the continuity between consciousness and 
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nature, Lachelier contended, “The true philosophy of nature is a spiritualist realism, in 
the eyes of which every being is a force, and every force a thought which tends to a more 
and more complete consciousness of itself.” 37 Du fondement sought to surpass the limits 
of mechanistic science in demonstrating the freedom inhering in the natural world.  
The specific problem that Du fondement addressed was the use of induction in the 
natural sciences. As a logical operation, induction facilitates the passage from the 
particular to the universal. At stake for Lachelier was the operation of induction in our 
knowledge of nature: how it is that science grounds necessary laws on the basis of 
contingent facts? The problem, Lachelier contended, hinges on the causal principles put 
to work when observing natural processes, since the natural sciences posit causal 
relations in order to predict the occurrence of a future event from prior events. According 
to Lachelier, the laws of nature depend on two kinds of causes: efficient causes and final 
causes. Efficient causes hold between a series of events, whereby the same effects follow 
when the same conditions arise – a principle that Lachelier identified with the universal 
laws of mechanics. Efficient causes explain, for example, the momentum transferred 
between objects in motion. Final causes, however, hold between a whole and its parts, 
such as in organisms, where the function of individual organs are tailored to their role in 
a biological system – what Lachelier, following the physiologist Claude Bernard, called 
the “directive idea” [idée directrice]. It is the final cause of the circulatory system, for 
example, to transport nutrients. Although the natural sciences make use of final causes, 
the very concept of a final cause, Lachelier argued, depends for its condition of 
possibility on the free activity of consciousness.   
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By positing the foundation of both final and efficient causes in the free activity of 
consciousness, Lachelier countered the claims of British associationism and Cousinian 
spiritualism. The associationist school posited efficient causality as the prototype of 
induction, exemplified in the repetition of similar effects out of similar conditions. Where 
repetitions hold between natural phenomena, consciousness forges an association 
between cause and effect. On the associationist account, the natural sciences uncover 
probabilistic, rather than necessary, relations, which for Lachelier left open the possibility 
of skepticism. Just because certain effects followed certain causes in the past does not 
ensure the same will effect will follow in the future. Efficient causality alone, as 
Lachelier argued, fails to secure a satisfying foundation for the organization manifest in 
nature. The Cousinian school, on the other hand, emphasized final causality, which 
depends on the concept, or what Cousin (in reference to Kant) called the “intellectual 
intuition” of beings. That is, the concept of an organism determines the complementary 
organization of its constitution parts. Since the principle of organization is not 
immediately evident in an organism’s anatomy, the natural sciences rely upon an 
intellectual intuition to determine how the organism is meant to develop. But for 
Lachelier, the Cousinian notion of final cause, confined to an exclusively intellectual 
operation, remained vague. More importantly, both associationism and Cousinian 
spiritualism severed the continuity between consciousness and nature: associationism by 
reducing knowledge to what is senses in nature, and Cousinian spiritualism by positing 
rational concepts of nature’s unity sui generis. “Empiricism vainly endeavors to set a 
principle on the solid, yet narrow ground of phenomena; the opposite doctrine 
[Cousinianism], in order to give this principle a wider base, builds in a void and only 
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manages to state a need of consciousness while claiming to satisfy it.”38 A sturdy 
foundation of induction instead depends, as Lachelier claimed, on a spiritualist reading of 
Kant’s transcendental principles.  
 The transcendental unity of apperception provided Lachelier with the key, first, to 
explaining both efficient and final causes, and second, to preserving the connection 
between consciousness and the natural world. True to Kant, Lachelier proceeded by 
deducing the foundation of induction from the requirements of science. “The most 
elevated of our knowledge is neither, on this hypothesis, a sensation nor an intellectual 
intuition, but a reflection by which thought immediately seizes its own nature and the link 
it supports with phenomena: it is from this link,” Lachelier argued, “that we can deduce 
the laws that consciousness imposes on them.”39 The unity of apperception, on 
Lachelier’s reading, confers unity on natural phenomena, precisely because conscious 
apperception instantiates its unity, following Kant, in the act by which it imparts a 
systematic structure to nature. But systematicity is not simply a construction of 
consciousness; it is also evident in natural phenomena themselves, since their “necessary 
determination is without a doubt something distinct from us, for it imposes itself on us 
and resists all the vagaries of our imagination.” 40 But sequential relations are not the only 
form of relations inhering in nature; there is also the spontaneity of life. Without final 
causes, biologists would be unable to explain the variations observed in each new 
generation of a species, as much as the complex relations among an organism’s biological 
systems.  
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Lachelier’s idiosyncratic reading of Kant, formulated in opposition to 
associationism and Cousinianism, demonstrated that final causes do not rigidly determine 
natural processes. Finality, that is to say, is not tantamount to ironclad teleology. Rather, 
Lachelier appropriated finality to formulate an account of spiritualist positivism that 
explained the harmony inhering in nature. Final causality amounts to “a flexible and 
contingent law in each of its applications: it requires a kind of harmony in the ensemble 
of phenomena, but it guarantees neither that this harmony will always be composed of the 
same elements, nor even that it won’t be upset by any disorder.”41 Final causes allow for 
reciprocal variation, evident in biological processes such as reproduction and retardation, 
evolution and devolution. In other words, final causes, according to Lachelier, explain the 
possibility of contingency, and more importantly, the contingency on which efficient 
causes ultimately depend. “[T]he realm of final causes, by penetrating the realm of 
efficient causes without destroying it, exchanges everywhere force for inertia, life for 
death, freedom for fatality.”42 The laws of physics, for example, depend on the efficient 
causes that hold between the points traversed by an object in movement; but the object’s 
motion depends on the final causes that impart it with a tendency. This latter order of 
causality accords with the intensive force propelling the object, an order otherwise hidden 
beneath its extensive measurement. It is what Lachelier called the aesthetic order of 
nature: “Nature thus possesses two existences founded on two laws that thought imposes 
on phenomena: an abstract existence, identical to the science for which it is an object, and 
a concrete existence, identical to what one could call the aesthetic function of thought, 
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which rests on the contingent law of final causes.”43 The aesthetic order of nature finds 
expression in the harmony and freedom with which final causes endow natural processes. 
But the aesthetic order equally explains the foundation of induction, of both the necessary 
laws of efficient causes and the contingency opened by final causes. Lachelier’s account 
of induction thus sought to expand the natural sciences beyond the narrow reach of 
mechanistic principles, and thereby demonstrate that it is not universal necessity, “but 
rather universal contingency that is the true definition of existence, the spirit of nature 
and last word of thought.”44 Lachelier’s reconciliation between the realms of mechanism 
and aesthetics deepened the bond that Ravaisson had initially forged between nature and 
consciousness. Ravaisson’s project, as Lachelier affirmed, animated the effort to 
naturalize spiritualism against the Cousinian tradition:  
There is a kind of spiritualism, which, at face value, consists of simply 
placing spirit [l’esprit] above nature without establishing the relation 
between one and the other. But there is a deeper and fuller spiritualism, 
which consists of searching within spirit for the explanation of nature 
itself, on the evidence of the unconscious thought that works within nature 
and becomes conscious within us, and that only works in order to bring 
about an organism through which it passes from… an unconscious form to 
a conscious form. This second spiritualism, it seems to me, was that of 
Ravaisson.45 
 
Lachelier’s spiritualist critique of the limitations of mechanism spurred many to 
criticize the philosopher for advocating the “bankruptcy of science.” “At the École 
normal they teach the relativity of science and the supremacy of morals,” one critic 
lambasted, “you find there, since Lachelier, all the young generations of students learning 
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it while beginning their studies.” 46 Yet Lachelier did not oppose science, as I hope to 
have shown; he instead critiqued a narrow conception of science, all the while defending 
mechanistic principles as the starting point of natural scientific inquiry. “Determinism is 
certainly not the truest system, and I even take it as absolutely false the moment it 
becomes exclusive, but on the other hand,” Lachelier hastened to clarify in a letter to 
Ravaisson, “it is the clearest, or rather, the lone clarity for our mortal eyes.”47  
Du fondement endured as the chief work by which Lachelier was known until his 
death in 1913. The young Bergson even read it as a young lycée student.48 Lachelier 
insisted that Du fondement, despite its mass appeal, was only a modest contribution to 
French spiritualism. When the philosopher Gabriel Séalles offered to write a 
philosophical biography on Lachelier, he promptly declined. “I had, I believe, some 
philosophical ideas,” Lachelier wrote, “hardly original, nearly all drawn from Descartes, 
Leibnitz, and Plato as well as Aristotle, who were all, no doubt, more valuable; but these 
ideas were never strongly enough connected, nor even largely enough developed, to make 
them into a system, or even simply a doctrine.” 49 Lachelier’s claim that he never had a 
system was not without merit. But his engagement with the natural sciences, and 
insistence that freedom surpasses the limits of the mechanistic world, lent a durable 
advancement to spiritualist concept of contingency in post-Cousinian France.   
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Nature and Contingency in the Thought of Émile Boutroux 
 
Émile Boutroux was born to a Catholic family in Montrouge, France on July 28, 
1845. Catholicism, and specifically his commitment to man’s freedom amidst the natural 
world, motivated Boutroux’s philosophical formation. Boutroux began at the École 
normale in 1865 and studied under the tutelage of Lachelier. Boutroux’s philosophical 
orientation became clear at an early age. He sought to reconcile the spiritualist 
philosophy in which he was immersed with the natural sciences. “As soon as I was at the 
École normale,” Boutroux reflected, “I wondered why philosophy had been confined to 
the section of letters, while all the great thinkers…had participated in the sciences.“ 
Boutroux believed that if philosophy “is a matter of truth, and not only of sentiment, then 
it could not consider the acquisitions of the positive sciences as its strangers.” 50  
Reconciling metaphysical and experimental methods preoccupied the young 
Boutroux, especially in his rich correspondence with Lachelier. “Take the example of 
water boiling. How does it boil?” Boutroux queried his professor. “The bubbles of vapor 
form and leave the vase that is in contact with the fire; the bubbles burst for a certain time 
before arriving at the surface of the liquid.” Experimental methods, Boutroux insisted, 
seek to uncover more than just how water boils. The problem at stake was why the water 
boils. “Science, Claude Bernard says, consists of predicting the phenomena of nature and 
mastering them. In other words, after having responded to the question how, you must 
respond to the question why? It is when we know the phenomena by their determinate 
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cause that we can predict and master them.” 51 It is up to the sciences, Boutroux affirmed, 
to ascertain the causes of natural processes; but Lachelier encouraged his student to seek 
further: “the question why might be susceptible to several meanings, and these meanings 
could be the object of metaphysics.”52 Indeed, metaphysics would not serve Boutroux 
simply to elucidate the foundations of the sciences, but to intervene in their working 
concepts.  
 After Boutroux passed the agrégation in philosophy in 1868, Lachelier suggested 
that “you will be a dangerous professor, so shouldn’t we send you on a mission.53 With 
Lachelier’s encouragement, Boutroux left to study under Eduard Zeller, the neo-Kantian 
professor at the University of Heidelberg. In fact, Boutroux was part of a wave of French 
intellectuals in the late nineteenth century who studied idealist philosophy across the 
Rhine.54 The timing, however, could not have been worse. The outbreak of the Franco-
Prussian War severed Boutroux from his intellectual and familial roots. At home, 
Lachelier served in the National Guard. Although he saw little combat from what he 
described as his “sedentary position,” Lachelier, skeptical of the Republican cause, 
developed what he described as “a sad idea of Parisians’ political intelligence.” 55 
Abroad, the experience of war hardened Boutroux. He returned to the wreckage of Paris 
in 1870, the city humiliated in the wake of the nation’s defeat and broken by the 
catastrophe of the Commune. Boutroux managed to find intellectual refuge by teaching in 
provincial lycées, first in Caen, then in Montpellier, and finally in Nancy. Although his 
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travels in Germany contributed to his defense of German culture for much of his life, the 
First World War prompted Boutroux to publically discern the sources of German 
belligerence in the idealist philosophy he had studied. “What is the German meaning of 
civilization?” Boutroux inveighed in a 1915 pamphlet, “It is a virile education aimed at 
force and employing force.”56  
 As a lycée philosophy instructor, Boutroux dedicated his time outside the 
classroom to drafting his doctoral thesis, De la contingence des lois de la nature (1874). 
Motivated by Lachelier’s concept of contingency, Boutroux demonstrated that freedom is 
not simply an exception to the mechanistic worldview, but immanent to the causal order 
of nature. Boutroux addressed De la contingence to natural scientists whose ambition it 
was to determine the necessary laws governing natural phenomena. A law of necessity 
holds where the same conditions generate the same effects. The paradigmatic example 
Boutroux had in mind was the law of the conservation of energy, which holds that the 
total energy of an isolated system remains constant over time. Variously formulated in 
the mid-nineteenth century by the physicists Robert Mayer, James Joule, and Hermann 
von Helmholtz, the law of the conservation of energy subsumed seemingly singular or 
arbitrary exchanges of energy under laws of necessity. Boutroux sought to demonstrate 
that the law of conservation is not exhaustive, and furthermore, that contingency is not 
simply an exception to the law of conservation, but a constitutive dimension: “Thus every 
fact” Boutroux wrote “depends not only on the principle of conservation, but also, and in 
the first instance, on a principle of creation.”57 De la contingence formulated the 
principles of novelty complementing the stability of nature. Boutroux did so by 
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comparing the postulates of science and the laws of reality from, as it were, two 
directions. From the direction of the intellect, the concept of causal necessity fails to 
completely capture the complexity of natural phenomena. From the direction of nature, 
creativity informs natural processes, from the distribution of energy to the emergence of 
new life forms. Boutroux thus demonstrated the very necessity of contingency.  
He did so by building upon Lachelier’s investigation of causality, and by further 
showing that the causal principles employed in the natural sciences must necessarily 
incorporate contingency. “How can we imagine that the cause, or immediate condition,” 
Boutroux asked, “really contains all that is needed to explain the effect?”58 If a cause did 
contain all that is needed to explain an effect, then an identical relationship would hold 
between the two. In that case, causality would “never contain that wherein the effect is 
distinct from itself, that appearance of a new element which is the indispensable 
condition of a relation of causality.”59 Contingency must, therefore, be a necessary 
dimension of causality, Boutroux concluded, in order to ensure that there is heterogeneity 
between a condition and its effect, such that effects introduce novelty in excess of their 
causes. The two directions of Boutroux’s argument showed that, by fact and by right, 
natural processes are composed of effects that exceed their causes. From the direction of 
nature, effects in excess of their cause are empirically observable: “The seed that falls 
from the beak of a bird on to a snow-clad mountain may occasion an avalanche which 
will submerge the valleys below.”60 From the direction of the intellect, the concept of 
causality entails contingency. If a condition could exhaustively explain what it 
conditions, then the two would be identical, precluding any genuine distinction between 
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cause and effect. Therefore, according to Boutroux, it is both factually evident that there 
are effects in nature which surpass the explanatory power of their cause (quid facti), and 
that the notion of causality must account for the novelty by which effects exceed their 
cause (quid juris).  
 The causal models of the natural sciences were not wrong, Boutroux argued, so 
much as limited. His demonstration showed that the law of the conservation of energy, in 
particular, suppresses the contingency inhering in nature by making use of a concept of 
causality designed to reign in the heterogeneity between causes and effects. Energy 
remains constant where purely quantitative relations of motion are abstracted from the 
qualitative transformations in natural processes, such as when water transforms into 
vapor – a process only made intelligible, from the standpoint of the law of conservation, 
in the terms of the amount of energy dissipated. “The law of the conservation of force 
presupposes a change it does not explain,” Boutroux contended, “which it would even 
make unintelligible were it regarded as possessing undivided sway over primordial 
modes of matter.”61 In this sense, the law of the conservation of energy reflects an 
abstract dimension of nature, isolated from a wider dimension contingency.  
 This was not to argue for the skeptical conclusion that scientific laws are simply 
human conventions imposed on nature, although De la contingence lent itself to this 
reading, especially in its claim that “Laws are the channel along which rushes the stream 
of facts: these latter have hollowed it out, although they follow its track.”62 Rather, 
Boutroux saw himself as intervening in the working concepts of the natural sciences. The 
principle of contingency, he argued, is not condemned to disorder and confusion, but is 
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fully intelligible, and moreover, ought to be incorporated into the sciences. Whereas the 
law of the conservation of energy exemplifies what Boutroux called the “static sciences,” 
a complementary, “dynamic” science would employ a historical method that traces the 
contingent transformations of natural processes. For Boutroux, examining the history of 
natural processes entailed meticulous experimentation on singular circumstances, in 
opposition to the deductive application of general laws. The dynamic sciences would 
unveil the very contingency giving shape to natural processes: “[I]f it is legitimate to set 
up dynamic sciences alongside of and above the static sciences; if objective science 
actually consists of these higher sciences, then the doctrine of contingency is 
conformable to the conditions of science.”63 
Science, for Boutroux, was not a monolithic enterprise. He conceived contingency 
as the organizing principle of the separate sciences. Each domain of nature manifests a 
heightened degree of contingency, from inorganic matter to organic creatures, from 
animal life to human being, and from sensibility to intelligence in consciousness.  
Physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and finally philosophy: these were the sciences 
that Boutroux arranged in a hierarchy, whereby each higher level introduces greater 
contingency, surpassing the explanatory principles of the lower levels.  Biology, for 
example, makes use of physical principles, but it cannot be reduced to the laws of 
physics. Boutroux directly opposed the claims of positivists such as Hippolyte Taine and 
Herbert Spencer who sought to uncover the universal principles on which all the sciences 
depend.  Laws capable of comprising nature as a totality would only hold if nature itself 
were composed of a self-identical substance. “The universe,” Boutroux argued, “is not 
made up of elements equal to one another, susceptible of being transformed into one 
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another, like algebraical quantities. It is made up of forms bound together by gradations, 
i.e. additions, that are altogether imperceptible.”64 The higher sciences leap beyond the 
lower sciences in a manner analogous to natural processes that exceed their conditions.  
 In the conclusion of De la contingence, Boutroux directed the implications of 
contingency squarely against the Kantian division between the sensible realm of nature 
and the suprasensible realm of freedom. In opposition to what he called the “doctrine of 
reconciliation,” which rescues the possibility of human freedom by excluding it from the 
mechanistic world of phenomena, the doctrine of contingency “does more than throw 
open to freedom apart from the world, a field that is infinite, though void of objects 
which it can contact. It shatters the postulate which makes inconceivable the intervention 
of freedom in the field of phenomena, the maxim which states that nothing is ever lost 
and nothing created.”65 Contingency manifests the interpenetration of the sensible and the 
supersensible in nature. Human freedom accentuates the spontaneity inhering in nature, 
and scientific laws gain their authority because they are part of nature, albeit the most 
abstract part. Thus contingency, in Boutroux’s words, “lends itself to the conception of a 
freedom coming down from suprasensible regions to mingle with phenomena and direct 
them along unforeseen paths.”66 
 
 
 The appearance of De la contingence in 1874 marked the philosophical and 
historical threshold of scientific spiritualism. Philosophically, the principle of 
contingency that Boutroux articulated served a new of wave of thinkers intent to elevate 
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the study of consciousness in a newfound dialogue with the science of nature. 
Historically, Boutroux himself belonged to the first generation of thinkers to come of age 
in the aftermath of Cousin’s eclectic regime, and to plant its roots in the alternative 
spiritualist current that Biran had inaugurated.  
 Boutroux extended the intellectual arc of nineteenth-century French spiritualism – 
from motility to contingency – by building upon the work of his predecessors, Lachelier 
and Ravaisson, both in giving shape to spiritualist positivism, and in undermining the 
philosophical authority of intellectualism. “In order to content our logical understanding, 
we let go of the spiritual proper, the real being: this lies, beyond its determinations, in the 
power to determine, in the creative faculty, in energy. This idea,” Boutroux affirmed, 
“dear to Ravaisson… was one that Lachelier made into his own conviction.”67 By 
incorporating the free activity of nature into consciousness, Boutroux struck at the 
“logical understanding” – the intellectualist picture of consciousness undergirding the 
neo-Kantian division between science and freedom. “From the moment that laws or 
properties have reality only in consciousness [l’esprit]],” as Boutroux characterized 
Kantian idealism in an unpublished essay, “what exists beyond consciousness would only 
be an existence, devoid of all species and manner of being; but such an existence is 
indistinguishable from nothing.” 68 Contingency, constitutive of nature’s creativity and 
the laws found therein, refuses to be confined, Boutroux claimed, to the phenomenal 
dimension of mechanistic causality. 
  De la contingence reflected an even great debt to Ravaisson. Not only did 
Boutroux dedicate his thesis to the philosopher, but he also closely studied De l’habitude 
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while preparing the manuscript. Boutroux transcribed Ravaisson’s book as a student at 
the École normale, and his notes reveal the import of the author’s ideas. In particular, 
Boutroux emphatically highlighted the double law of habit at the core of Ravaisson’s 
thought: “The continuity or repetition of the passion weakens it: the continuity or 
repetition of the action exalts and strengthens it.” 69 The double law, originally formulated 
by Biran, served Ravaisson’s method of tracing the conditions of human freedom from 
the animating energy of nature. That animating energy, in Boutroux’s thesis, took on the 
form of contingency. Boutroux’s lone marginal note to himself in the transcription 
reveals what he took to be the significance of the Ravaissonian concept of habit: “what 
precisely could explain the difference between habit and the will?” 70 The note suggests 
that the problem of willing, and its continuity with nature, preoccupied the young 
Boutroux, who clung to the spiritualist understanding of consciousness as a motor 
activity. De la contingence ardently heeded Ravaisson’s call in his 1867 Rapport to 
advance a new spiritualist positivism, a project equally developed by Lachelier to bring 
both science into the orbit of French spiritualism, and reciprocally, the domain of spirit 
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 Part II From Contingency to Pragmatism The Consolidation of Scientific Spiritualism 
 
 
 Scientific spiritualism emerged in France amidst the realignment of the natural 
and human sciences. In the final quarter of the nineteenth century, psychology, which had 
previously endured as a subfield of philosophy, became an independent experimental 
discipline. A new wave of empirically minded researchers culled methods from the 
physiological and quantitative sciences in order to wrest the study of consciousness from 
the sciences humaines and transform it into a science dur. Philosophy lost its privileged 
claim to psychology as the discipline underwent a bifurcation, split between metaphysical 
and experimental fields. In France, many experimental psychologists, on the one hand, 
saw themselves as liberating the study of consciousness from the obscure and exclusively 
historical bent of eclectic spiritualism. On the other hand, spiritualist philosophers, 
especially those who came of age under the yoke of Victor Cousin, rebuked experimental 
psychology as a determinist enterprise that reduced the complexities of consciousness to 
mere biological functions. Scientific spiritualists sought not simply to reconcile these 
divergent approaches, but to go beyond them. By studying physiological and quantitative 
research, scientific spiritualists showed that experimental psychology yielded new 
metaphysical problems prompting a radical re-conception of the place and role of 
consciousness in the world. 
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The emergence of experimental psychology in the late nineteenth century has 
been widely historicized as a break with metaphysical psychology.1 And in France, by 
way of contrast with Britain and Germany, experimental psychological was late to 
establish an institutional foothold because of the entrenchment of spiritualist philosophy.2 
Recent historiographies, however, have debunked the patricidal narrative according to 
which modern scientific methods were cleaved from metaphysical methods. Dorothy 
Ross documents the constructive imbrication of experimental psychology and 
metaphysics in the late nineteenth century;3 her approach is one that Jan Goldstein’s 
corpus has also brilliantly advanced.4 Similarly, John L. Brooks III and Edwin Reed have 
exposed the persistence of metaphysical presuppositions in French experimental 
psychology.5 But whether experimental psychology shed its metaphysical baggage, as the 
old story goes, or held on to it, as recent historiography argues, little research has 
investigated the path forged by thinkers who renewed metaphysics from within 
experimental psychology. This history, until now neglected, belongs to scientific 
spiritualism.  
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My argument in this section is that scientific spiritualism emerged out of 
engagements with two particular advancements in experimental psychology: 
psychophysics and psychopathology. It was through a sustained dialogue with 
researchers in these fields that thinkers such as Henri Bergson, Émile Boutroux, Victor 
Egger, Alfred Fouillée, Jean-Marie Guyau, Pierre Janet, and Jules Tannery carried out a 
scientific revolution within spiritualism. This dialogue, to be sure, was not exclusively 
scientific. Scientific spiritualists drew from the history of French spiritualism. These 
thinkers brought the principles of motility and contingency to bear on their engagements 
with experimental psychology, and in so doing, generated a new, distinctly pragmatist 
account of conscious activity. 
At a historical level, this dialogue transpired in the Revue philosophique de la 
France et de l’étranger, the first French journal dedicated to the burgeoning experimental 
psychology. The journal functioned as a reading community in which scientific 
spiritualists converged. By pairing articles in metaphysical and experimental psychology 
side by side, the Revue philosophique laid the conditions for a rapprochement between 
science and spiritualism. It also reflected the widening transnational reach of new inquiry 
in the human sciences, as contributors to the journal came from America, Britain, and 
Germany. Thus in opening French spiritualism onto an expanding, intercultural domain 
of intellectual debate around experimental psychology, the Revue philosophique also 
occasioned a distinctly scientific movement in French spiritualism. 
At a philosophical level, the pages of the Revue philosophique served as a 
whetstone on which scientific spiritualists sharpened their rupture from the old 
spiritualists of the Cousinian heritage. The terms of this rupture coalesced around a 
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pivotal transformation in the concept of conscious activity: from contingency to 
pragmatism. This transformation lent stakes to the shared problem around which 
scientific spiritualists united, first, by elevating the principle of contingency on the basis 
of developments of experimental psychology; and second, by conceptualizing 
consciousness anew as an action-oriented activity. From contingency to pragmatism 
signifies the intellectual trajectory scientific spiritualists followed in their dialogue with 
psychophysics and psychopathology.  
These fields captivated French audiences thanks to the young psychologist 
Théodule Ribot, whose institutional and editorial efforts catalyzed experimental 
psychology as an independent discipline. Ribot conducted few experiments of his own; 
his work was more synthetic than original. He founded the Revue philosophique in 1876 
in order to inaugurate a science of consciousness that streamlined trends from outside 
France. Ribot steered the flood of British and German developments in psychology that 
were inundating Paris in the final decades of the nineteenth century. First in La 
Psychologie anglaise contemporaine (1870) and then in La Psychologie allemande 
contemporaine (1879), Ribot disseminated research from British neurologists and reports 
from the first experimental psychology laboratory in Leipzig (which Wilhelm Wundt 
officially founded in 1879). Ribot’s corpus throws into stark relief just how belated the 
French were to transform psychology into an experimental science. Yet that is also what 
makes the French case so intriguing. The late emergence of experimental psychology as 
an independent discipline in France is attributable, I am suggesting, to the rich 
entanglement between spiritualist and experimental methods. 
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The Revue philosophique served as the chief channel of research, news, 
translations, and above all, criticism of experimental methods in France. The myriad 
articles and reviews that Ribot published therein, as well as his acumen for soliciting the 
contributions of psychologists, philosophers, historians, mathematicians, and literary 
scholars, laid the conditions for scientific spiritualists to publish and debate alongside 
experimental psychologists.6 In the inaugural issue, Ribot vigorously rejected what he 
took to be the hegemony of spiritualism, declaring, “Between natural psychology and 
metaphysics, there must be a choice.”7 Yet, Ribot also presented his Revue philosophique 
as a “complete and exact tableau of current philosophical movements, without excluding 
any school.”8 In 1876 readers surely considered experimental psychology as one 
philosophical movement among others. Ribot’s ultimate aim was to free experimental 
psychology from that generalization. He did so by tailoring his criticism of spiritualism to 
Cousin’s eclectic school. Under Cousin, as I explored in the first section, secondary and 
university education instilled the history of philosophy as the raison d’être of 
philosophical instruction in France from 1830 to 1867. During this period, psychological 
research was limited to what Ribot described as “the work of a solitary thinker who, in 
place of original work, nearly always ends up in useless repetitions or sterility.”9 While 
Ribot used his journal to pry psychology from the eclecticist regime and install the 
emergent science in the laboratory, scientific spiritualists appropriated experimental 
research from the pages of the Revue philosophique in order to revivify French 
spiritualism.  
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Psychophysics and psychopathology predominated the content of the Revue 
philosophique from its inception in 1876 to the close of the twentieth century. 
Unsurprisingly, these were the developments that Bergson tackled in first two books. 
Psychophysics, which I will explore in this chapter, preoccupied Bergson’s first book, 
L’Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (1889). Bergson invoked the 
principle of contingency to critique the results that Ribot had gathered from Wilhelm 
Wundt’s experiments in his Leipzig laboratory as well as from Gustav’s Fechner’s 
algorithms to measure the strength of perceived sensations on the basis of externally 
observable excitations. Ribot, for his part, believed that psychophysics could offer a 
mathematical basis for an experimental psychology firmly grounded in physiology. 
Psychopathology, and in particular the psychopathology of memory loss, to which I 
dedicate chapter four, figured prominently in Matière et mémoire (1896). Bergson 
penned his second book, I will argue, to challenge psychopathologists, Ribot chief among 
them, who claimed to reduce memories to the brain’s linguistic centers and thereby 
localize conscious functions. But Bergson, to be sure, did not draft his early work solely 
as a critique of experimental psychology. I hope to make clear that psychophysics and 
psychopathology served as springboards against which Bergson formulated his 
metaphysical edifice, including the concepts of the durée of consciousness and the virtual 
planes of memory. Although these concepts, and the force with which Bergson presented 
them, were uniquely his own, I contend in the following chapters that their stakes hinged 
on the problems articulated in the pages of the Revue philosophique and developed within 
a scientific spiritualist milieu. 	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Chapter 3: Measuring Consciousness 
 
 In the late nineteenth century, the Revue philosophique was the premier journal 
for experimental psychology, connecting humanists and researchers around the budding 
science both in France and across the continent. In fact, Friedrich Nietzsche was even a 
subscriber.1 Preparations for La Revue began in 1875, when Ribot laid the groundwork 
for a new journal that would have “an open character,” as he described the idea to his 
companion and fellow psychologist Alfred Espinas. “The project was approved without 
reservation by [Francisque] Bouiller, [Charles] Lévêque, and [Jules] Lachelier,” three 
spiritualist philosophers at the École normale supérieure; yet there were two others, 
“[Émile] Caro is wary,” and “[Paul] Janet, still very hostile toward my direction, has 
begun to calm down.”2 All would eventually contribute articles to the journal. But real 
excitement poured from Ribot when he relayed the news that he could “count on the 
articles of [Alexander] Bain, [Herbert] Spencer, [G.H.] Lewes, [Hippolyte] Taine, 
Wihelm Wundt.”3 Ribot compiled an international dream team that would advance the 
new psychology in the nearly 1200 pages of the first year’s twelve issues. Ribot’s work 
ethic was unflagging. He edited the journal until his death in 1916. Yet his most 
remarkable skill was networking.  
In addition to soliciting articles from fellow normaliens – classmates such as 
Espinas, Jules Tannery, and Gabriel Compayré who matriculated concurrently in 
philosophy at the École normale – Ribot also tapped the international circles that he had 
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formed while writing his first books. While writing La Psychologie anglaise 
contemporaine, the first popularization of associationist psychology in France, Ribot 
came in contact with Herbert Spencer. The two met in person in Paris in 1871, where 
their relation was cemented with Ribot’s decision to translate Spencer’s Principles of 
Psychology (published in France, 1872). Spencer put Ribot in touch with Léon Dumont 
and the Belgian psychologist Joseph Delboeuf who went on to champion German 
psychophysics in the Revue.4 The journal would serve as an unfiltered testing ground for 
Ribot’s own psychological work.  
 Before 1876, there was no journal in France dedicated to experimental psychology. 
Most psychologists published their work in the Revue scientifique. In 1874 the journal’s 
editor, Émile Alglave, requested that Ribot submit an article on Wundt’s psychology. 
Keen to find a publisher for his own journal, Ribot had Alglave put him in touch with 
Gustave Germer Baillière. Although Ribot frequently spurned academics, he quickly 
climbed yet another intellectual ladder. Ballière ran one of the most prestigious Parisian 
printing houses that produced the library collections of contemporary philosophy, history, 
and science, in addition to the budding reviews of the period like Revue des cours 
littéraires and Revue historique.5 Ballière served as publisher of the Revue philosophique 
until fellow normalien Félix Alcan took over in 1881. 
 As the editor of what was rapidly becoming the premier French philosophy journal, 
Ribot turned the tables against the spiritualist establishment. “The Revue,” Ribot wrote to 
Espinas, “has brought me harassment by the old spiritualists who, at the Institut [de 
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France] perpetually conspire against me.”6 Once the authorities to which Ribot appealed 
as a philosophy student, academic philosophers now turned to the Revue philosophique in 
order to publish their material. The other major philosophy journal at the time was the 
Revue des Deux Mondes. Philosophers would have to wait until 1893 for the founding of 
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale to find an alternative publishing outlet. The Revue 
philosophique helped usher in a booming era of academic publishing; and its success 
paved the way for Alfred Binet to found L’Année psychologique in 1894, the first French 
journal exclusively specializing in experimental psychology. Ribot fittingly served as 
Binet’s collaborator.  
 When the first issue appeared January 1, 1876, Ribot unveiled its purpose in 
unequivocal terms: “The Revue will dedicate its efforts to come to the aid of all who 
think that it does not suffice to shut oneself out from the world, and to enforce what is 
requested from all its collaborators: facts and documents.”7 Despite Ribot’s liberal 
gesture toward providing “a complete and exact tableau of the current philosophical 
movements, without excluding any school,” the target of his stern pronouncement was 
legible: the official spiritualism that replaced facts with “logical quibbles, imaginary 
creations, or mystical effusions.” Ribot left a token space open to metaphysics, but the 
majority of original articles, 188 in total between 1876 and 1890, were dedicated to the 
new experimental psychology.8  
 The Revue philosophique is a worthwhile source for an intellectual history of the 
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7 Théodule Ribot, “Introduction,” 2. 
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late nineteenth century because it elucidates the field of possible philosophical positions. 9 
Ribot was keenly aware of the makeup of each school. Given that the philosophy 
faculties of Parisian universities comprised a total of eighteen chairs, the influence of 
each school was easy enough to discern. But Ribot also played an active role in 
constituting scientific spiritualism as a distinct school among others. In the first issue of 
the Revue Ribot identified four schools: positivism (alluding to the inheritors of August 
Comte); the experimental school (in which he included himself); criticism (reflecting 
French neo-Kantianism led by Charles Renouvier), and “the spiritualism which in recent 
times has taken a new form here by finding its inspiration above all in Maine de Biran.”10 
In principle, the Revue provided each school with “a neutral terrain where they could 
produce work, meet, and study each other.”11 It was a marketplace of philosophical 
exchange, albeit one whose guiding hand was hardly invisible. Ribot’s exclusion of 
Cousin from the list was evident. A “new form” of spiritualism, he alleged, had taken 
Cousin’s place: a scientific spiritualism that jettisoned Cousin’s faculty psychology in an 
effort to stage a philosophical rapprochement with experimental psychology. The 
comment was more prescriptive than factual. If spiritualism hoped to survive, Ribot 
enjoined, then it ought to follow the return to Maine de Biran already underway.  
 Ribot, to be sure, did not champion scientific spiritualism. He sharpened the blade 
with which he carved up the philosophical landscape in an 1877 article, “Philosophy in 
France,” written for the British journal, Mind. Ribot opened his piece by rejoicing the 
demise of Cousin’s school of eclectic spiritualism. “The Revolution of 1848 struck a fatal 
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10 Théodule Ribot, “Introduction,” 2. 
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blow at Eclecticism,”12 and Ribot argued that philosophical knockout soon followed. 
“Eclecticism had been attacked by two eminent men who had been trained in it, M. 
Vacherot and M. Taine.”13 Étienne Vacherot maintained an ambiguous stance toward his 
teacher, Cousin. But Hippolyte Taine, whose De l’intelligence (1870) Ribot claimed as 
his intellectual compass, was the philosophical forefather of the new experimental 
psychology. He was head of what Ribot identified as the “experientialists” who took over 
the materialist mantle once claimed by positivism.14 As for positivism itself, Ribot 
identified Émile Littré (1801-1881) as the last spokesman to advance the project that 
Comte founded in the mid-nineteenth century. Others associated with the short-lived 
journal La politique positive still championed Comte’s positivist religion. Ultimately, 
however, the partisans of positivism rallied around experimental psychology to uncover 
the materialist foundations of consciousness.   
 Cousin’s eclectic spiritualism had given way to what Ribot identified as an 
emerging “mystical spiritualism, very hostile to eclecticism, whose place it makes every 
effort to usurp in the Faculties and lycées. The chief representatives of this school are Mr. 
Ravaisson, who is its leader, Mr, Lachelier, and Mr. Fouillée.”15 Ribot characterized the 
new spiritualism as mystic because “the school is far from priding itself on its 
precision.”16 But what is most striking about Ribot’s article is its diagnosis of a 
revolution within French spiritualism. Ribot suggested that the success of experimental 
psychology would not be the reason for the demise of Cousin’s eclectic spiritualism. 
Instead, “It is an enemy from within that tends to supplant it – that Spiritualistic 
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Realism.”17 
 Ribot identified what was still a loose formation in 1877. Over the next three 
decades these thinkers, all of whom expressed their debt to the French spiritualist 
tradition yet sought to revolutionize its conceptual underpinnings on the basis of 
scientific advancements, rallied around scientific spiritualism. “The new spiritualism,” 
the philosopher Étienne Vacherot wrote in his 1884 book on the movement, “is not a new 
doctrine: it is spiritualism renewed by science.”18  
 Indeed, the lines between this new spiritualism and the old spiritualism were 
drawn around the experimental research disseminated in the Revue philosophique. There 
an old guard continued to defend Cousin’s brand of eclectic psychology against Ribot’s 
scientific methods. “The interior life of man has been reduced once again to sensation, 
having become the simple consciousness of an organic state,” Jules Lachelier warned in 
“Psychologie et métaphysique,” his 1885 confrontation with the emerging experimental 
psychology in the Revue philosophique.19 Lachelier discerned in the new psychology a 
reversion to a bygone sensationalism: “The will is no more than the consciousness of 
reflex movement, thought no more than relation between two or several sensations, and 
reason no more than a résumé or even excerpt of sensible experience.”20 Even though 
Lachelier, as I explored in the last chapter, posited the concept of contingency as an 
exception to Cousin’s narrow eclecticism, the threat he discerned in Ribot’s research 
program prompted his re-allegiance with the old spiritualism. Lachelier allied with an 
older generation of spiritualist thinkers, including Paul Janet, Adolphe Franck, and Elme 
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Caro, who buttressed their forefather’s legacy as a safeguard against the nascent science’s 
rapid encroachment on what they saw as spiritualism’s metaphysical authority. In 
contrast, scientific spiritualists seized ahold of new quantitative and physiological 
methods to articulate new metaphysical problems. 
 
Associationism and Evolution 
 
 The discovery of the central nervous system and the philosophy of associationism 
respectively constituted the scientific and conceptual edifices informing the development 
of nineteenth-century experimental psychology. Associationism furnished the 
explanatory framework to structure consciousness within the body’s sensori-motor 
network. At stake in scientific spiritualists’ engagements with the explosion of 
psychological research was the problem of whether the methods of nervous physiology 
and the associationist account of consciousness were, on the one hand, inseparable, the 
obverse medical and theoretical faces of experimental psychology as Ribot argued, or, on 
the other hand, extrinsic to each other, associationism being suited to the study of the 
body’s biological systems but not to the study of consciousness. Spiritualists since Maine 
de Biran and Félix Ravaisson had recognized that the discovery of the central nervous 
system fundamentally overthrew the framework of introspective psychology. Nervous 
physiology, they believed, upended the theory of the faculties and replaced it with a 
theory of embodied mental activity. But associationism, these spiritualists argued, was 
equally dubious in that it relied on a reductive picture of consciousness mirrored on 
nervous movement. In this section I explore the critique of associationism, first 
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articulated by Maine de Biran and Ravaisson, which provided a philosophical archive 
that scientific spiritualists invoked in their engagements with the theoretical 
underpinnings of experimental psychology.  
Charles Bell (1774-1842) and François Magendie (1783-1855) discovered the 
sensory and motor operations of nerves in their experiments on the spinal cord and 
ventral root. Working independently, Bell and Magendie both observed whether these 
regions reacted to stimuli after being anaesthetized. Bell and Magendie experimented on 
animals by cutting the dorsal section of their spinal cords, the peripheral region that 
extends laterally, and noticed that the animals became insensitive to stimulation. The 
animals were nonetheless able to move the anaesthetized area despite not feeling pain. 
When Bell and Magendie compressed the ventral root, the peripheral region on the 
obverse side of the spinal chord, the animals shrieked in pain. Yet surprisingly, the 
animals were unable to move the affected area. Bell and Magendie concluded that these 
two regions, what we now call the dorsal and ventral roots, are the respective seats of 
sensation and motility. They are the points lining the spine to which sensory and motor 
nerves attach. What followed, the Bell-Magendie law, holds that the motor and sensory 
impulses travel in opposite directions in accord with the two sides of the spinal cord.  
Johannes Müller (1801-1858) deepened physiologists’ understanding of the 
central nervous system when he articulated the law of specific nerve energies in his 
Handbuch des Physiologie des Menschen (1834-1840). The law holds that the character 
of experiences depends on the particular nerves responding to stimulation rather than on 
characteristics of the stimulation itself. The sense organs thus translate humans’ 
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knowledge of the external world into a subjective form, a conclusion that, for Müller, 
barred unmediated knowledge of objects in themselves. 
Research into the nervous system was critical for associationist psychologists.21 
The formation of reflex mechanisms through nervous impulses served as a model from 
which to explain the formation of psychological associations. Sensory organs and ideas 
alike could share, as it were, the same pattern of concatenation. According to Robert 
Young, “The significance of the nineteenth-century analysis [of the sensory-motor 
account] lay first in its experimental demonstration in the central nervous system and 
second in the progressive extension of the concept as the fundamental explanatory 
principle in both physiology and psychology.”22 The progressive extension of the 
sensory-motor account into experimental psychology relied on the principle of 
associationism for its theoretical apparatus.  
Associationism explains the generation of ideas on the basis of the relations 
formed between their constituent parts. Consciousness, on this model, functions like a 
hierarchy: ascending from the most primitive sensations to the most advanced ideas 
follows a ladder of associations along which each higher rung combines the parts 
belonging to lower rungs. What begins as a lower-order relation between sensations 
transforms into a higher-order bond, or association, forged through repetition. Repetition 
over time perfects the execution of a skill or the application of a concept by uniting 
otherwise discrete sensations. Although psychologists in the nineteenth-century debated 
the rank of certain ideas within the ladder of associations, their underlying commitment 
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was that repetition is the motor of association: repetition, that is, generates a determinate 
link between sensations whose relationship was previously indeterminate. Herbert 
Spencer, offered the most succinct definition of the law of association, which he called 
“the law of intelligence,” “that the strength of the tendency which the antecedent of any 
psychical change has to be followed by its consequent, is proportionate to the persistency 
of the union between the external things they symbolize.”23 The more frequent the 
repetition, the more intense the association.  
 David Hartley was the first to apply the principle of association to the problem of 
the generation of ideas. His Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his 
Expectations (1749) began with the interaction between the nervous system and its 
environment. Neuronal vibrations produce basic relations that he called “vibratiuncules.“ 
When repeated, they become fortified relations, generating the higher rungs of 
associations of sensations, sentiments, memories, imagination, language, judgments, and 
ultimately free acts. Ascending the ladder follows from physical associations that regulate 
automatic processes and toward mental associations that engender voluntary processes. 
The ascent also transitions from simple to complex associations: rudimentary repetitions 
occur simultaneously in time while more complex repetitions occur successively. Hartley 
used the example of an infant developing language skills by first producing noises that he 
feels differently, repeating them enough to regulate his vocal organs and, ultimately, 
assigning meaning to the noises. The stimulation of the larynx and the noise that the 
vocal chords create first occur one after the other. Once they become a single coordinated 
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act, the infant develops noises into words, and perfects the skill of speaking to the point 
that speech becomes a voluntary, and even artistic act.  
 The distinction between automatic processes and voluntary ones drove Hartley to 
endorse the principle of psychophysical parallelism, according to which associations 
between sensations and ideas develop alongside associations between purely physical 
vibrations. A nervous event, that is, accompanies every psychological event. Parallelism 
facilitated Hartley’s objective to unite Locke’s empiricist account of the generation of 
ideas with Newton’s discovery of optic vibrations. Locke explained the formation of 
higher-order ideas from lower-order sensations, while neuronal vibrations, on Newton’s 
model, constituted the substratum of mechanical laws regulating associations as they 
propagate throughout the body. Hartley’s parallelism established the framework for the 
British associationist school generally, and for Ribot in particular, who championed 
parallelism as the bridge joining the physiological in relation with psychological.  
 Although Ribot found Hartley’s exclusively nervous physiology modeled on 
vibratiuncules inadequate, too formal and hardly experimental, he defended Hartley as 
the originator of associationist psychology in his Latin thesis: Quid David Hartley de 
consociatione idearum senserit (1873). The Sorbonne required two theses for a doctorate 
in philosophy, one written in Latin and dedicated to a historical topic, and another in 
French and dedicated to a contemporary topic. Ribot, however, was the first to dedicate 
both his theses to contemporary topics for his defense in 1873. Ribot’s French thesis, 
L’Hérédité: étude psychologique sur ses phénomènes, ses lois, ses causes, ses 
conséquences (1873), demonstrated how physiological heredity, already explained in 
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Darwin’s The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication (1868), could be 
extended to a psychological level.  
Herbert Spencer’s psychology was, for Ribot, the key. Spencer explained heredity 
by applying associationist principles to an evolutionary scale: “The doctrine that the 
connections among our ideas are determined by experience, must, in consistency, be 
extended not only to all the connections established by the accumulated experiences of 
every individual, but to all those established by the accumulated experiences of every 
race.”24 For Spencer, the associations supporting behavior in the species guide the 
associations supporting individuals’ behavior. The former are stronger because they have 
been repeated across a hereditary line of descent. Ribot made use of Spencer’s 
evolutionary associationism by demonstrating how indissoluble associations in the 
species account for the persistence of inherited traits in individuals. Heredity finds its 
foundation, according to Ribot, in the lineage of traits coded into the nervous systems of 
species over time – a ladder of associations formed across natural history.  
By writing his theses on Hartley and Spencer, Ribot paired together the thinkers 
who respectively originated and culminated associationist psychology. No one before 
him had dedicated a philosophy thesis to physiological psychology. When he appeared at 
his defense, Ribot threatened what Serge Nicolas describes as the spiritualist authority of 
the jury at the Sorbonne.25 These philosophers took issue with Ribot’s reduction of the 
soul to biology. Ribot responded by limiting the scope of the principles of associationism 
and parallelism. He clarified that associationism is not an exhaustive principle. Hartley, 
Ribot assured his critics, could not explain free actions, which are irreducible to 
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secondary automatic responses. And as for heredity, Ribot insisted that the intriguing 
problem in natural history was the exceptions to the identity of inherited traits: the 
individual aptitudes that inject diversity and previously unforeseen traits into the species. 
These psychological peculiarities follow their own laws; they are concomitant with 
physiological laws but not reducible to physiological causes. Ribot thus fell back on the 
principle of psychophysical parallelism in his defense. He claimed not to have refuted 
metaphysical claims to the union of the mental and physical; his aim was instead to 
absolve physiological psychology from entertaining metaphysical questions at all.   
Ribot’s L’Hérédité offered French readers a belated introduction to evolutionary 
theory. Darwin failed to find as much enthusiasm in France as he did elsewhere on the 
continent following the 1859 publication of On the Origin of Species. The fact has been 
widely attributed to the lingering influence of the nation’s own evolutionist, Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck, and his theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.26 Lamarck’s 
emphasis on transformisme, many thought, competed with Darwin’s model of the 
struggle for survival. Indeed, it was only with Ribot’s support five years after the 
publication of L’hérédité that the French Académie des Sciences accepted Darwin as a 
corresponding member. Ribot wholeheartedly endorsed Darwin, but it was in Spencer’s 
associationism that L’hérédité packaged evolutionary theory for a skeptical readership. 
Moreover, evolution, as Ribot presented it, was part and parcel of associationism. And 
Ribot found Spencer’s theory, more than Darwin’s, serviceable to the study of 
consciousness. “Evolution is a change,” Spencer held, “from an indefinite, incoherent 
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homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity through continuous differentiations and 
interpretations.”27 Ribot championed the maxim in support of the continuity of psychic 
evolution and biological evolution. The stronger the association, the more complexity, or 
heterogeneity, it introduces in the species. The most evolved mental operations thus 
ascend from the hereditary chain of more basic, or homogenous, associations. Thanks to 
Ribot, evolutionary theory initially took off in France as a psychological doctrine, rather 
than as an exclusively biological doctrine.28 
Scientific spiritualists critical of Ribot’s evolutionary psychology built upon the 
critique of associationism already developed by their nineteenth-century predecessors. 
According to Maine de Biran and Ravaisson, associationism amounts to a mechanistic 
model of consciousness that reifies ideas as if they were composed of physical matter. 
The thrust of their argument, as I explored in the first section, was that associationism 
conflates ideas with nerve impulses, and thus neglects the essential difference between 
the two: whereas nervous associations depend on an external relation between discrete 
nerve impulses, consciousness depends on an internal principle of the will. Nervous 
associations are reinforced through the repetition of coextensive sensations. And 
associative bonds are formed between nerve impulses. Ideas, however, are not discrete 
entities, and as such, repetition is not the sole motor that generates bonds between ideas. 
Both Biran and Ravaisson made the argument in their respective treatises on habit. Like 
associationist psychologists, they understood consciousness as a product of habit. But 
whereas associationists were committed to the idea that repetition alone generates 
associations, Biran and Ravaisson argued that in humans, habits depend at bottom on a 
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free act of the will. Biran forcefully made this argument against sensationalism: the free 
exercise of effort is necessary to generate the self-reflexive structure of consciousness. As 
he wrote in his treatise on habit, “Effort necessarily carries with it the perception of a 
relation between the being who moves or who wants to move, and an obstacle opposed to 
its movement. Without a subject or a will that determines the movement, without a term 
that resists, there is no effort, and without effort no consciousness, no perception of any 
kind.”29 The activity of motor effort is unique in that it unifies the body’s energy around a 
point of resistance. The physiological energy unified in effort engenders the unity of 
consciousness that all ideas entail. It was this sense of internal unity that Biran charged 
associationism with neglecting. It constitutes the structure of consciousness that cannot 
be analyzed from the outside, as it were, in a laboratory. In De L’habitude, Ravaisson 
radicalized Biran’s argument that consciousness depends on effort. Effort, and not 
passive repetition, is the proper animating principle, which, Ravaisson held, generates 
conscious activity:  
It is not, as has been supposed, the ideas or images that call one another to 
come together, that attract, or that move towards each other with increasing 
speed, like bodies gravitating in space. In images and ideas there is no 
movement or principle of movement. It is not the association of ideas that 
explains habit, it is rather by the law, by the principle of habit that the 
association of ideas can be explained.30 
 
Although not all philosophers critical of the mechanistic bent in associationism assented 
to the primacy that Biran and Ravaisson afforded to the unique experience of effort, these 
thinkers did establish a framework for scientific spiritualists’ engagements with 
experimental psychology: associationism neglected the free activity that lends unity and 
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fluidity to consciousness. Yielding to scientific progress, yet critical of associationist 
principles, scientific spiritualists sought to confine associationism to the functions of the 
nervous system in order to make room for non-mechanistic account of conscious activity.  
Scientific spiritualists, however, went beyond Biran and Ravaisson’s critique of 
associationism by engaging experimental psychology along two axes. The first was 
negative. Scientific spiritualists sought to delimit the appropriate domain of experience to 
which the results of experimental psychology were applicable. At stake was more the 
reach, and less the veracity, of these results. The second was positive. Scientific 
spiritualists sought to articulate within the dual scientific frameworks of nervous 
physiology and evolutionary theory a conceptual vocabulary tailored to the free activity 
of consciousness that was also rigorous enough to rival associationism. The success of 
these thinkers’ project hinged on demonstrating that a metaphysical logic appropriate to 
subjective reflection could explain consciousness as a kind of activity distinct from the 
sensory-motor activity explained by experimental psychologists.  
Generally, it was against Spencer’s evolutionary theory that these scientific 
spiritualists leveled their negative critique of associationism. They belonged to a 
generation that Daniel Becquemont and Laurent Mucchielli characterize as “young 
philosophers who stood out in the years of the 1880s successively trying to complete, to 
amend and often, as it were, to “re-spiritualize” Spencer’s apparently materialist 
evolutionism.”31 Excitement attended Spencer’s promise to situate consciousness within 
the natural world of competing forces. A young Bergson felt the enthusiasm while 
studying at the École normale, yet he found Spencer’s associationism unsatisfying. “We 
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felt the weakness of The First Principles,” Bergson reflected, “But this weakness 
appeared to us to come from what the author, insufficiently prepared, could not deepen in 
the “last ideas” of mechanics. We had wanted to take back this part of his work, complete 
it, and strengthen it.”32 Bergson belonged to a movement, I am suggesting, freshly 
animated by evolutionary theory, finding in it an antidote to the perceived sterility of 
Cousin’s eclectic historicism, all the while committed to the spiritualist defense of 
freedom.  
Specifically, it was in dialogue with the fields of psychophysics and 
psychopathology that scientific spiritualists advanced a positive logic of conscious 
activity. As I explore in this and the following chapter, Gustav Fechner and Ribot 
developed these respective fields by formulating causal laws appropriate to each: 
Fechner’s law explained the perception of sensations on the basis of excitations; Ribot’s 
law explained the order of memory loss in amnesia. Scientific spiritualists dedicated their 
writings to advancing a rival conceptual vocabulary that would explain the facts of 
consciousness occluded by Fechner’s and Ribot’s studies while nevertheless remaining 
within a naturalistic framework.  
 
Gustav Fechner’s Psychophysics 
 
 Ribot positioned psychophysics in the first issue of his Revue philosophique as the 
new foundation of scientific psychology, “without which, whatever may be said, no 
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research in psychology is possible.”33 Ribot’s interest in the matter was also personal. In 
a letter to a former professor at the École normale, Ribot characterized the journal’s 
opening article, which he had been working on for months, as “my entry into the German 
Psychology that I really want to put on display.”34 In it, Ribot drew on Wundt’s 
applications of Fechner’s law in order to calculate the time it took to perceive different 
sensations. Ribot brought together the measurements that Wundt conducted in his 
laboratory on the amount of time that elapsed between applying a stimulus, whether 
tactile, auditory, or visual, and the subsequent movement by which a human subject 
recognized the sensation. By changing the conditions under which the stimulus was 
applied, such as its intensity and frequency, Wundt claimed to offer a comparative 
account of the durations of conscious perceptions. He demonstrated that the time it took 
to perceive external stimuli diminished with their repetition. By contrast, acts of 
perception repeated fewer times, such as recalling memories, were shown to require 
greater attention and thus take longer.   
  If consciousness could be broken down into quantifiable acts of perception, then 
they could serve as what Ribot called the “basic givens” [données vulgaires] of 
consciousness, and their duration could be measured. Herein lay the stakes of the 
scientific spiritualists’ engagement with psychophysics: what constituted the fundamental 
constituents of consciousness, what Bergson called the “immediate givens” (or as the title 
of his Essai is translated, the “immediate data”) [les données immédiates]? Whereas 
psychophysics posited stimulation and perception as basic givens of consciousness, 
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scientific spiritualists advanced, as I will discuss later, qualitative descriptions of 
conscious experience as the basic givens. Both sides, I want to stress, shared the same 
problem. It is critical not to treat the two as opposed positions locked in conflict, nor to 
interpret experimental psychologists such as Ribot, Fechner, and Wundt as having 
initiated an outright departure from metaphysics. Both shared much in common, as Kurt 
Danziger affirms,  
If the tradition of mental philosophy, with its notion of introspection as 
method, bequeathed to the new psychology the concept of an inner mental 
world as a potential object of study, the model of physiological 
experimentation left the new discipline no choice but to pursue this study 
in a functional framework. The investigation of sensation and perception 
was virtually the only area in which these two approaches could be 
effectively combined, and the greater the pressure to expand beyond these 
confines the greater the methodological difficulties that the new discipline 
faced.35 
 
The science of measuring sensations began with Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795-
1898). Professor of anatomy and physiology in Leipzig, Weber conducted experiments 
aimed at discriminating the threshold for perceiving sensations. Weber had subjects lift 
weights. Beginning with a certain weight, subjects gradually increased the kilograms 
lifted until they first noticed a different sensation. For example, a subject would lift 10 
kilograms. He would then lift 10.5, 11, 11.5 kilograms; but he would not notice the 
change in weight until he lifted 12 kilograms. The difference between the first sensation 
of the initial stimulus (10 kilograms) and the second sensation and of a stronger stimulus 
(12 kilograms) constitutes what Weber called the “just-noticeable difference.” It indicates 
the threshold through which consciousness passes before perceiving a different sensation. 
Weber inferred from his experiments that a constant proportion holds between an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Kurt Danziger, Constructing the Subject. Historical Origins of Psychological Research (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 27. 
138 
increase in the stimulus and the just-noticeable difference. So if the same subject lifted 40 
kilograms, she would only perceive a more intense sensation when lifting 48 kilograms: 
the reason being that the proportion of the just noticeable difference to the original 
stimulus (2 / 10 = .2) would also hold for the subsequent stimulus (8 / 40 = .2). Weber 
applied his original experiments using weights, first published in 1834,36 to other types of 
sensations, such as the lengths of lines perceived in vision and the volumes perceived in 
hearing. His enduring contribution to experimental psychology was the principle of the 
just-noticeable difference, which linked the psychological domain of perception to the 
physiological domain of stimulation in quantitative terms.  
 Weber’s work fascinated Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887) when he was a 
young student at Leipzig. By 1828, Fechner retrospectively christened the idea that there 
is a constant proportion between excitation and sensation as “Weber’s law.”37 In 1860 it 
served as the foundation for the field that Fechner christened “psychophysics”: “the exact 
science of the functional relations of dependence among body and soul, more generally, 
between the corporeal and the mental, the physical and the psychological, world.”38 The 
functional relation holds between the constant increase in a stimulation and the corollary 
increase in a sensation. By means of a derivation, Fechner demonstrated in mathematical 
terms that the intensity of sensation follows a logarithmic increase in the strength of the 
stimulus.39 In other words, the rate at which a perceived sensation intensifies gradually 
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tapers off the more forcefully a stimulus is applied. Considering a stimulus such as light, 
the focus of Fechner’s mature work, a constant increases in the wattage produces a 
progressively smaller increase in the brightness perceived.   
 
Fechner’s ambition far surpassed Weber’s. Whereas Weber’s work was limited to 
measuring the strength of a stimulus, Fechner’s ambition was to measure the perceived 
intensity of sensation itself. Ultimately, Fechner’s work laid the foundations of future 
quantifying practices in psychology. Rather than statistically aggregate the collective 
responses of a mass number of subjects to the same experiment, Fechner introduced 
quantification into the very structure of psychological experimentation. He did not 
jettison subjects’ responses. They played an integral role in his experiments as he paired 
them with numerically graded stimulus series so that subjects would respond to each 
stimulus in binary form, such as heavier / lighter, stronger / weaker. This was the just-
noticeable difference. While Weber left the internal depths of sensation mysterious, 
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Fechner’s insight was to use the principle of a just-noticeable difference as the point of 
departure for constructing an external means of measuring sensations and thus shining a 
light on their internal mystery. 
 The problem that Fechner confronted was the impossibility of directly measuring 
psychological phenomena. They cannot be analyzed directly since sensations occur at 
different moments in time, hence they cannot be compared side by side.  This is why 
Weber could not simply subtract one sensation from another in order to ascertain their 
difference. He only arrived at a difference between the magnitudes of different stimuli. In 
order to compare sensations, there must be an independent rule that measures one against 
another. The same holds true for any natural phenomenon. We use the spatial distance 
covered by a clock’s hand, for example, to measure the duration of time. The clock 
indicates by an independent and formalized rule the passage of time. Fechner treated the 
intensity of the stimulus much like the hands of the clock: the former provided the 
independent and formalized rule to measure sensations. But the stimulus only bears an 
indirect relation to sensation. A clock, however, directly indicates the passage of time. 
The distances between its hands are quantitative indicators that mensurate the uniform 
quality of time. Since time is the sort of natural phenomenon that is equal throughout (at 
least within the limited range of earth’s temporality) it can broken up into equal parts; 
and those equal parts, time’s equal passages, can be measured by the equal distances on 
the clock. Now, although stimuli do have equal magnitudes, such as the kilograms of 
weight or the watts of light, it is not immediately apparent that sensations exhibit similar 
homogeneity such that their intensities can be broken into equal parts. Fechner took it as 
his task to demonstrate that sensations have constant degrees of difference, and he did so 
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indirectly – that is, in terms of the magnitude of stimuli. Fechner used the just-noticeable 
differences as the basic units of sensation. The homogenous dimension shared among 
sensations, allowing them to be divided into equal parts, is the character of a sensory 
threshold, the psychological gap that Weber demonstrated between sensations. Fechner 
showed that a sensation is a collection of just-noticeable differences that are added 
together as a stimulus becomes stronger. Since there is a gap between each increasing 
sensation at the same time that there is continuity between each increase in stimulation, 
Fechner could mathematize the relation between the two in terms of a logarithm. The key 
feature of Fechner’s discovery, however, was to show that the logarithm could indirectly 
measure sensations: the magnitude of the stimulus also functions as the independent rule 
to compare sensations. 
 The migration of Fechner’s psychophysics to France principally came via Ribot’s 
translations. But Ribot found indispensable help in Joseph Delboeuf, who regularly wrote 
on the measurement of sensations in the Revue philosophique.40 Professor of psychology 
at the Université de Liège, Delboeuf first popularized Fechner’s work in Études 
psychophysiques sur la mesure des sensations (1873) and proceeded to conduct his own 
quantitative experiments in Éléments de psychophysique (1883). Perhaps the most well 
known exemplar of psychophysics in France was Charles Féré’s studies of the 
dynamometer.41 Originally constructed to measure the torque of engines, Féré made use 
of Fechner’s principles in order to adapt the device to measure the muscular force of 
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human movement. After he initially worked with a dynamometer to measure the pressure 
of the grip of a subject’s hand, Féré applied the device to the perception of color, and 
went so far as to argue that he could measure the muscular effort involved in attention.42   
 
Quality and Quantity in Conscious States 
 
 The initial problem at stake in Bergson’s first book, Essai sur les données 
immédiates de la conscience (1886) was whether quantitative measurement could apply 
to the conscious perception of sensations. Bergson acknowledged that measurement 
could grasp a certain dimension of sensations. The force of his criticism was to 
demonstrate that in addition to the quantitative dimension of consciousness that would 
measure sensations, there is another distinct dimension of consciousness that cannot be 
measured. This qualitative dimension can only be grasped by philosophical introspection. 
At stake, therefore, was the division of labor between scientific and philosophical 
analysis. Bergson’s project was to demonstrate that there are independent dimensions of 
conscious experience with which each accord. And as such, there are distinct logics that 
philosophical introspection and experimental observation apply to each domain.  
The Essai was part of a wider debate over the nature of the immediate data of 
consciousness. Whereas the psychophysical method subjected consciousness to 
measurement and verification, scientific spiritualists, by contrast, argued that 
consciousness included an irreducibly qualitative dimension – what can be understood of 
as a proto-phenomenological dimension – that escapes experimental observation. The 
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debate over the immediate data of consciousness turned on how to explain the nature of 
the basic givens of consciousness. Do the basic data of consciousness admit mathematical 
analysis, as Fechner’s proponents held? Or are there other qualitative data that are equally 
if not more basic, as new spiritualist thinkers held? In his refutation of psychophysics, 
Bergson drew on a philosophical debate over the qualitative and quantitative dimensions 
of consciousness that Fechner had incited among scientific spiritualists.  
 
Jules Tannery on Sense and Quality 
 
The stakes of the distinction between quality and quantity first played out in the 
pages of the La Revue scientifique following the publication of an anonymous article in 
1875. The author challenged Fechner’s extrapolation of a differential equation from 
Weber’s law: “When we don’t know at all what signifies the difference between two 
sensations, how can we speak of the differential of a sensation? What relation is there 
between a differential and the fact that, by varying the excitation, we ascertain a moment 
when the sensation changes? Between the two, there is neither quantity nor continuity.”43 
The author was taking aim at Fechner’s attempt to measure sensations. He claimed that 
there is no uniform standard by which to compare different sensations as equal, since 
each sensation is perceived under a unique quality. That is to say that sensations are 
wholly different from each other, and not different according to a common standard. The 
author charged that Fechner could only construct a common standard to compare 
sensations by smuggling into the inner perception of sensations the external measurement 
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used to compare stimuli. But the qualitative nature of inner perceptions, the author 
affirmed, is not commensurable with the quantitative nature of observable measurements: 
Sensation is a phenomenon occurring in us, which we seize in ourselves 
by its interior side, as it were, and which rebels against any kind of 
measurement. Without a doubt, a sensation can be more or less intense, 
but does that suffice to make the sensation as a quantity? A quality, beauty 
for example, can also be lesser or greater. The only magnitudes that one 
can measure directly are those of which one can define equality and 
addition, and such magnitudes seem to be met only in the domain of 
abstraction, of pure mathematics.44 
 
The argument amounts to distinguishing quality and quantity by apportioning each to 
their appropriate dimensions of consciousness. Since the logic of quantity suits the 
external dimensions of consciousness, as observed from a third person perspective, it is 
inapplicable to the inner dimension of consciousness, as experienced from a first person 
perspective. The consequence the author drew was that a quantitative logic could at best 
set up a convention for comparing sensations against stimuli; but the convention would 
never capture the immediate quality of sensations as they are immediately experienced.  
 The anonymous author turned out to be Jules Tannery (1848-1910). A young 
mathematician at the École normale, Tannery was friendly with much of the philosophy 
faculty there. Although he would become known as one of the greatest mathematical 
minds of late nineteenth-century France, a deep metaphysical commitment animated his 
work. It was Jules’ older brother Paul Tannery (1843-1904), a historian of ancient science 
and editor of Descartes’ work, who disclosed his younger brother’s identity. Fittingly, it 
was in an article in the Revue philosophique that pursued the critique Jules had originally 
launched.45 The two brothers tackled Fechner’s law together. Jules Tannery entrusted 
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Paul Tannery to publish his articles.46 Paul Tannery was close to the editor of the Revue 
scientifique; yet Jules valued his anonymity. “If he had not been genuinely horrified by 
any publicity,” one commentator writes, “if he had not rather dedicated himself to not 
appearing as a creator of metaphysical systems, his name would have been soon known 
among the public like those of philosophers who are fashionable to admire much more 
than read.”47 Although Jules Tannery had little taste for the obsequious notoriety 
conferred on grand metaphysicians, his articles were the first to publically stake out the 
positive project driving the scientific spiritualist engagement with psychophysics: to 
articulate a qualitative logic of sensations appropriate to the inner dimension of 
consciousness.   
 The difficulty facing Jules Tannery’s critique was that his definition of “quality” 
remained murky: “We should be skeptical of pompous expressions and a mix of 
sensations, logarithms, and stimuli,” but as for an alternative mode of explanation, 
Tannery wrote, “I confess that I have this logarithm in my heart.”48 Ribot promptly 
responded that Tannery failed to distinguish questions of metaphysical and physiological 
psychology: “The first are by their nature insoluble and one can say whatever one wants. 
The second are questions of fact.”49 Ribot and other psychologists believed that the scope 
of quantitative measurement was limitless. There was no dimension of conscious 
experience, as Delboeuf added to the debate, that could not be translated into quantitative 
data: “From the moment that one thing is greater or lesser, even beauty, even the pleasure 
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I feel at the sight of a beautiful painting or the hearing of an opera, even if it presents the 
most obscure of metaphysical reasoning to thought, it can be said that this thing has a 
size, it has measure, and it is theoretically measurable.”50  
In order to advance a more rigorous account of quality, Tannery took as his task 
to explain how, as Wundt accurately described it, “a quality such as beauty can be larger 
or smaller, but depend on a difference that is not a quantitative.”51 In his rejoinder, 
Tannery set about distinguishing two ways of comparing quantitative and qualitative 
differences. He did so by considering two kinds of magnitudes: homogenous magnitudes 
that can be compared quantitatively and heterogeneous magnitudes that cannot. The 
difference is that comparing the augmentation or diminution of an object with 
homogenous magnitude changes nothing in the nature of the object. This is the case for 
magnitudes such as length, surface area, or time. But change in an object whose 
magnitude is heterogeneous changes the nature of the object. For an example, Tannery 
considered the impression of beauty when standing before the Venus of Milo. Neither the 
length of her form, nor the area that the sculpture occupies, nor even the time spent 
gazing at it could approach a quantitative measurement of its beauty. Moreover, 
subtracting an arm, or adding a leg, would change the entire composition of the sculpture. 
But the Venus’ beauty could nonetheless be compared to that of other great sculptures. 
All this goes to show, Tannery affirmed, that aesthetic sentiments like beauty could be 
likened to a heterogeneous magnitude admitting degrees: “certain works impress us more 
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than others. But between these diverse impressions, isn’t there not a difference of more 
and less, but a difference of nature?”52  
Aesthetics provided Tannery with the conceptual language for articulating a 
qualitative logic of sensations. The aesthetic character of sensations is singular: a world 
stands between the Venus of Milo and, say, Michelangelo’s David. Both stir aesthetic 
sentiments that Tannery thought could be compared according to a shared standard. But 
their comparison depends on describing singular aesthetic qualities on the basis of a 
heterogeneous magnitude.  
Tannery’s choice of aesthetic examples as the basis of his critique gained 
purchase in the debate with the publication of Fechner’s Vorschule der Aesthetik in 1876. 
The French translation follow that year and offered an outlet for psychophysics’ 
popularization outside the pages of the Revue philosophique. In opposition to 
philosophical aesthetics, which drew its aesthetic concepts such as beauty, taste, and 
satisfaction from above, as it were, Fechner sought to construct an experimental science 
of aesthetics from below. In France, Fechner’s book was read as an emboldened defense 
of psychophysics’ scope, extending as far as qualitative determinations. Fechner applied 
the psychophysical principle of measurement to hedonic and aesthetic judgments 
involving three types of experiments: he documented subjects’ choice of which artworks 
among a range of options they found to be the most pleasurable; he also asked subjects to 
make art objects that they found to be either the most pleasurable or the least pleasurable; 
and finally, he compiled statistics of the forms of beauty most often employed in works 
of art. The final method led Fechner to posit what he called the “golden rule” of 
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proportionality.53 Beginning with subjects’ judgments of the most pleasing proportion of 
sides in a rectangle, Fechner built up the golden rule to a principle he thought to be 
evident in the body shapes of human figures depicted in the tableaux of catalogues from 
European art museums. When figures’ torsos were too long, or their legs too short, for 
example, Fechner thought that they failed to instantiate the golden rule. He claimed to 
discover a “divine” proportionality that rendered the artworks employing it to be 
universally pleasurable. Unlike his early work, which analyzed the gradations of 
sensations, Fechner’s experimental aesthetics measured the sensory extremes – the most 
and least pleasurable. 
 
Émile Boutroux and Creative Nature 
 
Émile Boutroux’s work was decisive in forging the conceptual bond that Jules 
Tannery articulated between the qualitative and heterogeneous nature of consciousness. 
For Boutroux, the stakes of the two concepts – quality and heterogeneity – turned on the 
foundation they provided for human freedom. The qualitative and heterogeneous 
dimensions of consciousness constitute the creative domain of human experience that 
cannot be predicted in advance. Against Fechner, nothing in the sensory excitation of an 
object can determine whether I find the object to be beautiful. My qualitative experience 
of the object, and comparison between it and others on the basis of a heterogeneous 
standard, constitute, according to Boutroux, an irreducibly free act.  
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Boutroux’s correspondence with Jules Tannery about the psychophysics played a 
formative role in preparing De la contingence des lois de la nature, which I discussed in 
the second chapter. Boutroux and Tannery were students together at the École normale 
from 1865 to 1868. It was there where Tannery, Boutroux reflected, “was interested, with 
his open spirit, to my efforts to understand his scientific reasoning. Penetrating his soul, 
mixing my ideas with his was one of the most profound joys he had given me to taste.”54 
After the Franco-Prussian war cut his studies short in Heidelberg, Boutroux taught 
philosophy at a lycée in Caen in 1871. He was reunited with Jules, who took a 
mathematics professorship there, and Boutroux soon became a fixture in the Tannery 
family. Paul had recently completed an engineering degree at the École polytechnique 
and was on course to pursue a double career in the state-run tobacco industry and in 
historical scholarship. Paul eventually taught a free course at the Sorbonne in 1884-5, but 
he never took an official professorship as Jules had.  
Mary Joe Nye has closely documented the relationships among Boutroux, the 
Tannery brothers, and the mathematicians Benjamin Baillaud and Henri Poincaré, which 
constituted what she calls the “Boutroux circle.”55 At its heart, the group was committed 
to conventionalism, the idea that scientific models are not true and false, in the sense that 
they correspond or not to reality, but are instead convenient tools to explain natural 
processes. Less attention, however, has been given to the young Boutroux’s relation to 
Paul Tannery. Boutroux’s archive at the Institut de France contains the letters of their rich 
correspondence that transpired between 1872 and 1874. Therein the two discussed the 
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ideas that shaped the distinction between quantity and quality, and brought them to bear 
on their mutual critiques of psychophysics.  
To kick off the correspondence, Paul counseled Boutroux to read Auguste 
Comte’s first treatise on positive philosophy, which posed the question that would 
become central to Boutroux’s thesis: whether the laws of nature are determined 
absolutely or only in a certain measure. It is surprising that Boutroux would not have 
already read Comte, who was still one of the most dominant thinkers in France. The 
Comtian hierarchy of knowledge organized the sciences according to their dependence on 
each other. Mathematics was the most basic, followed by astronomy, physics, chemistry, 
biology, and sociology. Ascending the hierarchy, each science became progressively 
more concrete and pertinent to a science of man. Descending the hierarchy, each science 
became more abstract, supplying the laws on which the higher sciences depend. Tannery 
identified a critical point separating the sciences into two kinds: those that depend 
primarily on quantities, and those that depend on qualities. Mathematics, physics, and 
chemistry, those sciences at the base of the hierarchy, strictly make use of quantities to 
determine their objects in law-like fashion. “This truth,” Tannery wrote, “seems to 
become a contrary paradox if it is applied to biology or to the social sciences”56 – those 
sciences near the top of the Comtian hierarchy, which depend on qualitative variety. Yet, 
Tannery suggested, the metaphysical distinction between quantity and quality is not 
absolute. All quantities presuppose qualities. As Boutroux clarified in his thesis, quantity 
“acquires signification only as a limit, a point of intersection; and all limit presupposes a 
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thing that is limited.”57 There must exist unity, a homogenous order, beneath the different 
quantities measured. Optimistic in the future of science, Tannery added, “To the extent 
that science progresses, we’ll see the appearance of new unities which will allows us to 
evaluate quantities that were previously considered as qualities.”58  
Comte’s rational classification of the sciences informed the conceptual 
architecture of De la contingence des lois de la nature. For Comte as for Boutroux, each 
level of science is irreducible to the levels beneath it. Biology makes use of certain 
mathematical principles, for example, but it cannot be explained on the basis of 
mathematics alone. Boutroux reconceived Comte’s classification in two ways. First, 
Boutroux posited an ontological hierarchy structuring the multiple domains in which 
nature manifests itself. This began with being, and proceeded to advance through genera, 
matter, bodies, living beings, and finally, man. Second, much like Comte, Boutroux 
positioned philosophy atop the hierarchy. But while Comte treated philosophy as the 
synthesis of the sciences, and therefore as a domain ultimately reducible to the hierarchy 
of sciences, Boutroux conceived philosophy as leaping beyond the sciences. Philosophy’s 
role, he argued, is to articulate the final purposes to which the mechanistic order of nature 
is subservient. These architectural features marked the limit of Comte’s influence, by way 
of Tannery, on Boutroux’s thesis. The problem to which Boutroux addressed his 
classification of nature was distinct: what role does contingency play in each domain of 
nature, and in turn, to what extent does each science depend on contingency? At one end, 
mathematics reigns in contingency to its minimal degree since the laws of mathematics 
are identical to, and thus absolutely determine, the objects of mathematics. On the other 
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end, the human sciences integrate the most contingency, since human creativity outstrips 
the laws of psychology and sociology.  
Boutroux’s correspondence with Tannery reveals that the two thought about the 
problem of contingency in terms of the interplay between the quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions of the natural sciences. In a letter to Tannery, Boutroux outlined his 
dissertation in two parts: the first dedicated to quantity, the second to quality. A given 
science makes use of quantitative definitions in order to invariably determine the laws 
with which it measures phenomena. “I would like to determine the species of quantity of 
which each science studies the permanence. There would be the formula of kinetic energy 
(mv^2), weight, etc.”59 Acknowledging his scientific inadequacies, Boutroux asked 
Tannery, “You could without a doubt give me the formulas responding to my question.”60 
By isolating the quantitative dimension of each science, Boutroux could ascertain just 
how deterministic it is. Yet, even at the heart of its determinism, quantity evinces a 
dimension of contingency:  
Generally what remains is the possibility of there being different uses for a 
given quantity while holding onto the permanence of the amount. For 
example, the antecedent 4 works equally well as a consequent of 2+2 or 
1+3. I would like to find something analogous to the example in all of the 
sciences. This chain of several solutions, equally possible and legitimate 
from the scientific point of view, would be an element of chance contained 
in nature, studied with just the illumination of the understanding.61 
 
The second part of Boutroux’s outline considered quality, and the role it plays in 
contingency. Human creativity was for Boutroux the prototype for contingency. “In 
assigning it an appropriate place in the object of each science we could explain what in 
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each of these objects would remain unexplained.”62 Contingency, Boutroux conveyed, is 
not only the key to the “moral sciences,” it also inheres in the laws governing the natural 
sciences. Since scientific laws are human creations, even the laws of the inanimate realm 
retain an element of human freedom, “an ideal (platonic) of good, a perfect form for 
studying all of [the law’s] degrees.“63  
The partition that Boutroux sketched along the lines of quantitative and 
qualitative sciences helped to guide the organization of his thesis. Quantity and quality 
served as the base and peak respectively of the ontological hierarchy. At the base, 
mathematics studies the purest dimension of quantities; at the peak, philosophy studies 
qualities. Boutroux would spend the rest of 1873 graduating the mixtures of each that 
constitute the intermediary stages.  
 Tannery commended Boutroux’s distinction between quantity and quality. He 
added that its conceptual payoff could be reaped if brought to bear on recent 
psychophysical experiments. Tannery pushed Boutroux to consider how the distinction 
might help to compare natural phenomena according to their internal and external 
aspects. At stake was how to compare different sensations: “We know that hunger can be 
greater or lesser, and from there we represent it as an intensive quantum that could 
theoretically be measured absolutely like heat or light. But that is nothing. In effect, one 
can’t feel a hunger in one given moment, and one can’t compare with oneself the 
sensations of two different hungers.”64 Tannery’s point was that hunger can be measured 
in a variety of objective ways: according to the dilation of the stomach, or according to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Jules Tannery, letter to Émile Boutroux, Apr. 1783, MS 4122.2, Correspondance d’Émile Boutroux, 
Institut de France. 
154 
the amount of gastric acid. Yet the subjective aspect of the sensation escapes 
quantification because different states of hunger are qualitatively distinct. Tannery 
effectively applied Boutroux’s insight into the nature of quality to the problem on which 
his brother’s engagement with psychophysics would turn. As long as there is a 
comparison between natural phenomena that are qualitatively different nature, there is no 
standard to determine equal units for comparison. This amounts to what Tannery, 
alongside Boutroux, called the heterogeneous nature of qualitative comparisons.  
 Jules Tannery, however, identified a more nuanced reason why qualitative 
phenomena are heterogeneous. He wrote to Boutroux that there is a form of causality 
peculiar to qualitative phenomena: “For nothing can prove that all the anterior 
phenomena, in two different cases, would neither be the same as the sensation felt by the 
subject, nor that the consequences that follow would be the same.”65 Here Tannery 
intimated that there is not just a unique manner of comparing different qualitative 
phenomena, but there is also a kind of causality peculiar to qualitative phenomena. The 
idea might seem strange, since contingency is typically thought to be what falls outside of 
causal models, and is therefore inexplicable. Yet, consistent with the scientific spiritualist 
project of articulating a logic appropriate to freedom, Tannery asserted that contingency 
reigns where natural processes undergo a qualitative transformation, such as when sugar 
is dissolved into water. Although the amount of sugar stirred into water determines its 
final degree of saturation, the process of dissolution, by which one stirs the sugar in a 
glass of water, involves a series of random movements by sugar granules. What Boutroux 
took from Tannery was the idea that the science of nature can only arrive at quantitative 
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determinations by abstracting from the qualitative, and thus contingent, processes taking 
place: 
To consider quantity with relation to a homogenous quality, or to leave 
quality altogether out of account, is to place oneself outside the conditions 
of reality itself. Everything that is possesses qualities, and consequently 
participates in that radical indetermination and variability which belong to 
the essence of quality. Thus, the principle of the absolute permanence of 
quantity does not apply exactly to real things: these latter have of 
substratum of life and change, which never becomes exhausted. The 
singular certainty presented by mathematics as an abstract science does 
not authorize us to look upon mathematical abstractions themselves, in 
their rigid monotonous form, as the exact image of reality.66 
 
De la contingence pushed the principle of contingency to its extreme in the final 
chapter on psychology. Heterogeneity is greatest between psychic events, Boutroux 
contended, since consciousness evinces the highest degree of freedom that exists in the 
natural world. “A psychological consequent never finds in the antecedent its complete 
cause and all-sufficing reason.”67 Boutroux reproached experimental psychologists who 
transported the law of conservation, either knowingly or not, into the conscious domain 
of freedom. At worst, the reduction of consciousness to purely physiological causes 
would ensue; at best, experimental psychology would treat antecedent psychic conditions 
as determinate: “Even in the moral order of life, beneath changing externals, there are 
strata ever more and more solid. Beneath the disposition of the moment is individual 
character; beneath individual character are the manners and customs of the time; then 
follows national character, and, finally, human nature itself.”68 What experimental 
psychology neglected, according to Boutroux, was the potential for humans to resist their 
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personal habits, cultural mores, social laws, and even for human “nature” to undergo 
radical change.  
Although Boutroux never referenced Fechner, Weber, or any of psychophysicists 
explicitly in De la contingence, he was certainly familiar with their work. Boutroux had 
read Ribot’s books, and even suggested to a philosophy student that he write a 
dissertation on “The experimental method and its application to psychology.”69 It was not 
until 1892 that Boutroux directly critiqued psychophysics in a lecture course at the 
Sorbonne. “Scientific concepts, intelligible as a measure of reality, will lose all meaning 
if we insist on the measure finally measuring nothing but itself.” For Boutroux, 
psychophysics “shall thus land ourselves in nihilism,” unless measurement leaves room 
for a qualitative dimension of consciousness, “and with it the possibility of a spiritualistic 
metaphysics.”70 
 
Bergson’s Critique of Psychophysics 
 
Fifteen years after the publication of Boutroux’s De la contingence, Bergson drew 
on its account of qualitative heterogeneity, and above all, the causal model it entailed, in 
his critique of psychophysics in Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. 
Bergson explicitly referenced Jules Tannery’s indictment of Fechner’s science of 
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measuring sensations.71 As one philosopher commented, “In the Essai … what appeared 
completely new for the era was not the critique of Fechner’s theory of intensity, since we 
had all read Tannery; it was his conception of duration [durée]: for we had all relied on 
Kant, and on the a priori forms of the sensibility.”72 In fact, Bergson’s concept of 
duration drew heavily on Boutroux’s concept of quality. But Boutroux’s influence went 
unacknowledged.73 His absence is all the more surprising in light of the fact that Bergson 
was Boutroux’s student at the École normale. “Boutroux had the reputation of not 
admitting that philosophy could have a point of departure other than Kantianism,”74 
Bergson shared in an interview. But after taking his course a second year, Bergson later 
recognized the value of Boutroux’s method: “For this grand adversary of “scientism” 
actually respected science more than anyone else.”75 In fact, Boutroux encouraged his 
philosophy students to pursue studies in another positive science.  
Bergson’s Essai apportioned quantity and quality respectively to what he called 
the temporal and spatial dimensions of conscious experience. The example of two 
different ways of analyzing movement is illustrative. According to the spatial dimension, 
a motor activity such as running can be analyzed in terms of the space traversed.76 Say a 
runner completes 5 kilometers in thirty minutes, making for an average speed of 10 
kilometers per hour. In order to arrive at the figure, we of course divide the number of 
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kilometers traversed by the number of hours elapsed. The example is analogous to 
Fechner’s measurement of sensations. Both, Bergson claims, presupposes a spatial 
representation. Each step of the runner’s path is imagined as laid out along a line. It is the 
total points along the line, measured uniformly in units of kilometers, that allows 
consciousness to compute the average speed. According to Bergson, treating the runner’s 
movement as if it unfolds in an extensive space separates the movement into 
homogeneous parts. It is a mode of representation in which the natural sciences feel as 
home, since each part can be measured from an observable, third-person perspective.  
The mode of representing the runner’s movement becomes quite different when 
considered according the temporal dimension of consciousness. The entire process, from 
the initial burst of energy she exerts through the fatigue and ultimately exhaustion she 
endures when crossing the finish, constitutes a single unified experience. Understood 
from the first-person perspective of the runner, her movement is not yet decomposed into 
discrete parts and arranged linearly. It is a seamless endeavor, what Bergson called a 
lived duration. Now, despite being a unified process, there are nonetheless parts of the 
runner’s movement. She feels differently throughout, occasionally finding a mindless 
stride, and sometimes laboring to find the energy to continue. These sensations are 
different, but, when experienced as a lived duration, they are not different in the same 
way that the units composing the spatial representation of movement are different. When 
endured temporally, each sensation is perceived as a different quality, and the difference 
between them is heterogeneous. The difference between a casual stride and a furious 
exertion reflects a difference in nature. They admit no common measure; there is only the 
uninterrupted transition that bleeds from one singular sensation to the other. For Bergson, 
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this is the irreducibly qualitative dimension of sensations that philosophical introspection 
reveals. 
“We find it extraordinarily difficult to think of duration in its original purity,” 
Bergson wrote, “this is due, no doubt, to the fact that we do not endure alone; external 
objects, it seems, endure as we do, and time, regarded from this point of view, has every 
appearance of a homogeneous medium.”77 Bergson charged that Fechner unduly 
measured sensations by adopting a model of perception borrowed from that used by 
physics to measure the movement of material objects in space. But Bergson did not settle 
by arguing that Fechner was wrong. Bergson’s argument was that psychophysics’ 
distortion of the lived duration of consciousness followed from the illusion that 
consciousness ineluctably engenders by itself. Fechner fell victim to the natural tendency 
of consciousness to represent its activity as if it took place in a homogeneous medium. It 
is precisely this spatial representation of sensations, Bergson argued, which permitted 
Fechner to decompose them into discrete units that admit an equal measure. According to 
Bergson, there is nothing wrong with the quantification of sensation per se. Bergson 
pursued his philosophy degree only after switching from mathematics. By all accounts, 
he was a brilliant mathematician.78 But quantity is best suited, Bergson suggested, to 
measure material objects in the external world. Quantity proves adulterating, however, 
when applied to inner psychical processes. Fechner’s hubris was to think that a 
quantitative logic of homogeneity could grasp the temporal dimension of sensations, 
while Bergson’s correction was to demonstrate that sensations, because they belong to 
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the lived duration of consciousness, obey an entirely distinct qualitative logic of 
heterogeneity.  
Psychophysics served as a conceptual springboard for Bergson’s project in the 
Essai. Limiting the application of Fechner’s law to the spatial dimension of sensations 
and diagnosing the logic on which it depends allowed Bergson to reveal the temporal 
aspect of sensation as they experienced immediately. Bergson’s positive task was to 
articulate just what this qualitative logic suited to the temporal dimension of 
consciousness consists of.79  
Now the purpose of either logic is to compare sensations. Both Fechner and 
Bergson acknowledged there are differences in sensations. The distinguishing feature of 
their respective logics, I am suggesting, turns on what counts as a difference. The logics 
hinge, as Bergson saw the problem, on two forms of multiplicity. The form of 
multiplicity suited to the spatial dimension is extensive. The multiple degrees of a 
sensation’s magnitude, like the kilometer markers on a race course, are externally 
opposed to each other; they are static, and analyzable, as it were, side by side so that an 
observer can conveniently compare the difference in magnitude at two distinct points in 
time. Bergson called this “discrete multiplicity.”  
Conversely, the form of multiplicity suited to the temporal dimension is intensive. 
Sensations cannot be compared side by side without neglecting an essential feature of 
their intensive character – namely, the retention of the past sensation in the present 
sensation.80 The runner perceives the retention of past sensations in the feeling of 
transition from one state to another. Slowing down, for example, is coupled with relief 
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after having gone fast. Consciousness ascertains the difference between such singular 
sensations by describing the passage from one to the other. Bergson calls this “qualitative 
multiplicity”: 
We should therefore distinguish two forms of multiplicity, two very 
different ways of regarding duration, two aspects of conscious life. Below 
homogeneous duration, which is the extensive symbol of true duration, a 
close psychological analysis distinguishes a duration whose heterogeneous 
moments permeate one another; below the numerical multiplicity of 
conscious states, a qualitative multiplicity; below the self with well-
defined states, a self in which succeeding each other means melting into 
one another and forming an organic whole.81 
 
Different kinds of multiplicity – discrete and qualitative – structured the respective logics 
that Bergson allocated to the spatial and temporal dimensions of consciousness. And it is 
qualitative multiplicities which constitute what Bergson called the “immediate data of 
consciousness.” By identifying qualitative experiences as the most basic elements of 
consciousness, Bergson was explicitly critiquing Ribot’s claim to identify discrete 
multiplicities that could be measured as the “facts of consciousness.”82   
The positive part of Bergson’s project was not complete until he could 
demonstrate how the spatial and temporal dimensions mutually relate to each other. This 
relation is at first glance paradoxical. On the one hand, Bergson posited the temporal 
dimension of sensations as more basic than their spatial dimension. Consciousness 
follows a tendency to represent sensations in discrete terms in order to render them easier 
to communicate. Consciousness subdues the immediate intensity of sensations by 
extracting them from the qualitative fabric in which they interpenetrate. What results is a 
compartmentalized, more socially manageable, but derivative mode of representing 
sensations. On the other hand, Bergson made clear that consciousness can analyze 
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sensations in their qualitative dimension only by resisting this very tendency. A 
heightened concentration and inner reflection is required to restore sensations to their 
immediate context of bleeding seamlessly into each other.83 The paradox is that, for 
Bergson, consciousness must surpass the spatial domain of the natural sciences in order 
to arrive at the temporal domain, which, as he characterized it in the above passage, 
serves as its foundation. In other words, metaphysical analysis can reveal the conditions 
of psychophysics only by taking experimental results as a point of departure.  
Bergson’s critique of psychophysics was exemplary of scientific spiritualists’ 
engagement with experimental psychology. The negative task of the Essai consisted of 
delimiting the dimension of experience to which psychophysical research applied – 
namely, external observation – and identifying the logic on which it depended – quantity. 
The positive task consisted of carving out a distinct dimension of experience that resists 
quantification – namely, the immediate data of consciousness – and constructing an 
alternative qualitative logic appropriate to it. Bergson was not alone in advancing a 
critique of psychophysics in these terms. Indeed, the ideas of quality and quantity, as well 
as of contingency and heterogeneity, as I have argued, all gained a distinctly spiritualist 
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1932). It is not my intention to resolve this debate. Let me simply suggest that lived duration has a porous 
quality that is legibly distinct from the spatial representation of time, understood as a succession of 
immobile units.  
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Alfred Fouillée, the Unconscious, and Appétition  
 
Psychophysics broached the further problem of whether there is an unconscious 
dimension of sensation. Fechner’s concept of the just-noticeable difference entailed that 
slight differences in the level of excitation go unnoticed; they are not strong enough to be 
distinctly perceived. This accounts, as I have already shown, for the basic discrepancy 
that allowed Fechner to posit an algorithmic relationship between excitation and 
sensation. Sensation grows more slowly in intensity, by leaps as it were, than nervous 
excitation, which grows continuously. At stake in the reception of Fechner’s law was 
how to explain these “blind spots” of consciousness. What kind of mental activity takes 
place between each just-noticeable difference, that is, during the gradual increase in the 
strength of a stimulus? And if changes in stimulation do in fact go unnoticed, then can 
psychophysics demarcate the limits of consciousness?  
 According to Fechner, psychic phenomena that cannot be immediately 
apprehended are unconscious. 84 Today, the term’s connotation is psychoanalytic, owing 
to what Marcel Gauchet calls “the anti-historical illusion that has trapped us in the 
psychoanalytical movement, strangely convinced of its auto-generation.”85 Before Freud, 
Gauchet insists, “the privilege of consciousness was fundamentally shaken by the notable 
gains and models proposed by neurophysiology.”86 The neurophysiological underpinning 
of Fechner’s model of the unconscious operated, first, below the register of the perceived 
sensations, which he believed to constitute the basic givens of consciousness; second, 
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autonomously, such that sensations follow distinct laws of the unconscious, which can be 
analyzed apart from yet parallel to the laws of conscious phenomena. But Fechner’s 
model of the unconscious was modest. He claimed that the contents of the unconscious, 
those sensations passing between just-noticeable differences, are not yet consciousness. 
The just-noticeable difference therefore corresponds to the point at which consciousness 
retroactively perceives the build-up of unconscious sensations. 
Ribot, however, found in Fechner’s law a more radical model of the unconscious. 
Unconscious phenomena, according to Ribot, constitute physiological data that resist 
conscious apprehension. Ribot’s model had the effect of eliminating philosophical 
analysis from experimental psychology: introspection can reveal conscious phenomena, 
but unconscious phenomena are the purview of experimentation. The unconscious was 
instrumental to Ribot’s legitimation of the new psychology. For Ribot, the psychologist’s 
task, like that of the natural scientist, is to uncover the laws of the unconscious. Ribot 
drew his aspiration from Wundt, for whom “consciousness only knows the results of the 
work operative in the obscure laboratory situated beneath itself; the unconscious is the 
theatre of the most important spiritual phenomena: everywhere consciousness supposes 
the unconscious as its condition.”87 By depicting the unconscious as the theatre of 
“spiritual phenomena,” Ribot recruited Wundt as a critic of spiritualism. Ribot 
emphasized, “the traditional opinion which holds that consciousness is a stage embracing 
all our inner life is unacceptable.”88 Spiritualist metaphysics, Ribot inveighed, could 
penetrate inner experience only until it struck the physiological bedrock of the 
unconscious, at which point inner reflection must give way to experimental observation.  
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 Alfred Fouillée’s (1838-1912) engagement with psychophysics took issue with 
the dividing line along which Ribot cut the unconscious from consciousness. “It is 
important to avoid a confusion here that vitiates nearly all of the contemporary 
psychology,” Fouillée wrote in an 1883 article, “namely, the confusion between an 
indistinct consciousness and an entire unconscious.”89 Fouillée’s argument was that slight 
differences in excitation might be difficult to notice, but that does not make them 
unconscious. Fouillée did not dispute the truth of Fechner’s law. He took issue with how 
experimental psychologists such as Ribot extrapolated it to support a narrow picture of 
consciousness. This picture took consciousness to be a faculty of judgment. 
Consciousness executes a judgment when it subjects particular concepts to general laws. 
The fact that sensations fall outside this myopic picture of consciousness, Fouillée 
argued, does not lend good reason to countenance the claim that sensations are 
unconscious. By enlarging the realm of the unconscious to include physiological 
processes, Ribot and others, Fouillée charged, erroneously shrank the realm of 
consciousness. Fouillée not only reproached this picture for rigidifying concepts as 
exclusively intellectual and freezing consciousness into a static faculty. The new 
psychology, Fouillée diagnosed, had unwittingly molded the unconscious into the old 
spiritualist frame: “Life, sensibility, even consciousness is not a single and indivisible 
thing as imagined by the traditional spiritualism: it is susceptible not only to multiple 
directions, but diffusion, concentration, transmission, and displacement.”90 Fouillée took 
as his positive task to draw on experimental psychology in order to articulate a dynamic 
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framework for consciousness stretching from the murky affective depths to the most clear 
and distinct mathematical analyses. 
The idée-force was Fouillée’s key concept that expressed the dynamic nature of 
consciousness. It first appeared in Fouillée’s programmatic essay that sought to reconcile 
Ribot’s materialist psychology and Ravaisson’s spiritualism without leaning exclusively 
on either.91 The “motor power of the idea,” Fouillée posited, is the “middle term between 
the two.” Ideas have a natural propensity to act on the world. As Fouillée’s few 
commentators have noted, his concept of idées-forces grounded consciousness on the 
sensory-motor paradigm: ideas follow the centripetal impulsion inward (sensory 
reception) from an external world and direct their centrifugal impulsion outward (motor 
response) toward action on the external world.92  
Where Fouillée departed from physiology, and his metaphysical commitment 
intervened, was in the ethical motivation of his account. Ideas are not reducible, Fouillée 
claimed, to the determinism into which mechanistic explanations lapse. The dualism 
between intellectual representation and sensory reception reflects two dimensions of the 
will’s effort. Thinking, that is, presupposes freedom. In his first compilation of works 
dedicated to a systematic theory of idées-forces, Fouillée explicitly drew on Maine de 
Biran’s insight: “sensing or suffering [pâtir] already presuppose acting.”93 Intellectual 
concepts are equally forms of action beyond their capacity to represent facts since, 
Fouillée held, ideas encounter resistance in each other and, moreover, manifest a creative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Alfred Fouillée, “La philosophie des idées-forces: comme conciliation du naturalisme et de l’idéalisme,” 
Revue philosophique T. 8 (1879): 7. 
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power to conceive the world anew. Freedom, understood as embodied motility, was thus 
the pivot point for Fouillée’s account of consciousness. 
In place of the dualism that experimental psychologists erected between the 
conscious and the unconscious, Fouillée argued that there is instead a dualism internal to 
consciousness: “a consciousness purely sensible, which can be confused, and an 
intellectual consciousness, which is necessarily comparative, differentiated and 
contrasted.”94 The spectrum of forms that concepts assume ascend toward discrete and 
abstract representations and descend into the amalgam of sensory states akin to the 
stream of the passing meanwhile. Fouillée characterized the kinds of concepts 
respectively as representative (or reflexive) and immediate.  
At stake, again, was the status of the immediate data of consciousness. For 
Fouillée, the immediate data consist of non-reflected sensations. Consciousness can 
submit even the most transient sensations to a heightened level of reflection; and when it 
does, the results resemble those of psychophysics – namely, discrete, clearly 
distinguished sensations which can be measured. “At its origin, the living being does not 
need this entire apparatus; it suffers and it enjoys, and when it enjoys, and above all when 
it suffers, it does not need to search for a tool for contrasting, for being warned and 
feeling. It has an immediate rapport with itself; it has a spontaneous consciousness.”95 
The implication was that psychophysics generally, and Ribot’s interpretation in 
particular, was built on a derivative concept of sensations, abstracted from their 
immediate, incoherent state within consciousness. Sensations are no less conscious, 
Fouillée claimed, for not appearing distinct.  
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Fouillée drew on Maine de Biran’s principle: wherever there is sensation, 
consciousness follows. Fouillée believed it was critical that all sensations retain at least 
an inchoate conscious dimension because conscious phenomena cannot be built up from 
unconscious phenomena. Just as stasis cannot produce movement, the unconscious 
cannot produce consciousness. Following Leibnitz’s distinction between perception and 
apperception, the distinctions between conscious states turn on their degrees of clarity, as 
much as the distinctions between movements turn on their degree of momentum. Purely 
physiological phenomena lack the power to spontaneously engender psychic phenomena. 
Fouillée reproached Ribot’s model of the unconscious for having ossified what Fouillée 
took to be the plastic passage between the multiple dimensions of consciousness. 
 Fouillée construed his philosophical method as conciliatory. Beginning with his 
1872 La liberté et la déterminisme, he conceived the task of philosophy as reconciling the 
great systems. Fouillée contrasted conciliation, which he treated as speculative and 
theoretical, with Cousin’s eclecticism, which he saw as historical and critical. Whereas 
Cousin employed common sense to select the best philosophical ideas and leave the rest 
in the past, Fouillée took as his task to reconcile competing ideas. Among scientific 
spiritualists, Ribot admired Fouillée as “the most brilliant mind,” who “like the rest of his 
school, fully accepts the data of science on condition of subordinating them to the moral 
point of view, which contains the true ground of things.”96 
Fouillée’s decisive contribution to the development of scientific spiritualism was 
his idea that the division between the domains of experience is cut from within 
consciousness. Part of the very activity of idées-forces is to envelop two dimensions of 
consciousness. The first is intellectual. The second is what Fouillée called appetitive. 
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Appétition is the principle that, as one commentator summarizes, “pushes a living being 
toward action in view of the satisfaction of a need or a desire or the realization of an 
end.”97. The term conjures similarities with Spinoza’s conatus; but Fouillée explicitly 
expressed his debt to Darwin’s notion of competition for life.98 Appétition and 
intellection correspond to two dimensions of consciousness: “they are not two disparate 
realities that could be indifferent to one another, nor two “aspects” of which one, the 
mental, would be the epiphenomenon of a phenomenon; rather it is the same reality in the 
process of development that divides itself by the diversity of means to seize it.”99   
Psychophysics represented sensations as if they occupied the intellectual 
dimension of consciousness, but, Fouillée argued, the field neglected the appetitive 
dimension. Psychophysics treated sensations as discrete and separable representations, 
reflectively perceived by a subject. Intellectual representations, however, only reflect the 
superficial crust of consciousness. “The appetitive action that constitutes life and the 
will,” Fouillée contrasted, “is constant, without actual intermittences.”100 It was this 
dualism within consciousness, which, according to Fouillée, accounted for the “blind 
spots” in Fechner’s experiments. The activity passing between just-noticeable differences 
inheres in the appetitive dimensions of consciousness, which Fechner had occluded by 
relying on a narrowly intellectual picture of consciousness. Psychophysics was thus 
methodologically unable to account for appétition because, Fouillée held, only 
metaphysical analysis is uniquely disposed to capture the appetitive dimension of 
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consciousness. In line with the project of scientific spiritualism, appétition contributed to 
a conceptual vocabulary a logic appropriate to inner reflection.  
The difficulty that Fouillée confronted was that appétition carried too much 
physiological baggage into philosophy. William James criticized the concept on precisely 
these grounds. “the almost exclusively psychological point of view from which it is 
carried on, and the absence from it of any fundamentally original concepts keep it from 
effectually ‘laying’ all that more properly philosophical dust which it so well succeeds in 
stirring up.”101 Fouillée did position himself as an outlier within the French spiritualist 
landscape. In the eyes of many, he did not open psychology onto metaphysics enough.  
Nonetheless, the dualism that Fouillée conceived between appétition and 
intellection was of a piece with the dualism that Bergson posited between the temporal 
and spatial dimensions of consciousness in the Essai. In fact, Fouillée would describe his 
project in uncannily Bergsonian terms: intellectual consciousness “divides the indivisible, 
renders homogeneous the heterogeneous, immobilizes the mobile, and renders static the 
dynamic.”102 Fouillée and Bergson fashioned their respective dualisms to trace the 
dimensions of consciousness with which scientific observation and inner reflection 
accord. They therefore deepened the project of scientific spiritualism, which, I hope to 
have shown, articulated a conceptual vocabulary to explain the free activity of 
consciousness in terms rigorous enough to rival the associationist and mechanist logics of 
experimental psychology.  
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Experimental psychology spurred a new generation of philosophers to 
revolutionize their spiritualist commitment to the autonomy of consciousness. Tannery, 
Boutroux, Bergson, and Fouillée belonged to an initial wave of scientific spiritualism that 
gained coherence, first, through the reading community established in Ribot’s Revue 
philosophique, and second, around the problems of consciousness engendered by the 
advent of psychophysics. Far from having staged a revolt against positivism, these 
scientific spiritualists justified the necessity of metaphysics and the reality of free will by 
confronting the limits of Fechner’s quantitative methods. Psychophysics thus offered 
scientific spiritualists both the occasion to rejuvenate the critique of associationism, and a 
point d’appui to articulate a logic of conscious activity built around the concepts of 
quality, heterogeneity, and contingency.  
It was in the context of these debates that Bergson developed his concept of the 
lived durée, a conceptual pillar of his lifelong project to articulate the distinctly temporal 
structure of consciousness. As I explore in chapter four, these debates advanced further in 









Chapter 4: Locating Consciousness 
  
 If psychophysics legitimated the quantitative rigor of experimental psychology, 
then psychopathology promulgated the nascent science into the public imagination. Paris 
became a hub where continental audiences flocked in order to witness mental 
abnormalities on display: from the hysteric female patients presented by Jean-Martin 
Charcot in his lecture hall at the Salpêtrière Hospital beginning in 1879 to the first French 
psychology laboratory opened at the École pratique des hautes études in 1889. 
Psychopathology aimed to derive the laws of the healthy mind from the maladies of the 
sick mind. And Ribot dedicated ample space in his Revue philosophique to burgeoning 
psychopathological research. His focus was specifically the psychopathology of memory, 
which held the key to localizing the cerebral bases of consciousness. Ribot believed that 
the location of memories could be uncovered by identifying the brain lesions that cause 
amnesia, and eventually an entire map of consciousness could be charted along humans’ 
cerebral cortices. Scientific spiritualists studied the research on aphasia, the loss of 
language capacities, in order to confront the promise and peril of psychopathology. Can 
memories occupy a place in the brain? And if so, could consciousness be found under a 
microscope? Psychopathology opened the possibility of reducing consciousness to the 
brain; and it was around this metaphysical problem that scientific spiritualists converged.  
The problem spurred a number of thinkers to join the chorus of scientific 
spiritualism, including Victor Egger, Jean-Marie Guyau, and Pierre Janet. These thinkers’ 
ongoing dialogue, I will argue, lent significance to Bergson’s engagement with the 
psychopathology of memory in his second book, Matière et mémoire (1896). Therein 
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Bergson delivered the brunt of his critique to Ribot’s method of reducing memory to 
neural networks. Bergson affirmed that the brain functions to actualize memories, but not 
to conserve them. The brain “is the vehicle of an action and not the substratum of a 
knowledge.”1 Bergson had already demonstrated his interest in psychopathology via his 
anonymous 1883 translation of James Sully’s Illusions: A Psychological Study.2 The 
British psychologist synthesized physiological and introspective psychology to arrive at 
the laws of perception by an analysis of hallucinations. In the subsequent decades 
following his initial academic work, Bergson closely followed the emerging discourses of 
brain localization. The problems posed by the developing science, and widened by 
scientific spiritualism, set the stage for Bergson to radicalize his account of the temporal 
structure of consciousness and freedom.  
 
The Psychopathology of Memory 
 
In February of 1880 Paul Broca (1824-1880) invited Théodule Ribot to join the 
Société d’Anthropologie. Broca founded the Société in 1859 as a haven for the incipient 
science of the relationship between geography and psychology.3 Broca issued the 
invitation the year of his death, confirming the lineage in which Ribot already set 
himself: carrying on the unfinished work of localizing brain functions.4 Broca’s interest 
in anthropology followed from his early work as a brain surgeon. He identified lesions in 
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the left frontal lobe of the brain as the cause of amnesia. In so doing, he identified the seat 
of memory, what is still called “Broca’s area.” In May 1880, Ribot published his first in a 
series of articles in his Revue philosophique that he would compile the next year as Les 
maladies de la mémoire (1881). Drawing on the examples of amnesiac patients extending 
from Broca’s early work to the scattered cases in Hippolyte Taine’s De L’intelligence 
(1870), Ribot ushered in what has often been described as the golden decade of memory 
studies in France. 
That decade was part of a larger wave of medical psychology, or what was called 
“clinical” psychology at the time. The most notable clinical psychologists in France were 
the Englishmen Henry Maudsley (1835-1918) and John Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911), 
who  applied experimental procedures to the analysis of mental illness. Their goal was to 
discern the causes of maladies in order to deduce the laws of the healthy psyche. Ribot 
drew heavily on both psychologists in support of the psychopathological method that he 
applied to memory. Their research illuminated the dynamic processes that unfold across 
the past, present, and future of consciousness. In this sense, clinical study was 
longitudinal. It offered an alternative, though complementary, psychological angle to the 
neurophysiological studies of Fechner and Wundt, which analyzed short term, punctual 
sensations.  
Psychopathology was not the only route that experimental psychologists pursued 
to study memory during the decade. Researchers at Wundt’s laboratory, for example, 
made use of Fechner’s law to conduct experiments on auditory memory in which they 
would play a standard tone for subjects followed by subsequent tones.5 Subjects would 
report whether the tones were similar or different from the standard tone. In turn, 
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researchers would measure the rate of memory’s diminution by plotting the number of 
correct reports as a function of the time elapsed since the standard tone was played. 
Similarly, Hermann Ebbinghaus conducted a series of experiments on himself in which 
he would arrange a series of nonsense syllables and test how well he could memorize 
their order.6 After changing the syllables in the series, Ebbinghaus measured the rate of 
memory retention. The two kinds of experiments analyzed the successful recollection of 
memories in the healthy mind. Ribot’s work in psychopathology, on the other hand, 
analyzed the failure to recall memories in the abnormal mind.  
The conceptual issue at stake that both attracted philosophical interest in 
abnormality and motivated psychopathological research was the problem of brain 
localization. Several psychologists during the period sought to identify the locations of 
mental phenomena in the brain.7 Carl Wernicke (1848-1905) propelled the scientific 
culture of localization forward after it was initially set in motion by Broca’s studies of the 
damage to cortical regions causing aphasia. Whereas Broca identified the inferior frontal 
gyrus as the locus of language skills, Wernicke added the nearby superior temporal gyrus 
in 1874. Wernicke observed that damage to the area impaired aphasiacs’ ability to 
comprehend written and spoken language, but their ability to speak remained intact. The 
diagnosis of receptive aphasia, or “Wernicke’s aphasia,” bolstered Ribot’ confidence that 
psychopathology could some day complete the project of localizing the entire map of 
consciousness.   
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  Aphasia was one of two kinds of amnesia that Ribot studied. The first was general 
amnesia, or nearly complete memory loss. The second kind was partial amnesia. Among 
partial amnesiacs only certain memories are lost, typically the most recently acquired and 
thus least stable forms. Today general amnesia is divided into two types. Retrograde 
amnesia is tied to the suspension of memories of events that took place before the onset 
of amnesia; and anterograde is tied to the inability to create new memories since the onset 
of amnesia. Memory loss would begin slowly with momentary occasions of 
forgetfulness, especially when stopped in the middle of a task. Ribot observed that 
general amnesiacs lost memories progressively. This began with recent facts, then ideas, 
and finally sentiments. Eventually the ability to perform motor functions was lost up 
through the point that complete dementia set in.  
The most interesting cases of partial amnesia involved patients with aphasia. 
Ribot’s study of aphasiacs revealed that they progressively lose the ability to form words, 
both spoken and written, in the same order: descending from proper names to common 
names, adjectives, and finally to verbs.8 The order of language loss engendered by 
aphasia formed the basis of what is still referenced today as Ribot’s law, or the law of 
regression. The destruction of memories proceeds progressively from the least stable to 
the most stable, from the scantly repeated to the most frequently repeated. “From the 
initial term to the final term, the march of amnesia, regulated by the nature of things, 
follows the path of least resistance, which is to say of the least organization.”9 Proper 
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nouns are the least stable, hence they are the first memories that aphasiacs lose. Verbs are 
repeated most frequently and are thus held onto the longest. 
Ribot conceived language as a series of relations between ideas and the signs used 
to express them. The former are ideal; they represent the meaning of words. The latter 
involve motors activities. Speaking and writing are the motor language skills localizable 
in their neuronal imprint, which Ribot called, borrowing from Maudsley, the “motor 
residue” of nervous elements. The motor residue is the permanent trace left on the brain 
by the associations that build up the bodily memories on which the smooth execution of 
our motor skills relies. They facilitate the automatic functioning of speaking and writing 
in the form of a neural support network for more subtle associations, such as particular 
spoken and written signs. Although we don’t always make use of these more feeble 
associations, the motor residue of firmly installed associations in the brain indicates that 
we do regularly use general language skills. That is why, according to Ribot, we might 
easily forget particular words, but not our general capacity to write and speak words.  
What drove Ribot’s interpretation of aphasiacs was his distinction between two 
kinds of memory: organic and psychological. Organic memory is an unconscious 
biological function typified by what we conventionally call “muscular memory.” It 
includes basic habits coded into the nervous system, whether inherited from the species, 
such as the capacity to walk, or developed by the individual, such as the ability to ride a 
bicycle. Psychological memory is conscious memory that takes the form of an image. Its 
proper character is the recollection of a past event – what present day psychologists call 
episodic memory.10 Ribot repeatedly stressed, “it is impossible to say where memory – 
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either psychic or organic – finishes.”11 They are the two poles of the associative chain 
descending into the base of firmly installed motor memories and ascending toward the 
peak of fleeting psychological images. The most recently acquired memories, those of a 
lecture for example, are the most personal; in order to recall them we have to assign them 
a date in the past. The more we recollect a memory, the stronger the associative bond 
between a present perception and a past image. The stronger the associative bond, the 
deeper the memory embeds itself, descending toward organic memory. This is the case 
for a maternal language, or what psychologists now call semantic memory, which is 
repeated enough to function as smoothly as moving the body’s limbs.12  
Ribot’s brand of associationism proposed a more dynamic physiology of 
consciousness than those of Broca and Wernicke. Ribot observed that lesions to neural 
fibers caused aphasia; but he did not locate memories in particular nerves. Although 
associations find their support in brain cells, the model did not amount to a 
straightforward localization of ideas in the brain. Rather, as Pierre Hum clarifies, 
“applied to memory, mnesic imprints are not localizable in either a delimited region of 
the body or in the soma of a cell. Every memory engages the totality of the central 
nervous system in the form of stable dynamic associations between cells.”13 Whether 
Ribot’s dynamic account of aphasia overcame the static localizations of his predecessors, 
or instead represented the apex of localization in identifying neural complexity, its 
reductionist endeavor established the problem around which scientific spiritualists and 
physiological psychologists converged.  
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 Ribot’s model drew on the evolutionary psychology of Herbert Spencer and John 
Hughlings Jackson. Spencer had already established the distinction between conscious 
memory and unconscious memory that Ribot construed as psychic and organic memory. 
The organization of new memories, Spencer held, begins with the active recollection of 
conscious images and deepens with each repetition, until they fall under the automatic 
execution of unconscious habits.  Hence Ribot’s proposition at the opening of Les 
Maladies de la mémoire: “memory is, by its essence, a biological fact; by accident a 
psychological fact.”14 Jackson’s chief insight was to treat evolution as the progress 
toward greater heterogeneity. When applied to individual organisms, Jackson 
demonstrated that neurological disorders are dissolutions, or what he called “evolutionary 
regressions.” That is, biological functions are lost in the inverse order in which they 
evolve. On the one hand, each dissolution incapacitates the higher order function, yet on 
the other, liberates the lower order function.15 For example, Ribot noted that the 
dissolution of rational language often involved a more acute sense of emotional language. 
Similarly, amnesiacs who gradually lost recent memories often reported a surge of past, 
seemingly forgotten memories.16  
But it was the particular problem of aphasia on which scientific spiritualists’ 
engagement with Ribot hinged. Ribot noticed that aphasiacs are able to recall the idea of 
an object, but are not able to express its sign.17 When presented with a fork, for example, 
aphasiacs would typically acknowledge the object as a fork, moving their head in 
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agreement when asked if it is a fork. When asked to name the object, or even repeat the 
word “fork,” aphasiacs failed. Whereas the healthy mind takes for granted its ability to 
translate private ideas into publically recognizable signs, aphasiacs fail to connect the 
two. Ribot interpreted these cases to mean that the motor mechanism for putting thoughts 
into actions had been incapacitated. The aphasiac’s mind retains certain ideas but bervous 
lesions prevent the body from externalizing them. In aphasiacs the connection between 
psychological and organic memory is thus broken. They can remember language in a 
purely ideal form, or image-memory, such as the idea of “fork.” The image is no longer 
tethered to motor-memory: “this memory of vocal and written signs that survives in 
aphasiacs represents what is called an interior monologue [parole intérieure], the 
minimum of determination without which the mind would incur dementia.”18 Aphasia, 
for Ribot, incapacitates the body’s motor capacity to express signs, but not the ability of 
consciousness to represent ideas.  
At the heart of Bergson’s dispute with Ribot was how to explain image-memories. 
How is it possible to retain a pure image-memory severed from its complementary motor-
memory? How can an idea, in other words, persist without its sign? Ribot left the answer 
to the future of science. He had faith that some day experimental psychology would 
perfect Broca’s project of localizing language by identifying the seat of image-memories 
with the same precision that it had already localized the residue of motor-memories. 
Bergson, however, contended that image-memories are the limit case of localization. 
Although motor-memories could be located in nervous connections, Bergson held that 
image-memories are qualitatively different. The latter are peculiar to consciousness, in 
excess of the brain’s storage capacity. But Bergson’s critique in Matière et mémoire grew 
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out of a wide debate broached by scientific spiritualists in response to Ribot’s 
psychopathology of aphasia.  
  
Image-Memories in Victor Egger’s La Parole intérieure 
 
In 1881 Victor Egger proposed a resolution to the question left unanswered in Les 
Maladies de la mémoire: how do aphasiacs recognize ideas yet fail to reproduce their 
corresponding sign? Against the optimistic pretension that psychopathology would some 
day localize the neural associations that house ideas, Egger’s thesis, La parole intérieure 
(1881), claimed that it was impossible.19 Ideas are the inherent limit, Egger argued, and 
not a mere stumbling block, to the entire project of localization. Egger’s method was 
qualitative; he sought to describe the experience of recalling image-memories. Pointing to 
the subtitle, Essai de psychologie descriptive, one reviewer noted, “The only method he 
employs is observation by consciousness or rather by memory.”20  
Egger generalized from the particular case of aphasiacs. Aphasiacs privately think 
of ideas severed from outward bodily gestures when, returning to Ribot’s example, they 
acknowledge the word “fork” yet fail to speak or write it. Yet, as Egger showed, we all 
do the same as part of the internal monologue that occupies consciousness. Whether it 
streams along unknowingly or preoccupies our attention, the internal monologue is an 
immaterial dimension of language, which, despite its similarities with outward speech, 
depends on an independent explanation. Egger hedged much of his argument against the 
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English psychologist, Alexander Bain. Bain believed that muscular movement 
accompanies all intellectual states, and that buccal activity, or mouth movement, always 
accompanies an internal monologue. Egger pointed to cases in which the internal 
monologue takes on the voice of others, a phenomenon heightened in hallucinations. 
Consciousness is aware of the inward sounds of speech, but the body does not express 
them outwardly. The deeper the descent into consciousness, the more freely sonorous 
images detach themselves from motor functions. An internal monologue cannot therefore 
be localized in space, Egger argued, since it lacks a physical dimension. It is a purely 
temporal phenomenon, what he called, in advance of Bergson, the durée of 
consciousness.  
The distinction between inward and outward speech staged an opportunity for 
Egger to neatly separate the tasks of what he called physiological and descriptive 
psychology. Physiological psychology studies extended phenomena that occupy space, 
whereas descriptive psychology concerns unextended phenomena. Since consciousness 
does not occupy space, Egger took the distinction to mean that only descriptive 
psychology could achieve a science of consciousness. “In affirming space, we affirm the 
non-self [non-moi]; in affirming duration [durée], we affirm the self; the unextended that 
endures is the self.”21 Egger went on to highlight his description of consciousness in 
strikingly Bergsonian terms: “I am a pure succession.”22 Herein marked what Egger saw 
as the internal limit of psychopathological claims to localize conscious phenomena. 
Because it takes place only in time, an internal monologue ceaselessly effaces its origins. 
It cannot be indexed to an anterior sensation or neuronal association since it is not a 
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stable phenomenon. “The self is what flows, what passes or has past, but which, once 
past, often becomes present again.”23  
La Parole intérieure followed from Egger’s public engagements with 
psychopathology In 1877 he published an article criticizing Jules Bernard Luys’ recently 
published Le Cerveau et ses fonctions (1876). The book presented a neurological study of 
the process by which nervous excitations generate conscious representations by means of 
what Luys called “brain phosphorescence.” Egger’s critique of Luys defended the dualist 
position that consciousness is irreducible to matter. A brain function, Egger wrote, “is the 
function of the organ, it is the organ in function, the organ in movement; it is the organ 
and something else.”24 For consciousness, however, “the function is sui generis, apart, 
without relation to the organ, heterogeneous to the organ and all movement; it is a world 
apart, the unextended world.”25 The upshot, according to Egger, was a rigid distinction 
between cerebral anatomy and consciousness: “an insurmountable abyss separates their 
objects.”26 Intrigued by Egger’s critique, Ribot hosted a debate over the methods 
appropriate to psychopathology in the Revue philosophique.27 The physiologist and future 
recipient of the Nobel Prize in Medicine, Charles Richet, joined, responding with 
complete trust in the future progress of scientific psychology. Luys’ book, Richet argued, 
was but one contribution among many to the yet unfulfilled project of localizing the 
brain’s functions. Richet later offered his own contributions to studies on amnesia. He 
reported on what he called “objectification” in somnambulism, a phenomena where 
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sleepwalkers forget their personality and instead act out, following Richet’s observations, 
the roles of generals, bakers, and priests.28 He found Egger’s stance, however, 
detrimental. “Leaving the human sciences [la science de l’homme] to logicians who 
disdain the experimental method,” Richet wrote, “is contrary to progress.”29 Ribot, 
delighted by the interest that Richet and Egger inspired, offered both the chance to further 
pursue the debate in the pages of the Revue philosophique.  
  On the back of his personal copy of Richet’s response, Egger jotted notes to 
himself that would guide his research for La parole intérieure. They were questions to 
which, as Egger described them, “a serious adversary could carry the discussion.” Egger 
scrawled several tentative responses to his imagined interlocutor, clearly a physiological 
psychologist. They indicate the gravity of the problems of reductionism and localization 
within an increasingly scientific intellectual climate, as well as the stakes animating 
scientific spiritualism: 
 Is pure independent psychology, according to the introspective method, a science; 
that is to say, does it surpass the description of facts and explain them? Does it 
have laws? 
 Can brain physiology and psychophysics be separated in practice? Aren’t they 
reducible, by the differences in their methods, so as to depend on one another? 
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 Can the definition of the nervous system be updated without a notion of the 
unconscious? It would be the subsequent result of research on the system of 
particular nerves.30  
 
Egger’s notes offer a historical bridge between his 1877 articles and 1881 thesis at the 
same time as they also indicate the wider trend that scientific spiritualists began to pursue 
during the period. The “insurmountable abyss” that Egger affirmed between physiology 
and psychology in 1877 would give way to a more nuanced engagement with the 
particular problem of the internal monologue, a problem that emerged from within 
physiological psychology, notably in Ribot’s 1881 Les Maladies de la mémoire. Egger 
preserved in La Parole intérieure the distinction that he earlier drew between extended 
and unextended mental phenomena. But the distinction became less rigid as Egger’s 
thesis put it in service of clarifying the methods appropriate to descriptive and 
physiological psychology. The notes can be read as an intimate glimpse into the 
philosopher’s aspiration to be seen as rigorous in the eyes of his scientific peers.   
 
The Literary Factory of Alfred Fouillée and Jean-Marie Guyau 
 
 Alfred Fouillée and his nephew, Jean-Marie Guyau, advanced some of the most 
probing critiques of Ribot’s memory studies. Neither Fouillée nor Guyau endorsed the 
strict division by which Egger opposed physiological and descriptive psychology. 
Fouillée, for his part, invested his hope for the future of philosophy in psychopathology; 
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but he aimed to nuance the foundation of Ribot’s method, epitomized on the opening 
page of Les Maladies de la mémoire by the declaration, “memory is, by its essence, a 
biological fact; by accident a psychological fact.”31  
Following a brief professorship at the École normale, Fouillée moved to the hills 
of Menton overlooking the Mediterranean Sea in 1879. He brought Augustine Tuillerie, 
the young Guyau, and Guyau’s fiancée, Barbe Marguerite André. Together, they 
transformed their villa into a literary factory, churning out books at a prolific pace. André 
wrote children’s’ stories under the pseudonym Pierre Ulric. Augustine Tuillerie took on 
the pseudonym, G. Bruno, for fear that the conservative press might expose her books as 
the work of a divorcée.32 In addition to writing school manuals, her most famous literary 
achievement was Le tour de la France par deux enfants (1877), a work read throughout 
primary schools to consolidate national solidarity.  Tuberculosis caused Jean-Marie 
Guyau’s premature death at the age of thirty-three in 1888. The episode was traumatic for 
Fouillée. “I don’t remember a day in the last forty years of my life without some 
suffering, without some anxiety.”33 His stepson’s memory, however, impassioned his 
determination to write: “ I published one and sometimes two volumes per year. I didn’t 
have the time to cut short, since I feel that there remains plenty of things to do and to say, 
that my life…will be too short for my task.”34 
Fouillée set about adapting an irreducibly conscious dimension of the experience 
of time to Ribot’s physiology of memory. He took as his point of departure what he saw 
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as the outmoded picture of time that Ribot employed. The picture was borrowed from 
Kant. According to Kant, time constitutes an a priori form that all conscious experiences 
assume. Ribot, to be sure, rejected the notion of a priori categories. He saw time as a 
composite notion that humans progressively acquire as the body interacts with the 
world.35 Fouillée agreed. He described time as an experimental intuition rather than as a 
transcendental intuition.36 Nonetheless, Fouillée charged that Ribot held onto the Kantian 
picture of time as a linear form inscribed in space. In the Transcendental Analytic of the 
First Critique Kant described time as “a line progressing to infinity, in which the 
manifold constitutes a series of one dimension only.”37 Consciousness organizes events 
along this line as if they occupy sequential points in time. Even though Ribot did not treat 
time as an epistemological condition anterior to experience, his account was outmoded, 
according to Fouillée, because it failed to jettison the linear, spatial picture, of time. 
Kantians, Fouillée claimed, “always gather together time and space on the same line, as if 
what applies to one would also apply to the other.”38 
Ribot acknowledged that the spatial picture of time was central to his theory of 
recollection. In order to recall a memory, we depart on “a regressive march which, 
leaving from the present, travels a series of terms more or less long.”39 Traversing the 
entire associative chain of memories, as if reading the dossier of every past event, would 
be exhausting if not impossible. So consciousness naturally identifies “landmarks” in the 
form of significant past events, which facilitate the recollection of certain episodes. It was 
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in spatial terms that Ribot appealed to his readers to reflect on “how much this 
mechanism resembles that by which we locate ourselves in space. There we also have 
landmarks, abbreviating processes, perfectly familiar distances that we employ as units of 
measure.”40  
The spatial picture, Fouillée charged, suits the external dimension of 
consciousness. But when understood from the internal dimension, temporal experience 
demands a different picture since memories do not occupy an archive; they are instead 
co-extensive with the present, actively influencing consciousness. For Fouillée, 
appétition held the key to unlocking this alternative picture: “Time alone is the essential 
form of memory, and memory, ultimately being the consciousness of appetite, effort, and 
motor action, is as fundamental as life itself, for life is only appetite tending toward its 
satisfaction by a series of degrees and moments.”41  
Fouillée’s next step was to bring his alternative picture of time to bear on Ribot’s 
research. Since time, according to Fouillée, is experienced in two distinct dimensions, 
Ribot was wrong to treat the conservation and recollection of memories as an identical 
process. According to Fouillée, these dual operations are distinct.  
Fouillée analyzed conservation and recollection in two separate essays. In the first 
essay, Fouillée argued that conservation is basically a neural process: “each organ is a 
memory; the eye is a memory of luminous waves and the ear is a memory of sonorous 
waves.”42 Nervous vibrations are the material that conserves memories, and the law of 
association can readily explain the process. Fouillée invoked a favorite example of 
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Ribot’s: if I fix my eyes on a red disc and then turn them away, I will momentarily 
perceive the illusory image of a green disc. This is because the fatigue of optical nerves 
that register red leaves those that register green to vibrate alone under a white light.43 
Fouillée took the example to demonstrate that the conservation of memory amounts to the 
prolongation of nervous vibrations. Memory conservation is thus a purely physiological, 
and not explicitly conscious, process.  
 Conversely, recollection depends on an irreducibly free, conscious activity. To 
make the point, Fouillée drew on another favorite example to highlight the distinction 
between conservation and recollection. Toward the end of his life, Linnaeus took pleasure 
in sitting by the fire in the evening and reading the writings of his youth. Afflicted with 
amnesia, he would revel in his memory lapses, “How brilliant! How I would like to have 
written that!”44 Although Linnaeus automatically recognized ideas with which he was 
once familiar, he failed to actively recall that they were his ideas. The moral, for Fouillée, 
is that amnesia impaired Linnaeus’ conscious ability to actively recall his memories.  
 As a consequence, associationism can successfully explain the conservation of 
memories, but Ribot went wrong, Fouilée held, in believing that the psychological model 
can also explain recollection. A spatial picture of time is appropriate to the former, since 
associationism treats memories as localizable units that can be conserved in the 
associative bonds between neural cells. Fouillée agreed that the brain could provide a 
physical platform for memories. But since recollection is a non-spatial activity, it cannot 
be neatly localized. Fouillée argued that recollection adheres to a distinctly non-spatial, 
appetitive logic.  
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Fouillée conceived his account in memory alongside Guyau, whose La Genèse de 
l’idée du temps (1890) was published posthumously. Guyau agreed that the spatial 
picture, according to which memory is structured like an archive, is unsuitable to 
recollection since “generally taking the brain in a state of rest, the images it has are 
considered as fixed, clichés.”45 Memories, Guyau observed, are not ready-made. “There 
is nothing like that in the brain, not real images, but only virtual images, potentials, that 
only wait for a sign to pass into an action.”46 Recollection, according to Guyau, 
transforms memories into forms of action. Since memories are always actualized in the 
present, his thesis held, they must necessarily be rendered into a spatial form. The point 
of view of recollection “is always some scene in space,” Guyau wrote, “some event that 
happened in a material and extended milieu.”47 As Paul Riceour summarized Guyau’s 
view, “We localize time by localizing in space. This is literally the mise en scene of our 
remembrances.”48 But as to the nature of this transformation, by which recollection 
renders memories spatial, Fouilée and Guyau subtly diverged. For Guyau, recollection 
amounts to a knack, “nothing but the art of evoking and organizing these 
representations.”49 That is to say that our mnemonic strategies suffice to explain how we 
organize memories in spatial terms.  
For Fouillée, however, there is a vital logic immanent to the appetitive experience 
that actively transforms memories into forms of action. The key to recollection turns on 
forgetting: what requires explanation, according to Fouillée, is how we come to eliminate 
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the trail of memories that ideas carry with them. That is because, according to the 
principle of idées-forces, ideas endure in time, and thus necessarily retain their memory. 
Now the effort we undergo to overcome, for example, the blank befuddlement of 
forgetfulness amounts to the task of accommodating a memory to the demands at hand in 
the present.50 True to Fouillée’s Darwinian understanding of appétition, recollection 
entails an act of resisting other sensations that monopolize our attention. Memories, as it 
were, compete for our attention. And forgetfulness ensues when certain memories lose 
out to others, and thus cease to rise to the intentional plane of motor activity. Within this 
picture, consciousness intervenes in the constant struggle among memories by 
suppressing those that are not immediately useful. According to Fouillée, freedom 
inheres in the act of diminishing the influence of memories that do not serve our needs.51  
From this pragmatic, action-oriented account of recollection, Fouillée reconceived 
Ribot’s law of regression: “Among words, the [aphasiac] first forgets proper names, then 
common names, which are adjectives erected as substantives, then adjectives, then 
verbs.” 52  Whereas Ribot believed that the trajectory of language-loss follows from the 
most to least complex memories, or better, according to their associationist organization, 
from the least to the most often repeated, Fouillée added, “verbs, both passive and active, 
which survive the longest, are the immediate expression of emotions and actions.”53 
Verbs are the most resistant to aphasia, in other words, because they best capture the 
forms of action into which recollection transforms memories.  
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Fouillée’s account of memory, first presented in 1885, established the conceptual 
contours that Bergson would radicalize in Matière et mémoire eleven years later. Chief 
among them was Fouillée’s pragmatist account of recollection as a process that prepares 
memories to be actualized as forms of action. Bergson first noted in a review, “Mr. 
Fouillée appears to us to have pushed the analysis of Mr. Guyau further.” Fouillée 
identified, as Bergson saw it, the seamless “process of changing” that memory effectuates 
between the virtual conservation of the past and its actual recollection.54 The lone 
reference to Fouillée in Matière et mémoire acknowledges his insight that there is 
“preformation of the movements which follow in the movements which precede, a 
preformation whereby the part virtually contains the whole, as when each note of a tune 
learnt by heart seems to lean over the next to watch its execution.”55 Despite their 
divergences, both thinkers critiqued the same shortcoming of psychopathological 
research, which they both saw as its failure to explain the transformation that memories 
undergo as recollection makes the past serviceable to the practical demands of the 
present.  
The similarity between Fouillée and Bergson was not lost on Augustin Guyau, the 
son of Jean-Marie Guyau (and step-grandson of Fouillée): “in opposing the dynamic to 
the static, time to space, both want to safeguard liberty and novelty in the world.”56 In a 
comically hostile manner, Fouillée’s biographer hastened to note the lone difference: 
“Fouillée stays in the domain of experience; Mr. Bergson, believing to stay there, returns 
to the conception of an elusive and incomprehensible liberty, analogous, despite his 
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intentions, to Kant’s noumenon or Schopenhauer’s thing in itself.”57 Aware that 
Bergson’s fame occluded his own, Fouillée nonetheless maintained an amicable 
relationship. The two just missed each other at the École normale, where Bergson entered 
as a student in 1878, three years after Fouillée’s departure. But they did share many 
conversations later outside the university: “What a philosopher, Bergson, entirely into 
science and philosophy,” Fouillée reflected, “working with such an upstanding awareness 
and never set back by fatigue!” 58 As part of the scientific spiritualist formation, Fouillée 
and Bergson endeavored to articulate anew a pragmatist account of conscious activity in 
dialogue with the findings of psychopathology.  
 
Bergson’s Critique of Localization in Matière et mémoire 
  
 “[T]he cerebral process answers only to a very small part of memory,” thus 
summarizes the thrust of Bergson’s critique of the psychopathology of memory in 
Matière et mémoire.59 He directed the brunt of his critique at Ribot’s claim that the brain 
stores memories, affirming “that [the brain] is rather the effect than the cause, that matter 
is here as elsewhere the vehicle of an action and not the substratum of a knowledge.”60 
According to Bergson, the brain functions to actualize memories, but not to conserve 
them. In line with scientific spiritualism, Bergson apportioned metaphysics and 
experimental psychology to their respective domains of experience: psychopathology is a 
science of memories’ actualization (or better, the failures of actualization) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid.  
58 Augustin Guyau, La Philosophie et la sociologie d’Alfred Fouillée, 88.  
59 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 74. 
60 Ibid. 
194 
metaphysics, a study of their conservation and participation in perception. The 
reductionism of localization was the first pillar of psychopathology at which Bergson’s 
critique took aim.  
Although Bergson critiqued the claims of brain localization, his argument was 
deeply indebted to neurophysiology. Bergson drew from figures of the brain in 
circulation during the late nineteenth century. Specifically, he likened the brain to a 
“central telephone exchange” through which messages are sent but never conserved: 
“The truth is that my nervous system, interposed between the objects stimulating my 
body and those that I can influence, plays the simple role of a conductor that transmits, 
allocates, or inhibits movement.” 61 Bergson obtained the figure from his personal copy of 
De l’intelligence, in which Taine adopted the telegraphic figure of the nervous system to 
characterize the brain as a “coach [répétiteur] and multiplier, in which the diverse 
departments of the gray matter fill in the same functions.”62 Bergson took the figure to 
indicate that neuropathologies can only inhibit the brain’s action. They cannot destroy 
memories.  
The second pillar against which Bergson struck was the associationist logic 
underpinning Ribot’s law. For Ribot, “All the forms of memory, from the highest to the 
lowest, have for their support dynamic associations between nervous elements and 
particular modifications of these elements, at least of cells.”63 The positive task of 
Matière et mémoire was to develop an alternative non-associationist, non-reductive logic 
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of memories’ conservation. This motivated Bergson to articulate the uniquely conscious 
dimension of memories exceeding the limits of experimental psychology.  
Bergson took Ribot’s distinction between psychological and organic memory as a 
point of departure. Organic memory, as Bergson saw it, equips the body with its ability to 
act. Psychological memory, however, is not geared toward action. Its nature is 
contemplative. Recalling a past event brings an image before consciousness, but 
consciousness does not prolong the image into the external world. The image remains a 
representation. Bergson accepted Ribot’s classification of memories, but reinterpreted its 
meaning. He discerned a difference in kind between organic and psychological memory 
while Ribot only saw a difference in degree. Whereas Ribot staked the distinction on 
their degree of stability, Bergson argued that Ribot’s distinction belied a more essential 
difference between the two: namely, organic memories act; psychological memories do 
not.64 Bergson’s argument was simple yet precise: the nature of the past is to be no longer 
present. Recalling an image-memory from the past is a qualitatively different kind of 
activity than acting in the present with motor-memories. The latter can be located in the 
body; but image-memories – which, to recall Ribot’s experiments on aphasiacs, persist 
despite motor impairments – depend on a distinctly conscious explanation.  
The distinction between image-memory and motor-memory followed from the 
problem that oriented Matière et mémoire: what is the relationship between matter and 
memory? Bergson traced them back to their respective dimensions of consciousness: 
perception and recollection. Perception is human’s mechanism for acting on matter. By 
“matter,” Bergson meant all of the physical material as understood by the mechanist 
worldview. Perception is the action-oriented side of consciousness that facilitates 
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humans’ ability to negotiate that world. Perception, following scientific spiritualism, does 
not duplicate or mirror external world objects in the form of a concept. Its purpose is not 
intellectual; rather, it responds to the demands of what Bergson called “attention to life.” 
That is, perception carves up the organism’s perception of matter in order to facilitate 
action on it. Recollection, however, is human’s mechanism for gaining distance from 
matter and the immediate demands of the present. With that distance, we can pose an 
image before us and contemplate it: “To call up the past in the form of an image we must 
be able to withdraw ourselves from the action of the moment, we must have the power to 
value the useless, we must have the will to dream.”65  
Bergson conceptualized perception and recollection in a similar manner to the 
distinction he drew in his Essai between the temporal and spatial dimensions of 
consciousness. There, Bergson followed the two dual tendencies to their extremes in 
order to explain how they co-mingle in experience. Similarly in Matière et mémoire, 
Bergson claimed that in its pure form, perception facilitates action on matter by dividing 
it into discrete, immobile parts; while in their pure form, memories tend to bleed 
seamlessly into each other. All experience involves a mix of perceptions and memories. 
We find ourselves primarily employing perceptive skills as we go about mundane tasks. 
Memories interpenetrate with those perceptive acts in the quotidian moments where we 
reflect on our tasks, as well as in exceptional moments where we undergo an intellectual 
endeavor, think hard, and maybe even philosophize. The extent to which past 
recollections mix with a present experience corresponds to how willfully we arrest our 
fixation on the demands of the moment and instead preoccupy ourselves with memory-
images.  
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In the Essai as well as in Matière et mémoire, Bergson’s conception of freedom 
was of a piece with the Biranian idea of motor effort. We brush the surface of memory 
when retracing our steps to recall the series of events that led up to the present. We plumb 
memory’s depths, however, when we struggle to recall the name of a friend seen long 
ago, or pose a difficult math problem for which rote arithmetic will not suffice. Biran’s 
legacy left an indelible, although under-acknowledged mark on Bergson’s distinction 
between image-memories and motor-memories. Biran, to recall, divided habit into 
passive and active kinds. The case for Bergson was much the same. Perception makes use 
of motor-memory, and it is characterized by distraction. Recollection makes use of 
image-memory, and demands attention. The distinction turns on the effort consciousness 
exerts. Perceiving repeats the same motor memories, executing tasks and pursuing 
practical ends with relative ease, while recollection compels us to strain our psychic 
energy, furrow our brows, and concentrate on images embedded in an intimate and 
personal past.  
The contrast with Ribot’s account is legible. Ribot held that recollections are 
brought into the present by an act of “localization” (not to be confused with the 
localization of memories in the brain). We localize memories when we sift through the 
past, a process that Ribot described as a departure following “a regressive march which, 
leaving from the present, travels a series of terms more or less long.”66 Traversing the 
entire associative chain of memories, as if reading the dossier of every past event, would 
be exhausting if not impossible. So consciousness identifies “landmarks” [les points de 
repère] in the form of significant past events that transport us to certain episodes. Ribot 
grounded his idea of memory-landmarks in the laws of association: the landmark is a 
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strong memory, such as a significant life event; its associative bond with perception has 
been fortified well enough to transport consciousness immediately to the episode.  
Bergson found the entire picture inadequate to explain recollection: “The process 
of localizing a recollection in the past…cannot at all consist, as has been said, in plunging 
into the mass of our memories, as into a bag, to draw out memories, closer and closer to 
each other, between which the memory to be localized may find its place.”67 It was 
precisely in these terms that Ribot appealed to his readers to reflect on “how much this 
mechanism resembles that by which we locate ourselves in space. There also we have 
landmarks, abbreviating processes, perfectly familiar distances that we employ as units of 
measure.”68 Bergson’s critique diagnosed the same spatial picture as undergirding the two 
forms of localization that Ribot advocated: the first is the localization of memories in 
brain cells; the second is the localization of recollected events. Both forms of localization 
construe memories as independent entities that occupy a particular locale. 
The non-spatial, non-associative logic that Bergson proposed as an alternative 
construes memory in temporal terms. The problem that the logic served to answer was 
this: how does the past, despite no longer acting, survive into the present? Bergson’s 
point was that memory must coexist with the present if the figure of an archive storing 
memories in the past is an illusion. Yet, we do not witness the entirety of our past before 
our eyes, not because memories exist elsewhere, but because they are not useful in every 
moment. The name that Bergson gave to the non-spatial, non-associative logic was 
“virtual.” Pure memory is conserved virtually in the present, ready to be made useful for 
the pragmatic orientation of consciousness. 
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Bergson dedicated chapter three of Matière et mémoire to explaining how pure 
memory is virtually conserved in the present. By “pure” memory, Bergson meant the 
entirety of the past that persists, not yet differentiated into discrete image-memories. He 
showed that consciousness summons an image-memory from pure memory by an act of 
recollection. But recollection does not retrieve particular images; rather, recollection 
suppresses those aspects of memory that do not serve the demands of the present. The 
recollection of images is an act of elimination and not selection. Against the 
associationist logic of psychopathology, Bergson argued: “Association, then is not the 
primary fact: dissociation is what we begin with.”69 Metaphysically speaking, Bergson’s 
account of pure memory is monist and his account of recollection is eliminative. Both 
served his pragmatist understanding of perception, whose role is limited to excluding 
what does not help the organism act within and among matter. Bergson’s pragmatism was 
indebted to the spiritualist tradition, which he made explicit by invoking Ravaisson: “We 
cannot see how memory could settle within matter; but we do clearly understand how – 
according to the profound saying of a contemporary philosophy – materiality begets 
oblivion [la matérialité mette en nous l’oublie].”70  
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Bergson divided the structure of memory into three levels: memory-images, pure 
memory, and perception. In his own figure, Bergson respectively distinguished these 
three levels along the horizontal line segments AB, BC, and CD.71 Because it is oriented 
toward acting on the material and social 
world, pure memory imparts to 
perception only those images suited to 
the task at hand. But in order to enter 
perception, memory undergoes a 
transformation from its pure to its 
image form (along the entire horizontal 
axis AD) such that the memory-images inserted into perception bear the trace of the pure 
memory from which they were adapted and to which they return. Ribot, by contrast, 
clung to an associative picture of memory that cuts the entirety of memory along the 
vertical axis MP. By conceiving recollection as the interplay of sensations and memory-
images, Ribot neglected pure memory, the horizontal segment AB, wherein memory is 
virtually conserved. Ribot’s narrow account of memory, Bergson argued, followed from 
his failure to see that consciousness does not search for memory-images, but instead, pure 
memory surges into consciousness.  
The virtual organization of memory depends on the usefulness of the past for 
action-oriented perception. The easier it is to recollect a memory, the better adapted it is 
to action. The more difficult it is to recollect, the less useful the memory. The extent to 
which memories are useful accords with what Bergson called the “planes of memory.” 
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Each plane constitutes a dilation of pure memory. With each plane that we traverse, we 
further suspend our attention to the present and open consciousness on to the past, 
passing to a heightened “degree of tension.” According to Bergson, recollection expands 
and contracts the planes, as if “a nebulous mass, seen through more and more powerful 
telescopes resolves itself into an ever greater number of stars.”72 Bergson mobilized the 
figure in marked contrast to Ribot’s figure of a march through the archive of memory. 
Everything happens, then, as though our recollections were repeated an 
indefinite number of times in these many possible reductions of our past 
life. They take a more common form when memory shrinks most, more 
personal when it widens out, ad they thus enter into an unlimited number 
of “systematiztions.” A word from a foreign language, uttered in my 
hearing, may make me think of that language in general or of a voice 
which once pronounced it in a certain way. These two associations by 
similarity are not due to the accidental arrival of two different 
representations, which chance brought by turns within the attracting 
influence of the actual perception. They answer to two different mental 
dispositions, to two distinct degrees of tension of the memory; in the latter 
case they are nearer to the pure image, in the former, they are more 
disposed toward immediate response, that is to say, to action.73  
 
 Bergson admitted that the planes of memory “are certainly not easy to define, but 
the painter of mental scenery may not with impunity confound them.”74 The difficulty 
follows from the absence of any formula that could explain why certain memories are 
actualized rather than others. Habit is the sufficient reason. That is to say that 
consciousness is not an impartial arbiter that judges which image-memories are most 
useful to the demands of present circumstances. The virtual composition of pure memory 
structures the process of recollection; it is inseparable from the manner by which 
consciousness opens onto the past. Descending into deeper planes reveals progressively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 8th ed., 166. 
73 Ibid., 169. 
74 Ibid., 170. 
202 
less useful memories. The mental disposition of each subsequent plane, returning to the 
above passage, incorporates fewer motor-memories and more image-memories.  
The practical significance of the Bergsonian logic depended on the central role of 
effort. It is less the opacity or remoteness of past events that makes it challenging to 
recall memories. Rather, the strain we endure to retrieve distant memories is brought 
about by our effort to disengage from the present. If we were not instinctive creatures 
equipped with a perceptive mechanism, then an arbitrary barrage of image-memories 
would inundate us. Yet, if pure memory did not virtually accompany perception, then we 
would be condemned to endlessly repeat the present. The selection of image-memories 
depends more on displacing our absorption in actual circumstances and less on searching 
for a lost past.  
 The problem left unexplained by the psychopathology of memory, Bergson 
enjoined, is how consciousness suppresses, rather than retrieves memory, since the nature 
of memory is to surge from the past on its own accord. Bergson’s idea was that pure 
memory forcefully impinges on us. His claim, according to Gilles Deleuze, is that 
memory is not a part of consciousness, but that consciousness partakes in memory.75 The 
claim that that consciousness depends on memory underwrote Bergson’s critique of 
Ribot’s psychopathology of recollection: we do not actively sift through the archives of 
memory, Bergson charged, but instead make ourselves receptive to the outpouring of the 
past.  
Memory thus surges into consciousness. We do not choose which memory-
images will appear. “If perception evokes in turn different memories, it is not by a 
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mechanical adjunction of more and more numerous elements which, while remaining 
unmoved, it attracts around it, but rather by an expansion of the entire consciousness, 
which, spreading out over a larger area, discovers the fuller detail of its wealth.”76 
Bergson found support for this account in the science of dreams. Dreams revealed to 
Bergson a glimpse of memory in its pure form, untethered to the demands of present 
perception. Alfred Maury's Le sommeil et les rêves (1861) drew on observations of dream 
states in order to explain the organization inhering in the anarchy of pure memory. 
Dreams, according to Maury, are essentially memories in an accelerated form. When 
asleep, dreams occupy the entirety of our soul to the point that they take on a life of their 
own. Bergson found in Maury's book the critical insight that memory retains the entirety 
of the past. In his personal copy of Les Maladies de la mémoire, Bergson took note of 
Ribot’s reference to Maury, underlining the passage, “absolutely nothing is lost in 
memory.”77 Bergson’s marginalia include a note to self that he should read Maury’s 
book. So it is clear that Bergson read Ribot before reading Maury; but it further suggests 
that Maury inspired Bergson’s idea of pure memory from which no past event escapes.  
Dreams served Bergson as a fitting antipode to aphasia. In dreams there is a 
surplus of memory caused by the relaxation of the nervous system. In aphasia there is a 
lack of memory caused by a malady of the nervous system. The distinction served 
Bergson’s straightforward critique of the limits of psychopathology. Since aphasia only 
affects the motor-mechanism that actualizes memories, its symptoms reflect the 
superficial pole of memory – namely, motor-memories. Yet, despite their motor 
impairment, aphasiacs nonetheless experience a vibrant internal world of images-
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memories. Bergson thus tackled the problem Ribot confronted: how does the aphasiac 
acknowledge the fork yet fail to speak or write the word “fork”?  
In his personal copy of Les Maladies de la mémoire Bergson scribbled a giant 
“B,” likely signifying bien as if to applaud Ribot’s idea, adjacent to the following 
passage: “amnesia of signs is above all a malady of motor memory; that is what gives it 
its distinctive character, what makes it present itself under a new aspect.”78 It is clear that 
Bergson emphatically agreed with Ribot’s understanding of aphasia as a motor malady, 
since it served to explain why image-memories endure in the absence of motor-
memories. The motor-memory tied to the word “fork” had been incapacitated. That 
motor-memory could be located in the injured region of the brain. Yet, Bergson alleged 
that psychopathologists would only encounter confusion if they claimed, as Ribot had, to 
locate the corresponding image-memory in the brain. Bergson’s point was that the 
aphasiac’s image-memory had not been destroyed; it had only failed to be rendered 
actionable. That is, the aphasiac could not translate the image-memory into a motor-act.  
The case of aphasia was a springboard from which Bergson launched a critique of 
Ribot’s law. Bergson did not contest the order in which aphasiacs lost words, beginning 
with proper names and ending with verbs. Rather, Ribot’s law is problematic, Bergson 
claimed, because it fails to explain the transformation of image-memories into motor-
memories. This required an account of the virtual conservation of memory occluded by 
the path of least resistance followed by the law of regression. The law, Bergson argued, 
could not apply to the brain structure itself: “We could hardly explain it if the verbal 
images were really deposited in the cells of the cortex: it would be wonderful indeed that 
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disease should always attack these cells in the same order.”79 Instead, the regressive order 
of word loss follows the path by which pure memory transforms into perception. “The 
fact can be explained if we admit that memories need, for their actualization, a motor 
ally, and that they require for their recall a kind of mental attitude which must itself be 
engrafted upon the attitude of the body.”80 Proper names are lost first, Bergson inferred, 
since they are the least harmonious with the with body’s habits; they require more effort 
to recall. “Verbs, in general, which essentially express imitable actions, are precisely the 
words that a bodily effort might enable us to recapture when the function of language has 
all but escaped us.”81  
Bergson’s critique diagnosed the spatial, and ultimately Kantian, logic 
underpinning both Ribot’s effort to localize memories and his associationist explanation 
of their organization. After demonstrating that both applied only to the corporal domain 
of motor memory, Bergson cleared the conceptual ground to articulate a alternative logic 
to explain a qualitatively distinct kind of memory – pure memory – which is activated by 
the action-oriented perception. Bergson thus overcame the dualism according to which 
Ribot apportioned psychological and organic memory to consciousness and to the brain 
respectively. Bergson instead formulated a dualism within consciousness to explain the 
connection between pure memory and perception. As long as the two are opposed in 
spatial terms, “like two railway lines which cut each other at a right angle,” then, Bergson 
urged, their relation is irreconcilable.82 But by re-conceiving pure memory and perception 
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in temporal terms, then “the rails come together in a curve, so that we pass insensibly 
from one to the other.”83 
 
Hypnose and Hysteria in the Psychopathology of Pierre Janet 
 
Hypnotism, the psychiatric method that Jean-Martin Charcot made famous during 
his celebrated demonstrations at the Salpêtrière, was the aspect of psychopathology that 
captivated the public imagination. Since the seventeenth century, the Salpêtrière had 
been, in principle, a hospital for women. In reality it functioned as a depository of 
crippled, epileptic, and insane female outcasts. In 1862 Charcot took over as the chief 
physician of medical services. He revamped the hospital, transforming it into a medial 
institute equipped with laboratories and educational facilities. Charcot is still well known 
for his contributions to classifying the diverse neurological disorders that afflicted the 
hospital’s nearly 5,000 patients. These included amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), 
Parkinson’s disease, and multiple sclerosis. Charcot gained recognition for his work in 
1882 when he ascended to the hospital’s chair in diseases of the nervous system. But 
above all, Charcot achieved enduring fame thanks to his work on hysteria. He established 
the hysterical paradigm of the grand attaque, the four-stage series of symptoms that 
hysterics displayed. And he lent credibility to the disease, defining it as a neurological 
disorder, rather than as, like many thought before, a chaotic fit of madness stemming 
from complications in female puberty.  
Hypnotism became part of Charcot’s treatment of hysterics in his weekly 
demonstrations, first opened to the public in 1879. The audience included psychologists 
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such as Frederic W. Myers, Gilles de la Tourette, a young Sigmund Freud, and Joseph 
Babinski. They witnessed the female patients, the most celebrated being Blanche, 
Augustine, and Geneviève.84 Charcot dressed the women in hats with long plumes. The 
plumes’ oscillated in accord with hysteric trembles, and the patterns of oscillation served 
as evidence of the four-part classificatory scheme. Charcot stood alongside the women 
while drawing diagrams of different tics and spasms on the chalkboard. Once diagnosed, 
Charcot would proceed to the hypnotic treatment.  
Charcot conceived hypnosis as a neurosis uniquely induced in hysterics. The 
controversial method was that hypnosis imitates hysteria. Hypnosis aimed to fabricate a 
fantasy world in which patients would submit themselves to transformation. By way of 
suggestions, Charcot would guide susceptible patients to play out their hysteric gestures 
and proceed to correct them. The goal was to use hypnotism as a means to make patients 
believe they were healthy. If hysterical symptoms could be reproduced in hypnotism, 
then, so Charcot thought, they could just as easily be cured.  
 Far from the Salpêtrière, Bergson experimented with hypnotism while a lycée 
professor in the provincial town of Clermont-Ferrand. There was a reading salon in the 
town, a center of intellectual life that made for one of the young Bergson’s favorite 
stomping grounds.85 The salon owner, Albert Maire, took interest in Charcot’s hypnotism 
and on occasion invited Bergson to the séances he hosted with the guidance of a 
professional hypnotizer.86 Bergson’s experiments were the material of his first full article, 
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which Ribot published in the Revue philosophique.87 In the article, Bergson set about 
explaining a particular case of hypnotism induced in a number of young subjects between 
the ages of fifteen and seventeen. The hypnotizer opened a book before his eyes, allowing 
the subjects sitting across from him to see only the book’s cover. While hypnotized, the 
subjects announced the number of the page that the hypnotizer was reading, and they 
could even recite entire lines. A skeptical Bergson explained that the subjects managed to 
read off the corneas of the hypnotizer, whose eyes functioned as a convex mirror. Under 
hypnotism, Bergson noted, the subjects had a tendency to inverse the order of words. A 
rational explanation was in order, Bergson’s article concluded, without recourse to any 
mystic powers of the hypnotizer 
 Equally far away from Paris, the young Pierre Janet conducted his own hypnotic 
experiments on patients in La Havre. Janet, a fellow philosophy student alongside 
Bergson at École normale, also left Paris following the agrégation to teach in the town of 
Châteauroux. His time there was brief, and Janet quickly transferred to a more prestigious 
lycée in the northern town of La Havre. He spent his free spare time volunteering at a 
local hospital in which the head physicians set aside a separate space for Janet to work 
with female hysterics. Influenced by Ribot, whose classes he attended while in Paris, 
Janet hoped the opportunity would provide the fodder for a doctoral thesis in 
experimental psychology. Also a close reader of Charcot’s work, Janet seized the hospital 
space to conduct fresh experiments. The patients were distanced from the stifling culture 
of the overfull Salpêtrière. In fact, it was a criticism frequently leveled at Charcot’s work: 
that the hospital conditions contributed to his patients’ pathologies. Between 1882 and 
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1888 at La Havre, Janet compiled the material for his thesis, L’Automatisme 
psychologique (1889).  
 Janet added automatic writing to his hypnotic arsenal, a practice where he gave 
hysterics a pencil, fixed their attention elsewhere, and let them subconsciously scribble 
thoughts. The first patient was Lucie, a woman with chronic terror fits. Using automatic 
writing, Lucie revealed that two men had played a practical joke and traumatized her at 
the age of seven. The trauma became what Janet called a “subconscious fixed idea” that 
had been replaced by her symptomatic fits. Lucie’s conscious field had been restricted, 
leading her to forget the episode that she would spontaneously reenact. Hysteria, Janet 
contended, was a reenactment of subconscious fixed ideas. His goal was to treat the 
hysteria by destroying the fixed idea in a hypnotic state. Following Charcot, Janet would 
work on the hysteria by means of suggestion, what he called a “synthesizing treatment” 
aimed at reeducating the subconscious. Successful reeducation required that Janet steer 
clear of bringing the fixed idea to the patient’s conscious. He believed this would only 
change the idea into an obsession, potentially exacerbating the hysteric symptoms. 
Suggestion had to work on the subconscious phenomenon that manifested automatically.  
 Janet’s early work is significant for having been written in dialogue with scientific 
spiritualists. Against Ribot, his teacher in Paris, Janet insisted that experimental 
psychology ought to bring spiritualist principles into its methodological repertoire. 
Specifically, he pointed to Biran’s concept of motility. 
 In a series of articles published in the Revue philosophique,88 Janet demonstrated 
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the phenomenon of “psychological automatism.” The cataleptic states of hysterics were 
instances of automatic behavior. Total automatism manifests in hysterical catalepsy and 
diminishes the sense of self. Partial automatism occurs when a part of personality splits 
off from awareness, manifesting as a personality disorder. In both cases, Janet insisted, 
the automatic workings of hysterical or otherwise abnormal states were conscious, 
although the patient was not fully aware of them.89 Janet’s work on automatism was 
instrumental to defining a realm of the subconscious before the term was accepted in 
common parlance. Alfred Fouillée had already tackled the subject in a short article.90 And 
the psychologist Alfred Binet similarly attempted to demonstrate that hypnosis brings 
subconscious states to the fore.91 Janet’s research surpassed both. He showed that 
automatic psychic states continued until interrupted from the outside. They involve 
motility; the automatic state had to be acted out. The automatic state produced emotions 
that expressed themselves as associated gestures.  
 Janet’s account of psychological automatism drew on two central insights of 
scientific spiritualism. The first was that motor activity is indivisible from both sensation 
and conscious experience. If these were united, then, as Janet highlighted, “the study of 
elementary forms of activity would for us be at the at the same time the study of 
elementary forms of sensibility and of consciousness.”92 Janet explicitly identified 
Biran’s commitment to the unity of sensation and consciousness as an inspiration. 
Specifically, it was Biran’s idea of the sensation of experience, which he characterized as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Janet’s argument was directed squarely against Prosper Despine, who held that patients in hypnotic states 
exhibit automatic nervous, but not conscious, activity in Psychologie naturelle (Paris : F. Savy, 1868); 
Etude scientifique sur le somnambulisme (Paris : F. Savy, 1880).  
90 Alfred Fouillée. “L'homme automate,” Revue des Deux Mondes T. 76 (1886): 548-571. 
91 Alfred Binet, La psychologie du raisonnement (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1886). 
92 Pierre Janet, L’Automatisme psychologique. Essai de psychologie expérimentale sur les 
formes inférieures de l’activité humaine, Vol. 1, 4th ed. (Paris: Société Pierre Janet, 1973), 21, originally 
published by (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1889).  
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“a simple affective state” accompanying consciousness: “It is a positive and complete 
mode,” Biran wrote, “to which we draw closer every time that our intellectual thought 
weakens and wears away.”93 The implication that Janet drew from Biran was that the 
primitive feeling of one’s own body, although dimly conscious, is by no means without 
consciousness, since all conscious activity envelops an affective dimension. Biran, Janet 
provocatively claimed, was “one of the precursors of scientific psychology.”94 By 
invoking the spiritualist philosopher, Janet urged that experimental psychologists draw 
from, rather than sever, their spiritualist roots. The reference can further be understood as 
Janet’s debt to his father, Paul Janet, who championed Biran’s work in his own writings. 
In this light, the younger Janet wrote L’Automatisme psychologique to mend the 
segregation that Ribot enforced between spiritualist philosophy and experimental 
psychology.  
 The second concept that Janet drew from scientific spiritualism was Fouillée’s 
principle of idées-forces. From his observations of hysterics whose automatic psychic 
states that had to be acted out, Janet concluded that his research “verif[ied] by 
experimentation one of the most productive ideas of one of our philosophers.”95 Citing 
Fouillée in full, Janet argued that subconscious activity legitimated the principle that 
“The idea of a possible action is a real tendency, which is to say an already effective 
power and not a purely abstract possibility.”96  
 Reciprocally, Janet contributed a dynamic, multi-dimension concept of selfhood to 
scientific spiritualism. Partial automatism manifests what Janet called “impersonal 
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II, ed. Ernest Naville (Paris: Dezobry, 1859), 19.  
94 Ibid.,  23.  
95 Ibid., 63. 
96 Ibid. Pierre Janet citing Alfred Fouillée, Liberté et déterminisme 2nd ed. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1884), 3. 
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consciousness,” a phenomenon he identified in Léonie, a patient in La Havre who acted 
out multiple personalities. One of her roles emerged under hypnosis in order to please 
Janet; the other role returned Léonie to her childhood, which she would act out under the 
nickname, Nichette. Janet was startled to find that Léonie even acted out a third 
personality when hypnotized. It was the reenactment of a prior personality brought on by 
hypnosis twenty years prior. Léonie’s alternate childhood personality retained its own 
alternate personality. Janet concluded that the personalities, multiplied under hypnosis, 
demonstrate that the self is not a philosophically innocent basis of psychology. It is 
instead, he contended, a point of return, or synthesis, of various psychic states: “The idea 
of the self [moi] is, indeed, a complicated psychological phenomenon consisting of the 
memories of past actions, the notion of our situation, our capacities, our body, even our 
name, which, gathering together all these scattered ideas, comes to play a significant role 
in our understanding of personality.”97 Janet effectively overturned Cousin’s psychology, 
which posited the self as a logical presupposition of psychology, to which all ideas and 
sensations could be predicated. But it is important to highlight that Janet did so in order 
to advance scientific spiritualism.  
 Janet’s insights proved indispensible to Bergson’s thesis in Matière et mémoire that 
neural lesions incapacitate the brain’s “attention to life,” but do not destroy memories 
themselves.98 Janet observed that when certain memories detach from the central memory 
of subjects with personality disorders, the patient acts out the different memory groupings 
according to distinct roles. The memories remain intact, but their dissociation into 
different roles indicates that they disturb what Janet called the patient’s “sense of reality” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Ibid., 46.  
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[fonction du réel]. As Henri Ellenberger notes, Janet’s notion influenced Bergson’s 
concept of “attention to life.”99 It was already clear to Bergson that “attention to life” 
could be disturbed when neural scissions impair the body’s perceptive capacities. Janet 
further demonstrated, as Bergson wrote, “Recollections retain their normal aspect, but 
forego a part of their solidarity, because their sensory-motor base, instead of being, so to 
speak, chemically changed, is mechanically diminished.”100 
 Janet defended his thesis at the Sorbonne on June 21, 1889. It was the second thesis 
in experimental psychology defended before the philosophy faculty since his teacher, 
Ribot, submitted his thesis on heredity in 1873. Unlike Ribot, however, whose ambition 
was to free psychology from the yoke of spiritualism, Janet published L’Automatisme 
psychologique in order to stage a rapprochement between science and spiritualism. 
Psychology’s freedom, he contended, was not to be gained by replacing metaphysics with 
physiology. Both, Janet’s thesis concluded, “make parallel descriptions of one and the 
same thing.”101 Janet would stay in Paris, teaching first at Lycée Louis-le-Grand and then 
at Collège Rollin. Realizing that his philosophy degree would not suffice to propel his 
career in experimental psychology, Janet pursued a medical degree while also attending 
Charcot’s demonstrations from 1890 on. From 1895 to 1897, Janet taught Ribot’s course 
in experimental psychology in his stead at the Collège de France. With the emphatic 
support of Bergson, Janet would take over Ribot’s permanent position at the Collège in 
1902, which he held until 1935. 
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 Janet’s work emphasized the pragmatist orientation of scientific spiritualist’ 
engagements with experimental psychology. He advanced an action-oriented account of 
conscious activity in parallel with the accounts of Bergson, Fouillée, and Guyau. These 
thinkers, I hope to have shown, transformed scientific spiritualism: from the study of the 
contingent structure of consciousness, developed in dialogue with psychophysics, to an 
inquiry into consciousness’ pragmatic action in a shared biological and social world. This 
transformation primarily unfolded in the Revue philosophique, a formative reading 
community where experimental psychologists published alongside some of the central 
works of scientific spiritualism. Indeed, it was in these pages where the material for 
Janet’s L’Automatisme psychologique first appeared, as well as the initial version of 
Bergson’ Matière et mémoire.102 In this light, scientific spiritualism can be better 
appreciated as a movement that did not simply oppose the mechanist underpinnings bent 
of experimental psychology generally, and its quantitative and psychopathological 
methods in particular, but as a movement that formulated a rich account of the multiple 
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The rapid influx of experimental psychology and evolutionary biology into late 
nineteenth-century Paris fundamentally transformed French politics and culture. Not only 
did these incipient fields shake France’s spiritualist tradition, but they also overhauled the 
place and value of Catholicism, both for French men and women as well as for the 
religion’s public role. The reforms of the Third Republic further unmoored France’s 
intellectual and cultural roots. Following the nation’s defeat in The War of 1870, which 
many attributed to France’s retrograde scientific institutions, the newly established Third 
Republic sought to elevate science as the wellspring of national regeneration. In an effort 
to surpass Germany, French institutions underwent scientific and secular reforms, most 
noticeably in education, which, beginning in 1874, inculcated a new curriculum designed 
to undermine clerical authority and cultivate rational Republican citizens.  
 Scientific spiritualism was occasioned by and actively steered these tumultuous 
transformations. Scientific spiritualists sought to rejuvenate the nation’s deeply 
entrenched intellectual and religious inheritance on the basis of science. These thinkers, I 
am suggesting, cast into stark relief the extent to which the emergent natural and human 
sciences elevated, rather than eliminated, metaphysics and religion in French society. In 
the following chapters, I analyze two contexts – secondary education and the Catholic 












Before teeming crowds filled his lecture hall at the Collège de France, Bergson 
was a little known yet tireless professor of philosophy in a provincial lycée (the French 
equivalent of high school). He came to Lycée Blaise Pascal in the town of Clermont-
Ferrand in September 1883 and spent five years there. Bergson split his time preparing 
lesson plans, instructing inside the classroom, and writing his doctoral thesis, Essai sur 
les données immédiates de la conscience (1889). As his students’ course notes 
demonstrate, the three tasks often coincided. Bergson opened the first lesson on 
psychology, the focal point of the course, by framing the subject in squarely anti-
materialist terms: “If sadness were in the heart, if thought were in the head, it would 
occupy a place there, which by dissecting one could end up finding on the end of a 
scalpel. But thought does not reside in the brain.”1 He proceeded to articulate the central 
argument of his thesis, “Thought is nowhere, it doesn’t have a place in space, it a has a 
duration [durée] like a feeling, but it is not extended.”2 The classroom offered Bergson a 
forum to stage a dialogue between scientific psychology and spiritualist philosophy. “It 
was at Clermont that I made my most essential discoveries. But [the Inspector Generals, 
François] Evellin and [Jules] Lachelier, who inspected me there, forcefully told me: you 
have to go to Paris and take your place.”3 Shortly after publishing the Essai in 1889 
Bergson left for Paris to teach at the prestigious Lycée Henri IV. 
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2 Ibid. 
3 Cited in Jacques Chevalier, Entretiens avec Bergson (Paris: Plon, 1959), 178.  
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Since its introduction under Napoleon in 1809, philosophy has remained the 
terminal course of the seven years French students spend in secondary education. Philo, 
as the final year is called, was originally designed to synthesize a scientific and 
humanistic education. It served as the coronation of students’ studies, a term employed 
during the nineteenth century to signify philosophy’s exalted status atop the education 
system. The course curriculum followed the standardized programme released by the 
Ministry of Public Instruction. After opening with a brief introduction to philosophy, the 
first section of the programme was psychology, followed by logic, metaphysics, ethics, 
and the history of philosophy. Psychology was the centerpiece of the programme since 
Victor Cousin introduced the section in 1832 from his position atop the ministry. To this 
day, psychology, under the title, “the Subject,” endures as the first section of the terminal 
philosophy course that all lycée students must take before sitting the baccalauréat, the 
official exit examination.4 But beginning in 1874, in the wake of the Cousinian regime, 
psychology became distinctly physiological; it transformed from a science humaine to a 
science dure in lycée instruction. 
This chapter situates the development of Bergson’s early thought in the 
educational context of the French Third Republic. My claim is that the lycée philosophy 
course, and its psychology section in particular, provided Bergson with the opportunity to 
integrate developments in experimental psychology into his early writings. This assertion 
is not innocent. Phillip Soulez, Bergson’s biographer, warns that it would be “premature 
to make the published works and the courses into two inseparable halves of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Although the content in the programme for the contemporary philosophy course has changed, it retains a 
similar organization. Its five sections, in order, are the subject (with lessons in consciousness, perception, 
the unconscious, the other, desire, and existence and time), culture, reason and reality, politics, and ethics. 
For an exemplary guide, see: Objectif Bac: Toutes les matières terminale l (Paris: Hachette, 2012).  
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Bergsonian œuvre.” 5 Bergson himself acknowledged, “I took as a maxim at the Collège 
[de France] not to bring my current research into the direct subjects of my courses. That 
was even more the case for boys sixteen years old.”6 While it is certainly true that 
Bergson’s courses were not expositions of his ideas, I nevertheless want to suggest that 
the context of higher education, and specifically the experience teaching psychology in 
the lycée philosophy course, was a fundamental condition of Bergson’s emergence as the 
most successful professor within the milieu of scientific spiritualism. 
Following France’s humiliating defeat in The War of 1870, politicians and 
education reformers placed blame on the nation’s retrograde scientific institutions. In the 
face of the technologically advanced German Empire, the Third Republic looked to 
education as the key to surpassing the perpetual foe across the Rhine. The consolidation 
of the universities and lycées mended regional divisions in France, and more importantly, 
facilitated the dissemination of secular values. Secularism, or laïcité as it is known in the 
French context, functioned as the ideological support for the government’s educational 
reforms. Defined negatively by the curtailment of religious influences over the official 
curriculum, laïcité found its positive content in scientific instruction. Education “passed 
on first and foremost a cult of science,” according to Philip Nord, “and the republic 
elevated that cult into a secular religion, reverencing scientists as men of progress, raising 
statuses to them and extolling their virtues to the young.”7 Bergson belonged to the first 
generation of Republican philosophy professors charged with the task of inculcating laic 
and scientific values in order to cultivate rational citizens.  
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The state administered agrégation promoted national rejuvenation by accrediting 
philosopher professors as state functionaries. The selective examination was used to train 
the educational elite since its inception under Louis XV in 1766. But under the Third 
Republic, it came to serve the new function of channeling a corps of professors from 
Paris to the provinces in order to promote laic and scientific values. The agrégation 
conferred an emblem of cultural prestige on young intellectuals at the same time as it 
greased the cogs of the public educational bureaucracy.  
At the conclusion of his studies at the exclusive École normale supérieure in 
1881, Bergson finished second in a class of eight agrégés. 8 The grueling examination 
consisted of appreciating and critiquing three Greek texts, two in Latin, and two in 
modern French, in addition to delivering an oral lesson. Students spent a year intensively 
studying the texts chosen by the jury, which is why, as Alan Schrift contends, the 
agrégation played such a profound role in shaping the ideas of French philosophers.9 The 
stronger influence on Bergson’s philosophical maturation, however, followed his search 
for a teaching position in one of the seventy-seven existing philosophy posts in the 
lycées.10 It was in Clermont-Ferrand, after he passed the agrégation, that Bergson 
developed the ideas for which he became famous: 
At the École [normale], I immersed myself in mathematics and physics; I 
despised the rest, and made a “bad lesson” on the agrégation in 
psychology, which I renounced… It was in the contemplation of the 
province that I came around to completely changing my point of view: 
since, while reflecting there, I realized that mathematics could not explain 
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time, as one perceives it within oneself; and so, everything that I had 
neglected up until that day as secondary became essential for me.11 
 
As a freshly minted lycée professor, Bergson was expected both to write his 
doctoral thesis and to teach the philosophy class. First employed for a brief stint at Lycée 
d’Angers, a young women’s school, before moving to Clermont-Ferrand, Bergson, like 
most of his peers, set his sights on one of the sixteen philosophy chairs in Université de 
Paris system.12 As Christophe Charle notes, “Paris indeed remains the seat of all the 
exclusive resources enabling the exercise of intellectual power in the university: the 
scholarly reviews and societies, juries for recruitment and for the doctorate, national 
authorities of evaluation, collections of publications, and additional institutes for 
research.”13 Following two rejections for professorships at the Sorbonne, the École 
normale supérieure granted Bergson’s wish in 1898. Soon after in 1900, he leapt into the 
Collège de France, where Bergson remained until his retirement in 1921.14 By the age of 
forty, Bergson stood out among his fellow peers for having rapidly ascended the 
educational ladder from the provincial lycées to France’s premier teaching institution.      
Yet Bergson stood out even more starkly, I want to suggest, for having taken 
advantage of the psychology section of the terminal philosophy course. Three decades of 
educational reforms from 1874 to 1902 carried out the scientific imperative of the Third 
Republic by incorporating the emerging scientific psychology into the philosophy 
programme. The official curriculum released by the Ministry of Public Instruction since 
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the beginning of the nineteenth century underwent a transformation in its 1874 version, 
which mandated that psychology open with a lesson distinguishing psychological and 
physiological facts. The lesson was not only the first in the class’s history to recognize 
the possibility of a physiological basis of consciousness, but it also presented psychology 
under the rubric of facts amenable to experimental research. Subsequent reforms in 1880, 
1885, and 1902 deepened the ministry’s commitment to updating the psychology section 
by including more lessons on scientific advancements. Although the lessons were 
mandatory, their content and organization were left to the professor’s discretion. Profiting 
from an era of academic freedom, Bergson seized the opportunity to stage a 
rapprochement between scientific psychology and spiritualist philosophy in the 
classroom. He integrated detailed analyses of the research of experimental psychologists 
discussed in Section II, such as Théodule Ribot, Gustav Fechner, and Wilhelm Wundt. 
By the time he left lycée teaching, Bergson finished Matière et mémoire (1896), the 
second of his two major books to tackle experimental psychology. 
Bergson belonged to the first generation of lycée professors who taught the 
philosophy programme in the post-Cousinian era. Victor Cousin oversaw the educational 
hierarchy in France since 1830, and it was thanks to his efforts that psychology endured 
as the centerpiece of the philosophy curriculum. For Cousin, psychology was an 
introspective study inimical to empirical verification. It paved the high road to ontology 
by examining the faculties of consciousness – sensation, reason, and the will – using 
metaphysical methods culled from the history of Western philosophy. This brand of 
eclectic spiritualism constituted the official philosophy of France for much of the 
nineteenth century. As Jan Goldstein documents, Cousin’s educational monopoly 
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enforced his metaphysical approach to psychology by fashioning the subject’s lessons 
around the self [moi], whose self-identity and free activity independent of sensations 
served to anchor introspective inquiry.15 Following his death in 1867, the 1874 
programme was the first to diminish Cousin’s influence. The curricular reforms that 
followed deepened students’ exposure to experimental psychology as an increasing 
number of lessons centered on research conducted in German and British clinics and 
laboratories. Henri Marion, an architect of the 1880 programme, announced that the 
Ministry of Public Instruction chose to construe psychology as “the science of the facts 
and their laws,” although Marion acknowledged the subject’s indelible debt to Cousin by 
adding, “it is true that the order of facts, more than any other, provokes metaphysical 
curiosity.”16 Indeed, the educational upheavals of the Third Republic would not expunge 
Cousin’s mark, but the final decades of the nineteenth century nonetheless witnessed a 
scientific turn within the spiritualist framework of philosophy instruction. This scientific 
turn, I contend, explains the rise of a new generation of professors, Bergson chief among 
them, who advanced scientific spiritualism after becoming conversant with the research 
agenda of the nascent experimental psychology.  
In highlighting the impact of psychology instruction on French philosophy 
professors, this chapter intervenes in histories of the intellectual and educational culture 
of late nineteenth-century France. I challenge two approaches that predominate the 
historiography the period.  
The first approach posits continuity between the Cousinian legacy and the 
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educational reforms of 1874 through 1902. In The Eclectic Legacy John Brooks III argues 
that the human sciences in France at the end of the nineteenth century retained Cousin’s 
influence despite the anti-spiritualist pretensions of figures such as Théodule Ribot and 
Émile Durkheim.17 Brooks III justifies his claim by analyzing transformations in the 
agrégation, baccalauréat, and especially the programme, which both steered young 
scientific thinkers to conform to the French philosophical establishment and reflected the 
delicate imbrication of scientific and eclectic principles.  
More recently, Jan Goldstein asserts the even deeper continuity between Cousin’s 
legacy and philosophy instruction under the Third Republic. “As a regime that embraced 
scientific positivism and an active anticlerical policy once it became fully 
‘republicanized’ around 1880,” Goldstein writes, “the early Third Republic would seem 
to have had every reason to unseat the old Cousinian philosophy.”18 This was not the 
case, however, because “Psychology, still presented as the first and foundational branch 
of philosophy, still operated with a tripartite consciousness comprised of sensation, 
reason, and will.”19 To test her argument, Goldstein singles out the new lesson included 
in the 1880 programme, “sleep, dreams, somnambulism, hallucinations, and madness,” 
which introduced psychopathological research that appeared to fracture the unity of 
consciousness constitutive of the Cousinian self. Yet the 1880 programme remained 
tethered to Cousin’s eclectic spiritualism, since, as Goldstein posits, the lesson on altered 
states of consciousness was fully compatible with the contradictory vestiges of the 
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Cousinian self that endured in other psychology lessons. The programme’s “restless 
attraction to new data was motivated less by wonder,” Goldstein argues, “than by a kind 
of preemptive self-protectiveness.”20 Therefore, according to Goldstein, Cousin’s 
influence over lycée philosophy was so ingrained that it engulfed any scientific lessons 
adopted in the late nineteenth century.  
To the contrary, I contend that lycée philosophy instruction underwent a 
significant rupture with its Cousinian legacy. Goldstein fails to mention that 
psychopathological research made its way into the 1880 programme alongside scientific 
re-conceptions of several other lessons. As I will explore further, the precedent for this 
transformation was already in place in 1874, so that by 1880 the Ministry of Public would 
seamlessly refashion the lesson on “idea of liberty,” for example, into “the voluntary act,” 
a title drawn from the specialized language of experimental psychology.21 This is not to 
suggest that the educational reforms of the Third Republic completely abandoned French 
philosophy’s Cousinian heritage. Rather, my argument is that the scientific lessons 
introduced into lycée philosophy instruction laid the conditions for a scientific turn within 
French spiritualism.  
The second historiographical approach focuses on the political stakes of 
philosophy instruction. Jean-Louis Fabiani extensively documents the role that the 
agrégation, programme, and baccalauréat played in mediating the intellectual field, to 
use a notion introduced by Pierre Bourdieu, within which “the philosophers of the 
Republic” wielded their cultural capital.22 These three organs of the academic hierarchy 
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reflected the habitus that pre-consciously lent identity to philosophy professors’ shared 
position as state functionaries.23 Indeed, the final decades of the nineteenth century 
witnessed the vast professionalization of philosophy in France. A new class of academic 
philosophers bent on publishing books and articles took the place of early nineteenth-
century independent philosophers like Maine de Biran and Auguste Comte. Perched atop 
the hill in the Latin Quarter, the Université de Paris constitutes the central node in 
sociological studies of the academic circuit wherein professors and students jockeyed for 
position.24 While sociological methods help historians grasp the changing role of 
philosophers as a class, they neglect the transformations in education that explain the 
meaning of philosophers’ ideas. As a result, Fabiani’s vantage point reveals “The 
homogeneity of the professorial corps… reinforced by the strong proportion of agrégés 
teaching in the lycées, which augmented the social and intellectual proximity between 
secondary and university teachers.”25 This chapter, to the contrary, examines the distinct 
experience that teaching in the lycées conferred on young professors still distanced, both 
geographically and intellectually, from the Parisian universities.  
In what follows, I present the series of reforms issued by the Ministry of Public 
Instruction between 1874 and 1902 as the institutional backdrop to explain the 
transformation in the scientific character of French philosophy instruction. I proceed to 
foreground life inside the classroom by analyzing heretofore-neglected historical 
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materials: students’ course notes and philosophy manuals. Course notes help to build a 
synchronic account of how Bergson and other philosophy professors took up and adapted 
the programme in the classroom. The mushrooming publication of philosophy manuals, 
and their regular re-publication, help to build a diachronic account of how institutional 
changes trickled down into professors’ lessons. I aim not only to paint an intimate picture 
of the teaching of philosophy, but also to explain the singularity of Bergson’s ideas. 
While his colleagues all taught to the same programme and baccalauréat, Bergson’s 
course notes and use of philosophy manuals illuminate the pedagogical element that lifted 
him above his contemporaries.  
 
The Scientific Turn in Philosophy Instruction Between 1874 and 1907 
 
 Philosophy has endured as a distinguishing feature of French secondary education 
since it was first mandated as a field of study in 1809. That same year the Imperial 
University under Napoleon established the École normale supérieure at rue d’Ulm in 
Paris to train young professors. Access to the terminal course in philosophy remained a 
privilege open to the sons of the bourgeois élite for most of the nineteenth century. The 
Falloux law of 1850 decentralized education and charged each department with the 
obligation to ensure universal primary schooling and to expand secondary schooling. It 
was the responsibility of the towns to manage collèges, but the lycées fell under the 
national purview. While the majority of students attended ecclesiastic, or “free” schools, 
for much of the century, the Third Republic set about integrating the youth into the public 
schools and re-organizing philosophy instruction in the service of a national project.  
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Following the Franco-Prussian War, many in France turned to secondary 
education as the wellspring of national regeneration. In 1876, twenty-four university 
professors formed the Société de l’Enseignement Supérieure in order promote educational 
reforms and collect information about foreign institutions. The journal of the Société, the 
Bulletin internationale de l’enseignement (which was later renamed the Revue), dedicated 
the majority of its empirical studies of education to the German system. In France, 
education reformers straddled the competing imperatives of updating the curriculum with 
scientific research and preserving French philosophy’s distinctly Cousinian heritage. 
Even though, as Paul Janet reflected, “Germany has become our idol since it humiliated 
us,”26 it was secondary education that distinguished the French. Philosophy instruction 
was not mandatory in the German gymnasium, while it marked the apex of the French 
lycée.   
By 1907, the psychologist Alfred Binet surveyed three hundred lycée philosophy 
professors to measure the impact of experimental psychology in the classroom.27 He 
concluded that philosophy instruction had become more scientific and less metaphysical 
since 1874. Among the 103 surveys returned, Binet noted a curious pedagogical method: 
“The influence of Mr. Bergson’s ideas has, I believe, left the greatest mark. There are 
even four professors who adopt them without reserve while making them the heart of 
their teaching.”28 As one lycée professor wrote, Bergson’s engagement with the new 
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psychology, “so lively and so rich, always seduces many students, at least those who 
understand something of it.”29 
 Between 1874 and 1907, philosophy instruction underwent four major reforms: 
The Ministry of Public Instruction revised the programme in 1874, 1880, 1885 and 1902 
by incorporating scientific content into philosophy lessons. Yet paradoxically, formal 
scientific instruction came to be further distanced from philosophical instruction during 
the period. Lycée students had the choice of pursuing one of two degree tracks in either 
classical or mathematical (modern) studies. With each reform, the importance of 
philosophy for those pursuing the latter diminished: mathematics students had to spend 
fewer hours in the terminal philosophy class and the proportion of questions dedicated to 
philosophy decreased on the mathematics baccalauréat. During the final two decades of 
the nineteenth century, philosophy professors lived through a wave of reforms that many 
believed displaced philosophy as the coronation of secondary education. While 
philosophy instruction, on the one hand, lost its unity because of the widening gulf 
between two baccalauréats, on the other hand, the course assimilated ever more scientific 
concepts in the programme. When Bergson began teaching in 1881, he belonged to the 
first generation of lycée professors charged with inculcating the official rapprochement 
between scientific and philosophical psychology. 
But this rapprochement was by no means uncontested. It reflected a synthesis of 
academic and parliamentary power central to the educational politics of late nineteenth 
century France. As George Weisz documents, academics and professionals trained in 
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universities made up a significant portion of the government’s deputies.30 The Ministry of 
Public Instruction recruited philosophers into its ranks. François Evellin, a lycée 
professor and philosophy agrégé, and Jules Lachelier, the famed professor at the École 
normale, served as inspectors general charged with monitoring lycée professors. They 
reported to the deputies of education, which included philosophers such as Ferdinand 
Buisson, the 1927 Nobel Peace Prize winner who served as director of primary education 
from 1879 to 1896; Élie Rabier, director of secondary education from 1889 to 1907; and 
Louis Liard, director of the universities from 1884 to 1902.31  
 Jules Simon first implemented his vision of secondary education as the Minister 
of Public Instruction from 1870 to 1873. His tenure stood out for its momentary stability 
among the eleven heads of the ministry during the tumultuous first decade of the Third 
Republic. A former student of Cousin, Simon saw himself as representing his master’s 
legacy.32 Simon envisioned philosophical instruction as completing scientific training. 
Left to itself, scientific knowledge abandoned students to educational pedantry, which 
Simon, citing Montaigne, lambasted: “Just as birds sometimes go in quest of grain, and 
carry it in their beak without tasting it to give a beakful to their little ones, so our pedants 
go pillaging knowledge in books and lodging it only on the ends of their lips, in order 
merely to disgorge it and scatter it to the winds.”33 Scientific instruction, in other words, 
required philosophy in order to be internalized by students. To pursue his goal, Simon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 George Weisz, The Emergence of Modern Universities in France, 1863-1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), 9. 
31 See Isabelle Havelange, Françoise Huguet, and Bernadette Lebedeff, Les inspecteurs généraux de 
l’Instruction publique: Dictionnaire biographique, 1802-1914. (Paris: Institut National de Recherche 
Pédagogique, 1986). 
32 See Jules Simon, Victor Cousin (Paris: Hachette, 1887). 
33 Jules Simon, Réforme de l’enseignement secondaire (Paris: Hachette, 1874), 13; Montaigne, The 
Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), 
100.  
230 
replaced the imperial council of the University with a council of the ministry whose 
forty-eight members included numerous philosophers drawn from the university. The 
spiritualist philosophers Charles Jourdain, Michel Bréal, Ernest Bersot, Paul Janet, and 
Félix Ravaisson (who served as secretary) were “the friends,” Simon wrote, “who met in 
my cabinet every Saturday and who, without an official title, by their friendship for the 
minister and above all for solid scholarship, work with me on all the reforms.”34 
 It was on July 23, 1874 under the subsequent minister, Anselme Batbie, that the 
Ministry of Public Instruction released the first programme reflecting Simon’s vision. 
True to the Cousinian heritage, it opened with a brief introduction to the object of 
philosophy and its distinction from the sciences, followed by the first and most 
significant subject, psychology. But the 1874 reform also brought about a significant 
rupture: psychology ceased to be studied as a deductive inquiry, and instead opened with 
a lesson on the nature of psychological facts. Demonstrative of its new empirical 
framework, the lesson proceeded to distinguish psychological facts from physiological 
facts. The lesson acknowledged that metaphysics no longer laid claim to the only method 
appropriate to psychology. “The faculties of the soul,” the second lesson in psychology, 
ceased to be understood as a metaphysical truth and was instead framed as a working 
hypothesis. Professors were thus expected to confront the biological approach to 
experimental psychology from the beginning of their class, effectively barring them from 
taking for granted the long-standing introspective approach of Cousinian psychology. “It 
appears therefore that the general tone of this rubric was profoundly marked by the 
empiricism of a new discipline, psychology,” Bruno Poucet writes, “a sign, along with 
the presence of political economy, of the defeat of the unity of the philosophy 
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programme, which no longer marked the triumph of spiritualism as the only point of 
view.”35  
On November 25, 1875, the ministry announced the philosophy curriculum for 
the mathematics degree. It took the form of a minimized programme with select lessons 
and with the entire metaphysics subject eliminated.36 Whereas students pursuing a degree 
in letters spent eight hours in philosophy out of the twenty-three classroom hours per 
week, those pursuing a degree in mathematics spent one hour per week in philosophy. As 
the philosophy course became more scientific, the science degree became less 
philosophical.  
Jules Ferry cemented philosophy’s Janus-faced relation to scientific instruction. 
Ferry, who was named minister of public instruction February 4, 1879, was a devotee of 
Comtian positivism. 37 He spent the next four years overhauling secondary education, 
beginning by reorganizing the council of the ministry on February 27, 1880 and by 
opening a separate bureau of secondary instruction. Its members convened to release a 
series of reforms, most notably revamping the baccalauréat in letters by replacing the 
Latin composition with a French version and by opening public scholarships for students 
to pursue graduate training.  
 The new philosophy programme was announced August 12, 1880. It featured an 
even more extensive psychology section and the first appearance of an ethics lesson in 
political economy (which included three aspects: production, circulation and distribution, 
and consumption of riches). The scientific bases of psychology were reinforced. There 
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was no more mention of the “faculties of the soul,” as they were previously presented in 
1874 along the divisions of sensibility, intelligence, and the will. While the scientific 
spiritualist Alfred Fouillée celebrated the codified rapprochement between philosophical 
and scientific psychology,38 Francisque Bouiller of the old spiritualist camp bemoaned 
the reform: “despite the authors of the program, the word “faculty” is not more a part of 
our philosophical language than it is a part of our literary language. But the moment 
seems poorly chosen to ban the concept, while the reformers return more than ever to the 
honor of physiology, which they believe has definitively localized certain faculties in the 
brain.”39 The lesson on liberty in the psychology section was no longer titled, “moral 
liberty or free will, its demonstration, and negation,” reflecting the lesson’s Cartesian 
heritage. The 1880 reform instead presented liberty as a modality of psychological 
activity. The number of lessons in metaphysics decreased, while the ethics section 
became more practical in its design and increasingly sociological in its content. In 
addition to the section on political economy, ethics emphasized service to national 
institutions in the form of lessons on suffrage, obedience to the law, military service, and 
“dedication to the patrie.” The result was a less unified programme, one that deepened its 
ongoing engagement with the natural and social sciences.  
Yet the gulf between philosophical and scientific instruction also widened. The 
ministry announced the new philosophy section for the mathematics degree on February 
5, 1881. Rather than working from the philosophy programme and trimming its lessons, 
as was the case in the 1874 reform, the ministry decreed an all-together distinct 
philosophy curriculum for mathematics students. It included lessons in the methods of the 
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mathematical, physical, and natural sciences, as well as a section on morals. For the 
mathematics degree, philosophy came to serve the instrumental purpose of elucidating 
the epistemological foundations of the sciences. 
 The 1880 reform was coupled with new academic freedom for instructors. As 
Marion highlighted, “The order adopted in this program does not bind the liberty of the 
professor, provided that all the questions included are treated.”40 The reform opened the 
possibility for wide divergences among professors, in both their pedagogical style and 
especially in their treatment of the syllabus. Professors’ newfound autonomy, as Jean-
Louis Fabiani suggests, made it possible for works of celebrity philosophers to emerge, 
from Bergson’s Matière et mémoire through Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’Être et le néant.41  
The newfound academic freedom had its skeptics. Paul Janet asked, “Do we 
believe that families can have faith in the University, isn’t there a tacit accord which 
guarantees that the individual liberty of the professor does not pass certain limits and that 
he will not stray too far from those standard ideas on which society until now has 
rested?” 42 Marion believed that philosophy, properly guided by a rigorous pedagogy, 
would resolve the problem. He took over the first chair in the Science of Education at the 
Sorbonne in 1883, three years after promoting academic freedom as part of the 1880 
reform. Pedagogy, in Marion’s eyes, was a branch of philosophy, and thus accountable to 
principles transcending the whim of individual professors. Marion elaborated these 
principles his own writing,43 but left their codification to the philosopher and Director of 
Primary Education, Ferdinand Buisson, who published the Dictionnaire de pédagogie et 
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d’instruction primaire (1887). In 1890, Buisson took over Marion’s chair at the 
Sorbonne.  
It was Ferry’s campaign to laicize primary and secondary education that left an 
indelible mark on France. Parliamentary debate over educational laïcité began in 1880, a 
decade after Ferry initially promoted the cause as a young deputy. He did not see the 
reforms as condemning congregations. The laïcité of the state carried forth the work of 
the revolution, and laic instruction in the schools was the work of Republicans. Ferry 
invoked the value of active student participation in support of the reforms: “the new 
methods which took so much development have just begun to spread and triumph; these 
methods consist of no longer dictating, as by a decree, the regulation of the child, but 
make him find himself; above all they excite and awaken the child’s spontaneity; they 
monitor and direct his moral development instead of imprisoning him in ready-made 
rules.” 44 President Jules Grévy formally inscribed the separation of church and state into 
law March 28, 1882. The law barred religious instruction in primary schools, leaving it 
up to families and private schools to inculcate religion. 
Competing conceptions of spiritualist philosophy were pivotal in parliamentary 
debates over educational laïcité. The debate kicked off with a spar between Simon and 
Ferry. Although philosophy was only taught in the terminal year of lycée, a course in 
civic morals was part of the primary school curriculum. Simon proposed an amendment 
to eliminate the civics course and to include religious instruction in the terminal 
philosophy course. Simon thought that a spiritualist philosophical education ought to 
include a Christian conception of morality, while Ferry endorsed a rational conception of 
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morality. Speaking on Simon’s behalf before the Senate on July 1, 1881, Xavier Delsol 
defended a program for moral instruction, which, he claimed, “is linked with the 
spiritualist school and… which proclaims the three great principles of the moral liberty of 
man, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul.” 45 In response, Ferry argued 
that Simon and the fellow senators of the Center-Left feared a chimera. A school without 
God was impossible, Ferry contended, since the majority of the teaching corps, although 
not ecclesiastic, already endorsed spiritualist philosophy. The Senate adopted Simon’s 
amendment on July 4, but the Chamber of Deputies rejected it by the end of the month. 
Ferry’s sweeping vision of rational moral instruction won. As Jean-Marie Mayeur notes, 
“It has not always been sufficiently observed that Ferry’s argumentation refused not only 
education by a Christian school teacher, but also education of any positive religion, 
namely any ‘laïque’ religion, including that of the Saint-Simonian religion, the positive 
religion of Auguste Comte, and of course that “natural religion,” to which his principal 
adversary in the ranks of the Center-Left, Jules Simon, dedicated a book in 1857.”46  
Opening young women’s secondary education was an equally momentous reform.  
Thanks to the Republican deputy, Camille Sée, the law of December 21, 1880 organized 
public colleges and lycées for girls. 47 The reform extended Ferry’s secularizing 
imperative. In bringing young women under public tutelage, the state chipped away at 
ecclesiastic schools’ authority. Unlike secondary school for boys, there was no 
baccalauréat; young women received a diplôme d’études secondaires, which was not a 
vocational degree. “For the great majority of those who voted for the law,” Françoise 
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Mayer writes, “women’s access to schooling was not first of all designed for their 
personal blossoming, but rather for the stability and harmony of the household.”48 Hence 
Ferry’s defense of the law in 1882, “Equality in education is the reconstituted unity of the 
family.”49 There was no Latin education or philosophy instruction, leaving young women 
without the respective foundation and coronation of their education. During the third 
through fifth years, however, there was a morals class, which included thinkers like Kant 
and a discussion of psychology.  
 To ensure that local departments carried out the reforms, Ferry’s ministry 
expanded the role of the inspectors general. Created in 1802 under Napoleon, the 
inspectors monitored all public schools across the three levels of instruction. Under Ferry, 
two were assigned to primary schools, six to secondary schools (evenly shared between 
letters and mathematics), and eight to universities (three for letters, three for sciences, one 
for law, and one for medicine). Appearing in each classroom once a year, the inspectors 
graded the professors. Soon after Ferry assumed the ministry, the philosopher Jules 
Lachelier became an inspector general for secondary education. Once the professor of so 
many normaliens, Lachelier now surveyed their performance beyond his courses at the 
École normale supérieur. Alongside the other inspector, the former philosophy professor 
François Evellin, Lachelier saw to it that professors dictated lessons clearly and 
encouraged students’ participation. The fate of all lycée professors, and especially that of 
Bergson, hinged on the evaluations of Lachelier and Evellin.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Françoise Mayeur, L’enseignement secondaire des jeunes filles sous la Troisième République (Paris: 
Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1977), 13. 
49 Jules Ferry, Discours et opinions de Jules Ferry T. 1, ed. Paul Robiquet (Paris: Armand Colin: 1893), 
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 Lachelier served as a primary intermediary between philosophy professors and the 
Ministry of Public Instruction. When many expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
density of the 1880 programme, it was up to Lachelier to propose an alternative. He 
interviewed lycée professors in 1884 and came up with two recommendations: eliminate 
the lesson in political economy (since few were prepared to teach it) and minimize the 
role of the history of philosophy.50 What followed was a new programme released on 
January 22, 1885.51 The number of weekly hours that students in the letters degree spent 
in the terminal philosophy course was increased to nine, while professors no longer had 
to teach the political economy lesson. It instead became the watered-down “relations 
between morals and political economy.” Élie Rabier, who drafted the curriculum for the 
psychology section, pared away metaphysical lessons such as “the idea of God” and “the 
idea of the external world.” Lachelier re-named the “metaphysics and theodicy” section 
“metaphysics,” and, against the scientific trend, added a lesson titled “providence and 
natural religion.” Marion commanded the logic section, further shedding its content. The 
final section, “history of philosophy,” was replaced with “notions of the principle 
philosophical doctrines.” The lineage it traced commenced with Socrates and, as if 
extending an olive branch to the old guard, concluded with Cousin.  
 An updated baccalauréat followed on January 28, 1890. While the coefficient for 
philosophy increased to fifty percent of the version in letters, it was reduced to twelve 
percent of the version in mathematics. On June 4, 1891, the mathematics degree was 
renamed “modern education.” Its new status confirmed the worries already brewing 
among philosophy professors about the fate of their discipline. “Philosophy retreats into 
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letters and away from the sciences,” wrote Émile Boutroux, inveighing against 
provincializing the philosophy course. He thought it instead “rests on science and on 
letters as two columns; and it collapses as soon as one is eliminated.”52 The widened gulf 
between the degrees in letters and mathematics had the effect of consigning philosophy 
instruction to a marginal role. The experimental psychologist Théodule Ribot welcomed 
the declining significance of philosophy: “most [of the students] are put off by it; others 
intoxicate themselves in generalities and formulas that have no use.”53 Fouillée, however, 
went so far as to argue that all lycée professors ought to be trained in philosophy “so that 
all professors are, as much as possible, penetrated by the philosophical spirit.”54 In 1899, 
the parliamentary deputy, Alexandre Ribot, commissioned a report including the input of 
Boutroux and Fouillée.55 The report led Rabier to coordinate a project to reform 
secondary education, which began October 15, 1900. 
 What followed was the reform of 1902, which further fragmented philosophy 
instruction. Students now had the choice of pursuing four degrees instead of two.56 “So 
choose the easiest, the one that conforms the most to the taste you think you have,” 
retorted Fouillée.57 Philosophy professors found it more difficult to recruit students into 
their classrooms while it also became possible for students pursuing degrees in medicine 
and law to study neither Greek nor Latin. In the eyes of many professors, the reform was 
the last blow to the linguistic backbone of philosophy instruction, shortsightedly 
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cementing the practical orientation of secondary education. One newspaper even 
portrayed the reform as France’s “intellectual disarmament” before Germany.58  
Released on May 28, 1902, the new programme elevated the scientific dimension 
of philosophy by further trimming its metaphysical orientation.59 “Our old philosophy 
must still be conserved,” Louis Liard announced, “but while reducing its excessive 
dialectics and developing the scientific spirit.”60 The metaphysics section was demoted to 
a mere three lessons instead of seven, the last of which was titled, “metaphysical 
relationship between science and ethics.” The final section dedicated to the history of 
philosophy, over which Cousin’s legacy still claimed a waning foothold, was eliminated. 
The same was the case for the philosophy syllabus in the mathematic and medical tracks. 
No mention was made of the history of philosophy and its great thinkers. Instead, the 
syllabus was organized into two parts: elements of scientific philosophy and elements of 
ethical philosophy. 
The reform of 1902 brought the dual tensions propelling the educational 
upheavals since 1874 to a climax. More scientific than ever, on the one hand, yet 
distanced from scientific instruction, on the other, the terminal philosophy course looked 
starkly different from its Cousinian ancestry. 1902 brought a cessation to the chronic 
reforms to the philosophy course, which lasted until the Ministry of Public Instruction 
introduced the contemporary philosophy programme in 1960. But at the beginning of 
twentieth century, the course had been dethroned from its exalted status atop secondary 
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education.61 Fouillée responded by urging, “The philosophy class must remain for 
everyone a terminal class, the most obligatory of all, since it must raise all students above 
all of their particular studies,” but his words rang hollow, the echoes, as it were, of a 
bygone era.62 At once more precarious and scientific, the period of educational reforms 
between 1874 and 1907 established the institutional conditions driving philosophers to 
revamp the spiritualism of the past on the basis of the sciences of the late nineteenth 
century. 
 
Confronting Psychology in the Classroom 
 
 Lycée students pursuing a classical degree spent on average eight hours a week in 
the philosophy classroom. The typical day lasted fifteen hours, four of which were shared 
between two courses, while the rest were spent studying.63 The philosophy professor 
usually opened the class by dictating a summary of the day’s lesson, which students 
copied in their notebooks. The French system promoted scrupulous note taking, to the 
point that students scrawled every “and,” “but,” and “however” of the professor’s 
dictation. Students would rewrite their notes and submit them to the professor the 
following day. Following the lesson, students were welcome to pose questions. The 
professor would conclude by distributing essay prompts. “The professor expounds… and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See Anne-Marie Drouin-Hans, “Sciences naturelles et philosophie: les enjeux d’un territoire conceptuel,” 
in Sciences naturelles et formation de l’esprit. Autour de la réforme de l’enseignement de 1902, ed. Nicole 
Hulin (Lille: Septentrion, 2002), 107-128. 
62 Alfred Fouillée, L’Enseignement au point de vue national, 2nd ed. (Paris : Hachette, 1909), 145. 
63 Bruno Poucet, Enseigner la philosophie, 70.  
241 
the student composes,” as a typical dissertation manual presented the method: “The 
former is a kind of scientific work, the latter is a work of art.”64  
 Most lycées were boarding schools where students lived through the year. And 
life inside them left much to be desired: “Never-ending and obscure corridors, smoke-
filled classrooms, bare and narrow lessons, the freezing atmosphere of dormitories, heady 
kitchen odors too close to the cafeteria, unclean lavatories, dusty courtyards, soulless 
parlors,” so one former lycée administrator described conditions in the late nineteenth-
century. 65 No wonder so many professors desired to escape the provinces and teach in 
the more refined Parisian institutions!  
The inspectors general monitored philosophy professors. Whether the professor 
spoke clearly, held the students responsible, and used relevant examples, were all criteria 
that the inspectors employed when evaluating professors’ performance. Following the 
1880 reform, the inspector general François Evellin enjoined philosophy professors to 
begin the course with the philosophical lexicon: “the first duty of a professor is to create a 
rational vocabulary.” 66 Evellin outlined the two best teaching methods: the expository 
method, whereby professors read a lesson and answered questions from the previous 
day’s, and the dialectical method, whereby the professor poses a series of questions to 
lead students through the lesson (“cold calling” was standard practice). Evellin deemed 
the latter “the method the most appropriate for the formation of a youth, who, in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Émile Boirac, La dissertation philosophique (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1890), xvii.  
65 Paul Gerbod, La vie quotidienne dans les lycées et collèges au XIXe siècle (Paris: Hachette, 1968), 16. 
66 François Evellin, “La philosophie au lycée – vocabulaire, méthode, enseignement,” Revue de 
l’enseignement secondaire et de l’enseignement supérieur 4 (1884): 164. 
242 
become a resource for the country, must penetrate in all directions of thought, before we 
ourselves have even done so.”67 
 In 1885, Evellin visited Bergson’s class at Clermont-Ferrand and wrote a positive 
report.68 Bergson’s evaluations helped to expedite his ascent up the academic hierarchy. 
In 1894, Lachelier evaluated Bergson as a professor at Lycée Henri IV in Paris. The 
inspector praised the “rigor of his method,” returning the next year to write another 
glowing report: “complete clarity compatible with his depth, and only here and there are 
some things a bit artificial for his thought and a bit thin on development.” 69 Soon after in 
1896, Bergson was selected to teach courses in Greek and Latin philosophy as a docent at 
the Collège de France, where he took a full professorship in 1900. Bergson had a natural 
talent for oratory. But he achieved notoriety as a thinker for having seized hold of the 
psychology curriculum. Teaching motivated Bergson to read scientific articles 
voraciously, and he treated his lycée course as an experimental forum in which to bring 
scientific psychology in dialogue with spiritualist philosophy.  
 An essay prompt scrawled in the notebook of one of Bergson’s students in an 
1893 course at Lycée Henri IV reveals the close engagement between scientific and 
philosophical concepts in the classroom. Bergson had students respond to the question, 
“What does the philosophical spirit consist of? Determine the nature of the philosophical 
spirit by opposition with the scientific spirit and common sense.”70 “Common sense” 
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carried the particular meaning of a phenomenon’s appearance, which traditionally 
functioned as the starting point of dialectic reasoning in French philosophy instruction. 
Taking the concept of external perception as his example, the student compared, first, the 
utility of perception for survival according to common sense; second, the function of 
perception in making predictions according to science; and third, the knowledge that 
perception gleans from reality in itself according to philosophy. Although the student 
concluded, “there is therefore a real opposition between the philosophical spirit and the 
scientific spirit,”71 his outline reflected Bergson’s method of setting scientific and 
philosophical concepts in mutual dialogue.  
 Contrasting Bergson’s performance in the classroom with that of his spiritualist 
contemporary, Jules Lagneau, highlights the extent to which Bergson’s engagement with 
the psychology curriculum contributed to his prominence. A fellow normalien who 
passed the agrégation in 1875, six year before Bergson, Lagneau pursued the same career 
trajectory. He hopped from lycées in Sens (1876-78), Saint-Quentin (1879-80), and 
Nancy (1880-1886). Lagneau made it to Paris in 1886, taking a professorship at Lycée 
Michelet where he remained until his premature death in 1894 at the age of forty-three. In 
contrast to Bergson’s magisterial production, however, Lagneau managed to publish only 
a few review articles in the Revue philosophique during his lifetime.72 He achieved 
belated fame as a lycée professor. And it was thanks to his student, Émile Chartier, the 
future philosophy professor who adopted Alain as his nom de plume, that Lagneau’s 
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notes enjoyed posthumous publication. But since Lagneau hardly invoked scientific 
examples in the classroom, he failed to earn the respect of the inspectors general, which 
accounts for his failure to ascend to a Parisian university.73  
Lagneau, like Bergson, dedicated the bulk of his philosophy course to 
psychology. As one student commented, “During the major part of the academic year, he 
only treated the introduction to philosophy and psychology extensively. All the rest was 
taught briefly or passed on by means of copied texts.”74 Lagneau’s approach to the 
course, however, was markedly less scientific than Bergson’s. Lagneau swiftly handled 
the first psychology lesson on the distinction between psychological and physiological 
facts. A student’s notes from an 1886 course read: “It is known that in order to conceive 
of certain thoughts, we have to make use of a part of the brain… One might be tempted to 
substitute psychological knowledge for physiological knowledge, which arrives at 
tangible results.”75 Like Bergson, Lagneau believed that there is a strict separation 
between the two. “Physiological science can only go back to conditions of conditions: it 
would not know how to seek the reason for facts, but only the conditions in which they 
are produced.”76 In similarly summary fashion, Lagneau addressed required topics, 
“comparative or descriptive psychology,” “physiological or explanatory psychology,” 
and even “psycho-physics,” under the lesson, “the objective form and experimental 
method in psychology.”77 But Lagneau made no references to scientific psychologists. It 
was thus unsurprising to find that inspectors as early as 1879 wrote in their reports: 
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“Course too metaphysical.”78 Obligated to address physiology, Lagneau dispensed with 
the lesson, leaving the sciences behind in order to advance to what he saw as the heart of 
philosophy.  
 When Lachelier evaluated Lagneau’s class in 1887, he wrote a positive review: 
“His class is one of the strongest that I have seen this year; not only do the students 
respond well and voluntarily, but they also handle the subjects with ease and clarity in 
their essays.”79 But when another inspector, Élie Rabier, visited two years later, the report 
was hardly as warm: “Without a doubt, no one can teach contrary to his doctrine, and 
unfortunately yours, I do think, is among the most difficult to teach because of the 
originality of your point of view, which is completely metaphysical.”80 Rabier advised 
Lagneau to temper his abstract lessons with at least three scientific examples per week, 
“so that students could study sensations as ordinary facts.”81 
 Bergson, by contrast, tackled the same lesson on the distinction between 
physiological and psychological facts in the same year, 1886, by forcefully articulating 
the stakes of contemporary psychological research. “Our moral life consists of science, 
art, and religion, but we cannot at all see how nerves cells, if they existed alone, could 
coordinate themselves in a manner to bring about these great thoughts and beautiful 
feelings.”82 Bergson went on to cite Wilhelm Wundt and Paul Broca before placing these 
authors in a historical lineage, which, along with the phrenologists Franz Gall and Johann 
Spurzheim, sought to localize mental functions in the brain. In the thirteenth lesson on 
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psychophysics, Bergson laid out Fechner’s theory as well as that of like-minded psycho-
physicists, Joseph Delboeuf and Ewald Hering. Bergson argued “the experiments and 
Fechner’s law are very debatable, even for those who admit the possibility of calculating 
sensation. We could even go farther: we can wonder if a similar law would not be vicious 
in its very principle, for what does it mean for sensations to double, triple, or quadruple 
another?”83 Bergson entered into and elaborated psychophysics’ research program in 
order to arrive at the thesis of his Essai: conscious states are distinctly qualitative, and 
thus not measurable.84  
 Psychology was central to both Bergson’s and Lagneau’s teaching. The difference 
between the two, I want to suggest, turned on their respective engagements with 
experimental psychology and metaphysics: whereas Lagneau took metaphysics as 
psychology’s point of departure, Bergson took it as the subject’s point of arrival. In his 
notes for Langeau’s lesson, “psychology and metaphysics,” Alain wrote, “the true science 
of the spirit is not psychology, but metaphysics,” since metaphysics reveals the principle 
of the unity of the self on which thinking depends.85 Bergson, by contrast, oriented his 
psychology lesson around research in experimental psychology in order to demonstrate 
that it led to conceptual problems that yield metaphysical concepts. While Lagneau’s 
rigidly spiritualist commitments gained little purchase in an intellectual climate marked 
by the rapid influx of physiological methods into psychology, Bergson opened the study 
of consciousness to science.  
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 Both Bergson and Lagneau used the same psychology manual, Élie Rabier’s 
Leçons de philosophie.86 Originally published in 1884, the manual underwent twelve re-
editions until its last in 1912. (Although each reissue offered little new content, it did give 
the publishing house, Hachette, the opportunity to insert new advertisements for other 
manuals.) A heavy tome of 676 pages, Rabier’s manual was dedicated solely to 
psychology, and it offered the most comprehensive introduction to the subject. It was 
Rabier’s belief that “Philosophy collaborates with scientific studies, in the sense that it 
must first of all better understand science, and appreciate it all the more.”87 Rabier’s 
Leçons de philosophie was one of the most widely used manuals of the period, as Binet’s 
1907 survey of professors confirmed.88 In fact, it was the same manual that the young 
Marcel Proust used as a lycée student in 1886.89 Perhaps its success was due to the fact 
that the author served in prominent educational positions, first as inspector general before 
becoming the director of secondary instruction in 1889. It is likely that Lagneau used 
Rabier’s manual because he received a free copy.90 But Alain suggested that it was 
merely out of reverence to the inspector general that Lagneau mentioned it at all during 
his lectures: “Rabier was the “pedant”…kept in hand during his inspection.”91 
 It is clear from the notes taken by students in Bergson’s classes that he regularly 
incorporated and even critiqued Rabier’s manual. In the same lesson on the distinction 
between physiological and psychological facts, the manual advanced the spiritualist line: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See Marcel Conche, “Bergson à Clermont,” L’Enseignement philosophique 47, no. 2 (1996): 6.  
87 Élie Rabier, Du Rôle de la philosophie dans l’éducation (Paris: Delalain, 1886), 4. 
88 Alfred Binet, “Enquête sur l’évolution de l’enseignement,” 213. 
89 Clippings from Élie Rabier, Leçons de philosophie. I Psychologie (Paris: Hachette, 1884), 49-57, NAF 
16611, Fonds Marcel Proust, Bibliothèque nationale de France.  
90 Rabier’s letters at the Institut de France and the Bibliothèque nationale de France are peppered with 
notices sent to philosophy professors who received a copy of his manual. The publishing house, Hachette, 
maintained a list of professors who were sent free copies.  
91 Alain, Souvenirs concernant Jules Lagneau (Paris: Gallimard, 1925), 722.  
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“It is inexact to assimilate spiritual facts, or functions of the moral life, to organic facts, 
or functions of the physical life.”92 But where Rabier hastily dispensed with certain 
philosophical notions, Bergson was apt to add nuance. For example, Rabier glossed over 
the doctrine of realism, which, his manual claimed, “no longer exists in history; today it 
can only serve to illustrate a memorable adage.”93 Although he disagreed with the 
doctrine, Bergson nonetheless laid out its tenets, and encouraged his students not to treat 
realism as a “poetic fantasy.”94  
  Bergson’s discussion of the notion of unconscious psychic facts is even more 
revealing. Experimental psychologists of the late nineteenth century construed the 
unconscious as the domain of physiological processes taking place outside of 
consciousness (a construal notably different from either Freud’s or Pierre Janet’s 
understanding, which did not reduce unconscious drives to the body). In the lesson on 
consciousness, Rabier’s manual disputed the notion of the unconscious on the grounds 
that psychic facts do not exist outside of consciousness, but are minimally conscious: 
“The hypothesis of the unconscious is useless, since all the services that one claims of the 
absolute unconscious can be easily asked of a relative unconscious (made of small 
perceptions), since nothing stops us from admitting that the gradations of consciousness 
go until infinity.”95  Notes from Bergson’s course at Clermont-Ferrand in 1887 indicate 
that he remained faithful to Rabier’s claim.96 But by 1893 in Paris, Bergson took full 
advantage of his elevated teaching position and leveled a critique. Adding an additional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Élie Rabier, Leçons de philosophie, 22.  
93 Ibid., 306 
94 Henri Bergson, Cours de psychologie de 1892-1893 au lycée Henri-IV, ed. Sylbain Matton and Alain 
Panero (Paris: SÉHA, 2008), 220. 
95 Élie Rabier, Leçons de philosophie, 68.  
96 Henri Bergson, Cours I. Leçons de psychologie et de métaphysique. Clermont-Ferrand, 1887-1888, 91.  
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lesson on the problem of unconscious sensations, Bergson asked, “How can we explain 
them? A first solution would consist of purely and simply denying the possibility of 
unconscious psychic facts. That is where several contemporary psychologists stop, 
including Rabier. Their argument can be summed up thus: a psychological fact is by its 
very definition a conscious fact.”97 Bergson presented the work of Wilhelm Wundt and 
Herbert Spencer, as well as philosophers such as Hippolyte Taine and Rudolf Lötze, who 
countenanced sensations governed by mechanical laws operating outside of 
consciousness. Although Bergson disagreed with these thinkers, he cautioned students 
that it would be “too easy to decide the issue quickly,” and instructed them to appreciate 
the problem at stake: “Without a doubt, the perfectly psychological state is a conscious 
state, but this property of psychological states, as important as it may be, is not the only 
one. Even though there are states that might not resemble the properties of conscious, 
psychological facts, they are infinitely more conscious than physiological or physical 
facts.”98 Rather than dismiss scientific psychologists’ notion of unconscious states 
outright, Bergson seized the notion as a springboard from which to elaborate the multiple 
dimensions of consciousness. This would become a guiding principle of his subsequent 
book, Matière et mémoire, in which Bergson argued that memories, rather than residing 
outside of consciousness in the brain’s neural tissue, inhere in diverse planes of  
 consciousness, some of which are more easily accessible than others.  
Bergson made use of two other manuals in the classroom: Paul Janet’s Traité 
élémentaire de philosophie as well as his L’Histoire de la philosophie, les problèmes et 
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les écoles.99 The former was groundbreaking for having been the first psychology manual 
to include diagrams of the brain, as well as the sensory organs of the ear and eye, the 
nervous system, and spinal cord [see Figures I and II]. Conceding that contemporary 
advances in scientific psychology left the Cousinian heritage outdated, Janet decided to  
open the textbook, 
following a brief 
introduction, with a 
significant 
neurophysiology lesson. 
Grounding his approach in 
the claim that “All 
philosophy must depart 
from what really exists,” 
Janet defended his decision 
to incorporate 
physiological data by 
appealing to the avowed 
spiritualism of the manual: 
“By leaving out a discussion of the body and the role it plays in our life, we leave a 
dangerous weapon in the hands of materialism; for this part of our being, which, set up 
and displayed in its truth, can not at all jeopardize  
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Figure I Diagram of vertical brain section 100 
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what is higher in us.” 101 Janet saw his manual as a strategic line of attack in the face of 
the “philosophical crisis,” which he announced in a book by the same name in 1864.102 
The physiology lesson consisted of a thorough description of the human body, the organs 
and their nutritional functions, and the anatomy and functions of the nervous system,   
including an extensive 
discussion of the reflex arc. The 
subsequent chapters of the 
Traité advanced higher in the 
hierarchy of psychological 
complexity, from affective 
phenomena, sensations, and 
memory, to recent 
psychopathological discoveries 
on sleep, dreams, and madness. 
Janet divided his textbook into 
two classes of psychology, “on 
the one hand those aspects which immediately pertain to the body, and which we share in 
common with animals, and on the other hand those aspects raise us higher and belong 
only to man.”104 It was along these lines that Janet distinguished physiological and 
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Figure II Diagram of lateral brain section 103
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metaphysical methods respectively; and it was central to philosophy’s mission to 
demonstrate that the former, pursued to the limits of brain studies’ explanatory power, 
intractably lead to problems of consciousness, notably the relation between mind and 
body, that only metaphysics can address. This epistemological division of labor ensured 
that the conclusions drawn from brain research would not exceed the science’s reach and 
vitiate the spiritualist notion of freedom, which for Janet inheres in the irreducible act of 
thinking that distinguishes humans from animals. But this division of labor was neither 
evident, nor, in Janet’s eyes, respected by physiological psychologists. Janet deemed it 
essential that the responsibility of instructing lycée students in neurophysiology rest 
squarely in the hands of philosophy instructors. 
Janet’s Traité set the precedent for future philosophy textbooks such as Abel 
Rey’s Leçons élémentaires de psychologie et de philosophie (1903), which included even 
more extensive diagrams of the brain and nervous system [see Figures III and IV]. Rey, a 
philosophy professor and historian of science at the Université de Dijon, launched his 
career by publishing the most advanced psychology textbook following the 1902 reform 
to the programme. Leçons featured diagrams of the sympathetic nervous system and the 
anatomy of nerves in relation to the brain and spinal column. Sensory-motor functions 
were also represented in tables localizing nervous centers in the brain’s grey matter, 
including the centers of linguistic memory (divided into the motor images of writing, 
vocal motor images, vocal auditory images, and visual images of words) as well as the 
centers of sight, taste, and smell. Although hardly a spiritualist partisan, Rey nonetheless 
employed Janet’s epistemological division of labor between physiological and 
metaphysical psychology in order to “avoid distorting the minds of young students, by 
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carefully distinguishing what fits scientific study and what is the simple object of 
philosophical reflection.”105 The division reflected Rey’s commitment to 
psychophysical parallelism, 
the doctrine that nervous 
transmission and conscious 
activity are two aspects of the 
same psychic phenomena. 
But the division equally 
served philosophy’s 
pedagogical mission to 
demonstrate that 
“Metaphysics begins there 
where science and 
experiments can no longer 
say anything.” 107 
Janet’s subsequent 
manual, Éléments de philosophie scientifique et de philosophie morale, pursued this 
method by constructing morality on the basis of psychology.108 The laws of 
consciousness uncovered by experimentation only regulated sensations, Janet argued, 
whereas the laws of society depend on human volition. By explicitly taking account of 
physiological data, Janet enjoined philosophy professors to resist the reductionism into 
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which philosophy risked falling at the hands of experimental psychologists. 
The other manual that Bergson used, L’Histoire de la philosophie, les problèmes 
et les écoles, co-written by Janet and Gabrielle Séailles, was distinct in that it organized 
the history of philosophy according to problems and schools, rather than according to 
individual thinkers. The psychology section was organized into positivism and 
contemporary German and British experimental psychology. Therein, Janet and Séailles 
advanced a vision of spiritualism updated on the basis of the sciences: “Psychology, by 
calling the new sciences to its aid, by renewing and even transforming itself, remains a 
science of interior observation, a creation by means of sympathy.”110 The collaboration 
between Janet, a stalwart of the Cousinian spiritualism, and Séailles, a proponent of 
scientific spiritualism, represented, as one reviewer noted, “the contemporary state of 
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Figure IV Diagram of sensory-motor cerebral localizations 109 
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university philosophy in both its persisting traditions and in the new spirit reinvigorating 
them.”111  
Bergson’s engagement with science in the classroom reflected the organization of 
Paul Janet’s manuals. By setting philosophical concepts in dialogue with problems 
arising from experimental psychology, philosophy ceased to find its foundation in the 
Cousinian march of history, and instead found justification in then-contemporary 
research. “Without teaching philosophy to children, how can we bring them to pose for 
themselves, even in very vague form, some of the problems to which philosophy seeks 
the solution?” Bergson queried while reflecting on his teaching methods. “These 
problems emerge naturally in biology, physics, and even in mathematics.”112 In both his 
thought and his pedagogy, Bergson conceived philosophy as leaping beyond the sciences.    
 
Science and Metaphysics in the Clash of Manuals 
 
The new era of academic freedom opened under the Third Republic galvanized 
the market for publishing manuals by leaving it up to professors to choose which to use in 
their courses.113 Philosophy rode the wave as new publishing houses sprung up in Paris. 
Between 1874 and 1879, there were 20 new philosophy manuals, 9 between 1880 and 
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1884, and 14 more following the 1885 reform.114 Yet with the relative calm following the 
reform of 1902, a mere 6 new philosophy manuals appeared between then and 1907, the 
year concluding this study.115 Most were written by philosophy professors seeking to 
achieve momentary fame by publishing their course notes in lieu of more significant 
scholarship.  
 There were four types of philosophy manuals: pedagogical books, which 
professors used to guide their own teaching; manuals published by and for religious 
schools; dissertation manuals, which instructed students how to write philosophy essays; 
and educational manuals used in the terminal class of the public lycées. I focus on the 
final type.  
 Most philosophy manuals shared a general form. They opened with an 
introduction in which the author clarified recent reforms to the programme that prompted 
a re-edition. When he was honest, the author would also make his philosophical 
commitments explicit. This was a characteristic feature of the manuals used under 
Cousin’s tenure. “The doctrines of the manual are the pure and strict spiritualist 
doctrines,” a typical introduction read, “which the University, under the impulse and 
leadership of an illustrious philosopher, arduously sets about propagating.”116 With their 
increasingly scientific temperament under the Third Republic, fewer manuals conveyed 
such idolatry. A list of the lessons contained in the programme followed the introduction. 
Then the bulk of the manual featured the contents of the lessons, with italicized headings 
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indicating the most important paragraphs. The greatest difference among manuals turned 
on the principles, philosophers, and examples their authors chose to include.  
These choices were especially revelatory of the transition from eclectic to 
scientific spiritualism. The contrast between two paradigmatic manuals, one defending 
the old spiritualism, the other championing the new, scientifically updated spiritualism, 
elucidates just how institutional changes brought about this significant intellectual shift.  
Charles Jourdain’s Notions de philosophie was the longest lasting philosophy 
manual to survive Ferry’s reforms. Originally published in 1847, the manual underwent 
eighteen editions until its last in 1888. Jourdain wrote the first version of his manual on 
the basis of the notes he had prepared while teaching the philosophy course at Collège 
Stanislas and added to them with subsequent editions. Since the collège was private, 
affording him a wider range of curricular choices, Jourdain freely promoted Christian 
spiritualism. His subsequent work for the Ministry of Public Instruction, however, 
provided an official platform from which Jourdain disseminated the manual for public 
schools as well. The first edition was originally published as Questions de philosophie 
with a mere 127 pages.117 During the suppression of philosophy instruction under the 
Second Empire, Jourdain renamed his manual, Notions de logique, which by 1859 
doubled in size. Despite the change in name, Jourdain foregrounded the importance of 
metaphysics and ethics: “On the questions that interest [students’] morality and 
happiness, like free will, duty, and fate, God prepared for them the interior lights that not 
even the laziness of the spirit and misbehavior of the will can successfully extinguish.” 118 
Following the reinstatement of philosophy in 1864, Jourdain changed the title to Notions 
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de philosophie, and championed Cousin again. The lessons were peppered with 
Cousinian thought. For example, Jourdain echoed his master’s disdain for Spinoza by 
characterizing the Ethics as a “gloomy system, which upsets the most elementary notions 
of common sense, and annihilates any ethics and every religion.” 119   
Jourdain saw the 1880 reform as a direct affront to the Cousin’s eclectic 
spiritualism. His manual’s subsequent editions impugned the measures Jules Ferry had 
taken to render philosophy instruction scientific. “We continue to offer to the youth,” 
Jourdain inveighed, “positive affirmations of the soul and God, while casting aside those 
equivocal conclusions that betray the master and implant dangerous uncertainties in the 
student’s thought.” 120 In Jourdain’s eyes, Ferry had inscribed moral relativism into the 
curriculum. It was a criticism Jourdain pursued in an 1880 screed, L’École sans Dieu, 
which lambasted the laicization of education.121 Religious instruction was not only 
necessary to establish the foundations of metaphysics and ethics, Jourdain’s manual 
argued it also elevated philosophy above the natural sciences. In contrast to scientific 
spiritualists, who believed that philosophy ought to address particular problems broached 
by the sciences, Jourdain towed the Cousinian line, arguing that philosophy ought to 
establish the principles on which the sciences depend. Associationist psychologists 
abandoned this task, so the manual claimed in the history of philosophy section. Herbert 
Spencer and his disciples made students “relive this false and pernicious doctrine taught 
today in their work, with a talent worthy of a better cause.” 122 By 1888, the final edition 
of Notions de philosophie continued to promote Cousin’s bygone spiritualism, 
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concluding that “whatever the new evolutions of philosophical systems, a point remains 
constant in our eyes: they will efface from man’s thought neither the certainty of the 
existence of the soul, a soul endowed with the liberty and responsibility for his acts, nor 
the certainty of the existence of God, a personal, creating and rewarding God.” 123 
Jourdain’s long-enduring philosophy manual was a paradigmatic example of the fading 
yet tenacious influence of the old spiritualism over the classroom.  
Georges Fonsegrive’s Eléments de philosophie offers a striking contrast. Written 
following the 1885 reform on the basis of notes composed while a professor at Lycée 
Buffon, Fonsegrive dedicated his manual exclusively to psychology.124 Each lesson 
began with a summary of key concepts and was followed by a résumé. At the conclusion 
of each lesson, Fonsegrive included a list of suggested reading, frequently citing recently 
published literature, and even the experimental research conducted at the École pratique 
des hautes études, opened in 1889.125 The manual was groundbreaking in that it featured 
contemporary psychological research at the same time as it gave significant consideration 
to the history of metaphysics.  
Eléments de philosophie was organized into two sections: affective psychology 
and reflexive psychology. Its organization flouted the programme. Fonsegrive justified 
his approach by appealing to the normative division of labor between philosophical and 
physiological psychology in then-contemporary psychological literature. Affective 
psychology, he claimed, studied unconscious phenomena not attributable to the self 
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[moi]. The section offered an extensive survey of research pertaining to the nervous 
system and perception, as well as to the structure of the brain. Reflexive psychology, 
which Fonsegrive presented as “far more interesting than the former,” pertained to 
conscious phenomena inhering in the self.126 The section featured the conceptual 
problems of consciousness left unresolved by experimentation: for example, the 
composition of images, the structure of conscious activity, attention and its relations to 
muscular states, maladies of memory, and the formation of sensorial atlases. In accord 
with scientific spiritualists shared influence, Fonsegrive cited Maine de Biran, and not 
Cousin, as the motivation for the manual’s organization.127   
Fonsegrive, like Jourdain, was a Catholic indebted to the spiritualist tradition. Yet 
Fonsegrive’s studies at the École normale under Émile Boutroux propelled him to seek a 
rapprochement between religious and scientific thought. In his dissertation, Essai sur le 
libre arbitre (1887), Fonsegrive argued that determinism and free will are compatible. 
The laws of the natural sciences are products of humans’ free will, he claimed, echoing 
Boutroux’s thesis in De la contingence de la nature (1874).128 Fonsegrive’s manual 
conveyed his philosophical commitment to reconciling science and metaphysics: “It does 
not seem impossible to adopt these results, all the while remaining faithful to the 
doctrinal traditions precious to the University.” 129 By placing science in dialogue with 
the history of Western philosophy, Eléments de philosophie, according to one reviewer, 
left “little in the way of bringing together the theories of modern psychology, as they are 
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represented by the authors that everyone knows.”130 After the manual found success, 
Fonsegrive dedicated his career to bringing psychological advancements to bear on his 
Catholic faith.131 
Bridging religious and rational principles was a politically volatile affair. The 
laicizing reform of 1882 sparked a war over the manuals used in primary school. Primary 
school students learned about rational morality directly through civics manuals, which 
Ferry promoted as a pedagogical vehicle of his reforms. The manuals were written by 
philosophy professors and often patterned after the ethics section of the lycée philosophy 
course. The lessons were on practical subjects such as military service, the patrie, taxes, 
justice, the law, government, and the administration of liberty, equality, and fraternity. 
On December 15, 1882, the Papal congregation of the index under Leo XIII condemned 
four of the manuals.132 Paul Bert, who briefly served as Minister of Public Instruction in 
1881, especially drew the ire of the Catholic Church for having concluded his militantly 
Republican manual with the lines, “All cry out: live the Republic!”133  
The blacklisting spurred a confrontation in parliament, with competing 
conceptions of French spiritualism again at stake. On June 1, 1883, Senator Duc de 
Broglie, representing the Right, denounced the manuals before Parliament. Claiming that 
since Ferry had used them to attack Catholics, the manuals violated the Republic’s 
commitment to religious neutrality. Interestingly, de Broglie inveighed against manuals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Bernard Perez, “Eléments de philosophie, 1, Psychologie par G.-L Fonsegrive,” Revue philosophique T. 
33 (1892): 83. 
131 See Georges L-Fonsegrive, L’Attitude du catholique devant la science, 2nd ed. (Paris: Librairie Bloud et 
Barral, 1900); Le Catholicisme et la vie de l’esprit (Paris: Victor Lecoffre, 1899).  
132 The blacklisted manuals were, Paul Bert, L’instruction civique à l’école (Paris: Picard-Bernheim, 1882); 
Gabriel Compayré, Éléments d’éducation morale et civique (Paris: P. Garcet, 1880); Jules Steeg, 
Instruction morale et civique: l’homme et le citoyen (Paris: N. Fauvé et F. Nathan, 1882); Mme. Henry 
Gréville, L’instruction morale et civique des jeunes filles (Paris: Paris: E. Weill and G. Maurice, 1882). 
133 Paul Bert, L’instruction civique à l’école (Paris : Picard-Bernheim, 1882), 162.  
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written by spiritualists who invoked an abstract concept of God: “The place made in the 
programme for duty to the divine was made by convenience rather than by true 
conviction… God is there, it seems, as a provisional title.” 134 Ferry defended the manuals 
by returning to a basic distinction of Republican laïcité: “We have promised religious 
neutrality; but we have not promised philosophical neutrality any more than political 
neutrality.”135 A laic curriculum, in other words, did not preclude the state from 
promoting a positive moral program. In the debate, Ferry again turned to spiritualists’ 
manuals in order to cultivate secular students. Of the some forty civics manuals used 
among primary schools, Ferry declaimed, “All are founded on pure morals, on Platonic 
morals, on the morals that were the object of research by all the great philosophical 
schools since antiquity, on the morals that are called spiritualist or deist, which we call, 
ourselves, simply the morals of duty and sacrifice.”136 Émile Boutroux, committed to 
Catholicism as much as science, saw no anti-religious animus in the civics and morals 
manuals. In fact, he suggested, “Without a doubt, today the great majority of France is 
deist in a conscious or unconscious manner.”137 While some of the manuals promoted 
Catholic doctrine, and others abstained, the majority drew on the history of spiritualism, 
Boutroux claimed, to instill an upright conscience in students.  
The clash of manuals culminated in the letter that Ferry sent to instructors 
November 17, 1883. Seeking to dampen the flames between Catholics and Republicans, 
the letter clarified the distinction between families’ and churches’ responsibility over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 “Séance de 1er Juin, 1883,” Journal officiel de la république française, Débats parlementaires, Sénat 
(Paris: Bibliothèque de Sénat, 1880-1940): 596.  
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religious instruction, and the state’s responsibility over moral instruction. Official 
morality, according to Ferry, consisted in “this good and ancient morality that we have 
received from our from our fathers and which we are all honored to follow in its relations 
to life, without troubling us to discuss its philosophical bases.”138 While Ferry identified 
antiquity as the source of the principles of primary school philosophy manuals, those 
used in the terminal course were unequivocally modern.  
 
Critique and Instruction in Philosophy Education 
 
 In the face of educational upheavals between 1874 and 1907 under the Third 
Republic, philosophers were unified in their collective anxiety over the declining status 
of their discipline. Yet, as the terminal philosophy course lost ground with respect to the 
ascending emphasis on scientific instruction, a scientifically revamped philosophy 
curriculum laid the conditions for a pedagogical rapprochement between philosophical 
and scientific instruction. Far from reducing the study of consciousness to physiological 
methods, the close proximity between metaphysical and biological concepts in the 
programme occasioned a thoroughgoing critique of reductionism by thinkers committed 
to updating French spiritualism on the basis of science.   
 Alfred Fouillée forcefully gave voice to this critical stance in several writings on 
secondary education. On the one hand, the fragmentation of the philosophy curriculum 
and its widening distance from science courses threatened to lead students into uncritical, 
reductive thinking. “If you eliminate all of these [philosophical] questions, you commit 
the future men of science and the future doctors to a nearly certain materialism or to a 
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blind religiosity… Habituated to affirming the facts of positive knowledge, they will 
become negative toward all that does not admit of mathematical or physical certitude.”139  
On the other hand, Fouillée found an antidote in philosophy’s purchase over scientific 
psychology in the official curriculum. Echoing the strategy of Janet’s psychology 
manual, which incorporated physiological data to critique physiological methods, 
Fouillée affirmed that it was in the classroom where philosophy professors could resist 
biological reductionism head on. Fouillée posited the task as part of a broader project of 
national regeneration aimed at overcoming the instrumentalization of knowledge in the 
hands of  “practitioners without ideas, specialists without general views,”140 on the basis 
of three philosophical principles that he deemed critical to education: “The general 
critique of science and its conditions, the particular critique of materialism, and finally 
the possibility of a legitimacy of an idealism compatible with our knowledge of 
nature.”141  
 In critically engaging scientific research, philosophy professors simultaneously 
saw themselves as carrying out the Republican project of cultivating active and rational 
citizens. As Jean-Marie Guyau, Fouillée’s adopted son, argued in Éducation et hérédité 
(1889), scientific instruction risked lulling students into passivity without the corrective 
of philosophy instruction to galvanize their minds. Guyau contended that research on the 
nervous system showed that education could be mobilized to develop new habits to raise 
the human species above its heredity. “The best education,” according to Guyau, “is that 
which is not simply instructive, but suggestive and consequently directive, that which 
introduces in the brain, not only knowledge susceptible to “double usage” as Socrates 
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said, but social feelings and habits of action allied to the habits of elevated thought.”142 
Guyau therefore posited a homology between philosophical inquiry and philosophical 
instruction: both took scientific facts as a point of departure, beyond which scientific 
methods give way to philosophical speculation.  
 Guyau, Fouillée, and a host of thinkers committed to renewing spiritualism from 
within experimental psychology found in the educational reforms of the Third Republic a 
pedagogical platform for their ideas. Although philosophy ceased to enjoy its exalted 
status under Cousin’s regime, these thinkers steered the intellectual and cultural 
resonance of psychological research to defend the autonomy of consciousness and renew 
the pertinence of metaphysics. Bergson’s meteoric rise to the Collège de France, and the 
singular intellectual fame he achieved, was due in large part to his tireless engagement 
with the new psychology in the classroom. His Essai and Matière et mémoire were 
elevated above the work of his spiritualist peers because Bergson took advantage of the 
transformations in the official philosophy curriculum and in the role of lycée professors 
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Chapter 6: Édouard Le Roy, Maurice Blondel,  




 The pragmatist moment in scientific spiritualism came to fruition amidst the 
cultural and intellectual upheavals in the Catholic Church at turn to the twentieth century. 
The Church, whose foothold in France diminished with the laic reforms of the Third 
Republic, could not remain impermeable to advancements in experimental psychology 
and evolutionary biology. These nascent sciences not only threatened the ethical basis of 
Catholic teachings, but also challenged the Church’s role in public life, precipitating the 
modernist crisis within Catholicism. Catholic Modernism was a variegated and multi-
national movement that erupted in the late nineteenth century as theologians sought to 
reconcile their faith with the demands of experimental science and a biological 
framework that exploded the Christian vision of time.1 The Vatican, which censured the 
works of alleged modernists, officially condemned the movement in 1907 and sought to 
expel its proponents from the clergy. Although Catholic Modernism spread throughout 
Europe, scientific spiritualists in France – in particular, the philosophers Maurice Blondel 
and Édouard Le Roy – led the vanguard. Blondel and Le Roy revolutionized the Church’s 
teachings by conceptualizing Catholic faith anew as a repertoire of practices, as opposed 
to an ensemble of theoretical beliefs. Although Blondel and Le Roy did not see eye to 
eye, the debate they opened within Catholicism, and in scriptural interpretation 
specifically, hinged on the philosophies of action they both formulated. Thus in 
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challenging Catholic orthodoxy, Blondel and LeRoy simultaneously brought the 
pragmatist moment in scientific spiritualism to its apex.  
 This chapter analyzes scientific spiritualists’ engagement with religion through 
the prism of Blondel’s and Le Roy’s interventions in Catholic Modernism. My argument 
is that the modernist controversy set the stage for Blondel and Le Roy to formulate a 
pragmatist account of conscious activity, and further, that the wide-ranging debates in 
theological and philosophical circles over the implications of science for Catholic 
doctrine lent significance to this pragmatist moment in scientific spiritualism. At stake in 
these debates was the role of history in Catholicism. Is the Church a human institution 
that has transformed with the vicissitudes of history? And if so, is Catholic dogma subject 
to change, its meaning dependent on the exigencies of different epochs? Through their 
interventions in the debate over historicism, which tore at the roots of France’s Catholic 
heritage and called the revealed truths of scripture into question, Blondel and Le Roy 
radicalized their respective philosophical engagements with experimental psychology and 
evolutionary biology. Historicism, understood as both an institutional and an interpretive 
principle, offered a conceptual framework, I am suggesting, for Blondel and Le Roy to 
demonstrate not only that conscious activity is practical activity, but moreover, that 
practical activity takes place in a shared social context, and not only, as it were, between 
the ears. Blondel and Le Roy thus brought about a new moment in scientific spiritualism 
by having transformed the psychological account of conscious activity, explored in the 
Parts I and II, into an inter-subjective account. 
 The modernist controversy occasioned as well as concealed the pragmatist 
moment. In their efforts to reconcile faith and modern science, Blondel and Le Roy 
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reconceptualized the practical orientation of both in a manner that drew the ire of the 
Vatican.  Blondel first used the term “pragmatism” to characterize his philosophy of 
action: “I had proposed the name pragmatisme in 1888,” he reflected, “and I was aware 
of clearly devising it before I had ever encountered the word, which has since been 
employed in England, America, Germany and Belgium.”2 Yet Blondel soon retracted the 
label to avoid the same fate of Le Roy,3 who provocatively avowed the pragmatist banner 
in the face of the Vatican’s condemnation of the movement’s alleged agnosticism.4 By 
1907, Le Roy’s works were on the Vatican’s Index of banned books; while Blondel 
withdrew the re-editing of his own.5  
 The pragmatist moment in scientific spiritualism illuminates the inception of the 
notion well before William James declared it “A New Name for Some Old Ways of 
Thinking” in 1907.6 Bergson’s close relation to James, as well as the co-emergence of 
pragmatism in France and America, has been well documented.7 But the distinctly 
religious context of French pragmatism casts its difference from the Anglo-American 
variant into stark relief. Although James cited Blondel and Le Roy as influences,8 
pragmatisme, for these two thinkers, had both a distinct meaning and intellectual 
heritage. Blondel and Le Roy construed knowledge as springboard for intervening in the 
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world; and their account of pragmatism was part and parcel of their critique of 
intellectualism, the Kantian view that knowledge is a matter of judging our 
representations of the world – what John Dewey called the spectator theory of 
knowledge. But neither Blondel nor Le Roy posited utility as the sole criterion of truth; 
these thinkers instead sought to open a metaphysical – and even theological – dimension 
beyond the reach of scientific methods. Their appropriation of experimental psychology 
and evolutionary theory allied Blondel and Le Roy to scientific spiritualism; and their 
philosophy of action, moreover, set the principles of motility and contingency, both 
endemic to nineteenth-century French spiritualism, in a social and historical context.  
Blondel and Le Roy equally brought the latent Catholicism of French spiritualism 
to the fore. Maine de Biran had dedicated his late writings to the supernatural;9 Félix 
Ravaisson drew on a Christian archive to articulate the “law of grace” central to De 
l’habitude; and Victor Cousin promoted a distinctly Catholic morality in the ethics 
section of the lycée philosophy programme.10 But Blondel and Le Roy went beyond these 
thinkers by conceptualizing the very possibility of Catholicism from within the natural 
and human sciences. Neither thinker, to be sure, argued that religion is tantamount to 
science. These thinkers, as one critic wrote in 1903, reunited the realms of science and 
faith torn apart by Kant’s critical philosophy: “[S]ince Kant, the critique has taken a half-
turn. Kant assured the objectivity of science by renouncing knowledge of absolute reality. 
The New Critique sacrifices the objectivity of science to authorize metaphysics access to 
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the noumenon.”11 While the author criticized the “New Critique” for having originated in 
the religious convictions of French spiritualism, it was in fact spiritualists’ appropriation 
of the sciences, Le Roy insisted, that offered them a point d’appui to bring theology into 
the orbit of philosophy and science.12 Yet in so doing, Le Roy as well as Blondel opened 
scientific spiritualism to reproach by secular critics intent on purifying scientific inquiry 
of religious residue, as well as by Catholic critics committed to maintaining their faith’s 
independence from the natural order.  
Blondel and Le Roy belonged to a new generation of scientific spiritualists 
determined to delve into the tumultuous debate over religion – a debate from which an 
older generation demurred. Blondel was a student of Émile Boutroux, himself a 
committed though circumspect Catholic. Boutroux’s faith did leave a legible mark on his 
critique of mechanistic science in De la contingence des lois de la nature, intent as he 
was to ground the possibility of miracles in a natural world imbued with contingency.13 
Despite his unwillingness to make Catholicism an explicit theme of his philosophical 
writing amidst the anti-clerical politics of the Third Republic, Boutroux counseled the 
young Blondel, while he was preparing to sit the agrégation as a student at the École 
normale supérieure: “I still believe that to please jury, you needn’t sacrifice any of your 
convictions; you can and should remain yourself.”14 Blondel was also a student of Léon 
Ollé-Laprune, the Catholic philosopher at the École normale whose De la certitude 
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morale (1880) defended the central role of the will in matters of faith. Yet, it was in large 
part thanks to their student’s explicit treatment of religion as a philosophical problem, 
that later in life, Boutroux and Ollé-Laprune, would more confidently throw their 
Catholicism into the limelight.15 Under their tutelage, Blondel wrote his groundbreaking 
thesis, L’Action (1893), which rejuvenated the philosophy of action, long disregarded in 
favor of psychology and metaphysics, and boldly resuscitated religion as a problem 
central to French spiritualism.      
Le Roy was a student of Bergson and an outspoken exponent of his thought in 
works such as Une philosophie nouvelle: Henri Bergson (1913). Le Roy saw himself as 
advancing the scientific underpinnings of Bergsonisme, especially for the sake of the 
Catholic community. He was originally trained as a mathematician under Henri Poincaré, 
whose conventionalism furnished Le Roy with the intellectual stimulus for his 
pragmatism. Poincaré argued that scientific propositions do not apply to natural 
phenomena absolutely, but instead constitute conventions facilitating experimentation.16 
According to conventionalism, the test of scientific propositions’ validity turns on their 
value for describing and manipulating facts in respect to competing propositions. Le Roy 
synthesized Poincare’s conventionalism with Bergson’s account of consciousness in a 
series of essays, “Science et philosophie.” (1899). The essays launched Le Roy’s career, 
beginning with the post at the Collège de France that he took over from Bergson as an 
assistant instructor from 1913 to 1920, before assuming the chair of modern philosophy 
from 1921 to 1941.  
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 In what follows, I trace the development of Blondel’s and Le Roy’s thought from 
their early philosophical works, L’Action and “Science et philosophie” respectively, to 
their interventions in the modernist controversy. Their debate over the relevance of 
science to pragmatism, and in turn, the salience of pragmatism for Catholicism, shines a 
light on both the cultural resonance of the emergent natural and human sciences across 
Catholicism and the intellectual development of pragmatism as a coherent commitment 
of scientific spiritualism at the turn of the twentieth century.  
 
 




Resistance to Church orthodoxy had been brewing in the late nineteenth century. 
At the First Vatican Council of 1869 to 1870, Pope Pius IX tackled the rising tide of what 
he labeled rationalism and liberalism. In the face of the Church’s diminishing authority, 
precipitated by the democratic upheaval of the Third Republic and the unification of 
Germany, Pius IX reasserted the Vatican’s role in Europe at the close of the council with 
the doctrinal constitution, Pastor Aeternus, which enshrined Papal infallibility. Pope Leo 
XIII, who claimed the pontificate in 1878, subsequently sewed the seeds of the modernist 
turn, as Alec Vidler suggests: “His whole policy, specially after the extravagant 
conservatism of Pius IX, was calculated to create a psychological atmosphere which 
conveyed the impression that after all Catholicism was capable of fresh orientation, of 
coming to terms with political democracy and with modern knowledge.”17 Leo XIII was a 
firm promoter of education; he opened the Vatican archives to church laity and 
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protestants alike. Yet he also brought attention to the menace of modernism in his 
encycical of November 18, 1893, Providentissimus Deus [“On the Study of Holy 
Scripture”]. Therein Leo XIII cast suspicion over the theory of evolution and criticized 
modernists’ efforts to integrate evolution into biblical hermeneutics. What followed was 
the creation of the Pontfical Biblical Commission in 1902, a body of three Cardinals and 
twelve Consultors who advised the Pope on matters of scriptural interpretation. In the 
subsequent years, the commission sent a mushrooming number of works penned by 
alleged modernists to the Vatican’s index of banned books.  
 The height of the modernist controversy lasted from 1902 to 1907. Alfred Loisy 
ignited the spark with the publication of his L'Évangile et l'Église (1902). The ordained 
pastor argued that the Catholic Church had developed since the time of Jesus within and 
alongside human history. Loisy wrote the book in response to Aldolf von Harnack’s Das 
Wesen des Christentums (1900), which argued that the essence of the gospels consist of 
faith in God the Father. Harnack proposed an analytic method to distill the superfluous 
elements of Jesus’ ministry and arrive at its core. “This method of dismembering a 
subject,” Loisy argued, “does not belong to history, which is a science of observation of 
the living, not of dissection of the dead.”18 Loisy’s historical method, by contrast, did not 
construe the gospels as Christ’s immediate revelation, but as documents written during 
the Church’s early development. Biblical criticism, Loisy held, ought to grasp the vital 
principle motivating Christian history, which was not exhausted at its origin. “The 
gospel,” he claimed, is “a living faith, concrete and complex, whose evolution proceeds 
without doubt from the internal force which has made it enduring, but none the less has 
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been, in everything and from the beginning, influenced by the surroundings wherein the 
faith was born and has since developed.”19 The claim entailed Loisy’s further belief that 
the historical Jesus was distinct from the stories of Christ, and that Jesus’ teachings only 
found meaning after his time on earth. The explanatory purchase of Loisy’s method was 
to reconcile contradictory elements of scripture, particularly chronological 
inconsistencies found, for example, in the gospel of John, which recounts Jesus 
performing miracles in Jerusalem during different Passovers.20 Loisy argued that 
historical distance was required to interpret Jesus’ teaching properly: “The glory of the 
risen Lord threw new light on the memories of His earthly career.”21 The significance of 
the gospels, moreover, depended on their adaptation to the exigencies that the Church 
faced in different historical periods. The very lifeblood of the Church was therefore 
subject to mutation. Following the Church’s initial condemnation of Loisy’s historicist 
approach in 1902, he further defended his “little book” the next year in Autour d’un petit 
livre.  
 Loisy was not the first to separate the historical Jesus from Christ. Ernest Renan 
advanced the blasphemous claim in his Vie de Jésus (1863). Renan argued that Jesus, 
born a Jew, cleansed himself of Judaic traces in becoming Christian. And the Irish Jesuit 
George Tyrrell also dedicated his corpus to exploring the historical transformations of 
Christianity. But Loisy ignited a storm in Catholic France not only because of the force of 
his arguments, but also because of the prominent positions from which he leveled them. 
Loisy began his scholarly career at the newly opened Institut Catholique de Paris, before 
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being dismissed in 1893 after teaching seminars on the historical lives of Saints.22 Loisy 
took a subsequent position at the École des hautes études where he synthesized his 
historical method, and garnered the Vatican’s disdain for having catalyzed Catholic 
Modernism.  
 The modernist crisis in the Catholic Church reached an apex in 1907 when the 
Vatican condemned the movement in a series of formal statements. On April 17, Pope 
Pius X released an allocution vilifying modernism. Soon after, on July 3, he signed off on 
the Holy Office’s encyclical, Lamentabili Sane Exitu ["With Truly Lamentable Results"]. 
Lamentabili featured a list of sixty-five heresies of modernism. Loisy was the clear 
though unacknowledged target. Instead of reading the Bible as a series of factual 
propositions, modernists, according to Lamentabili, treated the Bible as an archive of 
human authors’ beliefs formulated at the time of its writing. The Vatican targeted the 
claims that “the exegete must first put aside all preconceived opinions about the 
supernatural origin of Sacred Scripture and interpret the [the Bible] in the same way as an 
other merely human document;”23 and that “Like human society, Christian society is 
subject to a perpetual evolution.”24 In addition to having illuminated modernists’ biblical 
hermeneutics, the Vatican also shone a light on the modernists’ embrace of scientific 
developments. Pius X condemned the belief that “Since the deposit of Faith contains only 
revealed truths, the Church has no right to pass judgment on the human sciences.”25 
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 The Vatican’s condemnation of Catholic Modernism came amidst the Church’s 
waning authority. In 1905, French parliament passed the law separating church and state, 
which the Vatican received as the final blow of the Third Republic’s anti-clericalism. The 
government’s decision not to support religious cults, whether economically or socially, 
stoked the flames of the controversy. On September 8, 1907, Pius X brought the full 
weight of the Vatican’s authority down upon “these very Modernists who pose as 
Doctors of the Church, who puff out their cheeks when they speak of modern 
philosophy,”26 in the encyclical, Pascendi Dominici Gregis [“Feeding the Lord’s Flock”]. 
The modernists’ central commitment, Pascendi stipulated, was to the doctrine of 
evolution, or what Pius X characterized as the principle of “vital immanence”: “that 
religious formulas, to be really religious and not merely theological speculations, ought to 
be living and to live the life of the religious sentiment.”27 The history of the Church, 
according to the doctrine, is divided between real history, organized according to the 
chronological sequence of human actions, and internal history, which exists in the pious 
meditations of believers. Whereas the former follows a linear sequence, the latter inheres 
in an trans-historical impulse adapted to the socio-cultural demands of particular eras. 
The division between two strata of history paralleled Le Roy’s and Blondel’s division 
between two dimensions of consciousness: intelligence and experience (or what Loisy 
called “sentiment”). Religious beliefs, according to their division, exceed the believers’ 
intellectual knowledge of church doctrine, and overflows in the practical experience 
animating devotional practices. The Vatican responded in the name of scholasticism by 
denouncing the critique of intellectualism. “[W]hat does this experience add to 
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sentiment?” Pius X rebuked, “Absolutely nothing beyond a certain intensity and a 
proportionate deepening of the conviction of the reality of the object. But these two will 
never make sentiment into anything but sentiment, nor deprive it of its characteristic 
which is to cause deception when the intelligence is not there to guide it; on the contrary, 
they but confirm and aggravate this characteristic, for the more intense sentiment is the 
more it is sentimental.”28 Pascendi concluded with a series of concrete initiatives 
designed to weed out modernist influences within the Church, including expelling 
modernists from seminaries and universities, none more notable than Loisy, who was 
excommunicated March 7, 1908. “In the excommunication which thus set me free,” 
Loisy wrote in his autobiography, “I found but a single defect; it arrived twenty years too 
late!”29 Loisy, however, was not alone. The Vatican censored troves of modernists. Pius 
X buttressed his encyclical three years later with the anti-modernist oath. From its debut 
September 1, 1910, the oath enjoined all clergy to submit to the condemnations contained 
in Lamentabili and Pascendi, which lasted until Pope Paul VI rescinded the oath in 1967 
following the Second Vatican Council. 
 The Vatican’s official statements of 1907 both condemned and constituted 
Catholic Modernism. Until Lamentabili and Pascendi, the movement hardly existed. It 
consisted of dispersed claims made by radical theologians whose commitments had yet to 
be consolidated. By composing a syllabus of modernists’ sixty-five tenets and by 
criticizing their claims head-on, the Vatican lent an identity to the movement that it had 
previously lacked. Yet it was an identity that proved to be self-contradictory. “The 
consequences of Pascendi were devastating,” Roger D. Haight affirms, “at once there 
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were no single “Modernists” who recognized their positions integrally represented in that 
document, and yet the “Modernists” were everywhere.”30 “Modernism” was thus a 
negative identity, a pejorative the Church ascribed to certain thinkers, rather than a 
theological commitment embraced by its advocates. Nonetheless, Catholic Modernism 
continues to signify the crisis breached within the history of Roman Catholicism at the 
debut of the twentieth century.  
 
 




Blondel was born in Dijon on November 2, 1861 into a bourgeois Catholic 
family. He initially entered the Université de Dijon in 1878 to complete a degree in 
science and law, but, driven by his true passion, he transferred to the École normale 
supérieure at the age of twenty to study philosophy. Blondel entered in 1881, just missing 
Bergson, who departed the previous year.31 Like Bergson, Blondel was thrown into an 
academic milieu where the sciences garnered mounting prestige. But as a devout 
Catholic, Blondel found the École normale stifling. Catholicism, although a private 
conviction among many students and faculty alike, was seen as an opprobrious 
philosophical position to take in the classroom. As a result, Blondel committed his early 
scholarship to exclusively scientific problems. He published his first article in the Revue 
philosophique, a study of the problems attending the perception of stars viewed on the 
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horizon.32 Blondel observed that stars appear larger on the horizon than they do when 
seen directly above in the night sky. He leaned on Boutroux’s account of contingency to 
argue that astronomy is inflected by the errors of human observation as well as by the 
instability of celestial illumination. Blondel’s argument was prescient for having 
articulated, in an inchoate manner, the relativity of light and gravitation that Albert 
Einstein later theorized. In fact, a British astronomical expedition to Africa in 1919 
verified Blondel’s claim.33 Photographs of a solar eclipse showed that light is affected by 
the earth’s gravitational pull and thus acts like any other mass. “I find your work very 
interesting and ingenious,” Boutroux wrote, “and I’ll send it to Mr. Ribot, asking him – 
which I’m sure is unnecessary – to welcome it for his journal.”34 But Blondel sought to 
go beyond his scientific spiritualist peers. The experimental sciences provided conceptual 
fodder for not only philosophical problems, Blondel believed, but religious problems as 
well. “‘Christian philosophy’ does not exist any more than Christian physics,” Blondel 
went on to argue in his thesis, “philosophy, that is to say, is applicable to Christianity in 
so far as Christianity exercises, in the last analysis, control and judgment even over men 
who are ignorant of it or reject it.”35  
 Blondel’s primary aim in L’Action was to demonstrate that scientific knowledge 
in its broadest sense, from the sciences durs to the sciences humaines, depends upon a 
theological foundation. What made the thesis groundbreaking in 1893 was that Blondel’s 
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demonstration was philosophical, not theological, and proceeded by deriving the 
theological ground of scientific inquiry from within the sciences themselves. In 
opposition to Christian thinkers who preserved the theological outside the scientific by 
cordoning off the explanatory limits of each domain, Blondel argued that scientific 
inquiry engenders conceptual problems that demand a theological resolution. But 
theology, Blondel believed, was not limited to the otherworldly; it suffuses conscious 
activity, the very activity that makes scientific knowledge possible.  
 Blondel’s secondary aim was to expand what counts as conscious activity beyond 
the narrow confines of human psychology. The subtitle of the thesis, Essai d'une critique 
de la vie et d'une science de la pratique [Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of 
Practice], indicates that Blondel conceived action as the totality of life, including 
consciousness; hence the problem he broached on the first page, “Yes or no, does human 
life make sense and does man have a destiny?”36 The problem set in motion a dialectic 
between the requirements of knowledge and the impulsion of the will. At first, action 
exceeds my thought. I find it impossible to explain the necessity of acting. “If I try to 
evade decisive initiatives, I am enslaved for not having acted. If I go ahead, I am 
subjugated to what I have done.” But the impasse broached in thought dissolves before 
the will. “In practice, no one eludes the problem of practice; and not only does each one 
raise it, but each, in his own way, inevitably resolves it.”37 I go on acting despite my 
initial inability to answer the problem, why must I act? This problem traverses the 
entirety of L’Action. And by the end of his thesis, Blondel demonstrated that the two 
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horns of the problem, thinking and willing, find their seamless harmony in the 
theological.  
 The guiding problem of L’Action may have foreshadowed French existentialism, 
but Blondel drew its stakes from scientific spiritualists’ critique of the reductionism of 
the emergent natural and human sciences.38 While scientific spiritualists carved out a 
domain of freedom both in excess of the mechanistic worldview and beyond the 
intellectual dimension of consciousness, Blondel justified the necessity of action, that is, 
the determination of human creatures to be free, from within the sciences. “For to show 
that what is transcendent and strange to…the positive sciences is the very thing that 
makes them possible and applicable will be to bring to light what, in science itself, 
requires that science be surpassed.”39 Blondel proceeded, first, by demonstrating the 
theoretical discontinuities of the sciences, which scientific methodologies alone are 
unable to suture, and second, by revealing the resolution of these discontinuities in action. 
He therefore showed, “The positive sciences are not sufficient for us, because they are 
not self-sufficient,” in order to elevate a philosophical science of action alongside the 
positive sciences of nature.40 
 The first discontinuity that Blondel diagnosed holds between what he called the 
qualitative and representative dimensions of sensory experience. The qualitative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 My argument that Blondel’s thought, especially in L’Action, developed as part of scientific spiritualism is 
contested in the literature. Michael Conway affirms, “Blondel drew fundamentally on principles developed 
and expounded by the spiritual positivists in their able criticism of both mechanistic materialism and an 
evolutionary idealism that was emerging from across the Rhine.” “Maurice Blondel on the Structures of 
Science within a Positive Phenomenology,” Irish Theological Quarterly 69 (2004): 380. Jean Leclercq, to 
the contrary, argues, “One cannot truly affirm that he claims an affiliation with this “wave,” even if 
spiritualism affirms that man is capable, by his intelligence and by his will, of freeing himself from natural 
necessity, thanks to a progressive conquest over himself.” “La Logique de la vie. Lectures du 
“jeune” Maurice Blondel (1881-1893),” Vol. 2 (PhD diss., Université Catholique de Louvain, 2002), 23. 
39 Maurice Blondel, Action, 65.  
40 Ibid. 
282 
dimension belongs to scientific researchers’ personal and singular interactions with 
phenomena – that is, the distinct experience one has in the laboratory. The representative 
dimension belongs to the properly scientific character of phenomena as they are 
communicated among researchers in the form of symbols. The two dimensions, Blondel 
insisted, cannot be isolated and separated from each other. They are fundamentally 
intertwined as two aspects of the same scientific labor. As Michael Conway argues, 
Blondel drew a phenomenological, rather than ontological, division between the 
qualitative and representative dimensions, which meant that they amount to composite 
aspects of scientific methodology.41 Blondel’s phenomenological method, which he 
pursued throughout L’Action, disentangled the overlapping tendencies otherwise taken 
for granted as unitary in the sciences.  
The second and principal discontinuity that Blondel diagnosed holds between the 
mathematical (or exact) sciences and the experimental sciences. The mathematical 
sciences, inaugurated in the geometry of antiquity, depend on the mind’s autonomous 
constructions, and thus belong to an ideal realm independent of the natural world. The 
experimental sciences, developed in the Enlightenment following Descartes’ and 
Newton’s laws of motion, depend on the observation of nature. Blondel cut the 
methodological distinction between the two along the lines of analysis and synthesis. 
Whereas the mathematical sciences analyze a whole in terms of its quantitative parts, the 
experimental sciences synthesize wholes by selecting among their elements. Herein lies 
the difference, for example, between drawing three angles subtending a circle to deduce 
the interior degrees of a triangle, and, on the other hand, identifying chemical substances 
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by means of analogy and verisimilitude. Boutroux immediately recognized the 
importance of the distinction: “These analyses are incredibly thorough and very 
penetrating,” he wrote in a review of Blondel’s manuscript, “certain questions, such as 
those addressing the relations between the mathematical and experimental sciences, are 
dealt with in a truly new and instructive fashion.”42 Blondel demonstrated that the 
mathematical and experimental sciences correspond to two distinct orders of scientific 
methodology, which, despite their independence, mutually borrow from each other in 
scientific practice. The demonstration showed that their connection is an aporia, 
irresolvable in exclusively scientific terms.  
The mathematical sciences borrow from experimental methods, most legibly in 
physics, which uses quantifiable models to explain concrete movements, such as the 
oscillation of a pendulum or the rebound of a ball. “[I]n spite of their ideal and detached 
character, the exact sciences have no reason for being and no possibility of existence 
unless, from the beginning, they implicitly tend to become what they are more and more, 
a substitute for experimental knowledge and an auxiliary of practical activity.”43 Indeed, 
the mathematical sciences, which develop their models in abstraction from concrete 
movement, cannot in turn account for their attachment to reality.  
The experimental sciences reciprocally borrow from mathematical methods. 
Chemistry, for example, borrows analytic procedures to arrange the numerical relations 
of molecules, as well as the laws of proportion. At the time, Dimitri Mendeleev’s 
standardization of the periodic table in 1869 was the most significant adaptation of 
mathematic precision to the study of natural entities. Yet, Blondel argued that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Émile Boutroux, “Rapport au Doyen de la Faculté des Lettres de Paris” (July 27, 1892), in Maurice 
Blondel, Lettres philosophiques (Paris: Aubier, 1961), 21. 
43 Maurice Blondel, Action, 66.   
284 
experimental sciences depend on mathematic methods in an even more profound way. 
Instead of taking their starting point from the concrete given, the experimental sciences 
necessarily abstract from the singularities of nature. The chemist must establish his or her 
distance in order to identify a molecule as a unity. Abstraction, which at first blush seems 
peculiar to the mathematical sciences, turns out to be the condition on which the 
experimental sciences impart coherence to natural phenomena. “Water is water and 
nothing else, it is not oxygen or hydrogen.”44 Blondel’s point was not that chemical 
symbols are false, but rather, that the unities determined by the experimental sciences are 
not absolutely true. What matters is that scientific symbols sufficiently isolate natural 
phenomena in order to submit them to mathematical measurement.  
 Evolutionary biology, by far the most advanced of the experimental sciences of 
the late nineteenth century, evinces the most pronounced integration of mathematical 
principles. Blondel argued that the evolutionary biologist makes use of analogies in order 
to establish continuity between an existing species and the anterior species from which it 
had diverged. Yet the evolutionary biologist, who Blondel likened to an alchemist, 
depends on an artifice to render the continuity between divergent species coherent. Just as 
the alchemist strives to transform ordinary materials into a greater composite, the 
evolutionary biologist assumes that life moves by a succinct progression toward a higher 
goal. Blondel, however, argued that the biologist has no right to do so on the basis of 
experimental methods alone, since the transition between species is never observed. In 
place of observation, the biologist borrows a model of continuity drawn from 
mathematical symbols, namely that of a mechanistic continuum, along which species 
divergences are arranged in linear fashion, progressing by creative leaps from the past to 
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the present. Blondel’s critique of evolutionism targeted not simply the latent teleology of 
the science, but more incisively, the mathematical basis of its epistemological 
underpinnings.  
 The discontinuities between the mathematical and experimental sciences, Blondel 
argued, emerge from within the intellect – that is, at the level of methodology – yet they 
cannot be mended by the intellect. “Our power always goes further than our science, 
because our science, risen from our power, needs that power still to find in its support and 
its end.”45 It is the will, and not the intellect, which settles these contradictions. The 
philosophical consequence Blondel drew is that scientific laws amount to conventions. 
As Adam C. English argues, Blondel supported a narrative basis of sciences. “His appeal 
to "the science of action" was not to establish a new foundationalism but to undercut late 
nineteenth-century scientific foundationalism by acknowledging that all sciences 
presuppose certain fictions.”46 Scientific knowledge is therefore secondary to scientific 
practice, since it is the will that creates scientific conventions, and the intellect that in 
turn poses theoretical problems. As Blondel claimed, “The positive sciences are only the 
partial and subalternate expression of an activity that envelops, sustains, and overflows 
them.”47 But far from condemning the sciences for being mere constructions, Blondel 
sought to afford the sciences a pragmatic imperative, and thus liberate them from the 
intellectual imperative to faithfully represent reality: 
Thus are removed the shackles that once subjected the sciences to the 
fictitious necessity of faithfully representing and entirely constructing an 
objective world, a world they were able to present to minds charmed by 
the certitude and the precision of their results as if it were reality itself, a 
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world of prestigious mechanisms where one could not tell whether it was 
the work of the senses or of reason.48  
 
The third discontinuity that Blondel diagnosed is that between the method and 
object of experimental psychology. The psychologist’s method of observing subjects 
from the outside, as it were, fails to adequately capture the nature of action – what 
Blondel held to be the true object of psychology – because “in the very use of his 
“subjective method” [the psychologist] considers the subjective as fact and not as act; he 
disfigures it under pretext of studying it.”49 To overcome the discontinuity, Blondel 
argued that psychology must adopt “not the static viewpoint of the understanding, but the 
dynamic viewpoint of the will.”50 Its task, commensurable with Blondel’s own 
phenomenological method, would be to explain the activity of consciousness from the 
inside: “A science of the subjective will inevitably be a mental dynamics.”51 The upshot 
was that Blondel promulgated scientific spiritualism to the level of a science of conscious 
activity rigorous enough both to rival and complement experimental psychology.  
Blondel’s own science of the subjective sought to explain the infinite power of the 
will, the animating force occluded by experimental psychology. From a third-person 
viewpoint, the will injects infinity – a concept of a piece with contingency – within the 
finite world of nature: “The infinite, that means here what surpasses every distinct 
representation and every determinate motive, what is without common measure with the 
object of knowledge and the stimulants of spontaneity.”52 But from the first-person 
viewpoint of consciousness – that is, from within the will itself – the infinite power of the 
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will manifests as a chasm opened between the power of action and the results of action, 
what Blondel called respectively the “willing will” and the “willed will.” My capacity of 
willing appears to me as greater than what I will. And in turn, what I will never exhausts 
my power of willing. The subjective science of consciousness reveals the discontinuity at 
the heart of action: the impossible demand to harmonize the will’s power of becoming 
with what the will brings into being. “It is to get to the point where what we will proceeds 
spontaneously from ourselves and where there is as perfect an agreement as possible 
between the élan and the result of our effort, equality between the amplitude of the 
voluntary aspirations and the magnitude of the willed ends.”53  
The division that Blondel drew between the infinite power of the will (freedom) 
and the finite results of its actions (necessity) returned to the very problem that launched 
L’Action: why are we necessarily free? Blondel reached this fundamental discontinuity of 
the will after analyzing the discontinuities of the natural and human sciences. And not 
even the science of the subjective, the most elevated of the sciences, could mend the 
fundamental discontinuity between freedom and necessity, and thereby explain the 
necessity of freedom. Blondel’s pragmatist philosophy of action thus served to illuminate 
a metaphysical lacuna beyond the reach of the sciences.  
 Here Blondel went beyond other scientific spiritualists in his appeal to the divine 
as the ultimate ground of both scientific methodology and conscious activity. Spiritualists 
from Maine de Biran to Bergson, as I have explored, conceived consciousness as a 
window onto the absolute. The activity of the will, according to their spiritualist thesis, is 
not simply a phenomenal appearance, but participates in and reveals the dynamic 
structure of reality. In L’Action, however, Blondel pierced through the phenomenal 
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dimension of consciousness in order to shed light on a thoroughly Christian notion of the 
absolute. For God is the energetic wellspring from which human action draws its power; 
the infinite we feel in the willing will is His. “Wherever we stop, He is not; wherever we 
walk forward, He is. It is a necessity always to go further, because He is always beyond 
our action.”54 In strikingly Bergsonian terms, Blondel identified God with the creative 
power in which human freedom participates: “It is because action is a synthesis of man 
with God that it is in perpetual becoming, as if stirred by the inspiration of an infinite 
growth.”55 Yet our finite will never amounts to the antecedent initiative of God’s infinite 
will. It is because of God that action confronts a chasm between the willing will and the 
willed will. Blondel’s formulation echoed Kierkergaard’s maxim, “If there were nothing 
eternal in man, he could not despair at all.”56 But the chasm that Blondel identified at the 
heart of action ultimately lays bare what he called the “one thing necessary.” Blondel 
employed the term to signify the one thing that humans cannot fully explain: the 
necessary being of action – that is, the necessity of freedom that inaugurated L’Action. 
We encounter the “one thing necessary” not in the form of a positive resolution of the 
problem, but instead, and fittingly, both as a constraint and as a choice for our practical 
action.  
 As a constraint, the one thing necessary manifests as the weight that the will 
bares: the insurmountable demand that action escape its finitude. “The ‘one thing 
necessary,’ then, is not the obscure side of my thought, the invisible reverse side of my 
consciousness and my action, as if I were to see it only within myself and as if all its 
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reality consisted only in the idea I have of it.”57 Blondel showed that God does not retreat 
from the world, but permeates our activity, for the will ineluctably tends toward the 
transcendent. As Blondel claimed, man aspires to be God. But it is an aspiration he can 
never fulfill. This philosophical constraint gives way to a practical choice: “to be God 
without God and against God, to be God through God and with God, that is the 
dilemma.”58 Understood as a choice, the one thing necessary must be practically 
accepted. I cease treating it as postulate of the intellect and instead take it up as a motive 
for my action. On the one hand, I can restrict my will to the natural order, and in so doing 
make my own action the point of departure and of arrival for my destiny. In this case, I 
deny God. I can spurn the weight my will bears; but I fail to reconcile the tension 
between my inescapable demand for the infinite and my feigned conceit for the finite. On 
the other hand, I can acknowledge the finitude of my action and, ultimately, my 
dependence on God’s infinite power. “Reduced to its own resources alone, [the will] can 
only acknowledge its ignorance, its weakness and its desire, for it is true to its infinite 
ambition only inasmuch as it recognizes its infinite powerlessness.”59 It is this constraint 
that philosophical analysis reveals as the foundation of scientific knowledge, beyond 
which theology opens the choice to receive God’s gift. Philosophy therefore paves the 
road to necessity, a necessity that only finds its reconciliation with freedom in the divine.  
Blondel’s pragmatist contribution to scientific spiritualism, I want to suggest, 
hinged on his critique of neo-Kantianism as well as on his singular conception of the 
relation between philosophy and religion. Despite his critical stance toward the 
limitations of the positive sciences, a stance suggestive of a resolute anti-positivism, 
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Blondel in fact leveled the brunt of L’Action against the limited picture of consciousness 
that Kant had bestowed upon modern philosophy. Kant believed that reason derails when 
it deviates from the straight track of scientific inquiry. But whereas Kant diagnosed the 
aporias of reason – what he called “the antinomies” – engendered by speculation 
untethered to the methodical analysis of natural phenomena, Blondel diagnosed the 
aporias manifest within the scientific manipulation of nature. “All the antinomies some 
have claimed to find in the realm of speculation reside in science itself,” Blondel averred, 
“Kant makes metaphysics depend on…the possible agreement between the a priori of the 
analytical syntheses and the a posteriori of the synthetic analyses. But it is in the sphere 
of the sciences that the duel and the reconciliation takes place, without our having to 
consider phenomena otherwise than as phenomena or to suppose anything else beside or 
underneath them.”60 For Blondel, Kant construed speculation as fanciful and science as 
its antidote because he held a myopic conception of reason as an exclusively intellectual 
faculty. Blondel’s pragmatism sought to undo this conception, as he wrote to Boutroux, 
“I contemplated defining it otherwise than in Kantianism, with its relations between 
speculation and practice, between knowledge and existence; above all, I contemplated 
showing the indestructible reality and radical insufficiency of the entire natural order, in 
order to discover the flaw in what I believe had been separated.”61 True to scientific 
spiritualism, Blondel argued that it is not the limitations of reason, but the limitation of 
the sciences, which pave the path toward speculation.   
 Blondel further advanced scientific spiritualism in his account of the relationship 
between philosophy and theology, a subject he expounded upon in his Lettre sur 
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l'apologétique (1896), published three years after L’Action. Blondel published the piece 
in response to the criticisms directed at his thesis, especially those of the Abbé Charles 
Denis, who in 1895 became editor of the Annales de philosophie chrétienne, the chief 
organ of academic theology in France. From his newfound pulpit, Denis intervened into 
the developing modernist controversy by targeting L’Action, the primary purpose of 
which, he claimed, “is to put Christian apologetics on a psychological terrain.”62 
Christian apologetics is a form of essay written to support faith on a rational basis and 
defend it against misrepresentations. This, however, was only partially Blondel’s aim. 
His wider objective was to argue that a philosophical intervention into the problem of 
religion must respond to the exigencies of modern philosophy, which were imbricated 
with the natural and human sciences. Hence Blondel’s full title, Lettre sur les exigences 
de la pensée contemporaine en matière d'apologétique et sur la méthode philosophique 
dans l'étude du problème religieux [Letter on the exigencies of contemporary thought in 
matters of apologetics and the method of philosophy in the study of the religious 
problem]. Blondel showed that philosophy conducts a natural analysis of consciousness, 
whereas theology delimits the supernatural domain of religion. But this distinction, he 
enjoined, ought not to be taken for granted. Blondel sought to mobilize philosophy to 
clear the groundwork for theology, and reciprocally, to bring the problem of religion into 
the realm of modern philosophy. What was required, Blondel argued, was to upset what 
he called the prevailing notion of immanence: “that nothing can enter into a man’s mind 
which does not come out of him and correspond in some way to a need for 
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development.”63 So long as philosophy, in the wake of Kant’s Critiques, remained a 
hermetically immanent inquiry untouched by the supernatural, then philosophers failed to 
incorporate religion, foreclosing them from advancing a sufficiently rigorous science. 
“For no science can be precisely defined unless we recognize the presence and, as it 
were, the pressure, of a limit beyond which other perspectives lie open, determining both 
what it is and what it is not.”64 Blondel argued that philosophy and theology, instead of 
constituting absolutely separate domains, meet in what he called “immanent 
transcendence.” Philosophy illuminates the “the blank spaces which cannot be filled in or 
established in their reality by any resources of ours,” and thus offers theology a point of 
departure.65 It is philosophy’s task neither to formulate a concept of God nor to justify 
His existence. “[Philosophy] cannot therefore pronounce on the question of fact,” 
Blondel argued, “it can only determine the dispositions which prepare for the 
understanding of facts and for the practical discovery of truths which emanate from 
another source.”66 Philosophy indicates the possibility of faith by the direction of action.  
Amidst the explosion of the natural and human sciences in the late nineteenth 
century, Blondel wielded Catholicism to push the domain of scientific inquiry beyond its 
boundaries. But he equally steered the sciences into the service of religion. As Jean 
Leclercq argues, Blondel advanced a new ontological proof of God.67 Instead of having 
deduced God’s existence from His concept, Blondel prepared the ground for the 
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supernatural from within the natural: “Instead of looking for the necessary outside the 
contingent itself, as an ulterior term, it manifests it within the contingent itself, as a 
reality already present.”68 As I hope to have shown, Blondel allied his faith, as well as the 
faith of his Catholic peers, to the project of scientific spiritualism. Blondelian pragmatism 
therefore forged a new rapprochement between the natural and the supernatural in 
scientific spiritualism.  
 
 




Édouard Le Roy was born in Paris on June 18, 1870. Raised in a sailing family 
that moved to the capital from the coastal town of Le Havre, Le Roy had his eyes set on 
the École normale from an early age. He entered in 1892, received a diploma in 
mathematics three years later, and proceeded to earn a doctorate in the subject in 1898. 
Le Roy studied under the famed mathematician and physicist Henri Poincaré, who 
lectured at the Sorbonne. But just a stone’s throw away at the Collège de France, the 
young Le Roy attended Bergson’s public lectures. Bergson’s thought held the key, Le 
Roy believed, to advancing his Catholic faith in a renewed dialogue with the sciences, 
and to further excavating the metaphysical foundations of the mathematical revolution in 
non-Euclidean geometry that Poincaré was carrying out. Le Roy dedicated his corpus to 
synthesizing the work of these two grand thinkers of the fin de siècle, while deepening 
scientific spiritualism under the banner of what Le Roy called “spiritualist positivism.” 
“Spiritualist positivism” re-asserted the scientific basis of French spiritualism, 
which Le Roy believed would shepherd the movement into the twentieth century. This 
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new positivism “far from having been called from outside, as it were, by metaphysical 
and moral preoccupations,” Le Roy wrote, “has appeared from the inside of science, 
under the pressure of its internal needs, and in contact with its very facts and theories.”69 
In appropriating the title of “positivism” from Comte and his disciples, Le Roy sought to 
expand what counts as a positive fact to include the facts of consciousness, as Bergson 
had forcefully propounded in his Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. The 
term also alluded to the realist or spiritualist positivism that Ravaisson foretold in his 
1867 Rapport. Le Roy did not simply reject positivism, nor even its deflation of 
metaphysics in the name of scientism; he instead took aim at the priority that the 
positivists of the mid-nineteenth century conferred upon discursive reasoning. Positivism, 
Le Roy argued, depended upon the intellectualism endemic to Kantianism. Spiritualist 
positivism, by contrast, advanced a pragmatist account of conscious activity: “In short, 
the new philosophy is neither… a philosophy of emotions nor a philosophy of the will: it 
would instead be a philosophy of action. Now action,” Le Roy clarified, “without a doubt 
implies emotions and the will: but it also implies something else, in particular, reason… 
The light and truth should be, in the end, sought after in the very movement by which 
action unifies the soul.” 70  It was by no means innocent for Le Roy to christen scientific 
spiritualism a positivism. In 1913, the philosopher André Lalande solicited Le Roy’s 
definition of “positivism” for the Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, the 
first dictionary in France to standardize philosophical terminology.71 But Lalande found 
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Le Roy’s entry too idiosyncratic: “most of our colleagues are of the opinion that the word 
positivism does not suit your doctrine. For positivism,” Lalande urged, “takes as its 
principle…that the conclusions of the “positive sciences” are the very model of certitude, 
and that their progress is the most important for philosophical thought, to the exclusion of 
any metaphysics, of any possibility of attaining things in themselves.” 72 Yet, the 
accepted definition of positivism belied the very project Le Roy sought to carry out: to 
place metaphysics in continuity with the positive sciences.   
 Le Roy explicated his spiritualist positivism in a series of programmatic essays, 
“Science et philosophie,” which appeared in 1899 at a decisive moment. Le Roy 
published the compilation in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale on the eve of the 
First International Congress in Philosophy, which the journal’s editors organized in 
Paris.73 The essays set the terms of the mutual conversation between scientists and 
philosophers that Le Roy hoped to stage at the Congress. His aim was “to open our eyes 
to the nature of contingency and the relativity of scientific constructions.” 74 But Le Roy 
equally enjoined philosophers “no longer to forget that their effective point of departure 
is scientific truth.” 75 The division of intellectual labor that Le Roy drew between science 
and philosophy reflected Bergson’s method of apportioning each to their respective 
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dimensions of conscious experience. Indeed, Le Roy set himself the task of extending 
Bergson’s account of these dual dimensions, originally developed in the Essai and 
Matière et mémoire, in order to trace the genesis of scientific reasoning and philosophical 
speculation from their shared origin in humans’ pragmatic engagements with the material 
world.  
“Science et philosophie” distinguished three dimensions of experience: first, the 
body’s primordial and, above all, practical intercourse with its environment; second, 
discursive reasoning, which renders practical activity intelligible by means of symbols; 
and third, creative speculation, which departs from practical exigencies. Following 
Bergson, Le Roy conceived science and philosophy as two dimensions of consciousness, 
apportioned respectively to the spatial and temporal; but he further clarified that both 
dimensions emerge out of the same pragmatic embodiment. The body’s action-oriented 
perception cuts the initial contours of conscious experience, according to which “the 
border of an object marks only the limit where an object ceases to interest our action and, 
since we act principally by contact, it is most often tactile and muscular impressions that 
determine its borders.”76 Le Roy’s phenomenology of bodily activity explained the initial 
division [morceler] of space into discrete objects, the immediate content of experience 
that discursive reasoning in turn elevates to a heightened degree of abstraction. By setting 
discursive reasoning in continuity with the body, Le Roy demonstrated that scientific 
symbols are not simply artificial notions imposed on experience from without. Rather, 
they develop from within the body’s intercourse with the world. 
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Symbols of measurement, such as intensity, tonality, purity, and extensity, 
constitute conventions; but Le Roy insisted that they are conventions allied to the body’s 
innate action-oriented tendencies. “Positive science can thus be defined: an immediate 
prolongation of common sense.” 77 The maxim reflected Poincaré’s principle that 
mathematics depends upon intuition in the contexts of discovery as well as justification. 
Mathematic concepts, that is to say, do not issue from the understanding alone, but must 
be adapted to particular problems. Le Roy sought to support his teacher’s claim by 
showing that the mathematic symbols of Euclidian space in particular are not innate 
categories of reason, as Kant had believed, but instead facilitate the manipulation and 
measurement of matter. Any number of alternative mathematical symbols, including non-
Euclidean concepts of space, could equally meet the pliable demands of discursive 
reasoning. Le Roy therefore radicalized Bergson’s account of space, understood as a 
practical dimension of consciousness, in order to lay the metaphysical groundwork for 
Poincaré’s conventionalism, emblematized by his claim, “what they [mathematics] have 
gained in rigor, they have lost in objectivity. It is by distancing themselves from reality 
that they acquired this perfect purity.”78 Le Roy agreed that mathematical concepts are 
conventions, but conventions that remain in contact with nature. 
Philosophy, however, resists the natural bent of the body’s pragmatic interests. Le 
Roy argued that philosophy follows a path of creative speculation opposed to that of 
discursive reasoning. “Extracting an analysis of the fundamental postulates of common or 
scientific discourse, cutting off from any point of view that is not that of pure speculation, 
seizing the internal soul of things in its concrete richness and living originality, and 
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bringing about the supreme unity of knowledge and life: these are [philosophy’s] ultimate 
mission.”79 Philosophy, Le Roy believed, is the means by which humans exercise their 
freedom, since philosophy restores the continuity of experience fractured by the quotidian 
requirements of perception and compartmentalized by the intellectual demands of 
discursive reason. “In a word,” what philosophy achieves is “a positive definition of the 
spirit, working to form a new intuition of psychic activity, and finally learning to live 
with the true ground of oneself: that is the task of philosophy, whose proper name is 
Spiritualism.”80  
Le Roy’s refutation of intellectualism opened his spiritualist positivism to 
criticism by neo-Kantian critics. Léon Brunschvicg forcefully defended intellectualism in 
the face of what he took to be Le Roy’s monolithic and static account of discursive 
reason. In Brunschvicg’s eyes, Le Roy inflated philosophy’s speculative prerogative only 
by narrowing the domain of discursive reason to logic chopping. In an article responding 
to “Science et philosophie,” Brunschvicg defended “the real character of intellectualism,” 
which Le Roy disfigured by “deliberately breaking up the synthetic unity of thought and 
returning it to the static elements on which the dogmatism of long ago was founded.”81 
Indeed, stark characterizations such as Le Roy’s claim, “Science is a ruse of the spirit for 
conquering the world,”82 certainly invited Brunschvig’s criticism. It appeared that Le Roy 
had driven a wedge between the discursive and speculative dimensions of consciousness, 
lending the impression that science is invariable, and philosophy, by contrast, is a 
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dynamic enterprise. Yet, in response to Brunschvicg, Le Roy insisted that his critique of 
intellectualism sought to demonstrate that science depends not only on discursive reason, 
but also on corporeal and motor engagements with the physical world: “the entire 
ensemble of preliminary movements by which we prepare ourselves to seize an object, 
describe its contours, experiment with its functions, palpate it, move it, handle it, in sum, 
to practice with it and live it.” 83 Le Roy thus took spiritualist positivism both to expand 
the genesis of science and to elevate the metaphysical prerogative of philosophy.  
 
 




In Lamentabili Sane Exitu, Pope Pius X specifically condemned those who 
believe, “The dogmas of the Faith are to be held only according to their practical sense 
[regula praeceptiva actionis]; that is to say, as preceptive norms of conduct and not as 
norms of believing.”84 Blondel and Le Roy were among the unacknowledged, though 
nonetheless legible, targets. Both argued that dogmas depend on action-oriented 
principles, and not on exclusively intellectual convictions.  
The problem of dogma lay at the heart of the Modernist controversy in France, 
and provoked Blondel and Le Roy to pivot from philosophical to theological debates. 
Dogmas are the infallible truths of Catholic doctrine. They have been declared since the 
biblical era of the Apostles, and extend through the modern Church. The dogma of 
transubstantiation, for example, lay at the center of the rift between Lutheranism and 
Catholicism in the sixteenth century. While both recognized the real presence of Christ in 
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the Eucharist, Catholics contended that communion transforms bread and wine into 
Christ’s body and blood, whereas Luther believed that transubstantiation is simply a 
symbolic, but not metaphysical, doctrine. In the nineteenth century, Pope Pius IX defined 
the Immaculate Conception of Mary, Her birth untainted by original sin, as a dogma.85 
And as recently as 1950, Pope Pius XII promulgated the additional dogma of Mary’s 
Assumption, Her bodily and spiritual ascendance to heaven upon death.86 But the 
problem of dogma at stake in late nineteenth-century France hinged on the very 
possibility of revealed truth. On what grounds could Catholic dogma claim to be true in 
the face of modern science? And how could Catholics continue to defend their beliefs in 
the face of the ascendant scientific methods of experimentation and verification? In their 
effort to adapt dogmata to the scientific demands twentieth century, Blondel and Le Roy 
plunged into the Modernist controversy, and in so doing advanced a decidedly pragmatist 
turn in scientific spiritualism.  
 Dogmas preoccupied theological debates following the problem of historicism 
broached by Loisy. Since the Church had evolved since the time of Jesus, Loisy claimed, 
the dogmas that he announced had also changed over to the course of two millennia. “He 
demanded faith in the approaching kingdom,” Loisy wrote, “but the idea of the kingdom 
and of its proximity were two very simple symbols of very complex matters, and even 
those who were the first to believe must have attached their minds more to the spirit than 
to the letter.”87 The separation that Loisy had cleaved between the history of the gospels 
and the evolution of the Church left the meaning and value of dogmas open to debate. 
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Are dogmas timeless representations of miracles? Or are they mere symbols whose 
expressive force transforms over time? Loisy’s answer was unequivocal: “The Church 
does not exact belief in its formulas as the adequate expression of absolute truth, but 
presents them as the least imperfect expression that is morally possible; she demands that 
man respect them for their quality, seek the faith in them, and use them to transmit it.”88 
Loisy dared to claim that the historical development of the Church confirmed the 
pragmatic, rather than absolute, value of dogmata. 
  
Blondel on History and Dogma  
 
Blondel tackled the problem in 1904 with a series of articles, “L’Histoire et 
dogme.” The articles were originally conceived in 1897 as part of a larger project, 
L’Esprit chrétien, which Blondel would not publish until 1944.  But the rising ferment 
surrounding Loisy’s historicist method spurred Blondel to intervene in the debate 
directly. At stake in “L’Histoire et le dogme” was the question of how to relate the facts 
of Christian history to the beliefs central to the Church’s teaching without reducing one to 
the other. How, that is, does the Bible ensure the Church’s authority at the same time as 
the Church interprets and supports the Bible? Blondel sought to explain the principle that 
synthesizes both, guaranteeing at once that dogmas are more than mere echoes of the 
gospels’ original testimony, and that the Church participates in and inflects a sacred 
history more expansive than the sum total of its teachings. The problem, according to 
René Marlé, amounted to articulating a principle that “is at the same time that of the 
relations of Scripture to the Church, and that of an eternal truth given “once and for all” 
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the manifestation of which develops in time.” 89 Blondel called the principle “tradition.” 
He claimed that tradition is a “living synthesis” of the collectivity and the individual, 
embracing “within it the facts of history, the effort of reason and the accumulated 
experiences of the faithful.”90 The value and purpose of dogmas, Blondel averred, is to 
convey tradition. 
 Blondel did not defend a fossilized notion of tradition. “So far is “development” 
from being heterodox,” he wrote, “that it is the static idea of tradition, fixism, which is 
the virtual heresy.”91 Blondel coupled his idiosyncratic account of the Church’s history 
with a critique of the thesis of historicism, and of Loisy’s version in particular. Blondel 
argued that Loisy’s historicism amounted to a positivist accumulation of historical facts, 
and further, that his principle of evolution, which Loisy conceived as Christians’ “living 
faith,”92 only reflected the external pressures that the Church confronted over time. 
Blondel forged his principle of tradition to mend the division that historicism tore open 
between the miracles preceding the founding of Christianity and the Church’s subsequent 
development. “If one accepts [historicism],” Blondel wrote, “although one might 
continue to say that Christianity is founded on Christ as a cathedral is built on a 
geological foundation, one can no longer add that it was explicitly founded by Christ, 
because one no longer looks behind the historical facts for a substantial and active 
reality.”93 As long as history remains confined to facts alone, then the history of 
Christianity, Blondel argued, would constitute one chronology among others. For 
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Blondel, historicism furnished a wholly inadequate justification for the authority of the 
Church’s teaching.  
What then is the status of the Church’s history? And on what basis is it subject to 
modification without severing the thread connecting Jesus’ ministry to contemporary 
Christians’ belief in his miracles? Blondel invoked his philosophy of action to resolve 
these problems. Tradition reflects the infinite action of Christian history, of which the 
scriptures are only finite expressions: “[Tradition] relies, no doubt, on texts, but at the 
same time it relies primarily on something else, on an experience always in act which 
enables it to remain in some respects master of the texts instead of being strictly 
subservient to them.”94 Blondel claimed that the collective action of Christianity, 
embodied in tradition, overflows the particular acts crystallized in dogmas. In a letter to 
Blondel, Boutroux recognized that his former student elevated his thesis in L’Action to 
the animating principle of Christian history: “It is indeed from within that the facts must 
be acted upon. It is the spirit [l’esprit] which is the seat of religion, but it is the spirit of 
another order than what appears and passes. And its reality, for us, is in fact other than 
both mind and matter.” 95 Blondel thus tied his theological critique of historicism to his 
philosophical critique of intellectualism in the name of a pragmatic notion of history. The 
formulations of scripture only appeal to the intellectual capacities of believers. Tradition, 
however, is not transmitted by exclusively intellectual means; it inheres neither in a 
supernatural world divorced from the natural world, nor in the historian’s balance sheet. 
Tradition is the historical activity that preserves the Church’s “sovereign authority in 
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regard to Scripture, but in such a way as to leave the Scriptures their own physiognomy 
and their original spontaneity.”96  
It was in his engagement with problem of dogma that Blondel radicalized his 
philosophy of action. Dogmas, Blondel argued, manifest the collective and historical 
action of Christianity. Far from being mere symbols depending on individual faith, 
dogmas are the living deposits of Christian tradition. The modernist crisis thus provoked 
Blondel to articulate a fully socialized and historicized pragmatism.   
 
Le Roy on Pragmatism and Dogma 
 
 Le Roy delved into the debate over dogma in “Qu’est-ce qu’un dogme?” – an 
article that extended his pragmatist critique of intellectualism originally developed in 
“Science et philosophie.” Le Roy sought to adapt dogmas to the requirements of modern 
science in order to safeguard his Catholic faith from the demands of experimentation and 
verification. The dilemma, he surmised, was that Catholics too easily opened their faith to 
scientific criticism by conflating revealed truths with logical truths. Catholics’ error 
consisted of construing dogmas as intellectual propositions, as if they were statements of 
a theorem, and thus, in the eyes of modern science, an indemonstrable theorem. To 
resolve the dilemma, Le Roy argued that Catholics should instead treat the Church’s 
teachings as practical propositions. By construing the nature of dogmas as practical rather 
than intellectual, Le Roy claimed to undermine the very ground on which science could 
contradict Catholic teachings. “The Catholic, obliged to accept them, is not restrained by 
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them except as regards rules of conduct, not as regards any particular conceptions.”97 
Freed from the duty of defending a theory of God’s teachings, Catholics could 
nonetheless follow His practical rules, unencumbered by scientific reproach.  
 “Qu’est-ce qu’un dogme?” appeared the year following Blondel’s “Dogme et 
Histoire.” Le Roy presented his article as a series of interrogations, wary that he might be 
received as having expounded a new theology.98 His goal was to deepen the debate 
already underway in French Catholic circles. Le Roy’s pragmatist inquiry drew the praise 
of progressive Catholics such as Loisy.99 Yet most found the article to be sacrilegious for 
having evacuated Catholicism of its core tenets, as when Le Roy claimed, “it cannot be 
repeated too often that Christianity is not a system of speculative philosophy but a source 
and regimen of life, a discipline of moral and religious action, in short the sum total of 
practical means to obtain salvation.”100 One priest decried Le Roy’s “attitude as 
dangerous to the faith of so many.”101 Another compared Le Roy with such detestable 
heretics as Gnostics, Manicheans, Waldensians, and Voltairians.102 Blondel, for his part, 
suspected that Le Roy had recklessly flouted the Vatican. In a letter to Lucien 
Laberthonnère, the progressive priest and public proponent of L’Action,103 Blondel 
confided that he believed Le Roy had gone too far: “I wish to say to Édouard, “Beware!” 
You are rolling down a hill that will take you much farther than you think, somewhere I 
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refuse to let myself be taken.”104 Blondel’s caution proved prescient. The Vatican 
promptly listed Le Roy’s books on the Index, alleging that Le Roy had condemned belief 
in favor of practice.  
 Yet Le Roy intended not to evacuate the theoretical content of dogmas, but 
instead, to delimit their intellectual and pragmatic dimensions. As part of his critique of 
intellectualism, Le Roy argued that the theoretical content of dogmas derives from their 
pragmatic guidance. The dogma of Jesus’ resurrection, for example, amounts to a 
practical metaphor: “Be in relation to him as you would have been before his death, as 
you are with a contemporary.”105 Its intellectual dimension, in turn, serves to guard 
against heretical notions of Jesus’ resurrection. Debates over theoretical interpretations, 
in other words, arise amidst schisms within the Church; and it is in these cases that the 
intellectual dimension of dogmata functions negatively to condemn heresies. The clergy 
and the laity may construe the theoretical meaning of the resurrection differently. “But 
whether ignorant men or philosophers, men of the first or of the twentieth century, every 
Catholic has always had and always will have the same practical attitude with regard to 
Jesus.”106 Although the theoretical meaning of dogmas participate in the flux of time, 
their pragmatic meaning, Le Roy argued, endures as a guidepost for the Catholic 
community.  
  Blondel believed that Le Roy had pushed his pragmatism both too far and not far 
enough. Not far enough, because Le Roy conceived the practical value of dogmas in 
narrowly subjective terms, as if dogmas offer guidance only to individuals; whereas 
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Blondel, to the contrary, conceived dogmas as expressions of collective practice. Too far, 
Blondel contended, because Le Roy risked liquidating the distinctly Catholic content of 
Church doctrine. Le Roy had distorted faith by tethering divine love to humans’ 
autonomous will. What went forsaken, Blondel charged, was the heteronomy by which 
our individual will depends on God’s infinite will:  
The more I reflect, the more it seems to me that our divergences are based 
on this profoundly deep cause: we do not have same idea of the 
supernatural. It would nearly seem that you only see the supreme 
blossoming of our own nature, as if it were a crowning achievement of the 
divine destiny calling us – a destiny which is realized by the harmonious 
development of our whole being; but this apparent heteronomy turns into a 
perfect autonomy. For me, to the contrary, the autonomy of our will must 
accept, even love, the real and irreducible heteronomy of divine love.107 
 
As long as Le Roy’s pragmatic account of dogma remained confined to subjective 
psychology, Blondel argued, then the grace of God’s gift becomes unthinkable. For 
divine love arrives as “an intrusion, as a substitution in us of the infinite that expands so 
far that we cry in pain.”108 
 Bergson, however, believed that Le Roy had established a prudent division of 
labor between the intellectual and pragmatic dimensions of faith in “Qu’est-ce qu’un 
dogme?” “The article arrives at an important philosophical conclusion, namely, that a 
dogmatic proposition can be determinate and precise while its meaning carries a share of 
indetermination. It suffices,” Bergson added, “that the proposition relies on a practical 
attitude, which outlines in a way the motor articulations of meaning – the meaning itself 
remaining (partially) indeterminate.”109 What Bergson saw, and Catholic critics 
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neglected, in Le Roy’s pragmatist conception of dogma, was the rejuvenated basis he 
furnished for faith, at once reconciled with and insulated from modern science. The 
conception took its point of departure from “Science et philosophie,” Just as the 
explanatory power of science depends on embodied practices, so too does dogma take its 
divine authority from the body’s submission to Catholic practice. But “practice,” Le Roy 
insisted “does not in the least mean a blind step, without relation to thought or 
consciousness.”110 Le Roy saw himself as expanding the domain of faith beyond the 
intellect, and thus as building upon a corporeal account of consciousness originally 
developed as part of his spiritualist positivism. 
 
  
The debate over dogma provided Blondel and Le Roy with the opportunity to 
advance their pragmatist account of consciousness. At stake was the possibility and value 
of religious belief in the face of scientific advancements. These two thinkers penetrated 
the depths of religious consciousness using the very scientific methods with which they 
were originally trained. Their debate, it should be highlighted, resonated beyond the 
pages of Catholic journals. It found expression in French culture through the semaines 
sociales, founded in 1904 to extend Catholic teachings to working class struggles. These 
“social weeks” were summer meetings organized in different cities outside of Paris. They 
attracted as many as two thousand people to attend seminars on Catholic social doctrine 
and discuss proposals to improve workers’ lives. Marius Gonin and Adéodat Boissard, 
Blondel’s brother-in-law, originally organized the semaines sociales as a democratic 
alternative to the growing strength of the neo-monarchist Action française movement. 
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Gonin and Boissard heeded the call of Pope Leo XIII in 1901 to promulgate democratic 
action in social life.111 But Church authorities soon suspected the semaines sociales of 
incubating modernism. Their organizer, Henri Lorin, advocated the philosophy of his 
mentor, Blondel, in arguing that the dynamic impulse of the will underpinned workers’ 
solidarity.112 By 1907, the semaines sociales came to be seen as a bastion of collectvism, 
a fear sparked by an outbreak of strikes across northeartern France by the socialist 
workers’ movement.  
As the Vatican’s comdenations of modernism casts a shadow of paranoia over 
French Catholic circles, Blondel went in hiding and pseudonomously published his 
subsequent work.113 Le Roy, undeterred by the ferocity of his critics, plunged further into 
the debate in 1907 with Dogme et critique, an expanded version of the article he has 
published two years before. Fresh off the press, Le Roy’s treatise ended up on the 
Vatican Index. The fervor surrounding Le Roy’s pragmatism was so vitriolic that Blondel 
soon after distanced himself from Bergson’s student – a strategic, though dubious, 
philosophical fib.114  
The pragmatist moment in scientific spiritualism found its expression in the 
philosophical and theological ideas of Blondel and Le Roy. But it was the modernist 
controversy in particular that precipitated these thinkers’ own radicalization of their 
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pragmatism: from the philosophy of action to the theology of action. Indeed, the 
problems of historicism and dogma, which shook the Church’s foothold in France, set the 
stage for Blondel and Le Roy to articulate a historical and social account of conscious 
activity. In so doing, these thinkers not only propelled scientific spiritualism into social 





































In 1908, Émile Boutroux reflected on the four decades that had passed since Félix 
Ravaisson foretold the rise of “spiritualist realism or positivism” in his seminal Rapport 
on the state of French philosophy.115 Boutroux observed that philosophy, “far from 
claiming to be self-sufficient, considers that it could only find in the sciences, life, and 
the arts, as they develop spontaneously, the necessary material for its theories.”116 Yet, 
philosophy in the twentieth century confronted a self-effacing precipice: “the present 
movement tends toward the complete abolition of philosophy,” he worried, “and its pure 
and simple replacement by science.” 117 The antidote, Boutroux urged, lay in renewing 
the guiding impetus of scientific spiritualism, which marshaled the sciences to yield new 
metaphysical problems. Philosophers might thus “find themselves driven to consider, 
beyond proper facts, those actual realities grasped with the senses, the internal and 
subjective work of the spirit, the living power that exceeds in reality and richness all the 
concrete forms through which it appears.”118 By 1908, Boutroux was memorializing the 
movement that he had once helped to set in motion by finding in the sciences a launching 
pad to revolutionize the place and role of consciousness in the world. His reflections 
came on the heels of Bergson’s opus, L’Évolution créatrice (1907), which brought the 
project of scientific spiritualism to its culmination with the celebrated notion of the élan 
vital.  
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In L’Évolution créatrice, Bergson elevated scientific spiritualism on the basis of 
evolutionary biology. He confronted the nascent science in order to tackle a particular 
problem: how does the same organic structure – specifically, the eye – emerge in species 
with divergent genetic lineages? Why is it that the pigment-spot of pecten (found in 
clams and scallops), the eye of mollusks, and the eye of vertebrae, all present analogous 
cellular structures, evident in the oculi, retina, and cornea? The problem confronted the 
limits of evolutionary theory, since “The more two lines of evolution diverge, the less 
probability is there that accidental outer influences or accidental inner variations bring 
about the construction of the same apparatus upon them, especially if there was no trace 
of this apparatus at the moment of divergence.”119 According to Bergson, the presence of 
the same organic structure across divergent evolutionary lineages indicates that the data 
of biology pose a problem irresolvable by the science’s methods alone. The methods 
available in 1907 were either neo-Lamarckian or Darwinian, which held that pecten, 
mollusks, and vertebrae had all developed similar eyes because each adapted to the 
environment, either by undergoing direct bio-chemical alterations, as neo-Lamarckians 
such as Theodor Eimer argued,120 or by gradually eliminating unadapted variations in the 
struggle for survival, as Charles Darwin claimed. Such explanations appealing to 
adaptation fall flat, Bergson argued, since, even if they could successfully isolate the 
same environment for different species, the environment does not function like a 
container to which species passively adapt. The organism does not externally conform to 
its surroundings, but instead, as it were, poses a problem to the environment, and 
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undergoes an adaptation in order to optimize the utility it derives. There must be, Bergson 
concluded, a principle internal not only to organisms, but to all of life, that imparts 
commonality to the organic structures shared across diverse genetic lineages – a principle 
that he called élan vital: “According as [the élan vital] goes further and further in the 
direction of vision, it gives the simple pigmentary masses of a lower organism, or the 
rudimentary eye of a Serpula, or the slightly differentiated eye of the Alciope, or the 
marvelously perfected eye of the bird; but all these organs, unequal as is their complexity, 
necessarily present an equal coordination.”121  
Bergson posited the élan vital as a metaphysical concept necessitated by a 
scientific problem. But the concept did not, he insisted, adhere to the bygone spiritualist 
doctrine of finality, which holds that an organic structure such as the eye develops in 
order to fulfill a particular function, namely sight.122 The élan vital does not impart the 
same evolutionary direction to species divergence, but instead endows evolution with the 
common stock out of which species diverge. It is on account of their commonality, and 
not their finality, that distinct species, Bergson believed, retain similar organic structures. 
But he went even further in his claim. Instead of reconciling the old spiritualist doctrine 
of finality with evolutionary theories, Bergson argued that both share the same mechanist 
presupposition: both hold that the eye develops by progressively accumulating its 
structural elements over generations, whether organized intentionality on account of an 
end, or accidentally on account of random variations. On this basis, Bergson succinctly 
argued that: “Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by 
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dissociation and division.”123 The eyes of pecten, mulluscs and vertebrae are divergent 
expressions of the same élan vital connecting each species to the entirety of life, and thus 
bridging the chasms left gaping in biological data. 
Bergson was motivated, as I have argued in my dissertation, by a critique of 
science as much as by a critique of the nineteenth-century spiritualism preceding him. He 
rode an intellectual wave that upended the Cousinian regime that Donald Kelly 
characterizes as “a particular way of doing philosophy, a so-called “eclectic” way, in 
which history in effect took precedence over unassisted and unencumbered reason and 
became “first philosophy.”124 In place of history, science became Bergson’s “first 
philosophy.” But that is not to suggest that Bergson severed his philosophical ties to the 
past. The natural and human sciences generated metaphysical problems that spurred 
Bergson to formulate anew the spiritualist commitment to the free activity of 
consciousness. He did so by updating the notion of consciousness as a motor activity, 
originally developed by Biran, and by radicalizing the contingent continuity that 
Ravaisson had posited between nature and the will. Despite the originality and enduring 
force of the élan vital, Bergson drew the concept’s stakes from the controversies, I am 
suggesting, around which scientific spiritualists converged. The élan vital bore the 
residue of the concepts of motility, contingency, and pragmatism articulated across the 
intellectual arc of scientific spiritualism. As Bergson characterized the élan vital:  
[A]ll life, animal and vegetable, seems in its essence like an effort to 
accumulate energy and then to let it flow into flexible channels, 
changeable in shape, at the end of which it will accomplish infinitely 
varied kinds of work. That is what the vital impetus, passing through 
matter, would fain to do all at once. It would succeed, no doubt, if its 
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power were unlimited, or if some reinforcement could come to it from 
without. But the impetus is finite, and it has been given once for all.125 
 
The passage lays bare three moments of scientific spiritualism: 
 
Motility: The Biranian principle of motor effort informed Bergson’s account of the élan 
vital as “an effort to accumulate energy,” which flows through the “flexible channels” of 
individual species. Bergson’s idea was that the élan vital generates novelty in the living 
world by confronting the resistance posed by concrete organisms. In a Biranian key, 
Bergson affirmed, “The physical order is ‘automatic;’ the vital order is, I will not say 
voluntary, but analogous to the order ‘willed.’"126 
 
Contingency: The élan vital injects contingency into evolution, engendering effects in 
excess of their cause. This principle was critical for Bergson to explain not only the 
commonalities shared across disparate lineages, but also the creative leaps by which 
divergent species develop parallel organic structures. Following Boutroux, who posited 
contingency as “that appearance of a new element which is the indispensable condition of 
a relation of causality,”127 Bergson conceived the élan vital as the catalyst of novelty 
within evolution. 
 
Pragmatism: The élan vital imparts unity to organisms within a shared biological milieu, 
facilitating their capacity to derive utility from the environment, such that with greater 
development the élan “will accomplish infinitely varied kinds of work.” Building upon 
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his account of action-oriented perception in Matière et mémoire, Bergson construed the 
eye as a paradigmatic evolutionary tool equipping organisms to intervene in the 
environment, rather than to form a representation of the environment.  
  
 In light of the arc that scientific spiritualism followed, it could be said that 
L’Évolution créatrice appeared in 1907 as a capstone of the movement, synthesizing the 
guiding moments of motility, contingency, and pragmatism. Bergson’s opus could 
equally be seen, following one critic’s account, as a fusion of pragmatism and science.128 
Indeed, the pragmatic value of the élan vital lay in its explanatory purchase over the 
aporias manifest in evolutionary biology. Far from having conceived the élan vital as a 
natural entity, understood as an animistic impetus or animating force, Bergson posited the 
concept as a conceptual tool. “[T]he “vital” order,” he wrote, “which is essentially 
creation, is manifested to us less in its essence than in some of its accidents, those which 
imitate the physical and geometrical order; like it, they present to us  repetitions that 
make generalizations possible, and in that we have all that interests us.”129 The élan vital, 
in other words, does not appear before the natural scientist as a natural specimen or a 
positive fact. Rather, it is a metaphysical concept facilitating his or her generalizations, 
thus filling in the methodological lacuna of evolutionary theory. Bergson did not 
therefore impose a metaphysical resolution from without, but instead demonstrated that 
problems within the natural sciences motivated the concepts of motility, contingency, and 
pragmatism.  
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 L’Évolution créatrice catapulted Bergson onto the world stage. Audiences were 
already packing his lecture hall at the Collège de France, where philosophy students often 
complained that they had to stand outside just to catch a glimpse through the windows. 
Following 1907, Bergson’s fame transcended France. He lectured across the continent, in 
Britain, as well as in America. The Comité France-Amérique, founded in 1909 to 
promote international cooperation through cultural exchange, facilitated his voyages 
across the Atlantic. The moment marked Bergson’s transformation from philosopher to 
statesman.130 As the Great War descended upon Europe, Bergson met with President 
Wilson in 1915 to encourage America’s support, a cause represented at the time as a 
struggle between cultivated French spiritualism and imperialistic German materialism.131 
With the former Prime Minister René Viviani, Bergson returned to the United States in 
April 1917 on the heels of America’s declaration of war.132 Committed to forging 
international peace out of higher ideals, Bergson headed the International Committee on 
Intellectual Cooperation, an advisory committee to the League of Nations founded in 
1922. Bergson’s intellectual production persisted throughout his diplomatic career and up 
until his death in 1941. But the cultural landscape of France, and the intellectual debates 
fueling scientific spiritualism, largely subsided in the wake of World War I.  
 The conceptual problems animating scientific spiritualism endured for a distinct 
moment in French history, but only as long as the yoke of Cousin’s anti-naturalist legacy 
and the rigidity of neo-Kantian intellectualism remained potent enough to stir a rebellion 
among young thinkers. Toward the end of his life, Bergson reflected on his incitement to 
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study philosophy as a student at Lycée Condorcet, thanks to his professor, a “Cousinian 
schoolmaster,” who “did the immeasurable service of shielding me from the reigning 
influence of German thought, and prepared me to return one day to that most original and 
deepest of eclectics, Maine de Biran.”133 Indeed, Bergson’s philosophical itinerary 
evinced the revolution against both Cousinian eclecticism and neo-Kantian 
intellectualism that guided the development of scientific spiritualism. Committed to the 
autonomy of consciousness and the reality of freedom, scientific spiritualists re-
excavated the subterranean memory of Biran to establish a historical foothold from which 
to launch France’s intellectual heritage into a newfound dialogue with the scientific 
advancements reshaping modern Europe.  
  Intellectual and cultural historians of modern Europe have rendered the fin de 
siècle unthinkable without Bergson; yet his place within the history of scientific 
spiritualism, as I hope to have shown, casts into stark relief the unthought limits of fin de 
siècle historiography – specifically, the limits of an enduring narrative of a crisis in 
science that continues to frame the period. Far from having staged a revolt against 
positivism, scientific spiritualism blossomed because its guiding concepts – motility, 
contingency, and pragmatism – contained the promise of founding a higher, “spiritualist” 
positivism. It was thus not despite Bergsonian “irrationalism,” but because of his 
rapprochement between science and spiritualism, I am suggesting, that after World War I 
the philosophy of science would take off in France in the work of Georges Canguilhem, 
Jean Cavaillès, and Gaston Bachelard.134 As long as the narrative of crisis continues to 
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frame historiographies of the fin de siècle, Bergson’s centrality to modern European 
thought will function as an all too convenient foil opposed to the emergence of the 
twentieth century. Rather, the Bergsonian moment was part of a dynamic and wide-
reaching scientific spiritualism animated by the intellectual and cultural contestations 
over the meaning and scope of science. Contestation, and not crisis, I am urging, ought to 
structure a new narrative that frames French debates over science and spirit in deep 
continuity with the present.   
The rapid influx of experimental psychology and evolutionary biology into France 
in the late nineteenth century sustained the social conditions in which scientific 
spiritualists thrived, motivated by the widespread aspiration to build upon these 
transnational advancements and to attain an expanded model of scientific practice. Born 
amidst the Third Republic’s campaign to regenerate French society in the image of 
science and surpass the nation’s perpetual foe across the Rhine, scientific spiritualism 
refracted the state’s investment in technological progress. Rising generations of 
professors charged with inculcating a new scientific curriculum in secondary education 
took hold of and reoriented the social pressures jeopardizing the metaphysical methods 
they had inherited. These thinkers demonstrated that the ascendance of science did not 
precipitate the death of metaphysics, but inspired a new metaphysics tailored to the 
pragmatic and inventive activity of consciousness. Scientific spiritualism, forged from a 
renewal of French spiritualism, might enjoy its own renewal today, as humanists and 
social scientists appropriate contemporary scientific advancements as a springboard to 
invigorate their disciplinary methods.  
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In 1983, Jean-Pierre Changeux, today France’s leading neuroscientist, argued in 
his L’Homme neuronal that contemporary advances in the neurosciences had rendered 
Henri Bergson’s critical engagements with the nascent experimental psychology obsolete. 
Changeaux took aim at Matière et mémoire (1896), in which Bergson critiqued the 
reductionism of early brain science on the grounds that “the nervous system has nothing 
in the way of an apparatus to make or even to prepare representations.”1 Bergson 
contended that consciousness could not be localized in cerebral tissues. Yet rather than 
reject the emergent sciences of his time, Bergson built upon their research program to 
demonstrate that the limitations facing the scientific study of the brain motivate a 
distinctly qualitative study of consciousness. On his account, thought generally, and 
human creativity in particular, surpass physiology. While France’s Nobel prize-winning 
philosopher left a legacy formidable enough for Changeux to take seriously, he 
nevertheless believed that Bergson’s ideas remained tethered to the outdated sciences of 
the late nineteenth century. “Man no longer has a need for the “Spirit”,” Changeux 
implored, “it is enough for him to be Neuronal Man.”2 
Like many scientists and philosophers of the late nineteenth century, Bergson 
compared the brain to a central telephone exchange, which “plays the simple role of a 
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321 
conductor that transmits, allocates, or inhibits movement.”3 Now functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) represents the brain according to the changing magnetic 
properties of oxygenated blood flows. Its well-known images of illuminated neural 
passageways have allowed neuroscientists to identify the neuronal correlates of conscious 
activity. These images furnish a figure of the brain far more advanced than the central 
telephone exchange. It would therefore seem, in the light of modern neuroimaging, that 
Bergson’s insight into the creative activity of consciousness could now be neatly archived 
in the dusty volumes of fin de siècle thought. 
Since his 1983 critique, however, Changeux has come to offer a more generous 
appraisal of Bergson. In L’Homme de vérité (2002) he affirms that, “The brain needs to 
be seen… as an open, motivated, and self-organizing system continually engaged in the 
exploration of its environment—a quality that recalls Bergson’s theme in La Pensée et le 
mouvant.”4 The neuroscientific figure of the brain, in other words, now appears more 
Bergsonian than ever.  
Neuroscientific research into the epigenetic evolution of neuronal networks 
during humans’ lifespans has shone light on the dynamic ways in which the brain 
develops through its interactions with the environment. Further insight into the plasticity 
of neurons demonstrates how they shape conscious activity as much as they are 
reciprocally shaped by it. Both domains, epigenesis and neuronal plasticity, have helped 
to overthrow the understanding of the brain as a material substratum – like the telephone 
exchange – or as an organ that determines conscious activity, an understanding that has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 40. 
4 Jean-Pierre Changeux, The Physiology of Truth: Neuroscience and Human Knowledge, trans. M.B. 
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persisted since the emergence of the brain sciences in the late nineteenth century. In order 
to furnish a figure of the brain that can adequately represent its self-organizing and 
creative capacities, these domains have motivated a curious return to Bergson.  
French philosopher Catherine Malabou, for example, explicitly invokes Bergson’s 
idea that consciousness surpasses the brain’s physiology to explain neuronal plasticity: 
“the invariable contrivance of consciousness… from its most humble origin in 
elementary living forms, is to convert physical determinism to its own ends, or rather to 
elude the law of conservation of energy while obtaining from matter a fabrication of 
explosives, ever intenser and more utilizable.”5 Malabou suggests that neuronal plasticity 
verifies Bergson’s figure of consciousness as an explosive, like “the slight pressure of the 
finger of the hair-trigger of a pistol.” Malabou concludes, “It is thus that one must think 
the transition from the neuronal to the mental.”6  
If the neurosciences have discredited Bergson’s account of consciousness as a 
spiritual dimension of human experience irreducible to the brain, it is only because, I 
want to suggest, neuroscientists have integrated Bergson’s very account into their 
understanding of the brain. The contemporary sciences of the brain have paradoxically 
managed to revitalize Bergson’s thought in the present, rather than consign it to history. 
Indeed, several neuroscientists have affirmed Bergson’s continuing relevance.7 But now 
as neuroscientific insights spread across the humanities and social sciences, his ideas 
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les neurosciences (Le Plessis-Robinson: Institut Synthélabo pour le progrès de la connaissance, 1997). 
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offer a doubly relevant perspective from which to take stock of the extensive uses of the 
neurosciences today.  
This is especially the case in history. Historians as eminent as Lynn Hunt and 
Daniel Lord Smail have called for a new “neurohistory.” Their project aims to integrate 
neuroscientific research into historiographical methods applicable across the writing of 
history, from the prehistory of biological evolution to the microhistory of particular 
historical actors. Neurohistorians believe that the neurosciences reveal certain facts about 
the human brain that can help historians to develop a more complete account of historical 
actors’ experiences.  
Others like William Reddy and Barabara Rosenwein have mined the literature in 
the affective neurosciences in support of the history of the emotions, now an established 
subfield in its own right. It has a journal, Passions in Context: International Journal for 
the History and Theory of Emotions, as well as several centers for the history of the 
emotions at Queen Mary, University of London, the Max Planck Institute for Human 
Development in Berlin, and the Universities of Brisbane and Melbourne. Not all 
historians of the emotions appropriate neuroscientific research. But those following 
Reddy’s program share neurohistorians’ aim to enrich their understanding of historical 
actors’ experiences.  
Given the current historiographical terrain, these two programs of neurohistory 
and the history of the emotions represent the two predominant attempts to stage a 
dialogue between history and the sciences of the brain, including the neurosciences and 
evolutionary biology. Although the specializations of neurohistorians and historians of 
the emotions widely diverge, they all are united in their aim to advance a new paradigm 
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for history on the basis of the rapidly advancing but still incomplete experimental data of 
these contemporary sciences. 
It is by no means new for historians to revamp their methodologies in light of 
advancements in the natural and human sciences. In 1938 Lucien Febvre posed the 
question to his compatriots of the Annales school, “how can we as historians make use of 
psychology which is the product of observation carried out on twentieth-century men, in 
order to interpret the actions of the men of the past?”8 What makes the programs of 
neurohistory and the history of emotions new is their use of the neurosciences in 
particular, and their participation in a general “neurologization” across the humanities 
and social sciences. The prefix, “neuro-” now appears in fields such as neuroethics, 
neuroaesthetics, neuroeconomics, and neuropolitics, all of which, according to Fernando 
Vidal and Francisco Ortega, profit from “the prestige of neuroimages,” combining “the 
epistemic authority and sensory appeal of images in general with the particular power of 
the neurological.”9 Indeed, the brain has become the frontier of biomedical research as 
much as it now frames the horizon of human experience. President Barack Obama 
unveiled the Brain Activity Map project on April 2, 2013, an investment of 100 million 
dollars to identify the single-celled brain circuits composing neuronal tissue. And on 
October 6, 2013 European neuroscientists inaugurated the Human Brain Project, an even 
more expansive 1.2 billion euro investment to map the brain’s 100 billion neurons. 
Invoking the figure of the brain promises to amplify the appeal of research in the 
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humanities and social science scholars. It was perhaps only a matter of time until 
historians would catch on.  
The most forceful critics among historians include Ruth Leys and Fernando Vidal. 
Both take aim at the reductionism of neurocultures generally and the uses of the 
neurosciences for historiography in particular. Leys identifies “anti-intentionalism” as the 
commitment uniting humanities and social science scholars who employ the 
neurosciences to reveal, “a set of innate, automatically triggered brain-body behaviors 
and expressions operating outside the domain of consciousness and intentional action.”10 
For Vidal, much “neurologized” scholarship relies on the problematic reductionist 
presupposition that “the mind is what the brain does.”11  
This epilogue stages a historical intervention into the present debate between 
historians inspired by and critical of the neurosciences. Scientific spiritualists’ 
engagements with the emergent sciences of the late nineteenth century, among which 
Bergson’s stands out as the most vigorous, offers a perspective from which to evaluate 
contemporary historians’ engagements with the mature sciences of the twenty-first 
century. My aim is to bring the preceding chapters into critical dialogue with the present 
so that the history of scientific spiritualism might help steer a course for contemporary 
historiography.   
It is scientific spiritualists’ critical point of view that makes their intervention 
relevent in the present debate. Although they acknowledged the insights of experimental 
psychology and evolutionary biology, scientific spiritualists were deeply critical of the 
reductionism attending these sciences. Between 1874 and 1907, these thinkers addressed, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ruth Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique,” Critical Inquiry 37 (2011): 465.  
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disputed, and overcame many of the conceptual problems still at stake in historians’ 
debate over the significance and utility of the neurosciences. Moreover, because the 
sciences that they engaged were still nascent, scientific spiritualists were unable to lean 
on the theoretical assumptions and cultural prestige now enjoyed by the contemporary 
brain sciences. In addition to Bergson, scientific spiritualists such as Maurice Blondel, 
Émile Boutroux, Alfred Fouillée, and Édouard Le Roy felt the demand to articulate the 
stakes of their philosophical engagement with the emerging sciences in no uncertain 
terms. The clarity and originality with which these thinkers advanced their project can 
thus help historians in the present to reappraise the conceptual check that they hope to 
cash by investing their work in neuroscientific research. 
In what follows, I will first present the common interest in the neurosciences 
motivating both historiographical programs, neurohistory and the history of the emotions 
– namely, to restore a thick account of historical actors’ experience neglected by the 
alleged excesses of the linguistic turn.  I will then argue why neurohistory is problematic 
and why the history of the emotions is promising. The former program employs 
neuroscientific research to reveal the somatic, nonconcious experiences of historical 
actors. I bring the arguments of Leys and Vidal to bear on the reductionist consequences 
of neurohistorians’ work, which occasions the intervention that I would like to stage.  
Although Leys and Vidal acutely discern the pitfalls of the neuroscientific 
paradigm, neither offers a corrective to its uncritical use by historians. I turn to the 
history of scientific spiritualism in order to contribute a positive dimension to these 
critics’ incisive critiques. In response to what they saw as the reductionism of 
consciousness resulting from the emergent psychology, scientific spiritualists creatively 
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appropriated scientific research to articulate an expanded account of consciousness. Their 
aim, as Bergson wrote in L’Évolution créatrice (1907), was to leap beyond the limits of 
scientific research, “in order to superpose on scientific truth a knowledge of another kind, 
which may be called metaphysical. Thus combined, all our knowledge, both scientific 
and metaphysical, is heightened.” 12 As long as historians continue to appropriate 
neuroscientific literature, then historians of the emotions, I want to suggest, offer the 
most promising program for doing so. By constructively mobilizing the neurosciences, 
they expand our understanding of historical experience while avoiding the pitfalls that 
Leys and Vidal shrewdly discern. In this way, the history of scientific spiritualists’ 
engagement with the emergent sciences of the late nineteenth century can help to guide 
contemporary historians’ engagements with the sciences of the twenty-first century. 
 
Seeking a New Paradigm Beyond the Linguistic Turn  
 
 Although neurohistorians and historians of the emotions hardly agree about 
methodology, they do share in a wide trend among historians of all stripes seeking to find 
a new paradigm in the wake of the linguistic turn. Richard Rorty originally identified the 
linguistic turn as a method embraced in Anglo-American philosophy.13 In historiography 
the term designates a framework for understanding society and culture as a system of 
signs, which came to be associated with the work the seminal figures Claude Levi-
Strauss, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida. Their insights into structural semiotics, the 
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archaeology of discourses, and literary theory coalesced from 1970s through 1990 into a 
linguistic and constructionist methodology. It directed historians to research the modes of 
cultural representation, the formations of knowledge out of power relations, and the play 
of topoi in texts. Traditional concepts of linear historical causality underwent heightened 
scrutiny as did Marxist concepts of the material base of social and political 
transformation. Historical scholarship duly benefited by proliferating the loci of historical 
agents’ identities beyond class and nation and by foregoing the search for pure origins. 
Yet, many historians now take these fruitful lessons to have, at best, exhausted their 
utility, and at worst, engendered a surfeit of linguistic constructionism untethered to the 
material past.  
 Even in its heyday, many historians criticized the linguistic turn. Martin Jay 
argued that there were several linguistic approaches to history, but no uniform turn.14 
John Toews criticized linguistic theorists’ claim “that the creation of meaning is 
impersonal, operating "behind the backs" of language users whose linguistic actions can 
merely exemplify the rules and procedures of languages they inhabit but do not 
control.”15 Historians inspired by feminist theory criticized what they saw as neglect of 
the material conditions of society and culture and a general failure to ground a 
meaningful concept of historical agency. In the face of critics, Gabrielle Spiegel endorsed 
a moderated approach to linguistic methods tempered by a return to their semiotic 
forefather, Ferdinand Saussure, who, she believed, could rescue a workable concept of 
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human agency.16 By the late 1990s, historians began to discuss the linguistic turn in the 
past tense. Lynn Hunt and Victoria Bonnell called for a new mode of historical 
explanation, which could go beyond symbolic and linguistic connections.17 Their 
aspiration was not only to set the past in a sturdier framework, but also to overcome the 
skeptical impasses – questions such as whether texts can find an anchor in the past – that 
linguistic theories often engendered in the hands of historians.  
“Conveniently,” Michael L. Fitzhugh and William H. Leckie, Jr. wrote in 2001, 
“neuroscience and linguistics… have now combined in a massive interdisciplinary 
endeavor called “cognitive science” which seeks to settle the major questions of human 
epistemology.”18 Research in the field could lay historians’ theoretical disputes to rest. 
According to Fitzhugh and Leckie Jr., cognitive science could help historians appreciate 
language as a communicative tool developed from human physiology, and not treat 
language as a medium that constructs experience.19 Cognitive science, in this sense, 
provides a new epistemological framework to elucidate historians’ inescapable 
relationship to language. The linguistic turn tout court need not be abandoned, so it is 
now argued among neurohistorians, but the constructionist claims of its theoretical canon 
can be undercut. Daniel Lord Smail explicitly adopts this “biological turn,”20 and Lynn 
Hunt endorses it as a means to appreciate how historical reality “is also built through 
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embodiment, gesture, facial expression, and feelings, that is, through nonlinguistic modes 
of communication that have their own logics.”21  
Whether or not historical writing undergoes a new turn – a concept recently 
criticized for outlasting its use22 – the widely perceived exhaustion of the linguistic turn 
indicates that historians are ready to rethink their epistemological relationship to 
historical documents. In particular, they are ready to restore a richer account of historical 
experience against what they see as a formerly myopic focus on historical subjects’ 
relation to language. The neurosciences offer one means to do so.  
 It may be surprising that historians on whom the linguistic turn exerted such a 
formidable influence, with the ire it cast over essentializing biological claims, would seek 
recourse in biological methods. It is especially surprising in the case of Hunt and 
Rosenwein, who acknowledge the strong influence of feminist theory on their work. 
Reflecting on the first rule that defined “good theory” at the height of the linguistic turn, 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank stipulated, “The distance of any such account 
from a biological basis is assumed to correlate near-precisely with its potential for doing 
justice to difference (individual, historical and cross-cultural), to contingency, to 
performative force and to the possibility of change.”23 To be sure, historians interested in 
the neurosciences do not wish to revert to a notion of biology-as-destiny so vigorously 
critiqued by feminist theorists. Developments in epigenesis and neuronal plasticity 
instead offer a picture of the brain and a more general biological framework that help to 
bring sexuality into the domain of nature while doing justice to difference and 
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contingency. As Constantina Papoulias and Felicity Callard observe, “borrowing from 
neuroscience is enabled… insofar as certain writings in neuroscience describe a fluid 
materiality of excitable neural networks, capable of disturbing the role of foundations in 
general and the distinction between nature and culture in particular.”24 Papoulias and 
Callard ultimately see the neurologization of feminist theory, however, as a pyrrhic 
victory. While the new vision of nature unbound by ironclad “natural laws” helps to 
overcome a prior antipathy toward biology, it is drawn from what Papoulias and Callard 
take to be uncritical distortions of popular neuroscientific literature. As a result, concepts 
still subject to contestation in the scientific community, such as affect, sensation, and 
consciousness, appear as settled when transported into humanities and social science 
scholarship.  
In a recent series of interviews, historians of the emotions reflect on their own 
efforts to overcome the linguistic conception of historical epistemology. Reddy 
straightforwardly endorses the brain sciences as a “useful corrective to the excesses of the 
“linguistic turn”.”25 Jan Plamper recalls that he felt motivated to explore the 
neurosciences in the early 2000s in order to find “approaches that would restore the 
visceral qualities of bodily experience to their rightful place, approaches that would also 
allow for stronger notions of causality than “discursive shifts” or the like.”26 But their 
interest in the neurosciences does not amount to an outright rejection of the linguistic 
turn. Nicole Eustace, echoing the program of Fitzhugh and Leckie Jr., suggests that 
linguistic and biological approaches are not mutually-exclusive, since the “neurochemical 
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perception of emotion is formed through language.”27 Rosenwein takes her interest in the 
neurosciences to follow from the lessons of the linguistic turn. And Eugenia Lean warns 
against rejecting the linguistic turn since one of its chief merits was to have centered 
historians’ work on subjectivity. Language, Lean insists, remains a productive starting 
point for interrogating historical actors’ experiences.28  
These historians’ shared motivation confirms Spiegel’s prognosis that “experience 
and practice” will be the master concepts for a new historiographical paradigm beyond 
the linguistic turn. 29 Spiegel contends that the stakes confronting historiography after the 
linguistic turn hinge on whether a new paradigm can rejuvenate a sense of historical 
actors’ phenomenal contact with the material world. At the same time, she affirms, a 
renewed appreciation for historical actors’ purposeful lives and intentional actions can 
continue to profit from a close analysis of structural context. As Spiegel points out, the 
excessive deflation of historical actors’ experience during the linguistic turn can be traced 
back to the initial abandonment of phenomenology by structuralism. Spiegel highlights 
theorists of social practice, such as Mark Bevir, Marshall Sahlins, and William Sewell Jr., 
as well as their predecessors, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel de Certeau, as the leaders of a 
new paradigm, who, in her words, “begin from a belief in individual perception as the 
agent’s own source of knowledge about, and action in, the world, a perception mediated 
and perhaps constrained, but not wholly controlled, by the cultural scaffolding or 
conceptual schemes within which it takes place.”30  
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None of these theorists, to be sure, integrate the neurosciences into their work. 
What I want to draw attention to, however, is the fact that those who do share the same 
objective of enriching their accounts of historical agents’ experience. The appeal to 
experience unites neurohistorians with historians of the emotions, as much as with a wide 
swath of the discipline seeking to find a new paradigm sensitive to the lived dimension of 
the past.   
The neurosciences in no way provide the only means to remedy the excesses of 
the linguistic turn. But whether they succeed in doing so, as Spiegel suggests, depends 
less on whether they overthrow the linguistic turn than on whether they take advantage of 
its methods to articulate a more robust sense of historical experience. “If most 
historians—especially those who still believe in the power and utility of the linguistic 
turn—have no desire to return to an "objective" social science model of history, that is, to 
"save the phenomena," many are nonetheless engaging in a widespread attempt to save 
the phenomenological.”31 Such are the stakes that both programs, neurohistory and the 
history of emotions, must confront in their respective ambitions to rejuvenate historical 
actors’ experience.  
 
The Neurohistorical Program 
 
Daniel Lord Smail’s ambitious neurohistorical program takes its conceptual point 
of departure from what he sees as historians’ outmoded opposition between culture and 
biology. The opposition informs the epistemological separation between the kinds of 
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objects that history and biology are respectively meant to investigate as well as 
methodological distinction between the models of causality on which each discipline 
depends. On this approach, the biological development of the human species laid the 
conditions in “deep history” from which culture emerged in “shallow history.” On the 
contrary, Smail argues that neuroscientific research reveals the opposite relationship: 
changes in culture enable changes in biology. As a result, biological evolution deserves to 
be brought into the epistemological domain of historical research. The transition between 
deep and shallow history, Smail contends, is marked by continuity rather than rupture. 
Smail finds support for his thesis in the central concepts of exaptation in 
evolutionary biology and neuronal plasticity in the neurosciences. An exaptation, as 
Steven Jay Gould and Elizabeth Vrba originally explained, is an evolutionary trait whose 
purpose exceeds the original reason for its emergence.32 The trait cannot be explained as 
an adaptation to the environment since its function surpasses whatever adaptive utility it 
may have initially served. Sex, for example, is exaptive in that it secures social bonds and 
reproduces cultural desires, both of which exceed its original function of procreation. 
Smail goes even further and contends that all of culture constitutes a constellation of 
exaptations.  
Humans’ cultural behavior has the power to influence their biology thanks to the 
concept of neuronal plasticity. The synaptic connections between the brain’s neurons, as 
Smail highlights, form in accord with human activity. Because the neuronal structures of 
humans’ brains have not completely grown at birth, physiological changes during the 
course of life, especially in its early stages, contribute to the brain’s organization. The 
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consequence of neuronal plasticity, as Changeux affirms, is sweeping: “This basic fact 
contradicts the naive picture of the brain as a sort of rigid automaton, made up 
exclusively of neuronal cogs and wheels whose operation is wholly determined in 
advance.”33 Thanks to the neurons’ plasticity, the exaptive traits that emerge over the 
course of evolution can reciprocally influence humans’ biology – a process that 
evolutionary biologists call the “Baldwin effect.”  
The twin concepts of exaptation and plasticity go together in Smail’s account of 
the co-determining relationship between culture and biology. As a consequence, Smail 
and neurohistorians generally do not fear that their program is reductionist, since their 
picture of biology is not meant to directly determine historical events. As Edmund 
Russell contends in his anthology of neurohistorical scholarship, “The main contribution 
of neuroscience is not to undermine the importance of culture in human history, but 
rather to open the black box of the brain to better understand how ideas develop, are 
processed, and affect behavior.”34 
There are wide-reaching implications for historians’ epistemological relationship 
to the past. Smail believes that historians who treat textual documents as their exclusive 
link to dead humans fail to update their discipline on the basis of evolutionary biology 
and the neurosciences. “Textual documents,” as historians of non-literate societies have 
shown, include sources that are not written, such as artifacts and fossils. Physiology, 
Smail urges, is an equally important link not only to past human actors, but to humans’ 
evolutionary predecessors as well. In this light, DNA constitutes a document admissible 
as historical evidence. Michael McCormick, Smail’s colleague at Harvard, encourages 
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medieval historians to recover the migratory patterns and economic structures from the 
traces of DNA available in sources such as the parchment of manuscripts. The hides on 
which medieval Europeans wrote contain DNA traces that can be compared to the bovine 
genomes of particular regions, indicating the movement and commerce of the materials 
used for writing. “Microbiology may well produce the most historical surprises in coming 
years” McCormick suggests, “as it clarifies, at the molecular level, the lives and 
economic experiences of medieval men and women.”35 History thus moves closer to 
archaeology, as DNA becomes a key document to unlock the experiences of historical 
actors. 
Neuro-imaging technologies such electroencephalographs (EEG) and fMRI scans 
also constitute a document linking historians to the past. Smail’s particular interest is that 
they exhibit how the brain responds to psychotropic mechanisms and can thereby reveal 
the history of psychotropic alterations. There are a host of psychotropic mechanisms – 
caffeine, cocaine, television, and the Internet, for example – all defined by their capacity 
to affect humans’ moods. The changes that different psychotropic mechanisms introduce 
into history occur at the level of humans’ stimulus-response patterns. According to Smail, 
these mechanisms have a cultural history that also affects humans’ brain chemistry. On 
the one hand, using caffeine, cocaine, television, and the Internet, is an exaptation 
because these mechanisms trigger hard-wired pleasure centers, while at the same they 
have their own cultural history. They are pleasure-inducing mechanisms circulated, 
produced, used, and abused, in particular cultural contexts. On the other hand, these 
psychotropics alter the brain’s chemistry, thanks to neuronal plasticity, so as to induce 
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new biological dispositions in evolution. Successive generations become accustomed to 
using certain psychotropics and even come to depend on them physiologically. A guiding 
objective of Smail’s neurohistory is to demonstrate how the cultural history of 
psychotropic mechanisms affects humans’ biological history, thereby thoroughly 
imbricating history’s cultural and biological dimensions.  
Psychotropic alterations link the present to both deep and shallow history. 
Dominance hierarchies have their origin, according to Smail, in primate societies where 
female baboons terrorize subservient females. The terrorizing females amplify the stress 
experienced by the subservient females, altering their hormones to effectively instill a 
biological capacity to feel submission. Post-lithic societies have exploited these 
capacities for submission through more modern hierarchies, from pre-modern agriculture 
to post-modern capitalism. But it is at bottom the capacity to experience submission 
physiologically that links power structures in the present to primitive hierarchies in the 
past.36 
Perhaps Smail’s most daring claim follows from his application of neurohistory to 
the origins of the Enlightenment. According to him, the psychotropic substances 
imported into Europe in the late seventeenth century such as coffee, sugar, chocolate, and 
tobacco laid the neuro-chemical conditions for the explosion in ideas characterizing the 
period. The emergence of the public sphere depended not only on the formation of 
reading communities in cafés and salons, but also on the consumption of psychotropic 
substances therein, stirring the bourgeoisie to banter and exchange ideas. These 
psychotropics were of a particular kind, what Smail calls “autotropic” – they alter one’s 
own stimulus-response patterns. The significance of his argument depends on their 
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difference from “teletropic” mechanisms, which humans employ to alter the stimulus-
response patterns of others. The circulation of autotropic mechanisms in the seventeenth 
century accounts for the decline in teletropic mechanisms employed by Christian 
authorities: “where individuals relied on religion and ritual as sources of dopamine and 
other chemical messengers, they turned increasingly to items of consumption, giving up 
God in favor of mammon.”37 The conceptual payoff of Smail’s neurohistory of the 
Enlightenment is to recast its emergence as a psychotropic alteration. Or simply stated, 
Europeans got high.  
Smail expands the scope and methods of his neurohistorical project in his recently 
published collaboration with the anthropologist Andrew Shyrock, Deep History (2011). 
The anthology brings together other historians and anthropologists, as well as biologists 
and geographers, to elaborate on the linkages connecting shallow history to deep history. 
Smail reiterates his argument that psychotropic alteration ties primate life, beginning with 
Homo habilis some 2.6 million years ago, to contemporary human communities. Again, 
the framework within which Smail and Shryock present their project aims to unsettle 
historians’ outmoded opposition to biology, such that “If the past in question predates the 
emergence of literature state societies, it falls under the jurisdiction of archaeologists and 
biological anthropologists, whose methods of inquiry are scientific, not historical.”38 The 
new kinds of documents that Deep History considers include genetic evidence, primate 
eating habits, human fossil records, radiocarbon dating, and instrumental neutron 
activation analysis.  
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. Lynn Hunt champions the methods of neurohistory to enrich historical actors’ 
experience in her own specialization, the French Revolution. The previous paradigms 
used to understand the history of the French Revolution, such as Marxism and neo-
Tocquevillian analysis, have been exhausted, so Hunt claims. The new paradigm must 
answer what Hunt takes to be a new question: how did French men and women 
themselves experience the revolution? The question motivates Hunt to “urge a 
reconceptualization of individual experience based on perspectives derived from recent 
research in neuroscience.”39 These perspectives, she claims, illuminate a mode of 
selfhood that synthesizes rational and emotional, conscious and unconscious processes, 
effectively unraveling the dualism of mind and body.  
By foregrounding this mode of selfhood, historians can appreciate how historical 
actors perceived the new visual culture of the Revolution. Hunt’s aspiration is to build on 
art historians’ research into the new print forms produced during the Revolutionary 
period to further understand the ways in which “prints had direct bodily effects via both 
the unconscious bodily emotions and conscious embodied feelings, and they had those 
effects not only because of their putative content but also because of their size, their look, 
and their potential for collective sharing with other viewers.”40 Historical actors’ 
subjective perceptions of the unique qualities of their Revolutionary environment, as 
Hunt writes elsewhere, “rested on new cultural forms that transformed the experience of 
time, space, and the apprehension of individuality,” all of which, she adds, “did not 
necessarily take place on a conscious level.”41 The coherence of Hunt’s project depends 
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on the conceptual division she draws between two levels of experience: feelings within 
consciousness and bodily effects outside of consciousness. She challenges historians to 
use the methods of neurohistory not merely to document how historical actors 
represented Revolutionary visual culture on the former level, but also to document how 
their bodies unconsciously felt on the latter level. The neurosciences thus serve to 
uncover how the bodies of French men and women reacted, rather than what their minds 
thought.  
 Hunt’s project follows from her earlier interest in the origins of human rights 
during the eighteenth century. In Inventing Human Rights: A History (2007), Hunt argues 
that new reading practices in the mass public helped to generate widespread interest in a 
universal concept of humanity. Epistolary novels induced readers to sympathize with the 
fictional protagonist, and accounts of torture drew readers into the lives of remote 
prisoners. Diaries and letters thus provided reading communities with a newfound access 
to characters’ and writers’ experiences. These new forms of writing did not produce 
sympathetic identification sui generis. Rather, Hunt contends, the reading practices 
enabled by these forms of writing mobilized the pre-existing human capacity for 
sympathetic feeling and elevated it to a wider universal plane: “reading accounts of 
torture or epistolary novels had physical effects that translated into brain changes and 
came back out as new concepts about the organization of social and political life.”42  
True to the neurohistorical program, Inventing Human Rights demonstrates how 
cultural practice produced biological effects that in turn changed the course of human 
history. Hunt does so by setting about the straightforward historical task of interpreting 
and contextualizing how historical actors read literature. At the same time, she sets 
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herself the distinctly neurohistorical task of drawing from neuroscientific observations of 
what the brain does when humans read literature.43 What follows is Hunt’s claim that the 
emergence of a particular concept of human rights depended less on the political 
commitments of its ideological proponents and more on physiological experiences 
“within individual minds.”44  
 Smail and Hunt share the common objective of explaining historical actors’ 
experience on the basis of neurophysiological facts about the brain. These facts are 
supposed to be unconscious, or as Smail and Hunt frequently seem to imply, 
nonconscious, since they belong exclusively to the brain (and thus are not unconscious in 
the psychoanalytic sense of drives). In order to pay attention to these facts, 
neurohistorians appropriate neuroscientific literature, which they take to reveal a register 
of experience impenetrable by conventional modes of historical interpretation. The 
ambition is to explain experience in terms of what it was like inside historical actors – a 
project that one commentator aptly calls “history from within.” 45  
Does it make sense to call the neurophysiological processes unfolding outside of 
consciousness experiences? And do the neurosciences even support such a notion of 
experience? If so, might neurohistorians risk reducing historical actors’ conscious 
practices to the work of their brains? Answering these questions requires a closer 
examination of the epistemological and methodological commitments of the 
neurohistorical program.  
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Neurocultures in Critical Perspective  
 
 Neurohistorians argue that they evade the charge of reductionism thanks to a 
dynamic understanding of the brain borrowed from the neurosciences. It is on this basis 
that they claim to unite culture and biology as reciprocally determining. But the stakes of 
their project turn on whether or not the brain, despite its creative capacities, can be the 
locus of experience. If neurohistorians claim to give an account of what it was like in the 
past on the basis of brain scans in the present, then neurohistory is committed to 
identifying what goes on in experience with what goes on in the brain.  
The identification is by no means innocent. As Fernando Vidal persuasively 
argues, the commitment is symptomatic of a modern ideology that “the mind is what the 
brain does.”46 This ideology is a default folk psychology. It draws its force from a 
particular notion of subjectivity that construes the qualitative aspects of experience, such 
as what it is like to perceive, deliberate, and think, as functions of the quantitative data 
represented in neuro-imaging technologies. Fernando Vidal along with Francisco Ortega 
state the critique forcefully:  
On the one hand, events on the visual surface of the computer screen are 
extrapolated into the brain (making it “light up” with intelligence, and 
“glow” with fear and desire); the organ is thereby personified and equated 
with the person. On the other hand, while in the laboratory setting, the 
label that will characterize the scanned subjects (normal, depressed, 
doping this or that) is established before the scanning begins; popular 
accounts tend to suggest that images provide the label, thus turning a 
social process into the subject’s essence.47  
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Determinations of what particular qualitative experiences mean – what fear, anxiety, 
desire, or reasoning are – must first be made in a normative and cultural context before 
those experiences can be observed in neuro-images. Vidal’s and Ortega’s point is that 
neuroscientists do not neutrally read these determinations off of EEG scans or fMRI 
images. Rather, culturally specific determinations subtend the very capacity of 
neuroimaging technologies both to be representative of what qualitative experiences are 
and, in turn, to represent qualitative experiences as happening within the brain. The 
twofold process by which the brain becomes identified with the totality of experience – 
both its meaning and its location – depends on a particular understanding of selfhood, 
what Vidal calls the “cerebral subject,” or what Nikolas Rose calls the “neurochemical 
self.”48 This understanding reduces the conscious and culturally normative determination 
of qualitative experience to the quantitative facts exhibited in neuro-images.     
Consequently, the neuroscientific research that neurohistorians appropriate does 
not so conveniently integrate the scientific and the cultural to effectuate the desired 
rapprochement between biology and history. This is not to say that the neuroscientific 
research that interests Smail and Hunt is a cultural construction without naturalistic 
validity. Rather, it is an irreducibly cultural concept of cerebral subjectivity that 
facilitates Smail’s and Hunt’s appropriation of neuroscientific research in the service of 
revealing a nonconscious notion of experience.  
This particular notion of experience as nonconscious is problematic. Despite their 
attempts to explain historical actors’ experience from the collaborative perspectives of 
biology and culture, neurohistorians construe the two perspectives as functioning on 
distinct levels, the former on a nonconscious level and the latter on a conscious level. 
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This amounts to what Leys calls “anti-intentionalism.” According to Leys, 
neurohistorians invoke neurosciencific research in order to unveil the brain processes 
functioning, as it were, behind the backs of historical actors. Smail’s psychotropic 
mechanisms are exemplary, in the eyes of Leys, since they “must be viewed as 
independent of, and in an important sense prior to, ideology—that is, prior to intentions, 
meanings, reasons, and beliefs— because they are nonsignifying, autonomic processes 
that take place below the threshold of conscious awareness and meaning.”49 New 
autotropics such as coffee, tea, and tobacco, to recall Smail’s argument, stirred 
energizing, even loquacious, moods that caused Europeans in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries to engage in a new public discourse. Smail replaces an analysis of 
the meaning of Enlightenment thought with an analysis of its affective, 
neurophysiological triggers, thereby demonstrating his commitment to anti-
intentionalism.  
 Leys uses a philosophically robust definition of intentionality borrowed in part 
from the phenomenological tradition: “intentionality involves concept possession; the 
term intentionality carries with it the idea that thoughts and feelings are directed to 
conceptually and cognitively appraised and meaningful objects in the world.”50 For the 
phenomenological tradition, beginning with Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl, 
“intentionality” signifies the “about-ness” relation that consciousness has toward its 
experiences, whereby experience is a matter of the subject’s relation to its intentional 
objects. Neurohistorians are anti-intentionalists in the sense that the kinds of experiences 
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that interest them, and which the neurosciences are meant to reveal, do not depend in any 
way on the meaning-making contributions of historical actors’ minds.  
Leys sees neurohistory as symptomatic of a wider turn to affect across the 
humanities and social sciences. One of the most influential affect theorists is Brian 
Massumi, who as early as 1995 argued that affect is an autonomous, animating force, 
producing effects faster than conscious thought.51 Massumi sees himself as responding to 
the excesses of the linguistic turn, wherein “The classical definition of the human as the 
rational animal returns in new permutation: the human as the chattering animal. Only the 
animal is bracketed: the human as the chattering of culture.”52 To restore the “animal,” 
Massumi poaches from a series of neuroscientific experiments, above all Benjamin 
Libet’s famed “missing half second” experiment, to demonstrate that the affective 
circuitry of the body acts in advance – .5 seconds to be precise – of the conscious 
coordination of volitional activity.53 For Massumi, as well as for a host of other 
humanities and social science scholars, “affect” functions as a malleable concept 
facilitating a new focus on the body in the aftermath of the linguistic turn. William 
Connolly brings affect into political theory. “The ubiquity of affect,” he claims, “is at 
work the force-fields of rapid news media, state policing, and neoliberal politics, 
effectively saturating political discourse with noise.”54 Nigel Thrift brings affect into 
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geography. He investigates the social affects drawing crowds into political decision-
making, which traverse individual bodies as nodal points.55 Lauren Berlant brings affect 
into English literary studies. She reads authors who depict “cruel optimism,” the affect 
inducing people to continue committing themselves to lovers, projects, or ideologies that 
are ultimately harmful.56 What these and other affect theorists share, despite their myriad 
differences, is an understanding of affect as, in the words of Teresa Brennan, “the 
physiological shift accompanying a judgment.”57 Affects work on the body by means of 
an “energetic determination,” which is not to be confused with a conscious 
determination.58 What this means, I take it, is that the vital activity of the body generates 
experiences independent of the meaning-making activity of consciousness. “The result,” 
Leys summarizes, “is the body not only “senses” and performs a kind of “thinking” 
below the threshold of conscious recognition and meaning but… because of the speed 
with which the autonomic, affective processes are said to occur, it does all this before the 
mind has time to intervene.”59 
As a consequence of their anti-intentionalism, neurohistorians rely on an unduly 
myopic picture of consciousness. As long as neurohistorians strive to restore historical 
actors’ experience on the basis of neurophysiological processes at work outside of 
consciousness or the mind, then the coherence of their project turns on what they mean 
by these terms. When Lynn Hunt writes, for example, “Like newspapers and novels, 
prints had direct bodily effects via both the unconscious bodily emotions and conscious 
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embodied feelings,” the intelligibility of her claim that media have “direct bodily effects” 
hinges on the distinction that she proceeds to draw between “unconscious bodily 
emotions” and “conscious embodied feelings.”60 The force of Leys’ critique, as I 
understand it, is to show that neurohistorians and affect theorists end up relying on a 
restricted picture of consciousness when they claim that a host of neurophysiological 
experiences occur outside of it. As Leys states, “it is only by adopting a highly idealized 
or metaphysical picture of the mind as completely separate from the body and brain to 
which it freely directs its intentions and decisions that they can reach the skeptical 
conclusions they do.”61 The profit that neurohistorians hope to garner from their 
investment in the neurosciences, after all, is that they reveal the nonconscious 
experiences of historical actors. In order for psychotropic alterations and direct bodily 
effects to be experienced outside of consciousness, for Smail and Hunt respectively, both 
historians narrow the scope of consciousness to transparent and rational calculation. 
Herein lies the crux of neurohistorians’ reductionism.  
Scientific spiritualists such as Alfred Fouillée critiqued a similarly restricted 
picture of consciousness attending the emerging experimental psychology and 
evolutionary biology of the nineteenth century in prescient terms: “Consciousness 
becomes a spectator, a witness, an eye contemplating things whose course it cannot 
change; even less than that, it is a simple reflection throwing momentary light on a 
genuinely obscure and unconscious depth.”62 But rather than reject these sciences for 
their reductionism, new spiritualist thinkers like Fouillée sought to build on their research 
program by articulating an expanded picture of consciousness.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Lynn Hunt, “The Experience of Revolution,” 677, my emphasis.  
61 Ruth Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique,” 155.  
62 Alfred Fouillée, L’évolutionnisme des idées forces (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1890). 36.  
348 
Despite their incisive critiques of neurohistorians’ problematic uses of the 
neurosciences, neither Leys nor Vidal offer a positive proposal for better 
historiographical uses of the neurosciences. In light of new spiritualists’ project, I want to 
ask whether Leys’ and Vidal’s critiques of neurohistory undermine the entire endeavor of 
historians to stage a rapprochement between neuroscience and history? Might it still be 
possible to hold onto a salvageable core of the neurohistorical program? Neither Vidal 
nor Leys make any mention of new spiritualist thinkers in their work, but that is perhaps 
all the more reason why the history of the new spiritualism, I want to suggest, can offer a 
productive intervention in the present debate. 
 
Scientific Spiritualism Today 
 
The history of scientific spiritualists’ engagement with the emergent sciences of 
the nineteenth century can help to deepen the critique that Leys and Vidal mount against 
neurohistorians’ problematic uses of the neurosciences. At stake for scientific spiritualists 
as well for Leys and Vidal, is the reductionism of the old and new brain sciences. But 
rather than having rejected the nascent sciences of their period outright, scientific 
spiritualists used them as a constructive basis on which to advance an expanded picture of 
consciousness and with it, a richer account of experience. It is this constructive project, I 
would like to suggest, which can help guide historians toward a more productive 
engagement with the neurosciences today. 
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Scientific spiritualists conceived consciousness as, at bottom, a form of both 
corporeal and conceptual activity.63 In opposition to neo-Kantian thinkers who conceived 
consciousness as an act of judgment, whereby the intellect evaluates the concepts through 
which it represents the world – an act contemporary philosophers construe as the giving 
and taking of reasons - scientific spiritualists conceived consciousness as an activity 
embedded in a shared biological, social, and historical world. The emergence of this 
pragmatic conception in late nineteenth-century France took off, as I documented in Part 
I, in part thanks to the revival of the early nineteenth-century philosopher, Maine de 
Biran. Biran presented conscious activity under two aspects: external and internal. 
External experiences make use of the body’s external sense organs to perceive discrete 
and punctual sensations in the outside world. Internal experiences make use of the 
internal organs and engender the feeling of muscular effort, a holistic and continuous 
sensation. Affection and intellection are thereby inseparable. Where scientific spiritualists 
advanced beyond Biran was in explaining these kinds of activity, the external and the 
internal, as two dimensions of the same conscious experience, rather than as distinct 
experiences. It followed that the philosophical problem scientific spiritualists confronted 
was not to connect body and spirit, but rather to explain how the emergent sciences could 
produce the illusion that two were separate. Since my immediate relation to my own body 
is always one dimension of phenomenal experience, Biran held, it is only by abstracting 
an idealized picture of consciousness that I can come to see my body and mind as distinct 
entities. I want to suggest that this multi-dimensional picture of consciousness as an 
activity that is at once psychic and embodied lends conceptual purchase to Leys’ critique 
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of neurohistorians’ “mistaken commitment to the idea of a presumed separation between 
other.”64  
For scientific spiritualists, making meaning and corporeal feeling are both 
activities performed within and by consciousness. Fouillée evinced this commitment in 
his notion of idées-forces, which holds that ideas are intellectual objects that drive toward 
action. As he wrote in his treatise on idées-forces, “there is the intellectual in emotion, the 
emotional in intelligence, and attention and appétition in every emotion and in every 
intellection.”65 Mental activity and bodily activity were therefore not understood as two 
separate experiences, the former occurring within consciousness and the latter outside of 
it. Rather, Foullée took both to be different dimensions of the totality of conscious 
experience.  
Scientific spiritualists’ constructive engagement with the nascent experimental 
psychology and evolutionary biology provided an occasion to critique these sciences’ 
reductionism by articulating an expanded, multi-dimensional account of consciousness. 
As I documented in Part II, the claims of experimental psychologists to reveal 
nonconscious, purely physiological processes were manifest in Fechner’s use of 
psychophysics to uncover the nonconscious sensations beneath the just-noticeable 
differences of conscious perceptions, as well as in Ribot’s use of psychopathology to 
ascertain the organic, evolutionary laws governing the conservation and recollection of 
memory. Bergson’s critique of these respective methods in his first two books, L’Essai 
sur les données immédiates de la conscience and Matière et mémoire, sought to limit the 
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reach of psychophysics and psychopathology to the superficial dimension of conscious 
experience – the sensorial dimension in contact with the external world. Bergson argued 
that Fechner and Ribot erred by extending the results of their research beyond the 
external dimension of consciousness to an allegedly nonconscious, anterior dimension. 
Bergson’s claim was that the quantitative duration of perceptions and the physiological 
laws of memory are not outside consciousness, but inhere in one dimension of 
consciousness. The data of experimental psychology thus adhere to a distinct logic best 
suited, Bergson contended, to the laws of associationism and the principles of mechanism 
on which psychophysics and psychopathology respectively built their methods. Bergson 
thought that these methods adequately capture the regular succession of discrete, 
momentary perceptions operating in the external dimension of consciousness. Beyond his 
critical task, Bergson took as his constructive task to articulate the principles of the 
deeper, internal dimension of consciousness that surpasses the reach of psychophysics 
and psychopathology.  
The internal dimension of consciousness, scientific spiritualists agreed, exceeds 
the reach of scientific methods because it is more responsive to freedom. Since freedom, 
following Biran, is experienced as a continuous and holistic integration of motor effort, it 
can only be revealed using philosophical tools of qualitative description – what 
philosophers would later call phenomenological reflection – rather than by using 
scientific methods of experimentation. Émile Boutroux succinctly posited this 
constructive task in De la contingence des lois de la nature: 
Now, abandoning the external point of view where things appear as fixed 
and limited realities, so that we may fathom our deepest self and, if we 
can, apprehend our being in its true origin, we find that freedom is an 
infinite power. We are conscious of this power every time we truly act. 
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Our actions do not, cannot realize it, and so we are not this power 
ourselves. It exists, nevertheless, since it is the root of our very being.66  
 
In contrast to the fragmentary activity of the external dimension of consciousness 
that the sciences discern, scientific spiritualists like Boutroux developed accounts of the 
fluid and free activity inhering in the internal dimension of consciousness. It was within 
this intellectual historical context that Bergson developed his concept of the lived 
experience of time, or durée, which, he argued, exceeds scientific psychologists’ 
measurement of psychic states:  
Below homogeneous duration, which is the extensive symbol of true 
duration, a close psychological analysis distinguishes a duration whose 
heterogeneous moments permeate one another; below the numerical 
multiplicity of conscious states, a qualitative multiplicity; below the self 
with well-defined states, a self in which succeeding each other means 
melting into one another and forming an organic whole.67  
 
Bergson’s distinction between the homogeneous, extensive, and quantitative form of 
superficial conscious states on the one hand, and the heterogeneous, intensive, and 
qualitative form of deep conscious states on the other hand, reflected his commitment to 
the scientific spiritualists’ project of developing a philosophical account of the inner 
dimension of consciousness, which, because it is free, eludes the sciences’ measurement 
of the external dimension.  
 Philosophers in France tackled the emerging quantitative methods head-on by 
reorienting public philosophy instruction around experimental psychology in the lycées. 
As I documented in Part III, the philosophy curriculum released by the Ministry of Public 
Instruction in the programme of 1874 broke with metaphysical study of consciousness 
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championed by Victor Cousin, who controlled public philosophy instruction until his 
death in 1867, and put students in newfound contact with experimental research. Bergson 
stood out as a young lycée professor for having seized the new pedagogical material. 
Following the mandatory psychology lesson on the distinction between psychological and 
physiological facts, Bergson added his own on “the problem of the unconscious,” in 
which he encouraged students to challenge experimental psychologists such as Ribot, 
Fechner, and Wundt. Their error, Bergson claimed was “to assimilate a psychic state to a 
state of matter.”68 The feelings undergone in the body, he urged, do not take place outside 
of consciousness. Bergson instead took Ribot, Fechner, and Wundt to reveal one 
dimension of consciousness among others, since, as Bergson reminded students, “What 
one must admit is that consciousness has degrees… Beyond the clear and distinct 
consciousness, there is another vague, confused and enveloped consciousness.”69  
 Although the emergent sciences of the late nineteenth century are certainly 
outdated in contrast to the neurosciences, scientific spiritualists offered a model of 
constructive engagement with the sciences still tenable today. Instead of having rejected 
the reductive picture of consciousness advanced by the nascent sciences, scientific 
spiritualists used them as the bases on which to develop an expanded picture of 
consciousness. As Alfred Fouillée succinctly put it, “Where science ends, metaphysics 
begins, and above all, the metaphysics of action.”70 The model of leaping beyond 
scientific results to achieve an expanded picture of consciousness motivated scientific 
spiritualists’ shared project. “The philosopher’s point of departure is correcting the truth 
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reduced to dogmatic formulas, such as those resulting from the organization that science 
elaborates,” Édouard Le Roy affirmed in “Science et philosophie.” “It is impossible to 
begin otherwise, since thought would have no solid point of reference.”71  
 The moral that neurohistorians should take from scientific spiritualists’ critical 
project is that the research program of the neursociences is mistaken so long as it is 
interpreted to reveal experiences outside of consciousness. A nonconscious experience is 
a reductive notion: it is no experience at all. The scientific spiritualists incisively 
demonstrated that, to the contrary, the emergent sciences of the nineteenth century 
successfully expanded the dimensions of consciousness beyond the exclusively 
intellectual scope of their neo-Kantian contemporaries.   
 As long as there are historians interested in making use of the neurosciences to 
reveal historical actors’ experiences, then they should take guidance from scientific 
spiritualist thinkers’ constructive project of using scientific research to advance an 
expansive, multi-dimensional account of consciousness. This constructive project can 
also enrich the critique that Leys and Vidal mount against neurohistorians’ reductionist 
use of the neurosciences by offering a positive model for productive uses of the 
neurosciences.  
 This is not at all to argue that historians ought to keep up to date with 
neuroscientific literature. Rather, I want to suggest that scientific spiritualism offers a 
vision for those who do. While I have no crystal ball to predict the future paradigms that 
historians will embrace, the history of the emotions offers the most promising program 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Édouard Le Roy, “Science et Philosophie III,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, T. 7, No. 6 (1899): 
719. 
355 
for appropriating neuroscientific research to advance an expansive, multi-dimensional 
account of historical experience  
 
The Program for the History of Emotions 
 
 In 1997, William Reddy presented a program for the historical study of the 
emotions on the basis of neuroscientific research. Like neurohistorians, Reddy sought to 
escape the excesses of constructionism, which, following the linguistic turn generally and 
Foucault’s discursive methodology in particular, he thought had construed historical 
subjectivity as “the absolute plasticity of the individual.”72 The neurosciences, Reddy 
believed, offer a universal basis firmly grounded in reality from which to investigate 
historical experience. 
 Where Reddy’s project differs from neurohistory’s is in his claim to interpret 
historical actors’ emotional experiences from their conscious statements about emotional 
experiences. Reddy dubs these kinds of statements “emotives.” An emotive is a form of 
speech act whose performative force mobilizes the speaker’s emotion. For example, the 
emotive, “I am angry,” evokes the speaker’s anger; it does not merely describe whether 
he or she is angry. Reddy conceives emotives as “instruments for directly changing, 
building, hiding, intensifying emotions.”73 The semantic form and meaningful content of 
emotives depends on their particular cultural and historical context. What the 
neurosciences provide is “some conception of the givens upon which this lexicon works 
(either well or poorly), to discover the tensions out of which change may grow and the 
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stakes in terms of the distribution of political power”74 For Reddy, the neurosciences help 
to reveal the kinds of neurophysiological mechanisms on which humans draw when 
conveying their experiences in the form of emotives. These mechanisms are at work as 
humans learn how to express emotion; and although their expressions are historically and 
culturally mediated, the biological bases of emotional training are universal. The 
historical study of the emotions, on Reddy’s account, finds its justification in the 
neurosciences yet surpasses their research program by making use of distinctly historical 
methods of interpretation.  
 Historians have studied emotions for some time. In The Autumn of the Middle 
Ages (1919) Johan Huizinga explored the emotional life of fourteenth and fifteenth-
century men and women. In his magnum opus, The Civilizing Process (1939), Norbert 
Elias documented the emergence of emotional control since late medieval period. Peter 
N. Stearns and Carol Zisowitz Stearns continue to advance their studies in 
“emotionology,” which they inaugurated in 1985 with an article urging historians to 
examine the social rules and norms governing the emotions.75  
 In the last fifteen years, Reddy’s program has motivated historians of diverse 
specializations to gather around a distinct approach to the history of emotions on the basis 
of the neurosciences. These historians depart from neurohistorians, and avoid the 
reductionist pitfalls that Leys and Vidal identify, in their nearly ubiquitous commitment 
to the imbricated relation between emotion and cognition, or corporeal and intellectual 
experience. In his first book to pursue his research program, The Navigation of Feeling 
(2001), Reddy explicitly criticizes the view that emotions, because of their non-linear 
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structure and physiological dependence, “departed from a vision of conscious, rational, 
voluntary action that was believed to be the hallmark of human intelligence.”76 Instead, 
he advances an account of conscious experience that is of a piece with the multi-
dimensional account developed by scientific spiritualists: “as thinking has increasingly 
been regarded as reflecting multiple levels of activation, attention, and coherence, it has 
become difficult to sustain the distinction between thought and affect.”77 It follows that 
neurophysiological processes do not work, as it were, behind the backs of historical 
agents; rather, historical agents actively take up and make use of their physiology.78 
Other historians of the emotions reiterate this view. In her book on emotions in the 
middle ages, Barbara Rosenwein writes, “The close connection between emotions and 
goals aligns them with conscious, well considered thought; there is no need – indeed it is 
incorrect – to separate emotions from ideas.”79 In her book on sensibility in the American 
Revolution, Sarah Knott presents cognition and emotion, “not in strict oppositions of 
head and heart, reason and passion, but rather in a naturally sensitive, briskly responsive, 
and thoroughly holistic self.”80 
 None of these historians mention Bergson or scientific spiritualists. The history of 
these thinkers’ engagements with the emergent sciences of the late nineteenth century 
nonetheless helps to underline the significance of Reddy’s program, in particular his 
proviso that the neurosciences must be interpretively integrated into an account of the self 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 William Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Monique Scheer pursues this point, arguing that emotions can be thought of as forms of practice. Her 
conception of “practice,” however, is not neuroscientific. See “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (And is 
That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding Emotion,” History 
and Theory 51 (2012): 193-220.  
79 Barbara Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2006), 14 
80 Sarah Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2009), 5.  
358 
in order to contribute a meaningful account of experience. He urges historians not to treat 
any neuroscientific position as a ready-made theory, easily serviceable to ground 
historical subjectivity.81 This enjoins historians to set their methods in a precise division 
of labor with the neurosciences. It is here where the history of the emotions best reflects 
new spiritualist thinkers’ constructive project for engaging the sciences.   
Reddy makes use of the affective neurosciencies in order to provide a language 
for humans’ natural capacities for regulating emotion. Following the research of Alice 
Isen and Gregory Diamond, Reddy conceives emotions as “overlearned cognitive 
habits.”82 Even though emotions seem to follow automatically from stimuli, coloring 
experiences, as it were, without the mind’s attentive and meaningful contributions, 
emotions are nevertheless slowly formed and deformed over time. This conception of 
emotions contradicts that of the basic emotions paradigm originally advanced by Paul 
Ekman and Wallace Friesen, according to which there are six biologically universal 
emotions that manifest transparently via facial expressions: happiness, sadness, fear, 
anger, surprise, and disgust.83 Ekman and Wallace did countenance culturally specific 
“display rules” that overlay and modify how individuals convey more complex 
emotions.84 But research in cognitive psychology has since affirmed that intention and 
meaning play active roles in shaping emotions through and through. Reddy highlights 
two ways in which emotions should be thought of as overlearned cognitive habits in The 
Navigation of Feeling. First, emotions reflect peoples’ goals. Actions, events, and 
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circumstances elicit emotions whose valence involves the significances attributed to 
them. The fear or anxiety one might feel when his or her health is jeopardy, for example, 
evinces the goal of living healthfully. Second, emotions involve mental control. To the 
extent that social norms govern how individuals ought to express or repress their 
emotions, hardwired constraints also prevent humans from completely bending emotions 
to their will. Reddy brings attention to the “reflexivity constraint,” whereby actively 
repressing a feeling can paradoxically evoke the feeling more powerfully.85 Between the 
pressures of culture and biology, emotion constitutes what Reddy calls a “domain of 
effort.”86  
A recent study of neuro-images displaying emotional responses conducted by 
Kristen Lindquist and her colleagues confirms that emotions cannot be understood as 
natural-kinds, localizable in specific centers of the brain. Emotions activate multiple 
pathways. For example, the amygdala, which is supposed to control fear, is also active in 
other emotions, such as disgust. “[A]ffect and executive attention are merely two 
different sources of attention in the brain,” the authors conclude, “rather than processes 
that differ in kind.”87 In other words, emotion admits universal regulative mechanisms 
that work in concert with other conscious activities. Learning to properly activate these 
mechanisms depends on culturally specific emotional norms, the minute analysis of 
which exceeds neuroscientific methods. The study’s moral, as Reddy suggests in a recent 
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lecture, is that “emotions have a history.”88  
This division of labor between neuroscientific experimentation and historical 
interpretation motivates what Nicole Eustace sees as “the practical and theoretical utility 
of combining biological and cultural approaches. On the one hand, we are able to analyze 
eighteenth-century emotion today only because of the existence of a shared physiology of 
feeling that stretches over the centuries. On the other hand, we cannot simply assume that 
eighteenth-century emotional expression can now be understood transparently and 
without translation.”89 I take Eustace’s point that emotional experiences cannot be read 
transparently from neuroscientific experiments to give force to the history of the 
emotions’ specific methodological approach to the neurosciences. By interpreting how 
historical documents deploy emotives, historians come to understand how social regimes 
gave shape to the norms through which historical actors articulated their emotional 
experiences.  
The conception of experience that the history of the emotions employs, unlike that 
of neurohistory, is public. Emotives open a window onto the kinds of social activities that 
constituted admissible emotional experiences in certain periods. They do not aim to 
ascertain the private experience of what it was like to be a certain historical actor – what 
Lynn Hunt presents as “the microlevel of the French Revolution as subjective 
experience.”90 It is wrong, consequently, to characterize the history of emotions as if “Its 
practitioners try to get into the heads of earlier generations in order to understand their 
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complex emotions and motivations.”91 
 Reddy carries out his program in The Navigation of Feeling by documenting the 
regulation of emotional experience in eighteenth and nineteenth-century France. Reddy 
argues that the royal court of Louis XIV enforced a rigid “emotional regime” through the 
civil code, which repressed its subjects’ abilities to express their emotions in public. 
Those who sought to escape the code’s constraints found “emotional refuge” in salons, 
theatres, clubs, and popular novels. Sentimental emotions found free expression in these 
spaces. The Revolution, according to Reddy, marked the overthrow of an emotional 
regime as much as the overthrow of the royal court. A space was cleared for the once 
marginalized sentimentalism to occupy the position of the new emotional regime. In the 
immediate post-Revolution era, emotions became a criterion of sound political discourse: 
Jacobins employed sentimentality in their arguments to justify their moral authority.  
 Emotion functioned not only as a dimension of political reason, which historians 
have widely identified as central to Revolutionary discourse (and Enlightenment 
discourse more broadly).92 According to Reddy, emotional activity was also one factor 
among other institutional, economic, and political factors that drove historical change, 
since revolutionaries sought to mold the new Republic in the image of the sentimentality 
enjoyed in emotional refuges.93 “The power of emotions to shape feelings had a decisive 
impact on the opening and the outcome of the Revolution. The eighteenth-century rise of 
sentimentalism gave the Revolution both its initial impetus and a strong bias toward 
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extremism.”94 The “emotional liberty” produced under Jacobin rule was short-lived and, 
Reddy hastens to add, disastrous. With the Terror, those who failed to express “true” 
emotives were deemed evil. But the Directory swiftly undermined sentimentalism by 
replacing it with “masculine reason.” Whereas the Jacobins tethered political discourse to 
emotional expression, the Napoleonic era severed the two. Newfound emotional refuges 
took form in art, literature, and domestic life, prompting the rise of the romantic passions 
that would come to define early nineteenth-century French aesthetics. 
 The affective neurosciences facilitate Reddy’s narrative by offering an additional 
layer of historical meaning with which to explain the Revolution. The emotional 
dimension in which French men and women experienced the Revolution depended on 
their deliberate self-regulation of emotions in conformity with the social norms governing 
their expression. The Navigation of Feeling thereby makes good on Reddy’s claim in his 
programmatic article, “Emotional control is the real site of the exercise of power: politics 
is just a process of determining who must repress as illegitimate, who must foreground as 
valuable, the feelings and desires that come up for them in given contexts and 
relationships.”95 The science of emotional regulation thereby contributes another tool 
with which historians can explain the exercise of power beyond its material, discursive, 
or gendered forms. The success of Reddy’s narrative, I want to suggest, depends on his 
commitment to using the neurosciences constructively in order to develop what he calls 
in a recent interview a “hermeneutic” account of emotional experience: “I attempt to 
understand human existence by examining the intentions of persons, what they mean to 
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say, what they mean to do.”96 In this, Reddy overcomes the reductionist pitfalls of 
neurohistory. The neurophysiological mechanisms of emotion do not serve to reveal 
experiences as such, but instead enable him to “propose that a new class of intentions be 
added to the mix, that is, intentional shaping of one's own emotions.”97 Herein also lies 
Reddy’s implicit conceptual debt to scientific spiritualism’s project of correcting the 
reductionist tendencies of the sciences by appropriating them to expand the dimensions of 
conscious experience. 
 Reddy advances this constructive model in his most recent book, The Making of 
Romantic Love: Longing and Sexuality in Europe, South Asia, and Japan, 900-1200 CE. 
He examines how the distinction between romantic love and desire (understood as a 
carnal appetite) emerged in twelfth-century Europe. Reddy traces the origins of the 
dualism to, on the one hand, the Gregorian reforms that condemned all sexual 
partnerships as inherently sinful on account of the bodily-driven desire of the flesh, and 
on the other, trobairitz and troubadour conceptions of true love, or fin’amors, that 
elevated selfless love for another as a truer form of sexual partnership, effectively 
spiritualizing bodily desire. The form of Reddy’s argument is similar to that in The 
Navigation of Feeling. Romantic, or courtly love, developed as a purified form of desire 
that escaped the rigid restrictions that Gregorian reforms imposed on all forms of sexual 
partnerships. It was thanks to the conflict between these two emotional regimes that the 
distinction between romantic love and desire-as-appetite gained coherence. Reddy 
contrasts this Western distinction to practices in Bengal and Orissa kingdoms of South 
Asia and Heian Japan, neither of which opposed flesh and spirit, and its corollary, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 William Reddy in “AHR Conversation: The Historical Study of Emotions,” 1509. 
97 Ibid. 
364 
romantic love and desire-as-appetite. Taking his point of departure from the purportedly 
neutral language of the affective neurosciences, Reddy’s comparative historical 
ethnography proceeds to demonstrate  
“three modes of understanding of longing and sexuality that developed independently as 
quite distinct realizations of human possibilities.”98  
 Numerous historians of the emotions who I have already mentioned in this section 
adopt Reddy’s constructive model for using the neurosciences to expand the dimensions 
of historical experience. Barbara Rosenwein explores what she calls the “emotional 
communities” of the sixth and seventh centuries in Emotional Communities in the Early 
Middle Ages. According to Rosenwein,“An emotional community is a group in which 
people have a common stake, interests, values, and goals.”99 She documents three 
emotional communities in the towns of Trier, Vienne, and Clermont in Francia, unified in 
their Christianity, yet distinguished in their regulation of emotions. One kind of emotive 
that Rosenwein interprets is found in the epitaphs that these communities drafted for 
burial ceremonies. Another kind is found in the writings of Gregory the Great and 
Gregory of Tours, each of whom represented disparate emotional communities: the 
former distrusted emotions whereas the latter valued emotional metaphors embracing 
family feeling. Rosenwein does not adopt Reddy’s program uncritically. She takes issue 
with its binary structure: “He recognizes one set of emotives for the royal court and 
another set – a very different one – for emotional refuges…Although the venues for such 
refuges were legion…the new emotives within these refuges were all of one type: 
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sentimentalism.”100 Rosenswein multiples Reddy’s binary set of emotives in order to 
conceive “emotional communities” as constellations of shared emotions. Rosenwein’s 
book makes good on her own programmatic article in which she posits a model for 
engaging the neurosciences, which demonstrates that, despite her nuanced difference, she 
shares Reddy’s model: “The physical and mental capacity to have emotions is universal, 
but the ways those emotions are themselves elicited, felt, and expressed depend on 
cultural norms as well as individual proclivities.”101  
 In Passion is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American 
Revolution, Nicole Eustace examines emotives deployed in Pennsylvania from the Seven 
Years War up to the Declaration of Independence. Colonists treated emotions as forms of 
power, she argues, by fixing them to social positions. Cheerfulness was understood as an 
elite emotion, while slaves expressed melancholy. The American Revolution untethered 
emotions to social position, inaugurating a period in which Revolutionaries saw all 
emotions as equally a “basic attribute of humanity.”102 Following Reddy’s program, 
Eustace uses the neurosciences to posit emotions as a distinct social stratum along which 
power is expressed: “if all people have the potential to feel the same emotions, then 
patterns in who expresses what and when and to whom assume real political 
significance.”103    
 As long as historians look to the neurosciences to provide a new historiographical 
paradigm in the wake of the linguistic turn, then it is imperative to avoid the pitfalls of 
reductionism that Leys and Vidal rightly detect. In light of the current trends in 
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historiography, where neurohistory and the history of emotions offer the most formidable 
programs for engaging the neurosciences, it is the latter which promises to advance the 
discipline. Not all historians of the emotions draw on neuroscientific research, nor must 
they; but those who do profit from an enriched account of historical experience drawn 
from thick descriptions of the training and molding involved in emotional life. Scholars 
have pursued this project further in contexts such as the American Revolution104, ancient 
Greece105, and the Protestant Reformation.106 Perhaps some day historians of all 
specializations might adopt the methods advanced by historians of the emotions as one 
historiographical tool among others. But I have no crystal ball. What is clear is that 
historians of the emotions build on the affective neurosciences to deliver an account of 
experience that corrects its diminution under the sway of the linguistic turn, without 




 What I hope to have shown is that the history of scientific spiritualists’ 
constructive engagements with the sciences offers a decisive perspective from which to 
intervene in the current historiographical terrain. What made the spiritualism of 
Bergson’s generation scientific was its willingness, as he wrote, “to take account of the 
biological, psychological, and sociological sciences, and on this broader base construct a 
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metaphysics that can go higher and higher through the continual, progressive, and 
organized effort of all philosophers, in the same respect for experience.”108 The dilemma 
of reductionism, I have tried to show, ought to be matched by historians’ renewal of their 
distinct disciplinary methods from within the neurosciences. Thus historians might not 
simply borrow from the prestige of the neurosciences, but surpass their research program 
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